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1 
 
Introduction 
 
1 The main objectives of the dissertation 
The process of European integration has a deep impact on the constitutional and political 
systems of the member states of the European Union. The development of the EU and its legal 
order has led to reconsiderations and adjustments of many traditional legal notions and 
doctrines as well as brought shifts in the institutional setting and balance within the respective 
states. In this sense, discussions over the winners and losers of the integration process among 
the national institutions have emerged.1 Based on this discussion, it has been argued that the 
greatest winners are the executive power, above all national governments, with their increasing 
decision-making power2 and the national ordinary courts of lower instances which have 
benefited significantly from the development of EU law.3 Then again, national parliaments and 
constitutional courts, as the argument goes, are the national institutions which are the greatest 
losers of the integration processes in Europe.4 This latter conclusion has been slightly adjusted 
in regard to national parliaments since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, as arguably, their 
status was strengthened by providing them with specific roles in the EU through treaty 
provisions.5 Nevertheless, the dominant perception of constitutional courts has remained 
unaltered, they are on a steady track of an institutional demise as a result of European 
integration.  
                                                          
1 See for instance Klaus H. Goetz and Simon Hix (eds), Europeanised Politics? European Integration and 
National Political Systems (Frank Cass 2001); Robert Ladrech, Europeanization and National Politics (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2010). 
2 See the seminal work of Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics 
and International Cooperation’ (1994) Working Paper Series 52, Center for European Studies, Harvard University; 
Klaus Dieter Wolf, ‘The New Raison d’Etat as a Problem for Democracy in World Society’ (1999) 5 European 
Journal of International Relations 333, 335-339; Klaus H. Goetz and Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, ‘The 
Europeanisation of national political systems: Parliaments and executives’ (2008) 3 Living Reviews in European 
Governance available at: http://www.europeangovernance-livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2008-
2/download/lreg-2008-2Color.pdf last visited 15.10.2018; and Ladrech (n 1) 44-70. 
3 On the empowerment of national ordinary courts Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: 
The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (OUP 2001) 45-52; Michal Bobek, ‘The Impact of the 
European Mandate of Ordinary Courts on the Position of Constitutional Courts’ in Monica Claes, Maartje de 
Visser, Patricia Popelier and Catherine Van de Heyning (eds) Constitutional Conversations in Europe (Intersentia 
2012) 288ff; Marta Cartabia, ‘Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously’ 5 European Constitutional Law 
Review 2009, 28, Monica Claes and Bruno De Witte, ‘Role of National Constitutional Courts in the European 
Legal Space’ in Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmayan and Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds) The Role of 
Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012) 90; and Ladrech (n 1) 114-120. 
4 Philipp Kiiver, The National Parliaments in the European Union: A Critical View on EU Constitution-Building 
(Kluwer 2006) 71ff, Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels (eds) National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe: 
Losers or Latecomers? (Nomos 2001); Maja Kluger Rasmusen, ‘The Empowerment of Parliaments in the EU 
Integration: Victims or Victors?’ in Jack Hayward and Rüdiger Wurzel (eds.) European Disunion: Between 
Sovereignty and Solidarity (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 99-114; Aleksandra Maatsch, ‘Empowered or 
Disempowered? The Role of National Parliaments during the Reform of European Economic Governance’ (2015) 
MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/10, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies; and Ladrech (n 1) 71-90. 
5 See for instance Katrin Auel and Thomas Christiansen, ‘After Lisbon: National Parliaments in the European 
Union’ (2015) 38 West European Politics 261-281; Rasmusen (n 4) 110-112. 
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Scholarly contributions entrenching this perception have been multiplying lately. The accounts 
have ranged from constitutional courts as the most disparaged branch,6 through the 
marginalization,7 disempowerment8 and displacement of constitutional courts as a consequence 
of the case law of the CJEU,9 to a creeping loss of their relevance (Bedeutungsverlust) in light 
of the increasing supranationalisation of national law.10 Consequently, according to these 
accounts, as a result of this situation and this sort of status of constitutional courts in Europe 
these institutions have eventually been forced to become the “brakeman” (Bremser)11 of the 
integration processes in order to protect their own institutional interests. These accounts are 
justified and supported by a common line of reasoning which puts emphasis on the ever 
increasing scope of EU law as a result of which it is entering core national constitutional areas 
and the CJEU’s constantly growing role and power that inevitably leads to the overshadowing 
of constitutional courts’ role in general. The latter essentially occurs as a result of the 
development of the fundamental principles of EU law, such as primacy and direct effect, which 
displace national constitutional law12 and accordingly national constitutional courts. 
While these accounts might come as very reasonable and intuitive, part of a realist approach 
even,13 they give rise to serious dilemmas which somehow linger throughout the years. 
Namely, how can it be that constitutional courts, which are the youngest among the central 
national institutions and which have been perceived as a fundamental part of ‘new 
constitutionalism’,14 are already under such an existential threat? Is it possible that while 
constitutional courts are claimed to be “the only truly novel institution within the parliamentary 
                                                          
6 Maria Dicosola, Cristina Fasone and Irene Spigno, ‘Foreword: Constitutional Courts in the European Legal 
System After the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-Crisis’ 16 German Law Journal 6, Special Issue, (2015) 1317, 
1317 -1320. 
7 Marta Cartabia, ‘“Taking Dialogue Seriously”: The Renewed Need for a Judicial Dialogue at the Time of 
Constitutional Activism in the European Union’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/07 available at: 
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/071201.pdf last visited 15.10.2018; .see Elias 
Deutscher and Sabine Mair, ‘National constitutional courts in the European constitutional democracy: A Reply to 
Jan Komarek’ (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 801, 802, Davide Paris, ‘Constitutional 
Courts as Guardians of EU Fundamental Rights? Centralised Judicial Review of Legislation and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 389, 390ff. 
8 Siniša Rodin, ‘Back to the Square One – the Past, the Present and the Future of the Simmenthal Mandate’ in 
Jose Maria Beneyto and Ingolf Pernice (eds.) Europe’s Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case 
Law of National Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011) 315; Bobek (n 3) 288ff; and for a claim of a “gewisse 
Erosion der Zuständigkeiten” see Barcyak 30-31. 
9 Jan Komarek, ‘National constitutional courts in the European constitutional democracy’ (2014) 12 International 
Constitutional Law Journal 525, 527; and Jan Komarek, ‘The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU’ (2013) 9 
European Constitutional Law Review 420, 428-444. 
10 Christoph Schönberger, 'Anmerkungen zu Karlsruhe' in Christoph Schönberger et al (eds) Das entgrenzte 
Gericht: Eine kritische Bilanz nach sechszig Jahren Budensverfassungsgericht (Suhrkamp 2011), 57; and Franz 
Merli,‘Umleitung der Rechtsgeschichte‘ (2012) 20 Journal für Rechtspolitik 355, 359-360. 
11 Thomas Giegerich, ‘Zwischen Europafreundlichkeit und Europaskepsis – Kritischer Überblick über die 
bundeverfassungsgerichtliche Rechtsprechung zur europäischen Integration’ (2016) Zeitschrift für 
Europarechtliche Studien 1/2016 3, 47. 
12 Dieter Grimm, Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford University Press 2016) 281. 
13 Bobek (n 3) 288. 
14 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford University Press 2000) 
37-38. 
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systems of Western Europe”15 and one of the most important institutions in the democratization 
process of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe16 are losing their 
relevance only after a couple of decades since their establishment?  Are they truly marginalized 
and without any significant influence if the EU and its member states anxiously await 
constitutional court decisions every time these might challenge EU law and its fundamental 
doctrines? Could constitutional courts be in a demise at the same time we speak of a global 
spread of constitutional review? 17 Are constitutional courts in Europe actually on the rise while 
falling? 
Constitutional courts have been established as pivotal institutions of the centralized model of 
constitutional review originally developed by Hans Kelsen in the early 20th century for the 
purpose of remedying the obvious practical shortcomings of the traditional understanding of 
the organization of state power and the doctrine of separation of this power.18 Accordingly, one 
of the main aims of constitutional courts has been to safeguard the centrality and supreme 
authority of constitutions by ensuring that the exercise of public authority by institutions is in 
compliance with the constitution. Therefore, they are specially designed and uniquely placed 
between law and politics in fulfilling their institutional purpose. Their successful track-record 
has brought to a rapid spread of the centralized model of constitutional review across Europe, 
and abroad, under which most of the member states of the EU today have constitutional courts 
as part of their constitutional systems. This proliferation of constitutional courts has led to the 
claim of the ongoing rise of constitutional courts.19  
Being a rather novel institution amidst already well-established ones, constitutional courts, 
from early on, have constantly been subject of both internal and external challenges in securing 
their authority. The former challenges have been posed by other national institutions whose 
authority has been influenced through the establishment of constitutional courts, and the latter 
by the internationalization and supranationalisation of the national legal orders. In this sense, 
constitutional courts are somehow by creation predetermined and required to become resistant 
to such challenges to their authority and endowed with instruments which enable them to 
organically adapt to the new developments and circumstances. It is exactly this process of 
                                                          
15 Helmut Steinberger, ‘Historic Influence of American Constitutionalism upon German Constitutional 
Development’, in Louis Henkin and Rosenthal (eds), Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United 
States Constitution Abroad (Columbia University Press 1990) 199. 
16 Marek Safjan, ‘Central and Eastern European Constitutional Courts’ in Michal Bobek (ed) Central European 
Judges Under the European Influence (Bloomsbury 2015) 375-379; Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts: A 
Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe (Springer 2nd edition 
2014) xvi; and Laszlo Solyom The ‘Role of Constitutional Courts in the Transition to Democracy’ (2003) 18 
International Sociology 133-161. 
17 Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Global Spread of Constitutional Review’ in Gregory A. Caldeira, R. Daniel Kelemen and 
Keith E. Whittington (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2008) 81 
18 Hans Kelsen, ‘Who Ought to be the Guardian of the Constitution?’ in Lars Vinx (ed.) The Guardian of the 
Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 
2015) 174-221; and Hans Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the 
American Constitution’ (1942) 4 The Journal of Politics 183. 
19 Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A European Perspective (Yale 
University Press 2009) 3; Victor Ferreres Comella, ‘The Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts’ in Tom 
Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 265-277; and Tom 
Ginsburg, ‘The Global Spread of Constitutional Review’ in Gregory A. Caldeira, R. Daniel Kelemen and Keith 
E. Whittington (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2008) 81. 
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continuous adaptation of constitutional courts to the supranationalisation of national legal 
orders resulting from the broadening scope and authority of EU law, and as well as the 
increasing influence of the CJEU and their role in the process of European integration, which 
is the main subject of interest in this dissertation. 
Against the paradoxical backdrop created on the one hand by the debate over constitutional 
courts’ demise in light of European integration, and the proliferation and rise of constitutional 
courts in Europe and abroad, on the other hand, this dissertation aims at explaining this 
conundrum by providing arguments through an interdisciplinary approach for a role of 
constitutional court as a “constructive corrective force” in the EU.20 Even though counter-
intuitive at a first glance, or argued by some to be an idealist approach,21 the main thesis is that 
not only are constitutional courts not ‘falling’ but rather they are on the ‘rise’ through the self-
established three new roles in the EU, previously not foreseen in any of the respective 
constitutions.22 First, as result of their particular deliberative nature constitutional courts 
represent the most adequate interlocutor of the CJEU in the national realm through which 
judicial exchange, direct or indirect, constitutional courts provide EU law with constitutional 
legitimacy. Second, constitutional courts through their power of identity review protect the 
constitutional identity against encroachment by EU law. Third, assuming the EU is a neo-
federal structure, constitutional courts represent the most appropriate institutions to safeguard 
the division and exercise of competences in the EU through their ultra vires review. 
Furthermore, these new roles and powers of constitutional courts encompass three very 
important aspects of the relationship between constitutional courts and the CJEU, and 
accordingly with EU law. They have to do with the procedural aspect of providing 
constitutional legitimacy to EU law through judicial dialogue, the substantive aspect of 
protecting constitutional identity, and the jurisdictional aspect of safeguarding the vertical 
division and exercise of competences in the EU. In exercising these new roles constitutional 
courts need to take into due consideration also the interests of the EU legal order and the 
possibly broad negative effects of their decisions in order to represent a genuine constructive 
corrective force.      
Accordingly, while it cannot be denied that the supranationalisation of the national legal orders 
definitely has a certain influence on the position and status of constitutional courts, it certainly 
has not caused their displacement, marginalization or creeping loss of relevance. Instead of 
talking of a loss of relevance, Bedeutungsverlust, it could be said that there is change of 
relevance, Bedeutungswandel, under which constitutional courts are assuming new roles and 
powers, which seem to be far more ‘realist’ than the claim of their demise.23 Therefore, this 
                                                          
20 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and 
after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) European Law Journal 262, 292. 
21 Bobek (n 3) 287-288. 
22 The most illustrative manifestation is to be seen in FCC, Case 2 BvE 2/08 Lisbon Decision, judgment of 30 June 
2009 para. 241: “also conceivable, however, is the creation by the legislature of an additional type of proceedings 
before the Federal Constitutional Court that is especially tailored to ultra vires review and identity review to 
safeguard the obligation of German bodies not to apply in individual cases in Germany legal instruments of the 
European Union that transgress competences or that violate constitutional identity. “ See also on this Herbert 
Bethge, in Theodor Maunz, Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Franz Klein, Herbert Bethge et al., 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz: Kommentar Band 1 (54th edition C.H. Beck 2018) 72. 
23 But cf Bobek (n 3) 288ff. 
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dissertation aims at profoundly restructuring the way in which the place and role of 
constitutional courts in the EU is being approached and comprehended. 
The stance of constitutional courts towards EU law and their relationship with the CJEU are 
issues that have been on the scholarly radar of many academics since the first encounters of 
constitutional courts with EU law. There is a significant amount of academic work devoted to 
this topic, however, rarely has this work taken into proper consideration the special nature of 
constitutional courts or their specific institutional features in the EU context.24 The focus has 
too often been narrowed down to decisions of constitutional courts which involve EU law 
providing partial accounts, above all, on whether these decision are pro-European or not, 
without truly engaging with the specificities of these institutions and therefore more general 
perspectives of national constitutional law have somehow been given a secondary 
importance.25 In this sense, constitutional courts have been mainly perceived in terms of 
conflict and struggle for power and not in terms of their potentially constructive role. One could 
easily get the impression that constitutional courts have been portrayed as conservative and 
traditionalist institutions interested in preserving national sovereignty at the expense of further 
integration in Europe.26  
On the other hand, the EU institutions have also kept turning the blind eye towards the special 
nature of constitutional courts which might be another reason why EU law scholars have 
mirrored this stance in their academic work. Most importantly, the CJEU has continuously 
overlooked and neglected the particular status and role these institutions play in national 
constitutional systems thus tacitly denying constitutional courts’ potentially constructive role 
in European integration.27 Additionally, it is worth noting, as another confirmation of EU’s 
indifference towards constitutional courts, that also within the EU enlargement process led by 
the European Commission not a single negotiating chapter devoted to the rule of law even 
mentions constitutional courts, not to speak of engaging with any standards related to them 
                                                          
24 Among the few works discussing these features see for instance Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmanyan and 
Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds) The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2013); 
Anneli Albi, ‘From the Banana Saga to a Sugar Saga and Beyond: Could the Post-Communist Constitutional 
Courts Teach the EU a Lesson in the Rule of Law?’(2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 791; or Jan Komarek, 
‘The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 420. 
25 Anneli Albi, ‘An Essay on How the Discourse on Sovereignty and on the Co-operativeness of National Courts 
Has Diverted Attention from the Erosion of Classic Constitutional Rights in the EU in Monica Claes, Maartje de 
Visser, Patricia Popelier and Catherine Van de Heyning (eds) Constitutional Conversations in Europe (Intersentia 
2012) 41-42. 
26 See for instance strong criticism of the FCC over its Lisbon decision in Daniel Halberstam and Christoph 
Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu Deutschland!”(2009) German Law Journal 1242, Frank 
Schorkopf, ‘The European Union as An Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe’s Ruling of the Treaty of 
Lisbon’ (2009) German Law Journal 1220, Christoph Schönberger, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones 
At Sea’ (2009) German Law Journal 1202, but compare this to Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro 
Livina, ‘ Why Constitutional Identity  Suddenly Matters: A Tale of Brave States, a Mighty Union and the Decline 
of Sovereignty’ in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Livina (eds) National Constitutional Identity and 
European Integration (Intersentia 2013) 14. There were also negative accounts over FCC’s OMT reference, for 
instance see Franz C. Mayer, ‘Rebels Without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s 
OMT Reference’ German Law Journal (2014) 111; and Mattias Kumm, ‘Rebel Without a Good Cause: 
Karlsruhe’s Misguided Attempt to Draw the CJEU into a Game of “Chicken” and What the CJEU Might Do 
About it’, (2014) German Law Journal 203. 
27 See for instance Paris (n 7) 404-405. 
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within the accession negotiations.28 In this manner, it is demonstrated, wrongly, that there is 
no place for constitutional courts in the European integration and they have no role to play. 
Different from such a stance of the EU institutions, constitutional courts of CEEC, for instance, 
have played a vital role in promoting EU values and respect of EU law even in the period prior 
to the accession of these countries in the EU.29  
In this regard, analyzing the three new roles this dissertation draws attention to the specific 
features of constitutional courts through which they are distinguished, above all, from the 
ordinary judiciary and argues for the special role and place of constitutional courts in the EU. 
It is argued that these institutions have an added value in the European integration through their 
institutional particularities and political sensibility that could hardly be provided by any other 
national institution. Member states with established constitutional courts tend to have more 
influence and impact on the legal integration in the EU as they have more possibilities in 
contributing to the debate and development of EU law. Nevertheless, this certainly does not 
mean that one should completely and unreservedly support what constitutional courts in Europe 
have been doing so far. As a matter of fact, by analyzing the new roles there is a critical note 
also on the manner in which constitutional courts have coped with the external challenge of 
supranationalisation and recommendations and guidelines are made for further adjustments of 
their approach. Serious concerns are raised over the stance of the CJEU towards constitutional 
courts as well, with the basic aim to provide for a more fertile ground for a mutual contribution 
of both the CJEU and constitutional courts in the development of the common European legal 
space. These recommendations and guidelines are strongly advocating the readjustment of the 
traditional doctrines and notions which have proven to be unable to cope with the current 
complex reality existing in the EU. Namely, the vertical relationship between the legal or 
constitutional orders in the EU cannot be perceived through traditionally entrenched 
hierarchical models but rather reflect the reality of heterarchy. 
In view of that, the theoretical framework through which the new roles of constitutional courts 
are analyzed here is based on the theory or theories of constitutional pluralism.30 As a theory 
on the exercise of judicial power under circumstances of competing claims of constitutional 
authority in the EU, constitutional pluralism provides theoretical basis for analyzing the 
institutional dimension of the heterarchical relationship between the legal orders. In essence, 
this theory focuses on the relationships between a plurality of institutional normative orders 
with a functioning constitution where none of these orders can claim a comprehensive 
constitutional superiority over the others and at the same time these orders have to be led by 
                                                          
28 This has been the case in all of the previous cycles of enlargement. See for instance Christian Boulanger, 
‘Europeanization through Judicial Activism? The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Legitimacy and the “Return 
to Europe”’ in Wojciech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota and Martin Krygier, Spreading Democracy and the Rule of 
Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist 
Legal Orders (Springer 2006) 274. Even under the new-approach to EU Enlargement negotiations from 2012 there 
is nothing on constitutional court in the so-called rule of law negotiating chapters, 23 and 24. 
29 Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Solange, Chapter 3: Constitutional Courts in Central Europe - Democracy - European 
Union’ (2008) 14(1) European Law Journal 1, 1-4; and Safjan (n 16) 375-379. 
30 For more on constitutional pluralism see Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek, Constitutional Pluralism in the 
European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012); Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), ‘Four Vision of Constitutional 
Pluralism’, EUI Working Paper Law 2008/21; and Klemen Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU, (OUP 
2014). 
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the principles of accommodation and mutual respect in avoiding legally unresolvable 
conflicts.31 By providing such an account of the state of play in the EU, constitutional pluralism 
serves as the most appropriate alternative,32 in both a descriptive and normative sense, to the 
traditional doctrines on the relationship between legal orders, monism and dualism. Therefore, 
each of the new roles of constitutional courts is viewed through the prism of constitutional 
pluralism that helps devise recommendations and guidelines which would best serve the 
constructive role of constitutional courts in the European integration. In this manner, 
constitutional pluralism is being placed in an institutional context, within which constitutional 
courts’ relationship with the CJEU has a central spot, and thus receives a more practical and 
tangible connotation instead of a mere high level of abstractness that often characterizes it.    
2 The methodology of the research 
There are several clarifications that need to be presented which concern the methodology of 
the research presented in this dissertation. They are intended to fend off the possible legitimate 
objections on behalf of the approach and methodology. 
Generally speaking, the research heavily relies on both theoretical as well as empirical 
methods. This is the direct result of the overarching goal of this dissertation not to represent a 
purely theoretical discussion and analysis but also to offer conclusions which would be 
applicable in practice. The methodology is dominantly based on a comparative and an 
interdisciplinary approach which cover diverse aspects and theories concerning the subject of 
interest, the role of constitutional courts in European integration and their institutional 
relationship with the CJEU. The empirical method is based on the analysis of the relevant case 
law of, above all, constitutional courts but also the CJEU, that sheds light on the relationship 
between these two institutions and helps determine the role of constitutional courts in the EU. 
There is one important caveat which needs to be addressed and clarified when speaking of the 
methodology. The most serious objection which could be raised against the methodology and 
approach taken here is its selectivity. However, there are convincing reasons that justify the 
selectivity present in this work. The scope of this dissertation is not ambitiously set in exploring 
the complete case law of all constitutional courts of the member states of the EU and the 
respective academic contributions on this very same case law. Such a task of a completely 
exhaustive overview would require far more time and resources which is currently beyond the 
capacity of the author. In this regard, there is an obvious need of picking and choosing which 
would not be randomly done but rather in a methodologically supported manner. 
First, the scope of the research is limited to constitutional courts in a strict sense. This means 
that, unlike some other scholars,33 the research does not include other judicial institutions 
tasked with constitutional review such as courts having constitutional jurisdiction or ordinary 
                                                          
31 Neil MacCormick, Questioning sovereignty (OUP 1999) 104. 
32 Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism – some doubts’ in Grainne de Burca 
and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2011) 8. See also Dana 
Burchardt, Die Rangfrage im Europäischer Normenverbund: Theoretische Grundlagen und dogmatische 
Grundzüge des Verhältnisses von Unionsrecht und nationalem Recht (Mohr Siebeck 2015) 30-32. 
33 Monica Claes, The National Court’s Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart 2006) 391ff. 
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courts pronouncing on constitutional issues. The latter two are part of the ordinary judiciary 
and do not share the institutional specificities, related particularly to design and purpose, of 
constitutional courts. The very fact that a certain judicial institution conducts constitutional 
review does not suffice in this regard.  
Second, there is no specific case study as seen through a constitutional court of a particular 
member state. Taking into considerations that there are discrepancies and differences in many 
respects between the respective constitutional courts, it is a very difficult task to select a case 
study that would be representative for all or even most of constitutional courts in the EU. 
Therefore, this dissertation employs a “middle-level abstraction”34 applied to constitutional 
courts in general, focusing solely on their common features, and hence develops more general 
recommendations and guidelines flexible enough to apply to all constitutional courts. In this 
manner, national constitutional specificities are left aside in order to avoid missing the wood 
for the trees. In this process, though, slightly more attention is placed on the most influential 
constitutional court: The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. This is only due to the 
coherent and comprehensive doctrine that this court has developed in regard to EU law and the 
CJEU so far, especially compared to most of the other constitutional courts in Europe. 
Third, there is also a certain selectivity when it comes to the relevant case law of constitutional 
courts. Namely, the relevance of the case law is based on their impact and influence on the 
doctrines and principles of EU law as well as on the relationship of constitutional courts with 
the CJEU. Thus not every case before the constitutional courts involving EU law is equally 
important in this sense. Additionally, the relevance is also supported by the academic interest 
and the level of their presence in scholarly contributions.  
Fourth, there is a very important substantive aspect of this selectivity. Among the new roles of 
constitutional courts analyzed here the important role of fundamental rights protection is not 
included. Most importantly, contrary to the three new roles, fundamental rights review already 
exists as part of the constitutional powers and jurisdiction of most constitutional courts and 
thus this role and review power, as result of EU law, is only extended to external sources of 
law. Accordingly, it does not represent a new role for constitutional courts and it is not only 
related to the EU. Moreover, the fundamental rights protection in Europe today is shared among 
several judicial instances, ordinary courts, constitutional courts, ECtHR and CJEU. In this 
sense, including this power of constitutional courts would substantially broaden the scope of 
this dissertation which is focused on their role in European integration. 
3 The structure of the dissertation – roadmap 
The dissertation consists of six chapters and a conclusion. The first two chapters are intended 
to set the stage for analyzing the role of constitutional courts and hence they are rather 
descriptive. Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the constitutional courts in the EU by 
discussing the main reasons behind their establishment and diffusion, their specific institutional 
features through which both differences and common features among constitutional courts are 
                                                          
34 Corando Hübner Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy (OUP 2013) 5-9. 
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presented and the internal struggles for establishing their authority. Chapter 2 continues with 
the external challenges of constitutional courts as seen through the process of 
supranationalisaiton of the national legal orders as result of the European integration. The focus 
here is placed on the evolution of the stance and relationship of these institutions with EU law 
and the CJEU by classifying the main approaches in researching this relationship and detecting 
the main substantive meeting points and points of contention. The last section of this chapter 
provides an analysis of the, arguable, decentralization of constitutional review and whether the 
empowerment of ordinary courts in the aftermath of Simmenthal II35 and its progeny has led to 
the disempowerment of constitutional courts.   
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework of the research. It represents an important part of 
the dissertation as in each of the subsequent chapters this framework is employed in order to 
determine and analyze the new roles of constitutional courts. The theory of constitutional 
pluralism is at the center of this chapter which provides a thorough theoretical outline of the 
general common features of this theory in the context of the EU and its main advantages and 
shortcomings. Taking into consideration that constitutional pluralism has various theoretical 
currents three versions of constitutional pluralism of the most renowned authors, Neil 
MacCormick, Miguel Maduro and Mattias Kumm, are presented in detail. 
All of the remaining chapters are dealing specifically with each of the three new roles of 
constitutional courts in the EU. They represent the substantive core of this dissertation. Chapter 
4 goes into the deliberative nature of constitutional court as one of their particular institutional 
features including the specificity of the constitutional discourse and their role in the judicial 
dialogue in Europe. The latter represents an important institutional avenue through which 
constitutional courts provide constitutional legitimacy to EU law which is the first new role of 
constitutional courts in European integration. In this vein, constitutional courts’ new role is 
perceived from its procedural aspect, that is through the judicial dialogue. This chapter in 
essence argues for the special role of constitutional courts in different forms of the judicial 
dialogue with the CJEU and their added value and unique contribution in this communicative 
arrangement in Europe.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the second new role of constitutional courts to protect constitutional 
identity in the EU that reveals a more substantive dimension. The central point of this chapter 
is Article 4(2) TEU which triggered the more intense development of the role of constitutional 
courts as guardians of the respective constitutional identity thus representing a sort of bridging 
mechanism between constitutional courts and the CJEU. Accordingly, this chapter provides a 
detailed analysis of this important provision, then turns to the relevant case law of constitutional 
courts related to the safeguard of constitutional identity using this provision as a sword or a 
shield in the EU context and lastly presents the main weaknesses and advantages of their stance 
in order to present a way forward which would facilitate a more constructive corrective role of 
these institutions. 
                                                          
35 CJEU, Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (Simmental II), Judgement 
of 9 March 1978, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49. 
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Chapter 6 draws on the jurisdictional aspect of the third new role of constitutional courts. 
Namely, it argues for a particular role of these institutions in safeguarding the vertical division 
and exercise of competence in the EU coining another name for the ultra vires review, the 
external federal mandate of constitutional courts. The chapter actually revolves around this 
latter notion and justifies it by conducting a theoretical analysis of the theory of federalism and 
proposing a new framework through which the EU needs to be perceived in this regard, neo-
federalism. Then it detects the main shortcomings of the political and, above all, judicial 
safeguards of the division of competences in the EU by looking at the notions of conferral of 
powers, subsidiarity and proportionality. In the end, it promotes an adjustments of the 
substantive and procedural elements of the ultra vires review that would prevent excessive 
centralization of powers in the EU while at the same time not jeopardizing the effectiveness 
and unity of EU law.    
At the end a summary of the main arguments and recommendations will be presented in the 
conclusions. It will shed light on how this dissertation has managed to fulfil its main objectives 
by arguing for the rise of constitutional courts through the three new constructive roles and 
why that is good for the process of European integration and for the further development of EU 
law.     
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Chapter 1 
Constitutional Courts of the Member States of the European 
Union 
 
1 Introduction 
Nothing in early 20th century Europe, with a constitutional landscape and legal and political 
discourse dominated by the notions of parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional monarchy, 
suggested that a newly born institution specialized for constitutional review could become such 
a successful institutional novelty.1 The success of the brainchild of Hans Kelsen,2 who first 
envisaged a specialized constitutional body for constitutional review called constitutional court 
in the Constitution of Austria in 1920, was not swift and immediate. The ‘triumph of [this] 
idea’3 and ‘the rise of constitutional courts’4 took several decades and waves of establishment 
before a large number of the states in Europe founded these institutions with their respective 
constitutions. This model of constitutional review through constitutional courts, also known as 
the European model, based on its successful track record, has come to be a very frequent feature 
of the institutional design, even though not indispensable, not only in Europe, but also in other 
continents.5 As a matter of fact, even in countries which have deeply rooted tradition of 
opposing constitutional review, such as the Netherlands, there are ongoing debates over the 
possible introduction of a constitutional court or at least a form of constitutional review.6 
                                                          
1 See for instance, Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe 
(University of Chicago Press 2000) 3, terming constitutional courts “strange new institutions”; Helmut Steinberger 
claims constitutional courts are “the only truly novel institution within the parliamentary systems of Western 
Europe” (see Helmut Steinberger, ‘Historic Influence of American Constitutionalism upon German Constitutional 
Development’, in Louis Henkin and Rosenthal (eds), Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United 
States Constitution Abroad (Columbia University Press 1990) 199, quoted in Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for 
Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (University of Chicago Press 2000) 18-19. In regard to the 
German context, Alfred Grosser argues that the Federal Constitutional Court is the “ohne Frage originellste 
Institution des deutschen Verfassungsgefüges”, see Alfred Grosser, Die Bonner Demokratie, Deutschland von 
draußen gesehen (K. Rauch 1960) 115. 
2 See for instance Hans Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the 
American Constitution’ (1942) 4 The Journal of Politics 183; Hans Kelsen, ‘On the Nature and Development of 
Constitutional Adjudication’ in Lars Vinx (ed.) The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt 
on the Limits of Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 22; Hans Kelsen, ‘Who Ought to be the 
Guardian of the Constitution?’ in Lars Vinx (ed.) The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt 
on the Limits of Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 174. 
3 Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A European Perspective (Yale 
University Press 2009) 3. 
4 Victor Ferreres Comella, ‘The Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts’ in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon 
(eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 265-277; and Comella (n 3) 3. 
5 See for instance Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases 
(Cambridge University Press 2003); and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional Courts in East Asia’ in Tom Ginsburg 
and Rosalind Dixon (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law in Asia (Edwar Elgar 2014) 47. 
6 Gerhard van der Schyff, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and South Africa (Sprigner 2010); Jan ten Kate and Peter J. van Koppen, Judicialization of Politics 
in the Netherlands: Towards a Form of Judicial Review’ (1994) 15 International Political Science Review 143; 
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But why has an institution which is not an indispensable part of the institutional setting of all 
European states reached such prominence and approval? What is this idea behind constitutional 
courts which triumphed despite all criticism? Are constitutional courts conducting a legislative 
or judicial function, political or legal? Is there truly one single model and design of 
constitutional courts or are there diversities which result from the necessary adaptations 
required in different countries?  
These and many other questions are frequently posed and occupy the academic debate on 
constitutional courts. In this sense, this first chapter aims to briefly discuss different aspects of 
the establishment, role and function of constitutional courts in Europe. It will, on the one hand, 
show the common features of constitutional courts across Europe but also, on the other hand, 
the existing diversity among these institutions. All these aspects of constitutional courts will 
be analyzed in three sections. The first section discusses the birth of an idea of establishing 
constitutional courts and the creation of two different models of constitutional review, 
decentralized and centralized, in order to reveal the main reasons and factors that led to the 
introduction of specialized institutions for conducting constitutional review in Europe. The 
second section focuses on defining constitutional courts through their main institutional 
features and characteristics. In this sense, constitutional courts will be distinguished from other 
judicial bodies, part of the ordinary judiciary, which are also endowed with the power of 
constitutional review. Specific features of constitutional courts – such as their institutional 
design, function and powers, appointment and tenure of constitutional justices, effect of their 
decisions as well as certain procedural aspects such as the access to the court – will be 
discussed. The third section is devoted to presenting and deconstructing the main objections 
and challenges to constitutional courts in national constitutional systems. These are often 
manifested through the constitutional court’s relationship with the legislative institutions as 
well as the ordinary judiciary and the sort of institutional struggle between them which has 
raised doubts over the appropriateness of the existence and function of constitutional courts. 
At the end, a conclusion will summarize the main arguments.   
2 The birth of an idea of establishing constitutional courts and the two models of 
constitutional review 
2.1 Reasons behind the initial establishment of constitutional courts  
The ‘quest’ of adopting an immutable and stable legal rule which would codify the basic values 
of states and societies has been ongoing for a very long time. In this sense, the notion of a 
written constitution, as a higher law through which the political power and its exercise would 
be legally framed, and the subordination of, above all, statutory provisions to it, has its roots 
very deep in history.7 However, the quest for introducing a judicial safeguard for the supremacy 
and respect of constitutions could be said to be of a relatively more recent date.  
                                                          
Leonard F. M. Besselink, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in the Era of Globalisation: the Netherlands in 
Comparative Perspective’ (2012) 18 European Public Law 231; Gerhard van der Schyff, Constitutional Review 
by the Judiciary in the Netherlands: A Bridge Too Far? (2010) 11 German Law Journal 275. 
7 Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Clarendon 1989) 117-131. 
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Constitutional review understood as ‘the power of courts to strike down incompatible 
legislation and administrative action’8 has been first incorporated by the U.S. Supreme Court 
with the renowned decision in Marbury v. Madison in 18039 and thus marked the beginning of 
modern constitutional review.10 By convincingly reasoning on the supremacy as the defining 
feature of a written constitution as well as determining the role of judges in saying what the 
law is, the U.S. Supreme Court in this decision had introduced the first model of constitutional 
review which is usually named as the decentralized or diffuse model of constitutional review:11 
Decentralized because, in the U.S. as well as the other constitutional systems which have 
incorporated this type of review, all ordinary courts have the power of reviewing the conformity 
of statutory provisions with the constitution in the course of their regular duties.12 
This sort of jurisdiction of ordinary judges to conduct judicial review did not arise ‘out of the 
blue’. On the contrary, belying the often existing impression, the idea of constitutional review 
in the U.S. could be traced to earlier doctrines and the role of judges in the former English 
colonies in America and in the United Kingdom overall.13 Thus, ‘more than a century of 
American history and a strong line of precedents – to say nothing of contemporary writings – 
stood behind’14 the decision of U.S. Supreme Court and the establishment of the decentralized 
model of constitutional review. 
A rather similar evolutionary path could also be recognized in the case of the second model of 
constitutional review which occurred much later. The so-called centralized model of 
constitutional review through constitutional courts was based on the same overarching ideas 
and aimed to fulfil similar goals which were gradually further developed in the European 
context.15 The centralized model of constitutional review is characterized by ascribing 
constitutional review of legislation as an exclusive power to only one specially established 
institution, a constitutional court. From a historical perspective the centralized constitutional 
review developed as a reaction to the perceived shortcomings of the decentralized model in the 
U.S.,16 but even more importantly, as a result of the unsuccessful attempts of its introduction 
                                                          
8 Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Global Spread of Constitutional Review’ in Gregory A. Caldeira, R. Daniel Kelemen and 
Keith E. Whittington (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2008) 81; also 
quoted in Maartje de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Hart 2014) 53. 
9 Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also on this Michel Troper, ‘Marshall, Kelsen, Barak 
and the constitutional fallacy’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 24; Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis 
Michael Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, Mark V. Tushnet and Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law (6th edition 
Wolters Kluwer 2009) 29-42. 
10 Simon (n 1) 15. 
11 De Visser (n 8) 94. 
12 Cappelletti (n 7) 133-136. 
13 Cappelletti (n 7) 130; and Ginsburg (n 8) 82-83. However, this was also the case in France prior to the French 
Revolution; on this see more on this Michel Troper, ‘The Logic of Justification of Judicial Review’ (2003) 1 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 103. 
14 Cappelletti (n 7) 131. 
15 For more on this generally see Louis Favoreu, ‘Constitutional Review in Europe’, in Louis Henkin and 
Rosenthal (eds), Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad (Columbia 
University Press 1990) 38; excerpts taken over in Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet (eds) Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Foundation Press 1999) 459-464. On specific issues, for instance, on the similarities and 
differences over the notion of supremacy between Marshall and Kelsen see Troper (n 13) 103-109 and on the 
common trait of negative experience with parliamentary sovereignty see Comella (n 3) 11.  
16 More on this in Favoreu (n 15) 464-466; and Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics 
in Europe (Oxford University Press 2000) 33, 40. On the Italian experience with decentralized review, see Vittoria 
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and application in Europe under the existing circumstances in the 19th and early 20th century.17 
Therefore one might argue for a certain level of historical continuum in the development of an 
idea of constitutional review and the supremacy and guarantees of the constitution. Namely, 
even before the establishment of the first constitutional court, there were attempts in certain 
European states to adapt the U.S. decentralized model by limiting the review only to the highest 
judicial instances, that is, through a form of centralization of the decentralized model of 
constitutional review.18 However, the success of these adaptations of the decentralized model 
of constitutional review did not even come close to the one achieved in the United States. As 
result of these developments and certain instances of serious failures of the existing model of 
separation of powers in continental Europe inherited from the French Revolution, Hans Kelsen 
and other scholars after him elaborated several reasons for the introduction of a new institution 
termed a constitutional court.19 The main goal of these institutions would be to guarantee the 
respect of the constitution from all public authorities not only from its procedural but also from 
a material aspect, that is, its content.20 In this manner the constitution would no longer be 
perceived solely as a mere political document subject to the discretion of the political 
institutions21 but rather as the highest or basic legal norm of the country which should be 
characterized through its supremacy.22 This task of constitutional review could not be entrusted 
to ordinary courts but rather to a special constitutional body which would be outside of the trias 
politica23 because of several reasons related to legal certainty, expertise and democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
                                                          
Barsotti, Paolo G. Carozza, Marta Cartabia and Andrea Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global 
Context (Oxford University Press 2016) 11-12. 
17 Cappelletti (n 7) 141, and ideals of 18th and 19th century, John E. Ferejohn, ‘Constitutional Review in the 
Global Context’ (2002) 6 Legislation and Public Policy 52; and Ginsburg (n 8) 84. However, to avoid confusion 
there are also successful examples that need to be stressed such as the Swiss example. See for instance Cappelletti 
(n 7) 133. On other examples see for instance, Allan Randolph Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative 
Law (Cambridge University Press 1989) excerpts in Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet (eds) Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Foundation Press 1999) 477-478; and de Visser (n 8) 95-95. 
18 See for instance Cappelletti (n 7) 134; Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: 
A Comparative Law Study (Cambridge University Press 2011) 13-14; and Favoreu (n 15) 462-466. 
19 Kelsen today is commonly referred to as the father of constitutional courts; however, similar ideas were 
elaborated before him by several authors, and some institutions served as precedents, such as the ideas of Georg 
Jellinek as well as some examples of abstract review in some South American countries since late 19th century. 
For more on this see Comella (n 3) 3; Cristoph Bezemek, ‘A Kelsenian Model of Constitutional Adjudication: 
The Austrian Constitutional Court’ (2012) 67 Zeitschrift für öffentlisches Recht 115, 117; and Manfred Stelzer, 
The Constitution of the Republic of Austria: A Contextual Analysis (Hart 2011) 176-177. 
20 Hans Kelsen, ‘On the Nature and Development of Constitutional Adjudication’ in Lars Vinx (ed.) The Guardian 
of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2015) 28-29. 
21 Cappelletti (n 7) 186; Christoph Möllers, ‘Pouvoir Constituant-Constitution-Constitutionalisation’ in Armin 
von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds) Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edition Hart 2010) 171-
173; Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches: A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers (Oxford University 
Press 2013) 127-128; and Dieter Grimm, ‘Types of Constitutions’ in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds) 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 115ff. 
22 Favoreu (n 15) 465. 
23 Comella (n 3) 14-15, quoting Allan Randolph Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (CUP 1989) 
118-119; Besselink (n 6) 232; but cf Simon (n 1) 27, quoting Möllers, argues that: “Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 
ist Teil der Gewaltengliederung, es steht nicht über ihr”, Christoph Möllers, ‘Dogmatik der grundgesetzlichen 
Gewaltgenliederung’ (2007) 132 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 493, 531. 
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2.1.1 Legal certainty 
Constitutional courts would be able to deliver higher level of legal certainty than ordinary 
courts in conducting constitutional review. This is mainly the result of the absence of the 
doctrine of stare decisis or the principle of precedent in civil law countries such as most of the 
European ones.24 Additionally, the organization of the judiciary in most of the European 
countries is characterized by lack of unity of jurisdiction25 and thus is based on the division of 
labor between separate judicial structures having jurisdiction either over civil and criminal or 
over administrative matters. These separate judicial structures have different supreme courts 
on top.26 Bearing this in mind, situations in which one court would declare a certain statute 
unconstitutional while the other would hold it constitutional could easily occur because there 
is no single supreme court at the apex of the judiciary.27 This does not mean that legal certainty 
would collapse in civil law countries which have incorporated the decentralized model. 
However, as a result of the limitations of the civil law system, constitutional courts could offer 
a better safeguard of legal certainty. This would result from an exclusive power of 
constitutional courts to invalidate unconstitutional legislative acts with erga omnes effect 
instead of just setting them aside and disapplying them only in individual cases, which is 
actually the power ordinary courts have in the decentralized model.28  
2.1.2 Expertise 
The claim goes that ordinary judges in civil law countries, who are career judges, lack the 
expertise for the highest level of abstract legal reasoning required by constitutional review 
which often involves complex analysis of normative and policy considerations.29 Such an 
assumption on the lack of expertise is also the result of the deeply entrenched distrust towards 
the judges, especially in the aftermath of the French Revolution30 and their function being 
reduced to application of legal syllogism.31 This has been best captured by Montesquieu’s 
understanding of the role of judges as a mere mouthpiece for the law and inanimate beings 
                                                          
24 On the factual relevance of precedents in civil law countries through the existing of a loose hierarchy in the 
organization of the judiciary see Comella (n 3) 22-23 and Stone Sweet (n 16) 146. However, this is not to say that 
the model of constitutional review is preconditioned or determined by the legal tradition or legal system. As a 
matter of fact, there are civil law countries which have also adopted a decentralized model of constitutional review 
and still maintain this model through certain adaptations. For more on this Brewer-Carias (n 18) 15; Favoreu (n 
15) 466-469 and de Visser (n 8) 94-97. 
25 Favoreu (n 15) 465; and Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (Foundation 
Press 1999) 458. 
26 Kelsen (n 20) 40; Comella (n 3) 21; John Bell, Judiciaries within Europe: A Comparative Review (CUP 2009); 
and Favoreu (n 15) 465. 
27 Hans Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American 
Constitution’ (1942) 4 The Journal of Politics 185-186. 
28 Kelsen (n 20) 40-43. It has to be noted, though, that as a result of stare decisis, for instance the decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, represents a binding precedent for future cases. See Comella (n 3) 18; and Jackson and 
Tushnet (n 25) 458. 
29 For more on this see Cappelletti (n 7) 142-146; Comella (n 3) 47; Favoreu (n 15) 465; and Jackson and Tushnet 
(n 25) 457.  
30 Later also, as a result of the democratization of totalitarian regimes, see Andrew Harding, Peter Leyland and 
Tania Groppi, ‘Constitutional Courts: Forms, Functions and Practice in Comparative Perspective’ in Andrew 
Harding and Peter Layland (eds.) Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (Wildy, Simmonds and Hill 2009) 
13. 
31 Cappelletti (n 7) 142-146; and Favoreu (n 15) 459-460. 
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which could not enter into interpretation of the laws, and this should be instead left to the 
legislative power.32 According to such an understanding of the role of judges, there is/was a 
strong emphasis on a manifestation of high level of judicial deferentialism to political 
institutions and public authorities which essentially undermines constitutional review.33 On the 
other hand, the constitutional discourse has a special nature and a relative autonomy as opposed 
to other forms of legal and political discourse.34 This character of the constitutional discourse 
stems from the way in which constitutions are drafted and enacted, often as result of political 
negotiations and compromises.35 In this manner constitutions frequently consist of general and 
open-ended provisions which require further clarification and interpretation. Consequently, the 
relative autonomy of the constitutional discourse draws with it the relative autonomy of 
constitutional review from ordinary courts and other public authorities. In this sense, specially 
designed constitutional courts would better achieve the role of guarding the constitution due to 
their composition with experienced lawyers with different backgrounds and expertise insulated 
from the ordinary judiciary and also from the other two branches whose acts are subject to 
constitutional review.36 This diversity in the composition of the constitutional courts ensures 
that the constitution as both a fundamental political and legal document would not fall into the 
trap of overtly ‘legalistic’ form of reasoning.37 In this manner, constitutional courts would be 
dealing exclusively with constitutional issues as their main task and not incidentally as ordinary 
courts would do in a decentralized system.  
2.1.3 Separation of powers and democratic legitimacy 
Ascribing constitutional review to ordinary judges raises serious objections, taking into 
consideration the understanding of the separation of powers in Europe dominated by the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.38 The most important among these objections is the 
issue of democratic legitimacy as perceived through the counter-majoritarian difficulty.39 This 
objection actually depicts the uneasy relationship between democracy and constitutional 
review as part of constitutionalism which is present in most liberal democracies.40 The counter-
majoritarian character of constitutional review has also been raised in light of the decisions of 
constitutional courts.41 However, constitutional courts through their specific institutional 
features are designed to better tackle the objections than is the case with the ordinary judiciary 
under the separation of powers doctrine.42  
                                                          
32 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (Batoche 2011) book XII chapter 6, 180. On 
the role of judges and a new light on Montesquieu’s interpretation see K.M. Schönfeld, ‘Rex, Lex et Judex: 
Montesquieu and la bouche de la loi revisited’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 274-301.  
33 Harding (n 30) 5. 
34 Comella (n 3) 36-55. 
35 On the notion of relational contracting and its consequences see Stone Sweet (n 16) 44.  
36 Kelsen (n 20) 47-48; and Favoreu (n 15) 459. 
37 Comella (n 3) 46; and Comella (n 4) 269. 
38 Comella (n 3) 11-12; Barsotti et al. (n 16) 235-236; and Ferejohn (n 17) 53. 
39 More on the counter-majoritarian difficulty in the U.S. context see Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous 
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale University Press 1986) 16-23. See also Comella (n 3) 86. 
40 Dieter Grimm, Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford University Press 2016) 215-219.  
41 Comella (n 3) 86-94. 
42 For instance, it is claimed that the centralized model could be subject to control more easily than the 
decentralized model and all of the ordinary courts; for this see Stone Sweet (n 16) 40. 
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Constitutional review in a centralized model involves invalidation of legislative acts which by 
its character is a legislative function. In this manner, constitutional review directly interferes 
with the legislative power.43 The legislative power under the separation of powers scheme is 
reserved solely for the legislative body that in a democracy is the highest representative 
institution of respective citizens who choose their representatives through elections. As a result, 
the legislative function is requiring democratic legitimacy which the ordinary courts in Europe 
do not possess and this makes the case for establishing a constitutional court even stronger. 
Taking this into consideration, the way in which constitutional courts are conceived and 
designed neutralizes these types of objections.44 Perhaps the most important aspect of 
constitutional courts which distinguishes them, for instance, from the self-declared power of 
judicial review of federal law of the U.S. Supreme Court, is that their exclusive power of 
constitutional review is explicitly proclaimed in the constitution.45 Furthermore, the members 
of a constitutional court, different from ordinary judges, are appointed to the court for a limited 
term and through procedures which directly involve the political institutions, the legislative 
and the executive, in providing indirect democratic legitimacy to these courts.46 Additionally, 
while invalidation of legislative acts might be perceived as a legislative function it does not 
represent a creation of new general legal norm strictu sensu by making policy decisions, but 
rather an application and interpretation of constitutional norms while conducting constitutional 
review.47 Lastly, the nature of constitutional courts’ function and the issue of democratic 
legitimacy have their implication also in the procedure of review before constitutional courts. 
Namely, constitutional review in abstracto before a constitutional court could be initiated only 
by a limited number of subjects related to the other three branches of power.48 All these aspects 
of the institutional design of constitutional courts represent a democratic check and at the same 
time refute the objections based on democratic legitimacy.49  
2.1.4 How ‘European’ is the European model of constitutional review? 
These reasons as well as the circumstances related to the constitutional and political system 
common to many states in Europe have contributed to the introduction of the centralized model 
of constitutional review through constitutional courts as special constitutional institutions. 
However, there are authors, especially from Latin America, which strongly rebut the 
uniqueness of this European model of constitutional review, arguing that a centralized model 
of constitutional review existed in Latin America several decades before Hans Kelsen first 
introduced the constitutional court in Austria but later under his influence also around Europe.50 
Nevertheless, there is a wrong assumption behind these arguments which tries to identify the 
process of centralization of the decentralized model with the establishment of constitutional 
                                                          
43 Kelsen (n 20) 45. 
44 Comella (n 3) 95-97. 
45 Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches: A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers (Oxford University 
Press 2013) 141; and Brewer-Carias (n 18) 8. 
46 See for instance, John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe’ 82 
Texas Law Review 2004, 1681; Kelsen (n 27) 187; and Kelsen (n 20) 47-49. 
 187. 
47 Kelsen (n 20) 47. 
48 Kelsen (n 20) 64-68. 
49 Comella (n 3) 95-107. 
50 Brewer-Carias (n 18) 8, 13-14; and Brewer-Carias (n 17) 477. 
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courts outside of the regular judiciary. In several states in Latin America in the late 19th century 
constitutional review was centralized in the highest judicial instances within the ordinary 
judiciary, supreme courts, and not in constitutional courts which makes a significant difference 
especially in light of the main reasons behind the centralized model. Therefore, a distinction 
should be made between courts having constitutional jurisdiction besides their other duties and 
constitutional courts which are entrusted with a monopoly and exclusive jurisdiction over 
constitutional review of legislative acts.51 Accordingly, it can be convincingly argued that 
constitutional courts are the product of constitutional developments that first took place in 
Europe. The initial model was first developed in Austria and Czechoslovakia and was named 
as the Kelsenian model.52 In the aftermath of the Second World War the model was adopted in 
several European states and was further developed through the establishment of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court after which the model is often termed as the Austro-German 
model. However, since constitutional courts were introduced in other European states which 
have opted for features of constitutional courts different from the Austro-German model, the 
centralized model of constitutional review perceived through its common features among all 
constitutional courts generally is referred to as the European model.  
2.2 Factors that determined the diffusion of the European model of constitutional review  
Since the introduction of the first constitutional courts in Austria and Czechoslovakia,53 it took 
several decades for the spread of this institution. The relatively rapid expansion and diffusion 
could be best perceived in Europe where a great majority of states have introduced a 
constitutional court in their constitutional systems. Currently, in the European Union 19 of the 
28 member states have constitutional courts. All seven countries that already set up a certain 
type of legal relationship with the European Union which might prospectively lead to a 
membership have established constitutional courts.54 More broadly, of 47 member states of the 
Council of Europe 33, more than two-thirds of them, have a constitutional court. The European 
model has been a successful exporting constitutional product abroad.55 Constitutional courts 
                                                          
51 Monica Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart 2006) 394-397. One should 
note that there are also so-called mixed or hybrid models such as that in Portugal where, besides the centralized 
model of constitutional review, ordinary courts have the power to enter into constitutional review which in the 
end is sent before the Constitutional court. For more on this see Art. 280 of the Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic and Lucas Prakke and Constantijn Kortmann (eds.) Constitutional Law of 15 EU Member States (Kluwer 
2004) 698. 
52 Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 46) 1676 and Bezemek (n 19) 115. 
53 Comella (n 3) 3, writes that before Second World War, besides these two countries, only Lichtenstein (1921) 
and Spain (1931) had established constitutional courts; Prakke and Kortmann (n 51) 779; Wojciech Sadurski, 
Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Springer 2nd edition 2014) 4; Jiri Priban, ‘Judicial Power vs. Democratic Representation: The Culture of 
Constitutionalism and Human Rights in the Czech Legal System’ in Wojciech Sadurski (ed) Constitutional 
Justice, East and West: Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a 
Comparative Perspective (Kluwer 2002) 373; and Zdenek Kühn, ‘Czech Constitutional Court as Positive 
Legislator?’ in Allan R. Brewer-Carias (ed), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Law 
Study (Cambridge University Press 2011) 446-448. 
54 Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo and Turkey. 
55 Christoph Schönberger, ‚Anmerkungen zu Karlsruhe‘ in Matthias Jestaedt, Oliver Lepsius, Christoph Möllers 
and Christoph Schönberger, Das entgrenzte Gericht: Eine kritische Bilanz nach sechzig Jahren 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Suhrkamp 2011) 44-45. 
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have been diffused to Africa,56 Asia57 and Latin America.58 Thus, Stone Sweet notes that in 
2005 of 135 national systems with a constitutional review 85 had a constitutional court.59 
Bearing in mind the number of countries in Europe and abroad which have already established 
constitutional courts, it should not come as a surprise that we could speak of a global rise of 
constitutional courts.60 
The spread of constitutional courts in Europe occurred in three waves which corresponded to 
the waves of democratization on the continent.61 The first wave was in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War when Austria, Germany and Italy established their constitutional 
courts with their respective constitutions. The second wave took place in the late 1970s when 
Spain and Portugal enacted new constitutions which were supposed to mark a turn towards 
democracy after experiencing military dictatorship and thus introduced constitutional courts. 
The third wave took place in the early 1990s after the collapse of the communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In most of these countries the newly enacted 
constitutions established new institutions,62 constitutional courts.63 It could be observed that all 
three waves came as a reaction to a previous authoritarian experience which further emphasized 
some of the abovementioned reasons for establishment of constitutional courts.64 
                                                          
56 For instance, on the case of Egypt see Tamir Moustafa, ‘Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The 
Judicialization of Politics in Egypt’ in Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (eds), Rule of Law: The Politics of 
Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press 2008) 132; Hienz Klug, ‘South Africa: South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court: Enabling Democracy and Promoting Law in the Transition from Apartheid’ in 
Andrew Harding and Peter Layland (eds) Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (Wildy, Simmonds and 
Hill 2009) 263-288; and Babacar Kante, ‘Francophone Africa: Models of Constitutional Jurisdiction in 
Francophone West Africa’ in Andrew Harding and Peter Layland (eds) Constitutional Courts: A Comparative 
Study (Wildy, Simmonds and Hill 2009) 242-262. 
57 Ginsburg (n 5); and Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, ‘Indonesia and Thailand: The Constitutional Court of 
Thailand and Indonesia: Two Case Studies from South East Asia’ in Andrew Harding and Peter Layland (eds) 
Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (Wildy, Simmonds and Hill 2009) 317-341. 
58 Thomas Bustamante and Evanilda de Godoi Bustamante, Constitutional Courts as Negative Legislators: The 
Brazilian Case in Allan R. Brewer-Carias (ed), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Law 
Study (Cambridge University Press 2011) 283-314; Sandra Morelli, The Colombian Constitutional Court: From 
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Even though an overwhelming majority of states have followed this pattern of establishment 
of constitutional courts, there are three exceptions to this pattern in Europe which could be seen 
through the examples of France,65 Belgium and Luxembourg. In the case of France and 
Belgium, the underlying reason for an establishment of a constitutional court was the control 
over the division and exercise of competences. In the case of France this mainly had to do with 
the horizontal balance of powers and therefore the Conseil Constitutionnel (CC) must 
safeguard the powers of the executive in relation to the legislative. As for Belgium, the 
constitutional court was introduced in light of the newly established federal order with the 
Constitution of 1993.66 In this sense the constitutional court’s main role is to safeguard the 
vertical balance of power within the federation. For the particular case of Luxembourg it is 
interesting to note that it was the judgment of the ECtHR against it which led to the 
establishment of a constitutional court.67  
However, while it is clear that there has been a rapid spread of constitutional courts, it is not 
clear what stands behind this rapid spread and diffusion of constitutional courts, particularly in 
Europe. 
The spread of constitutional courts in Europe, but also abroad, has been determined by several 
factors related to these institutions. The first factor has to do with the institutional adaptability 
of constitutional courts. More precisely, these institutions could be introduced without 
requiring drastic changes in the existing understanding of separation of powers and the 
parliamentary system of government.68 Being placed outside of the traditional trias politica, 
they represent an addendum to the existing institutional setting and in this sense constitutional 
courts do not extensively disrupt the main functions of the other constitutional bodies. 
Accordingly, constitutional courts represent a form of external control and checks over the 
three branches of government and whether they abide by the constitution and respect its 
supremacy.  
Second, constitutional courts proved to be perfectly tailored for fulfilling one of the main tasks 
of the new constitutionalism, the protection of constitutional rights. Even though this task was 
not foreseen initially as part of the powers of constitutional courts in Austria and 
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Czechoslovakia, it was through the prominent example of the FCC that this role of rights 
protection became an important, if not crucial, part of many constitutional courts’ powers and 
role. In this way, the Austro-German model gained its attractiveness which influenced its 
spread and adoption outside of these countries. As the processes of democratization placed 
rights protection at the center stage so did constitutional courts become very suitable 
institutional solutions to existing needs and challenges.69  
Third, it is the “recursive nature of the diffusion process”.70 Successful constitutional ideas tend 
to migrate quite swiftly.71 The speed with which they migrate is determined by the degree of 
their success and positive track record. When it comes to constitutional courts, this has 
definitely been the case, especially based on the success of the FCC. Accompanied by the 
important promoting role of the so-called international rule of law industry,72 constitutional 
courts became an essential element of new constitutionalism and in consolidation of 
democracy. In this manner, the path was paved for the global rise of constitutional courts.73  
Keeping in mind this line of institutional evolution and development based largely on the 
Austro-German model, could one claim that there is a single model of constitutional courts 
based on common institutional design and features or there are several different models of 
constitutional courts? The next section will provide an overview of the common elements and 
feature of the European model of constitutional courts and at the same time it will point out the 
differences that exist between individual constitutional courts.    
3 Institutional features of constitutional courts  
Constitutional courts are special institutions placed outside the ordinary judiciary which have 
an exclusive power, provided for by the constitution, to control the conformity of statutes and 
other legal acts with the constitution.74 Their overarching role is to guarantee the supremacy of 
the constitution and its respect by all three branches of the government. Therefore, they are 
positioned between law and politics, which follows the character of the constitution as both a 
legal and political document, as they are supposed to provide legal answers to political 
questions and conflicts.75 As a direct result of this role and position, they are perceived as 
hybrid institutions which are neither a regular court nor a purely political institution.76 
However, they are said to be both at the same time and thus having a double nature.77 As a 
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matter of fact, Kelsen himself has put this nicely by arguing that a constitutional court “is a 
court from an organizational point of view, is nevertheless, as a result of its function, engaged 
in an activity that makes it into something more than a mere court[…] an organ of legislative 
power”.78 This double nature and specific character of constitutional courts is best manifested 
and perceived through their institutional features. It is exactly through these features that it 
becomes apparent why they are outside of ordinary judiciary and why they are to be 
distinguished from other ordinary courts having constitutional jurisdiction or pronouncing on 
constitutional issues.79  
The institutional features of constitutional courts have been determined to a large extent by the 
reasons behind their establishment. As a result, based on the assumption that in the great 
majority of cases the same reasons stood behind the establishment of constitutional courts, one 
might think that this would determine the existence of one single institutional design for these 
courts based on Kelsen’s original model.80 However, there is a certain level of diversity 
between constitutional courts in different countries through which they diverge from the 
original model. This is quite understandable, as even Kelsen admitted this could easily be the 
case by arguing that “the specific design of the constitutional court will have to adapt itself to 
the peculiarities of the respective constitution.”81 Furthermore, new circumstances brought 
with them additional reasons, such as the rights protection imperative of the new 
constitutionalism, which influenced the institutional features of constitutional courts.82 
Accordingly, one could speak of three different models of constitutional courts in Europe. 
Those models are based on the respective constitutional courts of Germany, Italy and France.83 
However, this does not deny the fact that even among these three models there are common 
institutional features of constitutional courts which distinguish them from ordinary courts. 
These common features are related to the functions and powers, composition and appointment, 
certain procedural aspects and the effects of decision of constitutional courts.84   
3.1 The powers of constitutional courts 
The first common feature of all constitutional courts is their function to conduct constitutional 
review in order to secure the respect for constitutional provisions, above all by the legislative.85 
This finds its reflection in the powers and jurisdiction of constitutional courts. The most typical 
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powers are the abstract review which is almost in all cases accompanied by a procedure of 
concrete review because they manifest the exclusive power of constitutional courts to decide 
on the validity of legislation.86 In this sense, Comella argues that the ‘purity’ of constitutional 
courts is to be perceived through the level of importance that constitutional review plays 
compared to the other functions of constitutional courts.87  
The abstract review is characterized by the fact that it is not related to any prior litigation but 
it represents a review of the legislative act in abstracto, without a direct reference to its actual 
application to a specific case in practice, based on a general claim that an act is not in 
conformity with the constitution.88 Such a review could be initiated by a limited number of 
petitioners89 before and/or after the promulgation of the legislative act. In this sense the abstract 
review could be a priori or a posteriori, preventive or repressive review of constitutionality.90  
In Europe, all countries which have established constitutional courts have also foreseen the 
concrete review procedure along with an abstract review.91 The concrete review represents a 
procedure initiated by the ordinary judiciary through a form of a preliminary reference 
procedure in the course of an ongoing case before them in which the issue of constitutionality 
of a legislative act to be applied in the case is raised.92 In most countries these references are 
sent to constitutional courts if the issue of constitutionality of a legal act is crucial for the 
outcome of the case at hand and if the referring judge(s) has doubts on this constitutional 
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matter.93 In this way, the constitutional court is given an opportunity to conduct a concrete 
constitutional review of legislation in light of its actual application to a specific case before an 
ordinary court. It should be noted, however, that the level of abstractness does not often differ 
between the abstract and concrete review since constitutional courts are not dealing with the 
factual circumstances of the concrete case but only review the constitutionality of the disputed 
legislative act.94 Actually, it is quite possible that a constitutional court has an indirect insight 
into the way a legislative act is being applied even in a case of abstract review.95 Apart from 
certain procedural aspects pertaining to justiciability and self-restraint of courts sometimes 
present in concrete review procedures, the crucial difference between the two types of review 
is when and who can initiate a case before a constitutional court.96 Accordingly, the concrete 
review procedure establishes the link between the constitutional courts and ordinary courts 
through which the latter become involved and play an important, though relatively passive, role 
in guaranteeing constitutionality in the legal system.97  
Besides these most typical powers and forms of constitutional review by constitutional courts, 
there are two other important powers which in the practice of constitutional courts have played 
an important role in entrenching their authority and legitimacy. Both of these functions relate 
to constitutional review and were conceived by Kelsen as a rational part of constitutional 
courts’ powers.98 Those are the power of safeguarding constitutional rights and freedoms by 
constitutional courts through a procedure initiated by individual constitutional complaints and 
the power to decide on institutional disputes over vertical and horizontal division and exercise 
of competences.  
The former is designed to enable constitutional courts to serve as a protector of constitutional 
rights and freedoms. Namely, private individuals have been provided with an additional avenue 
for safeguarding their rights after exhausting all legal and judicial remedies in cases in which 
they believe their rights have been violated by ordinary courts or administration in the course 
of application or interpretation of legal acts. In certain instances, such as in Germany, if the 
private individual’s rights are directly violated by specific statutory provisions then a 
constitutional complaint could be lodged even against the statute itself.99 In this manner, private 
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individuals are granted a standing before the constitutional courts, something that is not the 
case in the previous two forms of review.100 As result, through review initiated by constitutional 
complaints, constitutional courts fulfil one of the basic requirements of rights protection under 
the principles of the new constitutionalism in Europe.101  
While the constitutional complaint procedure has often come to dominate the workload and 
dockets of many constitutional courts, it has also drawn academic debates on its suitability to 
the original idea on the role and position of constitutional courts. Namely, there are certain 
influential authors on the topic, such as Stone Sweet, who argue that by having the power to 
protect fundamental rights constitutional courts inevitably become ‘positive legislators’ and 
thus put their legitimacy in doubts.102 In this manner this added function of constitutional courts 
belies the original reasons and justifications for establishing these novel institutions. This claim 
is supported by the argument that, arguably, even Kelsen has clearly voiced his concerns about 
this by having a critical account on natural legal rules and ideals become a standard of 
constitutional review.103  
However, these claims are not well-grounded, especially when it comes to the ideas behind the 
original design of the powers of constitutional courts. As a matter of fact, Kelsen has never 
explicitly argued for this in light of constitutional rights and freedoms but only for principles 
of natural law representing meta-positive norms which are neither turned into positive law nor 
are clearly defined.104 
“If it is to be prevented, the constitution must, if it appoints a constitutional 
court, abstain from all phraseology of this kind [ideals of ‘justice’, ‘freedom’, 
‘equality, ‘equity’, ‘decency’, and so on]105; and if it wants to put up basic 
principles, guidelines, and limitations for the content of the statutes that are to 
be enacted, it must make sure to determine them as precisely as possible.”106 
Moreover, Kelsen in his article from 1928 has explicitly mentioned the possibility of 
fundamental rights review by constitutional courts, or more precisely, a protection of a legally 
protected interest violated by an individual legal act through an appeal to the constitutional 
court.107 Therefore, it cannot be convincingly argued that rights protection has been conceived 
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only later under the influence of new constitutionalism and that it has not been thought of 
during the initial stages of creation of constitutional courts. In this sense, being ascribed with 
rights protection function does not necessarily turn a constitutional court into a ‘positive 
legislator’. 
Lastly, one needs to point out the second power of constitutional courts which has played a 
significant role for the establishment of constitutional courts and their role in the institutional 
settings of many countries: namely, the power to review the division of powers along both 
vertical and horizontal lines.108 In this sense, constitutional courts have been said to manifest 
their genuine importance in federal states, overseeing the division and exercise of competences 
in the relationship between the central authority and federal units.109 Furthermore, the 
resolution of horizontal disputes has also become a frequent part of constitutional courts’ 
powers.110 The vertical and horizontal competence disputes could reach the constitutional 
courts in a form of both concrete or abstract and positive or negative disputes.111  
While the abovementioned powers of constitutional courts are most frequently part of their 
core functions and purposes, as they occupy the biggest part of cases before these court, there 
are also other powers besides these four. These other constitutional courts’ powers are referred 
to as ‘ancillary powers’112 not because they are generally less important but mainly because 
they do not reflect the main reasons and purposes for the establishment of constitutional 
courts.113 The main reason for ascribing these powers to constitutional courts could be to 
“alleviate the need for the creation of special courts.”114 Among them most common ancillary 
powers are to determine whether political parties are unconstitutional, impeaching senior 
governmental officials, adjudicating elections, examining regularity and constitutionality of 
referendums or certifying states of emergency.115  
3.2 Composition and appointment 
The special character of constitutional courts as institutions and the specificity of their core 
function are also reflected in the composition of constitutional courts and the appointment 
procedure of constitutional justices. Since objections are raised over the need for democratic 
legitimacy required for exercising a legislative function, the institutional features of 
constitutional courts have been designed to tackle these objections through the involvement of 
                                                          
108 de Visser (n 8)155-168; Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 46) 1688-1689; and Sturm and Detterbeck (n 77) paras. 41-
50, 60-78. 
109 Kelsen (n 20) 72-75; de Visser (n 8) 156-163; Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 46) 1676-1677; Möllers (n 45) 131-
134; and Harding (n 30) 9-10. For more on this issue see chapter 6. 
110 de Visser (n 8) 163-168. 
111 On the differences between Belgium, Spain, Italy and Germany see de Visser (n 8) 161-162; on Spain see 
Guillen Lopez (n 99) 545-546; and more generally see Prakke and Kortmann (n 51). For more on these powers of 
constitutional courts see chapter 6. 
112 Ginsburg and Elkins, (n 87) 1431ff. 
113 Ginsburg and Elkins (n 110) 1432. 
114 Kelsen (n 20) 54. 
115 For more on these powers see Ginsburg and Elkins (n 110) 1440ff; de Visser (n 8) 168-184; Bezemek (n 19) 
120-121; Prakke and Kortmann (n 51); Pavlicek and Kindlova (n 91) II-59-62; Iljanova (n 91) V-50; Vaicaitis (n 
91) VI-37-40; Brostl (n 91) IX-29-31; and Mavcic (n 91) X-42. 
27 
 
political or democratic institutions in the appointment procedure.116 Additionally, the diversity 
of the composition of constitutional courts, consisting of highly experienced lawyers capable 
of authoritatively framing political questions into legal frames, can equally be used to rebut the 
democratic objections.117  
Constitutional justices are dominantly recruited from experienced lawyers with diverse 
expertise and backgrounds, usually from the ranks of judges, university professors, lawyers or 
prosecutors.118 The specific requirements and eligibility criteria, such as years of experience in 
practicing or teaching law, certain years of age, or other criteria are usually enlisted and 
specified in constitutions or specific legislation.119 In certain cases, such as in France, Belgium 
or Italy, constitutional justices come also from the ranks of present or former politicians.120 The 
presence of justices with political experience and background does not have to be necessarily 
taken as a negative aspect opposing the perception of constitutional courts as ‘courts’ since 
their insight in the political processes can substantially contribute to the political sensibility 
needed in light of the broad effects and implications of constitutional court decisions.121 
Constitutional justices are appointed for a limited term, most frequently between 9 and 12 
years, and usually without the possibility of reappointment.122 Regulated in this manner, the 
composition of constitutional courts should be able to reflect the dominant views in the society 
on fundamental constitutional values by being, at the same time, independent from the current 
political representatives.123  
The appointment procedures vary across different constitutional courts but in all cases political 
institutions have a say in either nominating or appointing/electing constitutional justices.124 
Generally, the appointment procedures could be classified in three different models.125 The first 
is characterized by the exclusive power of the legislative body both to nominate and appoint 
constitutional justices. The typical example would be Germany where the Bundestag and the 
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121 David Robertson, The Judge as Political Theorist (Princeton University Press 2010); Dominique Rousseau, 
‘The Conseil Constitutionnel confronted with comparative law and the theory of constitutional justice’ (or Louis 
Favoreu’s unatenable paradoxes)’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 40; Comella (n 3) 39-45; 
Rolla and Groppi (n 93) 147; and Ponthoreau and Ziller (n 65) 127-128. 
122 For instance, in Belgium and Luxembourg the justices have a life term, that is, until the mandatory age of 
retirement. On this see de Visser (n 8) 218; and Prakke and Kortmann (n 51) 119, 549. In the Czech Republic 
there is the possibility of reappointment. On this see de Visser (n 8) 220 and Sadurski (n 53) 28. For more on this 
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123 Schlaich and Korioth (n 77) 7, 28; and Kommers and Miller (n 118) 3. 
124 Stone Sweet (n 16) 46-49; and Schwartz (n 1) 42. 
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1682, they distinguish three but they call them monocratic, majoritarian and super-majoritarian. 
28 
 
Bundesrat each appoint half of the members of the FCC with a qualified majority.126 The 
second model is also known as the collaborative model, under which the legislative and 
executive branch collaborate in the appointment procedure. In countries which have adopted 
this model, there are different modes of collaboration depending on how the stages of the 
appointment procedure are allocated such as nomination and election/appointment between the 
two branches. For instance, in Belgium the parliament nominates the candidates while the 
government selects the future constitutional justices from the list of nominees.127 However, in 
the Czech Republic the president nominates the candidates for constitutional justices to the 
Senate, the upper house of the Parliament, for approval.128 The third model is characterized by 
the allocation of quotas to different institutions for appointment of constitutional justices. This 
means that constitutionally designated institutions separately appoint a specified number of 
constitutional justices. For instance, this is the case129 in Italy where the president, the 
Parliament in a joint sessions and the senior courts (Cassazione, Consiglio di Stato and, Corte 
dei conti) can each appoint five justices.130  
3.3 Standing 
The exclusive power of constitutional courts to invalidate legislative acts has ramifications on 
certain procedural aspects. One of the most important procedural aspects which distinguishes 
constitutional courts from other ordinary courts is the question of standing especially when it 
comes to abstract review.131 It is particularly the abstract review procedure which most 
precisely depicts the specific nature of the function of constitutional courts, which is legislative 
in essence, and raises the issue of public interest132 that requires a particular rule on the actors 
which could initiate a case. Introducing a possibility of having an actio popularis would be 
irrational not only in light of the broader interest that an invalidation of statue raises but also 
for a more pragmatic reason of shielding the constitutional court from an overflow of 
unfounded challenges.133 Therefore, a common procedural feature among constitutional courts 
is to limit the standing for the abstract review to public institutions, such as the parliamentary 
opposition, the parliamentary speakers, the president, the government, authorities of federal or 
regional units, the ombudsperson and other public institutions.134 Taking into consideration 
                                                          
126 Werner Heun, The Constitution of Germany: A Contextual Analysis (Hart 2011) 169-170; Gerd Sturm and 
Steffen Detterbeck, ‘Art. 94: Bundesverfassungsgericht, Zusammensetzung und Verfahren’ in Michael Sachs (ed) 
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made more collaborative than through allocation. On this see de Visser (n 8) 208. Spain has a similar model of 
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131 Harding (n 30) 9; Schlaich and Korioth (n 77) 84-85; Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, Andras Sajo and 
Susanne Baer, Comparative Constitutional Law (2nd edition West 2010) 168; Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 46) 1682-
1691; and Comella (n 3) 7-8. 
132 Kelsen (n 27) 193; Schwartz (n 1) 28-33; and Kelsen (n 20) 67. 
133 Kelsen (n 20) 64-65. 
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that often the hearings before the constitutional courts are public, these institutions as well as 
the representatives of the ones which have enacted the impugned act have the opportunity to 
voice their concerns and present their arguments concerning the (un)constitutionality.135 As a 
direct result of these restrictive rules on standing in an abstract review the proceedings before 
a constitutional court represents another forum for deliberation of political issues through 
constitutional and legal arguments thus reflecting the specific character of constitutional 
courts.136  
3.4 Legal effects of decisions 
The reasons relating to legal certainty have been part of the traditional justifications for the 
establishment of constitutional courts and ascribing them with the exclusive power of 
constitutional review. Thus both the need for legal certainty as well as the monopoly over 
constitutional review has directly determined the effects of constitutional courts’ decisions as 
one of the main institutional features. As a result of the fact that in civil law systems there is 
no stare decisis or any formal principle of precedents, constitutional courts’ decisions 
invalidating a legal act are final and they have an erga omnes effect.137 This means that there 
is no possibility of appealing their decision and they are applicable not only to the case at hand 
but to all cases, future or past, depending on the extent of retroactivity of decisions. Even in 
cases brought to the constitutional court through a concrete review procedure, constitutional 
courts’ decisions are to be applied also to all other cases which involve the same legislative 
act.138 Such an effect of constitutional court decisions declaring a legislative act invalid is 
because such an act of invalidation has a legislative character and in this sense it is the interest 
not only of the party which initiates the proceeding but also of the broader public interest.139 
When it comes to the temporal effect of decisions, there is a difference between ex tunc and ex 
nunc effect of decisions.140 In the former type of decisions the effects take place from the 
moment of the promulgation of the unconstitutional legal act and spread to the annulment of 
legal effects that the unconstitutional act has caused, while for the latter the decision of 
                                                          
135 Comella (n 20) 61. 
136 Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 46) 1680. 
137 Kelsen (n 27) 187, “the decision of constitutional courts which invalidates a statute due to its unconstitutionality 
have the same character as a statute.” See also de Visser (n 8) 312; Schwartz (n 1) 23; and Dorsen et al. (n 131) 
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of a legal act within a concrete constitutional review which generally are binding only for the court that has made 
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Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Law Study (Cambridge University Press 2011) 728. 
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effect. On this see Rolla and Groppi (n 93) 149-151; and de Visser (n 8) 314-315. 
138 Understandably, there are certain limitations when it comes to res judicata. On the specific case of Italy see 
Rolla and Groppi (n 93) 145; and Visser (n 8) 312-313. 
139 Kelsen (n 27) 193; and Kelsen (n 20) 67.   
140 Initially on the extent of retroactivity of constitutional courts’ decisions see Kelsen (n 27) 199. He claimed that 
constitutional court decisions should have an ex nunc effect with a limited retroactivity only to the case in the 
course of which the question of constitutionality was raised. However, this is the case only for the ACC; for 
instance, see Stelzer (n 19) 202. When it comes to other countries there are different rules on the temporal effect. 
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invalidation has its effect from the moment of its publication.141 Nevertheless, not a single 
constitutional court has incorporated a pure form of either of these temporal effects. As a result 
the practice across Europe varies depending on the manner in which the temporal effect of 
constitutional courts’ decisions has been precisely regulated.142 From the early days of the 
establishment of constitutional courts they have found ways in which they would mitigate in 
certain cases the effect of their decision in order not to compromise legal certainty.143 In any 
case, the effects of constitutional courts’ decision are clearly distinguished from those of 
ordinary courts which are characterized by inter partes effect.   
4 The struggle of constitutional courts in establishing their authority 
Constitutional courts have been introduced as novel institutions into a traditionally organized 
institutional set-up in which the authority of other branches had already been established. 
Accordingly, they had to struggle for their authority and recognition within this set-up and 
since the very beginning faced challenges from other institutions. These challenges came from 
all three branches, but particularly from the legislature and judiciary with which constitutional 
courts are linked through their main powers and functions.144 On the one hand, due to the 
legislative nature of constitutional review, especially with the abstract review, constitutional 
courts have been characterized as a third or second legislative chamber which extend the 
legislative process with another stage of constitutional reading.145 On the other hand, through 
the concrete review and individual constitutional complaints, constitutional courts established 
a direct link with the judiciary that enhanced the constitutionalization of the legal systems. This 
latter process has, however, partly transformed the traditional role of ordinary courts and 
therefore led to occasional conflicts and obstructions.146 Nevertheless, these challenges and 
struggles do not necessarily have to be perceived negatively but rather as an unavoidable part 
of the constitutional dialogue within new constitutionalism.147 It should be noted, however, that 
these constitutional dialogues are merely enhanced and not introduced or established by the 
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constitutional courts since they exist also in states which do not have them. In this sense, both 
the judicialization of politics and the constitutionalization, and through it politicization,148 of 
the judiciary and legal systems are not the direct consequence of the establishment of a 
constitutional court because these tendencies have been part of a broader phenomenon of 
expansion of judicial power, generally, and the centrality of fundamental rights and 
freedoms.149  
4.1 Constitutional courts and parliaments 
In the relationships between constitutional courts and parliaments, there are three main points 
of contention. These contentions are understandable taking into consideration that constitutions 
place constraints on political institutions, legislative and executive, which constitutional courts 
are supposed to implement and protect from the parliamentary majority.150 In other words, the 
main object of constitutional review are legislative acts.  
The first contention is related to the legislative nature of constitutional review and the 
abandonment of the traditional doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. The function of 
constitutional courts has been famously described as that of a negative legislator151 under which 
they decide only on the validity of legislative acts. In this sense, constitutional review comes 
at a later stage in which political decisions have already been made and thus constitutional 
courts are reviewing only whether these decisions are consistent with the constitution or not.152 
However, it cannot be denied that the border between a negative and positive legislator is 
blurred, and constitutional courts occasionally cross it which raises concerns over interference 
with the legislative power.  
This argument is usually based on an overemphasized distinction between law and politics, 
despite their obvious relation, which classifies legislation as ‘political’ since it involves the 
process of creation of general norms and denies constitutional courts this sort of function.153 
However, the reality is a more complex than this. Just as Kelsen has argued, application of law 
necessarily involves its interpretation which could also represent a form of creation of law.154 
Consequently, courts in general are also involved in a form of ‘political’ function, creation of 
law, the main difference between legislation and adjudication being the level of discretion 
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available to courts as well as the effects of their decisions. When it comes to constitutional 
courts, this is even more pronounced.155 More specifically, it has to be taken into consideration 
that constitutional courts are strictly bound by the constitution in their decisions and not by 
political considerations or interest, generally they cannot initiate judicial proceedings on their 
own;156 however their decisions have an erga omnes, that is, general effect. Based on the latter 
it could be argued that constitutional courts practice a ‘political’ function; however, this should 
not be exaggerated. Invalidation of legislative norms could also be perceived as an application 
of constitutional norms and thus not as creation of law. On the other hand, even ordinary courts 
could be perceived as being involved in the process of creation of law, even though through 
individual and not general norms.157 In this sense, constitutional courts are definitely involved 
in creation of law through interpretation of constitutional provision.158 In any case, courts lack 
the power to determine political goals which is one of the main differences between their 
function and legislation.159 Accordingly, if one focuses on the effects of constitutional court 
decisions rather than the grounds on which constitutional courts support their decisions as well 
as the character of the process and proceedings taking place before them, one could claim that 
constitutional courts exercise a legislative function in its general sense.160 However, Klaus 
Stern has argued, essentially reflecting the hybrid character of constitutional courts, that:  
“In der Rechtkonkretisation wächst der Gerichtsbarkeit naturgemäß ein 
schöpferisches, ein rechtsbildenden und –fortentwickelndes, d. h. ein wertendes 
und rechtsgestaltendes Element zu. Das mag man politisch nennen; aber es ist 
in einem ganz anderen Sinne politisch als das Handeln des Gesetzgebers oder 
der Regierung; denn es ist am vorgegebenen Rechtsmaßstab orientiert, es bleibt 
stets rechtimmanent, ist nur ‘punktuell’, nicht generell rechtserzeugend, ist 
Urteilslogik, nicht Gesetzlogik.”161 
Following on Stern’s argument, regardless of the ‘political’ character of their main function, 
constitutional courts are designed to be independent from both the legislative and executive 
power162 and also for this purpose are legally obliged to act as courts notwithstanding the 
specificities of constitutional courts.163 Just as Ferejohn and Pasquino put it, “a constitutional 
court exercises legislative or normative power “in a judicial form”… in making its normative 
(norm-producing) decision operates under constraint that are typical of judicial bodies and that 
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differentiate them from a “legislative” legislator, the parliament.”164 After all, they are not 
called courts and tribunals for no reason.  
The second contention has to do with the disputed democratic legitimacy of constitutional 
courts’ involvement in the legislative process.165 Constitutional courts have not only been a 
negative legislator, but have very often, through the interpretation of constitutional and legal 
norms, taken the role of positive legislators.166 Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that 
the lack of democratic legitimacy has been raised as an issue. Nevertheless, apart from the 
democratic checks of constitutional courts through their constitutional underpinning and 
institutional features,167 their legitimacy could also be result-driven and thus needs to be viewed 
through the results they produce.168 As a matter of fact, constitutional review can contribute to 
the legitimacy of the democratic system as a whole by protecting and furthering the basic social 
consensus such as the safeguarding of fundamental rights and rule of law in general.169 In this 
sense, the control exercised over the legislative as well as the overall political competition by 
legally framing political conflicts in order to protect the basic social consensus from the 
parliamentary majority is definitely not anti-democratic.170 Additionally, and taking into 
consideration the circular nature of law, there are instruments which enable the legislative to 
invoke a constitutional override of constitutional courts’ decisions to invalidate a legislative 
act which in turn decreases the force of the democratic legitimacy objection.171 Therefore, the 
notion of the last word in the context of constitutional courts should definitely not be taken in 
absolute terms.172  
Lastly, the third contention has to do with the so-called judicialization of politics173 which has 
arguably resulted from an extensive influence of constitutional courts in the legislative process. 
Accordingly, it is claimed that this has the effect of constraining the political deliberation 
within the legislative process, as political actors need to take constitutional issues into 
consideration and anticipate possible invalidations on constitutional grounds.174 Even though 
this argument is frequently employed it is not totally convincing in negatively portraying this 
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decisions as examples of the ICC as a positive legislator see Rolla and Groppi (n 93) 151-153. 
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tendency. Namely, the process of judicialization of politics is not solely the result of the 
establishment of constitutional courts but rather of a broader phenomenon of the global 
expansion of judicial power and thus is present also in countries without a constitutional 
court.175 Furthermore, the judicialization is also the result of the delegation of authority by the 
constitutions to constitutional courts within the framework of ‘relational’ contracting.176 This 
latter notion sees the creation of constitutions as a process of contracting which consists of 
reaching complex comprises where the basic goals and objectives are agreed upon while other 
details are left rather under-clarified.177 As a result, constitutions delegate authority to 
constitutional courts not only by directly determining their powers but also through broad and 
open-ended provisions, as is a frequent feature of these legal documents, which thereby invites 
their further interpretation and concretization.178 The disagreements over the constitutional 
issues will thus be often referred to constitutional courts which in turn will tend to increase 
their influence.179 In this sense, the role of constitutional courts as well as the process of 
judicialization is something that is the direct consequence, though not always expected,180 of 
the institutional choices made by the constitutional drafters and constitutional assemblies or 
parliaments.181  
However, the judicialization argument is just one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is 
the politicization of the judiciary as seen through the anticipation by constitutional courts of 
the potential impact of their decisions and development and practice of political sensibility, 
particularly in certain cases with great political leverage. Once again, such a politicization is a 
natural and logical companion of constitutional courts’ functions and practice and should not 
be negatively perceived if kept within certain limits.182 They are obliged in this sort of practice 
because their judicial activism could backfire and their legitimacy might be put on the line due 
to possible rejections and non-compliance which constitutional courts cannot directly 
oppose.183 In this manner, it could be observed that the influence between constitutional courts 
and parliaments goes both ways. 
Taking all this into consideration, it cannot be convincingly argued that constitutional courts 
have jeopardized the position of the legislative even though the influence cannot be denied. On 
the contrary, constitutional courts have proven to serve as a constitutionally authorized check 
on the political institutions, particularly important in states which have had experience of a 
drastic form of tyranny of the political majority. Occasional frictions between constitutional 
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courts and parliaments could thus in most cases be perceived as a constructive addition to the 
ongoing constitutional dialogue.184  
4.2 Constitutional courts and ordinary judiciary 
According to the original design of constitutional courts it had been inferred that through their 
introduction a strict dual structure of jurisdiction had been put in place distinguishing between 
application and interpretation of a constitution conducted by constitutional courts, on the one 
hand, and application and interpretation of statutes conducted by ordinary courts, on the 
other.185 However, such a strict separation of jurisdiction is not sustainable especially in light 
of the powers of constitutional courts creating a direct link with the ordinary judiciary. In this 
sense, the concrete review procedure opened the possibility for ordinary courts to initiate a 
constitutional review and the individual constitutional complaints somehow created the 
perception of constitutional courts being placed above the ordinary judiciary. Namely, 
individuals through their complaints can in certain instances directly challenge ordinary court 
decisions for alleged infringement of their fundamental rights. In this way, constitutional courts 
become a sort of constitutional appellate court, or last instance courts on constitutional 
matters.186  
Nevertheless, this procedural aspect of the relationship between constitutional and ordinary 
courts had been soon accompanied by a substantive aspect which caused a greater challenge to 
the position of ordinary courts. This has to do with a phenomenon termed constitutionalization 
of the legal system which occurred through three interrelated developments.187  
First, in line with the requirements of the new constitutionalism constitutions were entrenched 
as the supreme law of the countries. As a result of the character of constitutional provisions, 
constitutional courts’ case law gained importance due to the fact that the proper comprehension 
of the constitutions required taking this case law into serious consideration, especially with the 
growing tendency of direct application of constitutional norms.188 Second, the constitutions, 
particularly through their fundamental rights provisions and their increasing horizontal effect, 
permeated almost all areas of the legal system.189 This has made the viability of a strict dual 
jurisdictional structure ever more difficult.190 Third, through this penetration of constitutional 
law, ordinary courts are required to take into consideration the case law of constitutional courts 
and use constitutional doctrines – such as proportionality for instance – in ordinary 
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possibility of appeal to this court in specific cases not related to the fundamental rights. For more on this see 
Article 280 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic and Prakke and Kortmann (n 51) 698 
187 On a different reading of constitutionalization as “the process by which a body of formal law becomes an 
effective source of limits on state power and government actors”, see Law (n 173) 384; and Schlaich and Korioth 
(n 77) 13-14. 
188 Bartole (n 158) 410-412. 
189 Ponthoreau and Ziller (n 65) 136; Stone Sweet (n 16) 114-115; and Michelman (n 185) 286, “constitutional 
colonization of private law.” 
190 Comella (n 4) 273. 
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adjudication. This has led to the broadening of the politicization of the judiciary to ordinary 
courts since they also need to adopt a form of politicized legal argument which is practiced by 
constitutional courts in applying and interpreting the constitution.191 However, not only is the 
argument politicized but it is the constitution that is judicialized since it can be directly applied 
in ordinary adjudication.192  
As a consequence of this constitutionalization of the legal system, constitutional courts 
expanded the field of possible conflicts with the recurrent practice of entering the role of a 
positive legislator. With the increasing relevance of constitutional law greater number of 
statutes came to be challenged. Aware of the potential negative impact of frequent invalidation 
of statutes as well as the possible backlash on their legitimacy of such a practice, constitutional 
courts have used different interpretative methods to condition the constitutionality of statutes 
instead of invalidating them.193 As a result, constitutional courts deliver their constitutional 
interpretation of statutes to ordinary courts, that might diverge from the latter’s statutory 
interpretation.194  
Under such circumstances the ordinary courts, particularly the supreme courts, occasionally 
defy constitutional courts and their case law.195 But these frictions need to be understood as a 
natural companion of the centralized constitutional review keeping in mind that constitutional 
courts distort the traditional understanding of separation of powers and the previously 
entrenched position of both political and judicial institutions.196 If frictions occur among 
different structures within the ordinary judiciary, it goes without saying that this is even more 
intensive and frequent between constitutional and ordinary courts. As Garlicki puts it “the 
presence of tensions among the highest courts is systemic in nature.”197 As long as these 
frictions and tensions do not become pure struggles for power198 they should be perceived as a 
constructive aspect of constitutional and judicial dialogue through the existing channels and 
links which would alleviate the possibility of conflicts.199  
In the same manner as in the relationship with the parliaments also in the case of ordinary 
judiciary constitutional courts are not at complete liberty to impose their decisions and 
interpretation. Constitutional courts legitimacy and authority is very much dependent on their 
                                                          
191 Möllers (n 45) 141; and Schwartz (n 1) 5. 
192 Garicki (n 99) 65. 
193 Ponthoreau and Ziller (n 65) 136. See for instance on the importance of different types of decision in the 
relationships with ordinary judiciary Rolla and Groppi (n 93) 150-151. 
194 Garlicki (n 99) 67; and Patricia Popelier, ‘The Belgian Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator: In Search 
of a Balance Between Rights’ Protection and Respect for Acts of Parliament’ in Allan R. Brewer-Carias (ed), 
Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Law Study (Cambridge University Press 2011) 268. 
195 Sadurski (n 53) 35-43; on Germany, Italy and Poland see Garlicki (n 99) 50-63; on France see Ponthoreau and 
Ziller (n 65) 135; on Czech Republic see Priban (n 53) 380-382; on Romania see Renate Weber, ‘The Romanian 
Constitutional Court: In Search of its Own Identity’ in Wojciech Sadurski (ed) Constitutional Justice, East and 
West: Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative 
Perspective (Kluwer 2002) 299-300. 
196 Sadurski (n 53) 38; and Popelier (n 194) 266. 
197 Garlicki (n 99) 63 [reference omitted]. While this is more emphasized in countries with an authoritarian past, 
it is not absent in the others such as France and Belgium. On this see Garlicki (n 99) 64. 
198 Sadurski calls them “war of the courts”. For more on these in the Czech Republic and Poland see Sadurski (n 
53) 38-43. See also Priban (n 53) 381. 
199 Garlicki (n 99) 63; Bartole (n 158) 428; Priban (n 53) 380-381; and Ponthoreau and Ziller (n 65) 137. 
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acceptance which often results from their ‘responsiveness’.200 Thus the greatest threat to their 
authority is not so much the struggle or occasional conflicts which could be also perceived as 
constructive but the disobedience of their decisions by other institutions, above all the 
legislature and the judiciary.201 Put in other words, since constitutional courts do not have the 
power to execute their decisions it is of the utmost importance that they produce legal reasoning 
which will be persuasive not only to other institutions but also to the broader public.202 In this 
way a positive balance is being struck between constitutional courts and other institutions and 
if maintained this balance furthers the basic societal consensus and the values of 
constitutionalism. So far, constitutional courts have stood the test of time in many countries 
and based on their success and authority have become a widely accepted and one of the basic 
pillars of new constitutionalism.  
5 Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide a relatively brief overview of constitutional 
courts as specialized constitutional bodies with the exclusive power to conduct constitutional 
review. Constitutional courts represent one of the most important institutions under the new 
constitutionalism which is often characterized by the existence of a centralized model of 
constitutional review. Discussing constitutional courts in this chapter three aspects were 
covered in detecting the main specificities and characteristics of these institutions. First, the 
main reasons behind establishing constitutional courts are discussed. The establishment of 
constitutional courts was dominantly related to the issues of legal certainty, expertise, 
separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. The witnessed dysfunctionality of the 
traditional understanding and implementation of the principle of separation of powers before 
the Second World War and the existing distrust towards ordinary judiciary and judges 
determined these reasons and paved the way for the introduction of constitutional courts in 
Europe. While these are the reasons that justified the establishment of constitutional courts, 
there are three factors which determined the further spread of these institutions not only in 
Europe but also around the world, thus becoming a widely spread institutional solution for 
guaranteeing constitutionality. These factors have to do with the institutional adaptability of 
constitutional courts to fit within the existing conception of separation of powers, their 
institutional features which enabled them to fulfill one of the key tasks of new 
constitutionalism, fundamental rights protection, and the diffusion process which was 
continuously reinforced through the positive track record of already existing constitutional 
courts. Second, through analyzing the specific institutional features of constitutional courts 
they are distinguished from other judicial bodies, part of the ordinary judiciary, with a 
constitutional jurisdiction. In explaining this distinction, the emphasis is placed on the specific 
aspects of the institutional design such as powers of constitutional courts, the composition and 
                                                          
200 On the importance of acceptance, especially in Germany, see Simon (n 1) 27-28; Heun (n 126) 186; 
Schönberger (n 55) 54; and Bartole (n 158) 420 421, 430-431. For Italy Barsotti et al. (n 16) 35; and Rolla and 
Groppi (n 93) 151. For Romania see Weber (n 195) 298-303. On responsiveness see Law (n 172) 385; and on this 
type of ‘institutional responsiveness’ see Carrick (n 153) 16, 48. 
201 Rousseau (n 121) 42; Stone Sweet (n 16) 90; Grimm (n 40) 216; and Bartole (n 158) 419-421, 430-431. 
202 Rousseau (n 121) 39-41; and Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 46) 1680. 
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appointment of constitutional justices and certain procedural aspects, as well as the effect of 
their decisions. All these institutional features, determined by the same reasons for their 
establishment, enabled constitutional courts to fill the previously existing gap in protecting and 
guaranteeing constitutionality and also tackled some of the new challenges to 
constitutionalism. The third aspect covered in discussing constitutional courts is their 
institutional relationship with the other branches of state power, particularly those directly 
affected by their establishment, that is, the legislature and judiciary. Namely, constitutional 
courts have been introduced into an already existing institutional setting with long-established 
functions and powers of the other institutions. As a result, constitutional courts, in establishing 
and developing their authority and institutional role, are faced with certain institutional 
struggles which have brought to the surface objections and challenges to their position within 
the constitutional and political system. These objections and challenges are mainly related to 
the notions of constitutionalization of the legal order, judicialization of politics and 
politicization of the judiciary. Nevertheless, due to the specific character of constitutional 
courts and the particular nature of their function and role they have managed, in most cases, to 
successfully tackle these objections and further their authority and importance. While these 
internal institutional challenges have been surpassed in most cases, it is to be seen how they 
manage to cope with the new forms of external challenges arising from the ongoing processes 
of internationalization and Europeanization.   
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Chapter 2 
Constitutional Courts Encounter EU Law and the CJEU – Close 
Encounters of the European Kind 
 
1 Introduction 
Constitutional courts in Europe as newly established institutions had a difficult period of 
securing their place within the national institutional structure. They faced many internal 
challenges and obstacles from the already well-established branches of state power in obtaining 
and fortifying their authority. Some of them still face these internal challenges. However, 
simultaneously to the spread of the centralized constitutional review in Europe, constitutional 
courts faced another group of external challenges as seen through the processes of 
Europeanization and internationalization of law. These processes, particularly the former, have 
led to the rapidly increasing influence and importance of judicial instances such as the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) which were and still are perceived as posing a competition or even a threat to the 
position and status of national constitutional courts. In other words, national constitutional 
courts have faced close encounters of the European kind, something that was often not foreseen 
and anticipated during their introduction.1 In this sense, the centralized model of constitutional 
review was suddenly challenged through decentralizing tendencies resulting from the 
overlapping jurisdictional points between national constitutional courts, the ECtHR and the 
CJEU, especially with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the legal binding effect of the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU.2 This has created a judicial triangle in Europe, most 
importantly, on one area which has traditionally been materia constitutionis, namely the 
protection of fundamental rights. However, with the continuous widening of the scope of EU 
law and the blurring of jurisdictional borders between national and EU law, there were also 
                                                          
1 Namely, Hans Kelsen, for instance in Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: ‘A Comparative Study of 
the Austrian and the American Constitution’ (1942) 4 The Journal of Politics 183; Hans Kelsen, ‘On the Nature 
and Development of Constitutional Adjudication’ in Lars Vinx (ed) The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans 
Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 22; Hans Kelsen, 
Who Ought to be the Guardian of the Constitution? in Lars Vinx (ed.) The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans 
Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 174, has 
elaborated in some detail on the relationship between constitutional courts and other national institutions, 
however, understandably to certain extent, neither his work nor the traditional notions of legal and constitutional 
theory have been able to provide accurate answers to the new challenges that surfaced with the development of, 
above all, EU law. On this theoretical elaboration and on the weaknesses and deficiencies of the traditional theories 
see more in Chapter 3. 
2 Jan Komarek refers to this as the ‘rights revolution’. See Jan Komarek, ‘National constitutional courts in the 
European constitutional democracy’ (2014) 12 International Constitutional Law Journal 525, 527; Jan Komarek, 
‘The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 420, 421. But cf. 
Elias Deutscher and Sabine Mair, ‘National constitutional courts in the European constitutional democracy: A 
Reply to Jan Komarek’ (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 801, 802-808; and Jan Komarek, 
‘National constitutional Courts in the European constitutional democracy: A rejoinder’ (2017) 15 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 815, 816-817. 
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overlaps in other significant constitutional areas which became equally important. In this sense, 
constitutional and legal theory was somehow caught unprepared and thus unable to provide 
answers and solutions. This situation in turn brought to an increasing scholarly interest on the 
topic of the relationships between legal orders on different levels as well as that between their 
respective judicial instances which resulted in an abundance of scholarly work covering 
different aspects of these relationships. This work essentially reveals, on the one hand, the 
complexity of this issue and the impact that these recent developments have had on national 
constitutional courts as well as their response to this, and on the other, the dissonance and 
conflicting interpretations among scholars on these very same topics.  
Taking into consideration that this dissertation is focused solely on the role of constitutional 
courts in the European integration, the further discussion, not only in this chapter but also in 
the rest of this work, will deal with the relationship of these institutions with the CJEU and, in 
this manner, generally with EU law. With this hindsight and in order to enter into a serious 
discussion on the topic at hand, one must first examine two issues. First, what kind of 
relationship has been established between the constitutional courts and the CJEU so far? 
Second, what are the implications for the position of constitutional courts within the respective 
national institutional settings brought by the development of CJEU’s case law and EU law in 
general? For this purpose, this second chapter aims to discuss briefly the constitutional courts’ 
stance on the issues related to EU law and their attitude towards the CJEU and its case law by 
covering these two central questions, which will set the stage for a more detailed analysis 
provided in the subsequent chapters of this work.  
The argument in this chapter will further proceed in three sections. The second section will 
provide a short overview of the history between constitutional courts and the CJEU by covering 
the different approaches used to analyze this relationship. Most importantly, this section will 
discuss the main subject areas which served as meeting points but also as areas of contention 
between these institutions and thus determined the different subsequent phases in the evolution 
of this relationship, starting with the fundamental rights protection, the issue of vertical division 
of competences in the EU, and specific national constitutional provisions. 
The third and fourth sections will be devoted to the impact of the CJEU case law on the status 
of constitutional courts and their exclusive jurisdiction and monopoly to conduct constitutional 
review in the respective national constitutional systems. These two sections will cover two 
interrelated aspects of this impact on constitutional courts. More specifically, the third section 
will discuss the decentralizing tendencies that were brought by the Simmenthal mandate3 of 
national ordinary courts, and it will be argued that the decentralizing tendency of the CJEU 
case law has been overstated since such tendencies have been present prior and parallel to this 
development as a consequence of the increasing constitutionalization of the national legal 
order. The fourth section, on the other hand, will discuss the so-called doctrine of displacement 
                                                          
3 CJEU Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (Simmenthal II), 
ECLI:EU:C:1978:49. The phrase of ‘Simmenthal mandate’ is borrowed from Monica Claes, The National Courts’ 
Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart 2006) 69ff. 
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of constitutional courts,4 developed and practiced by the CJEU through its recent case law. 
This section will provide brief analyses on the extent that this doctrine has negatively 
influenced the mandate of constitutional courts. Lastly, a conclusion will summarize the main 
arguments. 
2 Constitutional courts and the CJEU – the story so far 
2.1 Preliminary remarks 
The first pivotal question to be discussed in this chapter is the history and evolution of the 
relationship between constitutional courts and the CJEU and, through this, generally the 
former’s stance towards EU law. This story has been told many times in a great number of 
academic works.5 Therefore, it would be safe to say that there is no student of law which has 
not heard or read about the Solange saga of the FCC6 or the Frontini decision of the ICC7 and 
other significant constitutional court decisions related to EU law. However, amid this tide of 
information there is still a necessity to provide at least a brief overview of this relationship in 
order to set the stage for a more detailed elaboration on this matter. Thus, providing this 
overview is the main aim of this section. Without having an accurate account of the story so 
far one cannot cultivate a constructive vision of the direction in which this relationship should 
develop in future. 
The CJEU has definitely served as a motor and catalyst of legal integration in the EU. The 
fundamental principles and doctrines of EU law were developed by this court in its case law. 
The primacy and direct effect of EU law served a significant role from the initial period in 
fostering further and deeper legal integration in Europe.8 On the other hand, as one of CJEU’s 
main counterparts at the national level, constitutional courts have played a significant role in 
developing doctrines and principles in national law through which EU law has found its 
                                                          
4 Jan Komarek, ‘National constitutional courts in the European constitutional democracy’, 12 International 
Constitutional Law Journal 2014 525, 527ff; and Jan Komarek, ‘The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU’ 
(2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 420, 428-444. 
5 See for instance Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds) The European Court 
and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart 1998); Allan F. Tatham, Central European Constitutional 
Courts in the Face of EU Membership (Nijhoff 2013); Jose Maria Beneyeto and Ingolf Pernice (eds) Europe’s 
Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law of National Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011); 
Aida Torres Perez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (Oxford 
University Press 2009);  Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmayan and Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds) The Role of 
Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012); Sven Simon, Grenzen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts im europäischen Integrationsprozess (Mohr Siebeck 2016); Mattias Klatt, Die 
Praktische Konkordanz von Kompetenzen (Mohr Siebeck 2014); Franz C. Mayer, ‘Multilevel Constitutional 
Jurisdiction’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds) Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart 2nd 
revised edition 2010) 399; Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino (eds) The National Judicial Treatment of the 
ECHR and EU Law: A Comparative Perspective (Europa Law 2010) and many more.  
6 FCC, 2 BvL 52/71 (Solange I) decision of 29 May 1974 and 2 BvR 197/83 (Solange II) decision of 22 October 
1986.  
7 ICC, Judgment 183/1973 (Frontini) of 18 December 1973.  
8 See for instance Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti European Union Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2nd edition 2010) 142-183. 
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appropriate place within the national legal orders of member states.9 The constitutional courts’ 
case law is thus equally important taking into consideration that, besides national constitutional 
provisions enabling and authorizing membership in the EU or international organizations 
generally, there are no other detailed constitutional provisions10 related to the powers of 
constitutional courts or even ordinary courts which regulate the status and effect of EU law 
within the jurisdiction of theses courts and the manner of its application.11 Since constitutional 
powers of constitutional courts do not even mention EU law, this issue is left to be dealt with 
in their case law. Nevertheless, this situation and approach in the domestic legal realm brings 
more flexibility to constitutional courts and the national legal orders in adjusting to legal 
integration in the EU characterized by high levels of dynamism.12 
Just as there are differences between constitutional courts in certain aspects of their powers and 
institutional design,13 there are also some variations among them when it comes to EU law and 
the CJEU.14 Nevertheless, despite these differences, there are common threads also in regard 
to constitutional courts’ attitude towards EU law and the CJEU which have resulted from an 
ever more frequent practice of consulting and invoking decisions of other constitutional courts 
in their reasoning, that is, through horizontal judicial dialogue. As a matter of fact, it could be 
convincingly argued that, judging by the tendencies within the case law of constitutional courts, 
there are certain signs of convergence, particularly as result of the great influence of the FCC. 
Namely, even though not the ‘trailblazer’ when it comes to direct judicial dialogue with the 
CJEU, the FCC has the most elaborate and consistent case law on EU law which has been 
continuously invoked by other constitutional courts.15  
                                                          
9 Monica Claes and Bruno De Witte, ‘Role of National Constitutional Courts in the European Legal Space’ in 
Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmayan and Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds) The Role of Constitutional Courts in 
Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012) 93-94. 
10 On this ‘loud silence’ of national constitutions see Claes and De Witte (n 9) 93. On the classification of these 
type of constitutional provisions see Giuseppe Martinico, ‘National Judges and Supranational Laws: Goals and 
Structure of the Research’ in Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino (eds) The National Judicial Treatment of 
the ECHR and EU Law: A Comparative Perspective (Europa Law 2010) 15-16. The most elaborate exception 
would be the Portuguese constitution which regulates this issue in details something not common among the other 
Member State constitutions. For more on this see Leonard F. M. Besselink, Monica Claes, Sejla Imamovic and 
Jan Herman Reestman, ‘National Constitutional Avenues for Further EU Integration’ (European Parliament 2014) 
246ff and Stefan Griller, Stefan Keiler, Thomas Kröll, Georg Lienbacher and Erich Vranes, ‘National 
Constitutional Law and European Integration’ (European Parliament 2011) 21-22. 
11 Claes and De Witte (n 9) 93-94. 
12 Besselink et al (n 10); and Griller et al (n 10). 
13 For more on this see Chapter 1 section 3. 
14 See more generally in Oreste Pollicino, ‘Conclusions: In Search of Possible Answers’ in Giuseppe Martinico 
and Oreste Pollicino (eds) The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Law: A Comparative Perspective 
(Europa Law 2010) 501-511; Besselink et al. (n 10); and Claes and de Witte (n 9) 81-82. On the difference between 
and Central and East European constitutional courts and West and South European constitutional courts see Marek 
Safjan, ‘Central and Eastern European Constitutional Courts’ in Michal Bobek (ed.) Central European Judges 
Under the European Influence (Bloomsbury 2015) 380; Michal Bobek, ‘Conclusions: Of Form and Substance in 
Central European Judicial Transitions’ in Michal Bobek (ed) Central European Judges Under the European 
Influence (Bloomsbury 2015) 413-414. 
15 Claes argues against this claim: see Monica Claes and Bruno de Witte, ‘Competences: Codification and 
Contestation’ in Adam Lazowski and Steven Blockmans (eds) Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law 
(Edward Elgar 2016) 71-73; and Monica Claes, ‘The Validity and Primacy of EU Law and the ‘Cooperative 
Relationship’ between National Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2016) 26 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 157-163. But cf. chapter 6 section 4.4; Peter M. Huber, 
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Taking this into consideration, there are four common threads among constitutional courts 
which could be recognized. First, constitutional courts have had a reactive approach towards 
the developments of EU law and the CJEU case law. Basically they have been taking a rather 
passive stance and reluctance to engage with EU law, particularly in the first decades of its 
development, and thus have reacted only when there was a major development in the realm of 
EU law that would potentially contradict fundamental constitutional provisions. For instance, 
even though one could argue that the Solange I decision was a proactive step made by the FCC 
that pushed the CJEU to enter into more intensive fundamental rights protection, it seems that 
the underlying intention of the FCC was to place constitutional restraints on the primacy of EU 
law as a reaction to the newly established doctrine.16 Second, from early on constitutional 
courts have recognized the special nature of EU law, emancipated from both international and 
national law, and consequently they accepted relatively quickly the judge-made principles of 
EU law such as primacy and direct effect, as well as the Simmenthal mandate of national 
ordinary courts.17 However, they have never accepted absolute primacy of EU law as promoted 
by the CJEU and have conditioned it with the respect for fundamental constitutional 
provisions.18 Third, even though the status and effect of EU law have been determined by the 
CJEU itself, constitutional courts have continuously insisted, regardless of whether they adhere 
to monism or dualism, that the legal basis for the application of EU law in the respective 
member states is to be found in the national legal order.19 Fourth, constitutional courts with 
few exceptions have not been keen on entering into direct judicial dialogue with the CJEU by 
submitting preliminary references.20  
2.2 Different approaches in analyzing the relationship 
There are several ways in which one could approach the relationship between constitutional 
courts and the CJEU. These three approaches could be recognized based on three different 
aspects of the relationship which are frequently present in the academic writings: the 
procedural, the jurisdictional, and the substantive approach.  
                                                          
‘The Federal Constitutional Court and European Integration’ (2015) 21 European Public Law 83, 90-93; and 
Tatham (n 5). 
16 Andreas Voßkuhle, ‘“European Integration Through Law”: The Contribution of the Federal Constitutional 
Court’ (2017) 58 European Journal of Sociology 145, 147-148. 
17 For a more detailed account see national reports in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (n 5). On the Italian 
exception in which it took some time before the ICC accepted these principles and doctrines see Vittoria Barsotti, 
Paolo G. Carozza, Marta Cartabia and Andrea Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context (Oxford 
University Press 2016) 205-222. On Germany see Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: 
The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press 2001) 80-177, and on France 
157-173; Voßkuhle (n 16)148-150; and Simon (n 5) 55. On the experience of CEE constitutional court see 
contributions in in Adam Lazowski (ed), The Application of EU Law in the New Member States (Asser 2010); and 
Safjan (n 14) 375. 
18 Herbert Bethge, in Theodor Maunz, Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Franz Klein, Herbert Bethge et al., 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz: Kommentar Band 1 (54th edition C.H. Beck 2018) 144; Huber (n 15) 87; and 
Mayer (n 5) 410, 417-420. 
19 Huber (n 15) 86-87; Mayer (n 5) 410; Alter (n 17) 96; and Voßkuhle (n 16) 150. 
20 While BCC and ACC have been rather active from earlier in this regard, this has not been the case for other 
constitutional courts in the EU which have used this occasion in very few cases or in none at all. See Maartje de 
Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Hart 2014) 403-404; Barsotti et al. (n 17) 418; 
Mayer (n 5) 401-407. For more on this see chapter 5 section 4.1. 
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The first approach is procedural in nature. It is focused on the interaction between these 
institutions and whether the procedural mechanism for direct judicial dialogue is being 
employed by constitutional courts or there is recourse to indirect forms of interaction with the 
CJEU.21 Constitutional courts have been rather creative in finding various avenues to avoid 
their obligation for sending preliminary references stemming from Article 267 (3) TFEU.22 
From this perspective, constitutional courts for a very long period were consistently avoiding 
any type of direct judicial dialogue and thus, with few exceptions, were not submitting 
preliminary references to the CJEU. Even though the situation has changed recently, the track 
record is not large enough to make any firm conclusions on the matter.23 Instead of direct 
dialogue, however, constitutional courts have frequently opted for indirect forms of interaction. 
For instance, they have referred to and invoked the case law of the CJEU or used the method 
of signaling the CJEU through their reasoning on certain contentious issues between the 
national and EU legal order.24 Such an attitude of constitutional courts is not necessarily 
negative but it could be perceived as a wise maneuver in evading direct conflicts with the CJEU 
which might create a legal deadlock not to be welcomed by either side.25 In this sense, it is to 
be seen that the interaction between these courts is not always a matter of struggle or friction 
and the relationship is not characterized solely by the conflict potential. For instance, even 
though constitutional courts themselves avoided entering into a direct judicial dialogue, they 
have been very constructive in securing the respect for the preliminary reference procedure by 
national courts through the safeguard of the constitutional right to a lawful judge or the right 
to a fair trial, which in the cases involving EU law is the CJEU.26  
The second approach is jurisdictional and it is related to the powers and mandate of 
constitutional courts in regard to EU law. Namely, Claes has analyzed this relationship by 
looking at both the national and EU perspective on the exercise of constitutional courts’ powers 
to, potentially or actually, conduct a priori and a posteriori review of both primary and 
                                                          
21 de Visser (n 20) 403- 407; Mayer (n 5) 401-407. 
22 Article 267 (3) TFEU: “Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall 
bring the matter before the Court.” For more on these tactics of avoidance see for instance, de Visser (n 20) 403-
407; Mayer (n 5) 403-406; Michal Bobek, ‘Learning to Talk: Preliminary Rulings, the Courts of the New Member 
States and the Court of Justice’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1632 – 1633; Roberto Miccu, ‘Toward 
a (Real) Cooperative Constitutionalism? New Perspectives on the Italian Constitutional Court’ in Jose Maria 
Beneyto and Ingolf Pernice (eds.), Europe’s Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law of 
National Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011), 128; Pierre-Vincent Astresses, ‘The Return of Huron, or Naïve 
Thoughts on the Handling of Article 267 TFEU by Constitutional Court when Referring to the Court of Justice’ 
(2015) 16 German Law Journal 1714-1715. 
23 For more on this see chapter on deliberative section 4. 
24 On different forms of interaction see Claes and De Witte (n 9) 98-100; Giuseppe Martinico, ‘Judging in the 
Multilevel Order: Exploring the Techniques of ‘Hidden Dialogue’ (2010) King’s Law Journal 258; Daniel 
Sarmiento, ‘The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds.), Constitutional 
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 285ff.  
25 Jan Komarek, ‘The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 
420, 442ff; and Florian Geyer, European Arrest Warrant, Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
Judgment of 3 May 2007, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Werd VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 4 
European Constitutional Law Review (2008) 150; and Claes (n 3) 426. 
26 See for instance Voßkuhle (n 16) 150-151; and Mayer (n 5) 406-407. For a more detailed overview see chapter 
4 on deliberative section 4.4. 
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secondary EU law.27 While this approach is valuable from the viewpoint of constitutional 
courts’ stance towards EU law, it does not include in all instances the relationship between 
constitutional courts and the CJEU since in certain types of review the latter does not have any 
jurisdiction in the cases at hand. More precisely, in cases of a priori review of either EU treaties 
or, theoretically, secondary EU law, the CJEU cannot have a say since the EU law at stake has 
not entered into force; thus there is no possibility of any type of interaction between them. In 
this manner, the jurisdictional approach does draw on the procedural one by reflecting on the 
indirect dialogue and it does reveal, to a certain extent, the groups of contentious issues on 
which there is a cleavage in the relationship between constitutional courts and the CJEU and 
accordingly EU law. However, this approach does not classify or analyze these contentious 
issues from the substantive aspect which reflects that it is not really concerned with the actual 
issues behind the contentions.28 
The third approach is perceiving the relationship through substantive areas which serve as 
meeting points but also as areas in which lines of constitutional resistance have been drawn by 
constitutional courts.29 Actually, this approach also includes procedural and jurisdictional 
aspects since focusing on substantive issues does not exclude examining the two other aspects 
of the relationship. In this manner, one obtains a more complete overview. Different from the 
jurisdictional,30 the substantive approach does not restrict itself only to the a posteriori review 
of secondary EU law in determining the constitutional limits of EU law since constitutional 
resistance could be aimed at the interpretation of certain EU Treaty provisions especially 
related to the fundamental freedoms or, in the cases on the financial crisis, mandate of the 
CJEU. As a matter of fact, constitutional courts have utilized the weaker position of the CJEU 
on occasions of preventive review of EU treaties to enter into an indirect dialogue by addressing 
matters of constitutional limits and resistance to EU law. They have used these opportunities 
to send signals to the CJEU from a national constitutional perspective regarding how far it 
should go in interpreting the treaty provisions or even secondary EU law.31 Therefore, both the 
direct and indirect judicial dialogues in their different forms are under consideration within this 
approach. More importantly, since the jurisdictional aspect of constitutional courts have not 
been able to reveal much, the substantive approach depicts, in the best possible manner, the 
common threads among constitutional courts’ attitude towards EU law and the CJEU. In this 
sense, particularly visible is the resistance of constitutional courts in the context of various 
issues towards the absolute primacy of EU law as continuously declared by the CJEU.  
Turning to the actual substantive areas, there are three such areas which have served as points 
of encounter and resistance at the same time. Those areas are: fundamental rights, vertical 
division and exercise of competences and specific constitutional provision of high importance 
                                                          
27 Claes (n 3) 465-650. 
28 Claes and De Witte (n 9) 102-104. 
29 de Visser (n 20) 408-417; Mayer (n 5) 407-420; and Mattias Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional 
Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law 
Journal 262, 263ff. 
30 On this aspect of a posteriori review of secondary EU law see Claes (n 3) 559-650. 
31 Most obvious examples being FCC, 2 BvR 2134 and 2159/92 Maastricht Treaty (Brunner), judgement of 12 
October 1993; FCC, Case 2 BvE 2/08, Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009.  
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to particular member states. The remainder of this section will go through these substantive 
areas. 
2.2.1 Fundamental rights 
Fundamental rights have represented the first point of serious encounter of constitutional courts 
with EU law and indirectly with the CJEU. Namely, two decisions in the early 1970s have set 
the pace for most of the future developments in this relationship. These decisions came as a 
sort of a reaction to the establishment of two fundamental principles of EU law, primacy and 
direct effect, through the renowned case law of the CJEU in the mid-1960s.32 Both the FCC 
and ICC, after demonstrating their readiness to accept these two principles, turned to determine 
certain constitutional limits on EU law, bearing in mind the state of the European integration 
process at the time.33 This state of integration was, among other things, characterized by lack 
of any bill of fundamental rights at the EU level and an underdeveloped case law by the CJEU.34  
It was first the ICC in its Frontini decision in 197335 which elaborated on the constitutional 
limits of EU law by establishing the well-known counter-limits doctrine. This doctrine 
basically limits the primacy of EU law with the fundamental principles set in the Italian 
Constitution among which fundamental rights are seen as particularly important. Accordingly, 
these principles represent counter-limits to the limitation of sovereignty in the process of 
European integration.36 This doctrine was later confirmed by several decisions of the ICC and 
is still valid.37 
Very soon after the ICC introduced the counter-limits doctrine, the FCC delivered one of its 
most renowned decisions which initiated its case law on determining the constitutional limits 
of EU law. In 1974 the FCC in Solange I38 addressed the issue of primacy of EU law through 
the prism of the level of fundamental rights protection at the EU level and established the 
foundation for the existence of constitutional limits of EU law in the national legal order as 
well as the limits on the transfer of sovereign rights according to the national constitutional 
provision. Namely, the FCC clearly declared its power to safeguard these national 
constitutional limits against EU law, particularly in the context of fundamental rights, as long 
as the standards of fundamental rights protection of the EU are not comparable and compatible 
with those provided for in the German Basic Law.39  
                                                          
32 CJEU, Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration (van Gend & Loos), Judgment of 5 February 1963, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; CJEU, Case 6-
64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L, Judgment of 15 July 1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
33 See for instance Barsotti et al. (n 17) 215; and Griller et al (n 10) 67. 
34  The only important decisions predating Frontini being, CJEU, Case 29-69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – 
Sozialamt (Stauder), Judgment of 12 November 1969, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57; and CJEU, Case 11/70, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Internationale 
Handelsgesellshaft) Judgment of 17 December 1970, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. See also Barsotti et al. (n 17) 215. 
35 ICC, Frontini (n 7).  
36 Barsotti et al. (n 17) 214. 
37 ICC, Judgment 70/1984 (Granital) of 8 June 1984; ICC, Judgment 232/89 (Fragd) of 21 April 1989; and ICC, 
Order 24/2017 (Taricco) of 23 November 2017. 
38 FCC, Solange I (n 6). 
39 For more on this see for instance Juliane Kokott, Report on Germany, in Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone 
Sweet and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds)The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart 
1998) 87; Rudolf Streinz, ‘Art. 23: Verwirklichung der Europäischen Union, Beteiligung des Bundestages und 
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As result of these two decisions and the rationale behind them the CJEU was provided with a 
strong impetus and entered into developing a fundamental rights case law and their protection 
to comply with the constitutional limits declared by the ICC and the FCC. Thus these two 
constitutional courts induced and motivated the fundamental rights protection at EU level, 
something for which they have been praised. This has in turn led to the substantial development 
of the CJEU’s fundamental rights case law which eventually brought to the enactment and the 
binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.40 As a matter of 
fact, one decade after this constitutional reservation was introduced, the FCC in Solange II41 
declared that due to the essentially comparable level of protection of fundamental rights at the 
EU level it would have only residual power to conduct a fundamental rights review of EU law 
and only in extraordinary cases.42 In the latter case the applicants would have to convincingly 
argue that the opposite has occurred and that the protection of fundamental rights or of a 
specific right is not comparable with the German legal standards.43 In this sense, there persists 
a rebuttable presumption that there are no reasons for the employment of the fundamental rights 
review by the FCC.  
The issues revolving around fundamental rights are most commonly emphasized in academic 
writings; however, other very important aspects of Frontini and Solange I are somehow set 
aside. In both decisions the overarching idea was the establishment of certain constitutional 
limits on the primacy, and more generally the application, of EU law particularly that the CJEU 
gave this doctrine a very broad scope and interpretation.44 More specifically, both Frontini and 
Solange I were obviously about drawing a line in the sand and determining broader 
constitutional limits of EU law. Even though the central point, fundamental rights, were not 
the only important issue. In view of that, it could be argued that, besides the fundamental rights 
review, these constitutional court decisions, particularly Solange I, provided the basis for 
constitutional identity review as well as the inspiration for ultra vires review. As a matter of 
fact, the notion of constitutional identity as a constitutional limit originates in this decision.45 
Ironically, it is exactly this overarching aspect of these decision that has been subject of 
criticism often by the very same authors that praise them for fundamental rights aspects. 
Contrary to the expectation and perception of some scholars who have basically declared that 
fundamental rights cannot be credibly invoked as a constitutional limit in the future since the 
principle of equivalent protection has been further secured with the adoption of the Charter, we 
                                                          
des Bundesrates’, in Michael Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz (8th Edition C.H. BECK 2018) paras. 41-53; Mayer (n 5) 
411; Griller et al (n 10) 67; and Simon (n 5) 56-57. 
40 This document was initially enacted by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission as an 
instrument of soft law, [2000] OJ C364/1. Later Article 6(1) TEU, proclaimed that the modified version of the 
Charter, reprinted in [2010] OJ C83/389, that shall have a legally binding effect identical with the legal effect of 
the Treaties. On the influence of constitutional courts to the processes which led to the enactment of the Charter 
see Andreas Voßkuhle, ‘Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische 
Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 191-193. 
41 FCC, Solange II (n 6). 
42 Streinz (n 39) para. 101:”Reservekompetenz”; Mayer (n 5) 411-412; Kokott (39) 90-91; Simon (n 5) 60-61, 80 
Voßkuhle (n 40) 192; Voßkuhle (n 16) 151-153. 
43 This was essentially confirmed in the FCC, 2 BvL 1/97, Banana Market, decision of 7 June 2000. See on this 
in Voßkuhle (n 40) 192. 
44 CJEU Internationale Handelsgesellshaft (n 34). 
45 Voßkuhle (n 16) 148. 
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have seen a kind of revival of this aspect of fundamental rights.46 Namely, they have once again 
opened the door for potential constitutional resistance in the context of constitutional identity. 
The extensive interpretation of Charter’s scope of application and arguably lowering the level 
of protection of fundamental rights in the EU due to the overarching interest of uniform and 
effective application of EU law have raised concerns among constitutional courts.47 There are 
several instances in which constitutional courts have included certain fundamental rights as 
part of their respective constitutional identity and thus reintroduced fundamental rights as 
constitutional limits to EU law through the ‘back door’. The conundrum over the Data 
Retention48 and the ongoing EAW saga49 are just two instances which make this point more 
than valid. It is actually the EAW saga that is also directly related to the manner in which the 
CJEU has interpreted the scope of application of the Charter which has raised eyebrows and 
faced constitutional courts’ resistance.50 In this respect, Akerberg Franson and Melloni have 
drawn strong criticism and resistance over the interpretation of Articles 51 and 53 of the Charter 
provided in these two CJEU decisions respectively which has substantially expanded the reach 
of the Charter.51  
                                                          
46 See for instance Besselink et al. (n 10) 23; but cf Kumm (n 29) 264. 
47 CJEU, Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson (Akerberg Fransson), Judgement of 26 February 
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105 and CJEU, Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal (Melloni) Judgement 
of 26 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. A warning signal was immediately sent by the FCC in reaction to 
the Akerberg Fransson decision of the CJEU in FCC, Case 1 BvR 1215/07 Judgment of 24 April 2013, para. 91. 
On this reaction see for instance Tristan Barczak, BVerfGG: Mitarbeiterkommentar zum 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (De Gruyter 2017) 51-52, paras. 84-85. 
48 RCC, No 1.258 decision of 8 October 2009, FCC, 1 BvR 256/08, judgment of 2 March 2010; CCC, Pl. ÚS 
24/10, decision of 22 March 2011; and HCC, no. 1746/B/2010, decision of 19 December 2012. The CJEU finally 
recognized some of the problematic aspects of the Data Retention Directive (EC Directive 2006/24 of 15 March 
2006, O.J. 2006 L 105/54) upon a preliminary reference lastly sent by the Austrian Constitutional Court and the 
Irish High Court in CJEU, Case C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources et al and Kärtner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof 
Tschohl and others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. For more on this see for instance Ludovica Benedizione and Eleonora 
Paris, ‘Preliminary Reference and Dialogue between Courts as Tools for Reflection on the EU System of 
Multilevel Protection of Rights: The Case of the Data Retention Directive’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1727; 
Theodore Konstadinides, ‘Destroying Democracy on the Ground of Defending It? The Data Retention Directive, 
the Surveillance State and Our Constitutional Ecosystem’, 1 European Current Law (2012) 722; Hendrik 
Wieduwilt, ‘The German Federal Constitutional Court Puts the Data Retention Directive on Hold’ (2010) 53 The 
German Yearbook of International Law 917ff. 
49 See for instance Aida Torres Perez, ‘The Challenges for Constitutional Courts as Guardians of Fundamental 
Rights in the European Union’ in Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmayan and Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds) The 
Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012) 66-75. 
50 PCT, P 1/05 Decision of 27 April 2005; CCC, Pl. US 66/04, Judgement of 3 May 2006; FCC, 2 BvR 2236/04, 
Judgement of 18 July 2005. For more on this see Torres Perez (n 49) 66-75; Jan Komarek, ‘European 
Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In Search of the Limits of “Contrapunctual Principles”’ 
(2007) Common Law Market Review 9; Oreste Pollicino, ‘European Arrest Warrant and Constitutional Principles 
of the Member States: A Case Law-Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike the Right Balance Between Interacting 
Legal Systems’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal; Elies van Sliedregt, ‘Introduction. The European Arrest Warrant: 
Extradition in Transition’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review. On the latest decision see FCC, 2 BvR 
2735/14, EAW II, order of 15 December 2015. 
51 Among a large number of critical accounts see Daniel Sarmiento, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Charter? The Court of 
Justice, National Courts and the New Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’, 50 Common 
Market Law Review (2013), 1267ff; Leonard F. M. Besselink, ‘The Parameters of Constitutional Courts after 
Melloni’ (2014) 39 European Law Review 4 531ff; Paul Craig, UK, EU and Global Administrative Law: 
Foundations and Challenges (Cambridge University Press 2015), 503-505; Voßkuhle (n 16) 152; Safjan (n 14) 
382-383; Jan Komarek, ‘National constitutional courts in the European constitutional democracy’ 12 International 
Constitutional Law Journal 2014 528; Jan Komarek, ‘National constitutional Courts in the European constitutional 
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2.2.2 Vertical division and exercise of competences in the EU 
With the expanding scope of EU law, particularly with the Maastricht Treaty, another form and 
line of constitutional resistance immediately surfaced. The vertical division of competences 
between the member states and the EU as well as their exercise at the EU level very soon came 
under the spotlight and on the radar of constitutional courts. This has been even more 
intensified with the already existing rich case law in which the CJEU has extensively 
interpreted EU competences. The FCC was the first to introduce the ultra vires review and later 
on through its subsequent decisions has further elaborated and developed it.52 FCC’s 
Maastricht decision53 in 1993 came as a clear reaction to the ongoing competence creep as well 
as the high likelihood of furthering this expansion of competences by the EU.54 Even though 
the idea of constitutional courts policing the jurisdictional borders in the EU was not a new 
idea,55 the Maastricht Treaty came as a breaking point due to the penetration of EU law in areas 
which were previously considered to be exclusively a matter of national constitutional law.56 
Accordingly, the FCC declared its residual power to control through the ultra vires review both 
the secondary EU law and the CJEU case law, which under the guise of treaty interpretation, 
could, de facto, introduce treaty amendments through which EU law would encroach on other 
policy areas outside its determined competences and scope of application.57 In this sense, the 
ultra vires review became the second line of constitutional resistance that soon came to be 
embraced, tacitly or explicitly, by most of the other constitutional courts.58 Judged by their 
decisions and reasoning, these constitutional courts seem to be quite aware and share a common 
view on the necessity for a certain level of judicial restraint that needs to be practiced by 
reserving the ultra vires review for exceptional situations. 
The FCC’s Maastricht decision was the moment of initiation for the ultra vires review; the 
latter was further developed, refined and qualified through subsequent case law, most 
                                                          
democracy: A rejoinder’ (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 815, 817-818. On the two different 
approaches taken by the FCC (Trennungsthese) and the CJEU (Kumulationsthese) see Barczak (n 47) 49-53, 
paras. 81-87. For a different account of these cases claiming that they have not brought anything new but only 
confirmed previous case law predating the Charter, see Deutscher and Mair (n 2) 803-807. 
52 For more on this see chapter 6 section 3.  
53 FCC Maastricht Treaty (n 31) para. 106ff. 
54 Simon (n 5) 62-64; Mayer (n 5) 412-415; Kokott (n 39) 92-107; Voßkuhle (n 16) 155-156; Huber (n 15) 88; 
and Alter (n 17) 104-108. 
55 de Visser (n 20) 413; Kokott (n 39) 95-96; and Simon (n 5) 234. 
56 Marco Dani, ‘National constitutional courts in the European constitutional democracy: A reply to Jan Komarek’ 
(2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 785, 794. 
57 FCC Maastricht Treaty (n 31) paras. 155-158; Voßkuhle (n 40) 193-194; Mayer (n) 412; and Simon (n 5) 235-
237. 
58 See for instance, Mayer (n 5) 417, Tatham (n 5) 248-249; Ana Maria Guerra Martins and Miguel Prata Roque, 
‘Judicial Dialogue in a Multilevel Constitutional Network: The Role of the Portuguese Constitutional Court’ in 
Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds.) Courts and Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 312-
314; Philippe Gerard and Willem Verrijdt, ‘Belgian Constitutional Court Adopts National Identity Discourse: 
Belgian Constitutional Court No. 62/2016, 28 April 2016’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 182. 
But cf. Claes and de Witte (n 9) 71-73 and Monica Claes, ‘The Validity and Primacy of EU Law and the 
‘Cooperative Relationship’ between National Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’ (2016) 26 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 157-163. 
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importantly through the Lisbon,59 Honeywell60 and OMT (Gauweiler) decisions.61 In these three 
decisions, ultra vires review was shaped in a manner that would serve both national 
constitutional law and EU law respecting the existing constitutional pluralism in Europe. While 
the FCC has introduced and meticulously developed the ultra vires review, so far it has never 
declared an EU act ultra vires.62 However, the CCC was the first and so far the only 
constitutional court to declare an EU act, that is, CJEU Landtova decision63, to be ultra vires.64 
Nevertheless, this precedent from 2012 has not had a deep impact on the relationship between 
constitutional courts and the CJEU and has been interpreted as an isolated incident.65 
2.2.3 Specific national constitutional provisions 
The third substantive area in the relationship between constitutional courts and the CJEU is 
related to specific national constitutional provisions. Different from the previous two, this 
substantive area is more diverse and is difficult to be classified more precisely. There are 
authors who have classified these specific provisions under the notion of constitutional 
identity66 as a separate substantive area of constitutional resistance.67 However, this does not 
do any favors to constitutional provisions which are not defined as part of the respective 
constitutional identity but, on the other hand, have been the subject of the relationship between 
constitutional courts and the CJEU. In this sense, the substantive area of specific national 
constitutional provisions does include both provisions which are part of a constitutional 
identity, and those which are not part of it but do regulate fundamental issues of national 
constitutional law.  
Furthermore, there is another distinction to be drawn in this context when it comes to 
fundamental rights. Namely, in some cases they do represent an essential part of constitutional 
identity clearly defined by constitutional courts, while in others these are separated from a 
narrower view on constitutional identity that does not include, at least not all, fundamental 
rights. Depending on whether fundamental rights are viewed independently or as part of a 
constitutional identity, there is a differing perception of the overlap between the fundamental 
rights review and identity review in different member states. The case of the FCC is telling in 
this sense because it does distinguish three forms of review of EU law: fundamental rights, 
constitutional identity and ultra vires review.68 However, it has been indicated by this court 
                                                          
59 FCC Lisbon (n 31) para. 225ff. 
60 FCC, Honeywell 2 BvR 2661/06, order of 6 July 2010, para. 39ff. 
61 FCC, OMT decision 2 BVR 2728/13, judgment of 21 June 2016, para. 149ff. For more on the manner in which 
ultra vires review has been qualified respecting the principle of openness towards European Law, see chapter 7 
(6) section 4.2. 
62 The FCC employed the ultra vires review in FCC, Honeywell (n 52) paras. 75-78; and announced it in FCC, 
OMT referral, 2 BvR 2728/13 of 14 January 2014, para. 23. 
63 CJEU, Case C-399/09 Landtova, 22 June 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:415. 
64 CCC, Holubec, Pl. US 5/12, plenary judgment of 31 January 2012. 
65 For more on this Michal Bobek, ‘Landtova, Holubec, and the Problem of an Uncooperative Court: Implications 
for the Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 54 and Jan Komarek, 
‘Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires Revolution’ (Verfassungsblog 22 February 
2012). 
66 On the role of constitutional courts in safeguarding constitutional identity see chapter 5. 
67 See for instance de Visser (n 20) 415-417; and Besselink et al. (n 10) 23-24. This type of approach closely 
follows the development of the FCC’s relationship with EU law and the CJEU. 
68 See for instance Besselink et al. (n 10) 24. 
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that there is a certain overlap between fundamental rights and constitutional identity review.69 
However, this is not the case with all constitutional courts. Even the ICC since the very 
beginning does not distinguish between these types of reviews and declares to have a single 
group of fundamental constitutional provision and principles which represent the counter-limits 
to EU law.70 In the case of the constitutional courts of CEECs, we have a similar situation when 
it comes to the relationship between fundamental rights and identity review. Namely, as these 
states have entered the relationship with the EU law and the CJEU at a stage in which 
fundamental rights review was already assumed to be absolved, most of them turned to perceive 
fundamental rights as an essential part of their constitutional identity.71  
Be that as it may, the specific national constitutional provisions are very often the ones that 
envisage the fundamental constitutional principles such as rule of law, democracy, republican 
status, secularism and similar principles which are often declared to be an integral part of the 
respective constitutional identity. However, there is no exclusive list or even an identical 
meaning to the same principles.72 While most of these broad principles are common to the 
member states, they have a specific manifestation in different member states; thus this caveat 
needs to be borne in mind. These principles have also been differently interpreted and 
developed by national constitutional courts. For instance, a specific aspect of the principle of 
democracy as interpreted by the FCC, the principle of budget autonomy of the German 
Parliament, has given rise to a separate line of case law related to the financial and euro crisis.73  
Besides these type of principles directly tied to the constitutional identity we have also other 
principles and specific national constitutional provisions which are only indirectly related to 
the constitutional identity but have been in one way or another an issue in the relationship 
between constitutional courts and the CJEU. The most recent examples have to do with the ban 
                                                          
69 For instance, in the first case in which the FCC applied the identity review, FCC, 1 BvR 256/08 Data Retention 
Directive, judgment of 2 March 2010, the overlap between fundamental rights of the German Basic Law and 
constitutional identity became obvious. But cf. Opinion of Advocate General Bot in CJEU Melloni (n 47) para. 
142. See de Visser (n 20) 417. 
70 Torres Perez (n 49) 64; and Besselink et al. (n 10) 22-25. 
71 Safjan (n 14) 387-388; and Torres Perez (n 49) 64. 
72 For an overview see Monica Claes, ‘Negotiating Constitutional Identity or Whose Identity is It Anyway?’ in 
Monica Claes, Maartje de Visser, Patricia Popelier and Catherine Van de Heyning (eds) Constitutional 
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73 FCC, 2 BvR 987/10 EFSF, judgment of 07 September 2011; FCC, 2 BvR 2728/13 ESM, order of 14 January 
2014; FCC OMT decision (n 61). For more on these decisions see Huber (n 15) 99-105; and Simon (n 5) 68-75. 
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on nobility titles in Austria,74 the status of the Lithuanian as the official national language75 or 
the particular understanding of the principle of legality in Italy.76   
3 The Simmenthal decision and the caveat of decentralization of ‘constitutional 
review’   
3.1 The Simmenthal mandate of national courts 
The relationship between constitutional courts in the EU and the CJEU can also be perceived 
through the impact of the latter’s case law from a rather procedural aspect on the status and 
position of the former. Namely, the development of EU law through the CJEU’s case law has 
brought a long-standing debate on the external decentralizing tendencies on constitutional 
review.77 The debate on the decentralizing tendencies has been initiated by a landmark decision 
in the Simmenthal II case.78 This decision was basically the product of CJEU’s objective to 
ensure the uniform interpretation and effective application of EU law by further strengthening 
the primacy of EU law. Simmenthal II also represented CJEU’s reaction to the initially 
expressed national constitutional resistance by constitutional courts, particularly the ICC’s 
strong insistence on maintaining its monopoly over the review of national legislation.79 
Namely, the ICC based on the international law approach towards EU law claimed that in such 
cases the principle of lex posterior applies and that every breach of EU law by the national 
legislation needs to be brought before it because this at the same time represents a breach of 
Article 11 of the Italian Constitution.80 Therefore such a national rule should be subject of a 
constitutional review that is the exclusive competence of the ICC.81 
                                                          
74 This ban represents an implementation of the principle of equal treatment, however the CJEU has declared it to 
be related to the republican status as part of national identity under Article 4(2) TEU, see CJEU Case C-208/09, 
Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, Judgment of 22 December 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806, 
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Sweet and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds) The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence 
(Hart 1998) 136-137, Francesco P. Ruggeri Laderchi, ‘Report on Italy’ Community’ in Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
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Against this background, the Simmenthal II decision introduced the duty of national courts to 
conduct review of national legislations’ compatibility with EU law. If a national rule is not 
compatible with EU law the national courts need to set it aside, regardless if it was adopted 
prior or subsequently, and apply EU law.82 If this incompatibility cannot be clearly determined, 
the national courts where necessary should send a preliminary reference to the CJEU.83 In 
conducting this duty, national courts do not need to address the issue to higher judicial instances 
nor a constitutional court and await the procedure before them to be completed.84  
“…a national court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to 
apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those 
provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting 
provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not 
necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such 
provision by legislative or other constitutional means.”85 
In this manner, the CJEU confronted ICC’s reasoning and practice and established a 
Simmenthal mandate of national ordinary courts86 to conduct a review of national legislation. 
In other words, the CJEU introduced a logic of ‘comply or disapply’ as a guiding rule for 
national courts.87 But how is this mandate perceived to influence the status and position of 
constitutional courts in view of their constitutional mandate to have the exclusive power to 
conduct constitutional review? 
3.2 The status and position of constitutional courts in light of the Simmenthal mandate 
Simmenthal II has often been perceived as negatively influencing the position and role of 
constitutional courts by introducing a ‘decentralized system of constitutional review’ into the 
national legal order.88 Actually the empowerment of national ordinary courts has been done to 
the detriment of the position of constitutional courts.89 The latter have lost their monopoly over 
review of national legislation.90 So, the argument goes, the national courts have 
instrumentalized this mandate also to circumvent constitutional courts.91  
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While these claims and arguments sound very convincing at first glance, there are certain 
weaknesses to this line of thought. In this sense, there are three main arguments that need to be 
presented in rebutting such claims. First, Simmenthal II has not introduced a new form of 
constitutional review into the national legal order but rather a ‘decentralized enforcement 
mechanism of EU law’ by ordinary courts92 that includes a certain form of judicial review. 
Accordingly, the Simmenthal mandate of national ordinary courts has at most introduced a new 
form of judicial review, that is, compatibility review of national legislation with EU law.93  
Furthermore, Simmenthal II refers to national legislation and it does not imply constitutional 
provisions within the scope of the mandate of national courts.94 In this sense, it does not entail 
anything that was not present already as a form of constitutional and judicial review in the 
member states. In France, for instance, the distinction between constitutional and compatibility 
review as seen through control de constitutionalite and control de conventionalite has existed 
even prior to this EU mandate in regard to international treaties.95 The former is part of the 
CC’s powers and the latter of ordinary courts. This power of ordinary courts has never been 
interpreted as jeopardizing the status of the CC. Moreover, constitutional review is conducted 
only in light of constitutional provisions as a standard of review, and in the case of 
compatibility review it is EU law that is at stake. Even if the EU’s legal order is presented as a 
constitutional order, still the Simmenthal mandate is not confined only to EU’s ‘constitutional 
norms’ but rather to EU law in general, thus including many legal rules that are far from 
‘constitutional’ relevance.  
Second, the decentralizing tendencies have been present within the national legal orders for 
some while. Actually there are even instances in which ordinary courts have been authorized 
to set aside and disregard certain statutes on basis of their perceived unconstitutionality.96 
Generally, though, the decentralization of constitutional review has mainly been the result of 
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the process of constitutionalization of the legal order which finds its manifestation in several 
forms.97  
Constitutional rights provisions have permeated all areas of the legal order, thus leading to the 
necessary use of constitutional methods of reasoning by ordinary courts.98 As a result, ordinary 
courts rely extensively on constitutional provisions as well as the case law of respective 
constitutional courts. Moreover, they enter into the process of determining the meaning of 
constitutional provisions and principles, thus bridging the traditional distinction between 
constitutional and ordinary legality.99 On the other hand, concrete constitutional review has 
also led to a diffusion since ordinary judges in such instances enter into a preliminary or initial 
review and assessment of constitutionality of statutes in deciding whether to send the issue 
before a constitutional court.100 Likewise, ordinary courts regularly enter into various forms of 
interpretation of national legislation in conformity with constitutional law, thus becoming 
heavily involved with safeguarding constitutionality by, where possible, assuming 
constitutional validity of these legal acts.101 All these forms of decentralization have been 
welcomed and even promoted by constitutional courts, taking into consideration that most of 
these courts are rather overwhelmed with cases and large workloads.102 Additionally, in all of 
these cases of decentralization, the issue at stake could still end up before the constitutional 
court either through a procedure of concrete review or constitutional complaint.103 Thus, in 
cases in which national courts invoke their Simmenthal mandate to set aside a conflicting 
national legislative rule, the matter could also be brought before a constitutional court. For 
instance, a party to the case could claim that a certain constitutional right has been breached as 
result of such a disapplication of national legislation.104  
Third, the Simmenthal mandate theoretically empowers all courts, including constitutional 
courts.105 Hence constitutional courts are also potentially empowered by this mandate, as their 
constitutional powers never specifically include review of statutes in light of EU law and in 
most cases not even with international law. Under this mandate constitutional courts would 
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have the power to disapply or invalidate national legislation in conflict with EU law.106 
Therefore, it is rather questionable to which extent the empowerment of national ordinary 
courts has actually disempowered constitutional courts.107 Nevertheless, this empowerment has 
remained an unused potential since constitutional courts have persistently refused to embrace 
and directly apply the Simmnethal mandate for different reasons.108 Even though constitutional 
courts have been rather meticulous in securing that national courts abide by their Simmenthal 
mandate, they have never accepted this mandate as applicable for them.109 Nevertheless, either 
acceptance or refusal of the Simmenthal mandate could not change constitutional courts’ 
position and status concerning constitutional review as they continue to have the exclusive 
power and monopoly over invalidation of unconstitutional national legislation. Still the 
national courts must refer the issue in cases in which they doubt that a national legislation is 
incompatible with the constitution. However, it is true that national ordinary courts have used 
the Simmenthal mandate to circumvent constitutional courts since setting aside a national 
legislation is usually a faster option than staying the court proceedings and waiting for a 
constitutional court to decide, but also swifter than waiting for the CJEU to decide upon the 
preliminary reference.110  
Based on these three lines of arguments, it could be convincingly argued that the effect of 
Simmenthal II has been rather overrated.111 Neither a new form of constitutional review has 
been introduced nor the decentralizing impact has been directly related to constitutional review 
in order to significantly alter the status of constitutional courts. There is no doubt that 
Simmenthal II has led to the introduction of a parallel review of national legislation by ordinary 
courts, besides the one before constitutional courts; however this has not been something that 
has caused substantial changes to constitutional review.112 Ordinary courts have not gained the 
status of ‘miniature constitutional courts’.113 Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that 
all constitutional courts eventually114 accepted the Simmenthal mandate of national ordinary 
courts.115 If it were really that obvious that constitutional courts’ position would be jeopardized 
by this, they would have never accepted it that easily, as that would amount to interference 
with the centralized model of constitutional review as a fundamental constitutional structure. 
As a matter of fact, they have had very good reasons for accepting this decentralized 
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enforcement of EU law by national courts since this would reduce the pressure from the rather 
large workload which would in turn allow them to focus on truly fundamental constitutional 
issues. Thus the docket control and efficiency reasons play a significant role in this regard.116 
Additionally, this would also have potentially a positive effect on the safeguard of 
constitutionality and reduce the pressure from constitutional courts being accused of judicial 
activism.117  
Lastly, the impact of Simmenthal should not be overestimated, because of the development of 
doctrines such as horizontal effect and the margin of appreciation the force of this mandate was 
tamed as setting aside of a national legislation became something that national courts are trying 
to use as a measure of last resort.118 The national courts have tried to secure national 
legislation’s compliance with EU law through its interpretation in conformity with the latter.119 
This very much resembles what national courts do in interpreting national statues in conformity 
with the constitution.   
4 The displacement doctrine of the CJEU and constitutional courts 
The rapid expansion of EU law’s scope has deepened the dilemmas over the conditions under 
which the parallel types of review of national legislation could coexist. While Simmenthal II 
denied that it was mandatory for a national court to initiate a constitutional review before a 
constitutional court in order to determine incompatibility of a national legislation with EU law, 
it empowered national ordinary courts to set such a national legislation aside directly, thus 
circumventing constitutional review. Hence, the CJEU did not deny the possibility of having a 
sort of coexistence or parallelism between the two types of review. However, it did not dwell 
in Simmenthal II on the relationship between constitutional review and decentralized judicial 
enforcement of EU law. It was rather Simmenthal’s progeny in which the CJEU was confronted 
with this rather complex issue that put at stake the role and status of constitutional courts. 
Accordingly, the debate on this issue intensified through time and led certain authors, such as 
Komarek, to speak of CJEU’s developing ‘doctrine of displacement’ of constitutional courts.120 
The CJEU has in a series of decisions touched upon different aspects that influence the status 
of constitutional courts. 
There are three types of questions which this case law has raised. First, limits were placed on 
the binding effect of constitutional court decisions in cases involving EU law. Second, the 
temporal effect of constitutional courts decisions was limited in cases in which the ordinary 
courts are willing to invoke their Simmenthal mandate. Third, the issue of sequence and priority 
between constitutional and EU law review was also the subject of CJEU’s case law. Each of 
these three aspects of the relationship between constitutional courts and the CJEU will be 
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briefly elaborated below in order to assess the exact impact of CJEU’s case law on 
constitutional courts. 
First, regarding the effect of decisions of constitutional courts which collide with EU law and 
the mandate of national ordinary courts to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU, one 
decision is very telling. In Križan121 the CJEU was faced with a situation in which the Supreme 
Court of Slovakia was basically denied the possibility to opt for sending a preliminary reference 
to the CJEU by the Constitutional Court of Slovakia. The latter, deciding upon a constitutional 
complaint, annulled the Supreme Court judgement and remitted the case back to it with a clear 
instruction to abide solely by its decision. Thus the question raised was whether the Supreme 
Court could in these circumstances be allowed under Art. 267 TFEU to send a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU. The CJEU ruled quite clearly that national ordinary courts are free to 
decide whether to send a preliminary reference and, in this regard, are to set aside the national 
legal provision providing binding effect of constitutional court decisions.122 Additionally, in 
such circumstances the Supreme Court is even under obligation to send a preliminary reference 
according to Art. 267 (3) TFEU since the possibility of challenging its decisions through a 
constitutional complaint before a constitutional court cannot discard its classification as a court 
of last instance against whose decision there is no judicial remedy.123 Accordingly, Križan has 
introduced limits to the binding effect of constitutional court decisions in cases in which they 
are contrary to EU law and has essentially authorized ordinary courts not to abide by them.  
Undoubtedly, this is a direct impact on the position and authority of constitutional courts. 
However, this could be perceived as a necessary consequence of the decentralized review of 
EU law and its judicial enforcement in member states. As a matter of fact, setting aside of 
judicial decisions was also mentioned in Simmenthal II124 and thus Križan further developed 
this doctrine to apply to constitutional court decisions.125 As a result of this decision, 
constitutional courts are essentially being pushed to address the contentious issues themselves 
or leave the matter to be decided by the ordinary courts.126 In this manner, it seems that a 
possible way of avoiding such disobedience to their decisions is for constitutional courts to 
send a preliminary reference to the CJEU themselves before remitting a case back to ordinary 
courts. Nevertheless, constitutional courts so far have not shown to be eager to enter a direct 
judicial dialogue with the CJEU.127 On the other hand, the CJEU needs to avoid rigid 
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generalizations and take a more nuanced approach in order to embrace certain exceptional 
situations that might justify an opposite stance than that taken in Križan that in turn better 
serves the effective application of EU law. Namely, there might be cases in which a 
constitutional court quashes, by invoking EU law and CJEU case law, an order of a national 
ordinary court for a preliminary reference due to a manifest abuse of this mandate. It could 
happen that a national ordinary court simply wants to prolong the ongoing court proceedings 
by addressing the issue to the CJEU. This might turn out to be against the right to a fair trial or 
the right to a lawful judge in cases in which a constitutional court determines this by arguing 
in light of the acte clair or acte éclaire doctrines.128 Bearing in mind that neither constitutional 
courts nor the CJEU have been confronted with such an issue, it remains to be seen how this 
aspect of the relationship between the courts will further develop. 
Second, in two cases involving the FCC and PCT, Winner Wetten129 and Filipiak,130 the CJEU 
was deciding on whether admonitory decisions of these two constitutional courts respectively 
involving unconstitutionality of national legislation are in breach with the Simmenthal mandate 
of national ordinary courts. More precisely, the CJEU in these two cases ruled that, if a national 
legislation that was declared to be unconstitutional but remains to be in force for a ‘transitional’ 
period specified in a decision of a constitutional court, is at the same time perceived to be 
incompatible with EU law by national ordinary courts, then the latter are at liberty to set aside 
the incompatible national legislation.131 In this way, there is an empowerment of ordinary 
courts to disregard an admonitory constitutional court decision for the sake of preserving the 
unity and effectiveness of EU law. As Komarek puts it, this represents a disturbance of the 
temporal balance within the national legal order.132  
However, the CJEU in Winner Wetten and Filipiak does not take into serious consideration the 
underlying reasons and justification provided by constitutional courts for delivering such 
decisions.133 Namely, constitutional courts through admonitory decisions usually provide 
safeguards for values such as legal certainty and fundamental rights by preventing the 
occurrence of more severe consequences resulting from a decision of unconstitutionality that 
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would have an immediate instead of deferred effect.134 Thus, the primacy and effectiveness of 
EU law need to be balanced against these values and rights before reaching a final decision. 
This is even more so if one takes into consideration that the ECtHR has already approved these 
types of constitutional court decisions to be in line with the ECHR when based on adequate 
reasons.135 Whether the CJEU will recognize the special nature and character of constitutional 
courts and their decisions, and thus address and develop in future what it has implied in Winner 
Wetten, is not clear at this point, but it is something that should be promoted. Such 
considerations might be a connecting point of the coexisting parallel forms of review. 
Third, finding itself in the middle of a national judicial struggle136 brought to the EU level, the 
CJEU was confronted with the issue of determining the sequence and priority between 
constitutional and EU compatibility review. The case of Melki and Abdeli137 was initiated by a 
reference from the French Court of Cassation which challenged the compatibility with EU law 
of the newly enacted priority question of constitutionality procedure138 that provided the CC 
with significant power over concrete constitutional review. This procedure of concrete review 
in France, inspired by a similar one already in place in Belgium,139 was introduced to remedy 
situations occurring from the duality of review within the national legal order that could lead 
to conflicts between the highest courts and the constitutional court.140 Thus, bearing in mind 
the erga omnes effect of constitutional court decisions and concerns over legal certainty,141 the 
concrete constitutional review by constitutional courts in these member states was given a 
priority over other forms of review. However, it did not exclude the parallel existence and 
functioning of any of the latter, including the review of compatibility with EU law or the 
possibility of parallel preliminary references.142  
Against this background the CJEU in Melki, by referring also to the case law of the CC and the 
French Council of State,143 decided that the coexistence of constitutional and compatibility 
review in light of EU law is foreseen under national law, and thus upheld the procedure for 
concrete constitutional review. However, its compatibility with EU law is conditioned by 
providing leeway to national ordinary courts in using the preliminary reference procedure at 
whatever stage of judicial proceedings and the possibility of setting aside a national legislation 
at the end of an interlocutory procedure of concrete review before the CC.144 
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“On the other hand, Article 267 TFEU does not preclude such national 
legislation, in so far as the other national courts or tribunals remain free: 
– to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, at whatever stage 
of the proceedings they consider appropriate, even at the end of the interlocutory 
procedure for the review of constitutionality, any question which they consider 
necessary, 
– to adopt any measure necessary to ensure provisional judicial protection 
of the rights conferred under the European Union legal order, and 
– to disapply, at the end of such an interlocutory procedure, the national 
legislative provision at issue if they consider it to be contrary to EU law.”145 
 
As a result, in Melki and Abdeli the CJEU provided the conditions for the coexistence of the 
two types of review, thus entrenching the parallelism.146 In this regard, it should be noted that 
the CJEU ‘went the extra mile’ to accommodate the position of the CC, something that was not 
the case later on, for instance in Landtova.147 First, it moderated the requirement stemming 
from Simmenthal II under which national courts should immediately set aside national 
legislation conflicting EU law148 by postponing this possibility till the end of the constitutional 
review, thus allowing a sequential existence of constitutional and compatibility review.149 In 
this manner it recognized that there could be a priority of a constitutional review and this is not 
necessarily against EU law. Second, the CJEU in Melki basically confirmed the logic behind 
Mecanarte150 which provided that there is no absolute priority of compatibility review with EU 
law and that an obligation to refer an issue to a constitutional court cannot prevent a national 
court either to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU or disapply an incompatible national 
legislation.151 There is one exception, however, under which the decision and procedure on the 
validity of EU law, particularly directives, that according to Foto-Frost152 needs to be taken by 
the CJEU, will need to have priority over constitutional review.153 Lastly, both of these 
                                                          
145 CJEU Melki and Abdeli (n 135) para. 57. 
146 Bossuyt and Verrijdt (n 95) 377. Such a stance was confirmed later in another case, CJEU, Case C-112/13, A 
v B and others, Judgment of 11 September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2195, in which the CJEU used the completely 
identical reasoning for providing bases for such a coexistence between the power of ACC and Simmenthal 
mandate. For more on this see Davide Paris, ‘Constitutional Courts as Guardians of EU Fundamental Rights? 
Centralised Judicial Review of Legislation and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU’ (2015) 11 European 
Constitutional Law Review 389. 
147 CJEU, Case C-399/09 Landtova, 22 June 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:415; Komarek (n 25) 440, referring to CJEU, 
Case C-412/96, Kainuun Liikenne Oy and Oy Pohjolan Liikenne Ab, Judgment of 17 September 1998, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:415, paras. 21-24, he argues “its [CJEU’s] settled case law states that it is the interpretation of 
national law provided by the referring court it takes into account, not that submitted by a party or a government 
in its submissions.” 
148 CJEU Simmenthal II (n 78) paras. 21 and 24. See also Torres Perez (n 49) 59; Bossuyt and Verrijdt (n 95) 371, 
377; Paris (n 146) 404-405. 
149 CJEU Melki and Abdeli (n 135) para. 51-57. See also Torres Perez (n 49) 59; Bossuyt and Verrijdt (n 95) 376. 
150 CJEU, Case C-348/89, Mecanarte - Metalúrgica da Lagoa Ldª kontra Chefe do Serviço da Conferência Final 
da Alfândega do Porto, Judgment of 27 June 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:278. 
151 CJEU Mecanarte (n 146) para. 45; Komarek (n 25) 437-438. 
152 CJEU, Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost (Foto-Frost), Judgment of 22 October 1987 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:452. 
153 CJEU Mecanarte (n 146) para. 56. 
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concessions to the priority of constitutional review are balanced with a possibility of national 
ordinary courts to adopt necessary measures protecting rights under EU law during an 
interlocutory procedure of constitutional review.  
The CJEU’s approach in accommodating constitutional review in Melki has not come out of 
the blue, and it was previously met not only by the interpretation provided by the CC but also 
by some of the other constitutional courts of member states where there is no such rule 
stipulating the priority of concrete constitutional review. For instance, the FCC154 and the 
CCC155 have clearly stated in their decisions that ordinary courts are free to choose between 
initiating either constitutional or compatibility review.156 Whichever way ordinary courts 
choose to go, they will need to base their decision on solid reasons as these might be subject to 
constitutional complaints at a later stage.157 In this manner, constitutional courts have retained 
a residual control over the judicial practice of ordinary courts but more importantly they have 
played a constructive role in securing that the European mandate of ordinary courts is being 
respected.158  
Taking into consideration the position of the CJEU in Melki as presented above, the dilemma 
of whether this decision has generally weakened constitutional courts in Europe does not pose 
a great challenge to be resolved.159 Reading Melki in line with Mecanarte, it should be easy to 
conclude that, even though constitutional courts have been influenced through this case law it 
cannot be said that they have been weakened.160 After all, the priority of constitutional review 
was declared to be compatible with the Simmenthal mandate of national ordinary courts even 
though subject to certain conditions. In this sense, both constitutional courts and the CJEU have 
managed to provide the necessary conditions for the constructive coexistence of the parallel 
forms of review. Just as it was argued in the other instances of CJEU’s procedural influence on 
constitutional courts’ position, it certainly cannot be denied that constitutional review in Europe 
has been subject of external influence through the development of EU law. Nevertheless, the 
magnitude of this influence should not be overestimated in order for it to fit rightly into the 
discourse of the demise of constitutional courts in Europe.  
 
 
                                                          
154 FCC, 1 BvL 4/00, Judgment 11 July 2006, para. 52. 
155 CCC, Pl. US 12/08, Order of 12 December 2008, para. 34: “The Constitutional Court leaves it entirely to the 
discretion of the ordinary court whether it will concern itself with reviewing the conflict with European 
Community law of the statutory provision which it should apply or will focus on the review of its conflict with 
the constitutional order of the Czech Republic. If it primarily focuses on the review of the conflict with European 
Community law and asserts, as in this case, that the statutory provision under review is in conflict therewith, it 
must draw from its conviction the consequences in accord with the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, that is, that 
the contested provision not be applied”. 
156 Komarek (n 25) 437. 
157 CCC (n 150) para 34. The same rule is part of the national legislation in Belgium, that is Article 26 paragraph 
4 of the Constitutional Court Act. For more on this see Bossuyt and Verrijdt (n 95) 370. 
158 Komarek (n 25) 437. 
159 De Visser (n 20) 423; Bobek (n 89) 298-300. 
160 Komarek (n 25) 442. 
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5 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at providing a condensed overview of the relationship between 
constitutional courts and the CJEU. Such an outline is supposed to provide the bases upon 
which a more detailed analysis is to be further developed in the subsequent chapters. Therefore, 
many of the issues dealt here were merely touched upon, while a comprehensive discussion is 
left for the chapters dealing with them specifically. In this sense, the overview provided here 
has addressed two aspects of the relationship – the substantive and procedural – and what kind 
of influence they have on the positions and status of constitutional courts.  
The story so far has shown that, despite the diversity among constitutional courts in the EU 
member states there is still certain level of convergence when it comes to their stance towards 
the CJEU and EU law. In this sense, there are four common threads among constitutional 
courts: their reactive approach to the developments of EU law through the case-law of the 
CJEU; acceptance of the special nature of EU law and of its fundamental doctrines and 
principles as designed by the CJEU, however with certain reservations on the primacy of EU 
law; application of EU law is provided for and based upon a national legal basis; and there has 
been evident reluctance so far in entering into direct judicial dialogue with the CJEU through 
sending preliminary references. These common features can be observed through three 
different approaches which focus on the procedural, jurisdictional or substantive aspects of the 
relationship between constitutional courts and the EU. The latter approach essentially delivers 
the complete picture involving different aspects and provides a classification of the substantive 
issues which have represented both a meeting point and a point of constitutional resistance. 
Accordingly, these issues are related to fundamental rights, division and exercise of 
competences in the EU and specific national constitutional provisions. 
When it comes to the proclaimed procedural primacy of EU law and CJEU, there is an ongoing 
debate revolving around the external decentralizing tendencies on constitutional review which 
were initiated by the Simmenthal II decision. While an impact on constitutional courts’ position 
resulting from the Simmenthal mandate of national ordinary courts cannot be denied, still, as it 
is argued here, the debate has frequently overestimated this impact. This is mainly because 
neither a new form of constitutional review has been introduced nor was the decentralizing 
impact directly related to constitutional review to alter significantly the status of constitutional 
courts. In this sense, the coexistence of constitutional and EU law compatibility review does 
not endanger constitutional courts, and this is one of the main reasons they have accepted and 
acknowledged the Simmenthal mandate within the national legal orders.  
On the other hand, the most recent CJEU case-law directly related to the Simmenthal II decision 
has touched upon three different aspects of the coexistence of constitutional and EU 
compatibility review: conditioning of the binding effect of constitutional court decisions in 
cases involving EU law (Križan); limiting temporal effect of constitutional courts decisions 
(Winner Wetten and Filipiak); and determining the sequence and/or priority between 
constitutional and compatibility review (Melki and Abdeli). These three lines of CJEU cases 
have raised concerns and led to an ongoing debate over the arguable development of a 
displacement doctrine by the CJEU. While theoretically the displacement doctrine as a notion 
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might have drawn scholarly attention, the practice, as argued in this chapter, has not (at least 
not yet) proven this conception as the most accurate one. Although the CJEU still does not 
demonstrate a satisfactory level of understanding and accommodation of the role and status of 
constitutional courts in national constitutional orders, this court and the constitutional courts 
themselves have begun to lay foundations for a possible constructive coexistence of the two 
types of review. However, since this is a development of a more recent date and requires further 
analysis in the future, firm conclusions over the relationship in this regard cannot be drawn at 
this point. Be that as it may, one thing nevertheless could be argued convincingly. 
Constitutional courts have not been subject of a fatal blow to their role, status and authority by 
the CJEU’s case-law and development of EU law, and there is ample room for their 
constructive role in the European integration. But how this role is to be perceived and defined 
will be the subject of all the subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Constitutional Pluralism and Constitutional Courts 
 
1 Introduction 
The ability to strike the right balance between different values and priorities and to reach the 
optimal solution is perhaps one of the toughest challenges that we so often face in our day-to-
day lives. It is no different in the realm of law either and it is actually one of its fundamental 
goals. In this sense, one contentious issue with a very strong gravity among legal scholars in 
constant search for the right balance is indeed the relationship between legal orders, particularly 
between national legal orders and the one of the European Union. The questions of supremacy, 
application, enforcement, effect and status of legal norms stemming from external legal orders 
have become central topics in the legal discourse. 
The debate on these types of relationships has been ongoing for quite long, however its 
relevance has increased dramatically over the last few decades with the growing influence of 
globalization on law.1 This phenomenon has led to the expansion and at the same time the 
layering and fragmentation of international law,2 the increasing enmeshment of domestic and 
international law and the creation of specialized branches and regimes and their emancipation 
from international law; the EU being the most vivid example.3 Another very important 
influence of globalization is perceived through the incremental shift of the law-making power 
to non-state actors - agencies and organizations - as the state is losing its monopoly over law-
making, and its sovereignty. Consequently the existence of multiple legal sites creates 
circumstances under which the overlaps and intersections between different legal orders are 
very frequent and complex4. On the other hand the decentralization of law-making authority 
                                                          
1 For more on globalization in this context see Anne Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’ in Janne 
E. Nijman and Andre Nollkaemper (eds) New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International 
Law, (OUP 2007) 252-254. 
2 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Rethinking Constitution Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism’ (2008) 6 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 415, 424, explains these two notions quite clearly arguing: “Two other 
potential points of convergence in a post-Westphalian world revolve around segmentation of the legal universe. 
In such a world, the legal realm seems to become, at once, increasingly layered and fragmented. It becomes 
layered, along vertical axis – German constitutional polity cannot be seamlessly integrated into the EU in the same 
way California is into the U.S. – and fragmented, through the proliferation of single, segmented, self-enclosed 
and self-referential legal regimes stacked alongside one another in a horizontal sequence.” For more on this issue 
see Martii Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 
Leiden Journal of International Law 533. Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law 2006, 
International Law Commission 58th session, 2006. Grainne de Burca and Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘The 
Denationalization of Constitutional Law’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 245, 246. 
3 Diramuid Rossa Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of European Community (Round 
Hall Sweet and Maxwell 1997) 21-37. 
4 Neil Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’ 
(2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373, 378. 
66 
 
away from the state5 leaves larger space for diversity that frequently is seen as putting at risk 
the unity and coherence of legal orders thus jeopardizing rule of law, as some would claim.6  
Under these circumstances the traditional doctrines and theories on the relationship between 
legal orders are not able to cope with the complexity of this new reality, often referred to as 
post-Westphalian.7 This reality cannot be framed through purely formalistic and binary 
reasoning. In this sense monism and dualism as theories that elaborate on the status and effect 
of international legal norms in the national legal orders, even though dominant in the legal 
discourse in the past, nowadays are losing their relevance. They are not able even to provide a 
descriptive account of the reality today, while their normative justifications have become very 
weak. Consequently, there is a strong argument that accepting either monism or dualism as the 
dominant doctrine on the interface between national and international law does not have much 
relevance for the actual status of international or more specifically EU law within the respective 
legal system. The debates about the choice between monism and dualism are now less useful 
for understanding the actual attitudes towards ‘external’ legal sources. Monistic states have 
proven to be not particularly open towards international law, and dualistic states have not been 
as international law unfriendly as might have been anticipated.8  
The traditional doctrines are too state-centered and locked in the Westphalian pattern of 
reasoning where the state owned the stage as far as law-making authority was concerned, 
something that seems to be long behind us.9 Consequently, the debate has shifted to assertions 
that “[monism and dualism] are intellectual zombies of another time and should be laid to rest, 
or “deconstructed””.10 Similar rigid dichotomies of either strictly local i.e. statal or global 
perspectives of viewing legal orders are equally not fitting the present circumstances of 
substantial overlaps and intertwinement.11 This is the main reason why the paradigm has been 
shifting towards broader acceptance of legal pluralism as the both descriptive and normative 
account of the relationship between legal orders. 
                                                          
5 Janne E. Nijman and Andre Nollkaemper, ’Beyond the Divide’ in: Janne E. Nijman and Andre Nollkaemper 
(eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (OUP 2007) 349-351; Lars 
Viellechner, ‘Responsiver Rechtspluralismus: Zur Entwicklung eines transnationalen Kollisionsrechts’ (2012) 51 
Der Staat 559, 563-564; Thomas Vesting, ‘Die Staatslehre und die Veränderung ihres Gegenstandes : 
Konsequenzen von Europäisierung und Internationalisierung’ in Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigungen der 
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 63 (2004) 47-58. 
6 Andre Nollkaemper, ‘Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law’ (2010) 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches 
Recht 65, 74. For more specific overview of this argument in the context of the EU see next section. 
7 Among others that frequently refer to this notion are: Walker Beyond (n 4); and Rosenfeld (n 2). 
8 Hellen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Introduction to the Project’ in Hellen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), 
A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, (OUP 2013); Karen Alter, Establishing 
the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of International Rule of Law in Europe (OUP 2001) 29. 
9 Walker (n 4); Rene Barents, ‘The Precedence of EU Law from the Perspective of Constitutional Pluralism’ 
(2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 421, 435. 
10 Armin v. Bogdandy, ‘Pluralims, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say’ (2008) 6 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 397, 400. For a similar view see also Dana Burchardt, Die Rangfrage im Europäischer 
Normenverbund: Theoretische Grundlagen und dogmatische Grundzüge des Verhältnisses von 
Unionsrecht und nationalem Recht (Mohr Siebeck 2015) 29-30. 
11 See for example Daniel Halberstam, ‘Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe meets the World’ in 
Grainne de Burca and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2011). 
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But why would this be relevant to the context of constitutional courts in Europe and their role 
in European Integration? Why would any type of paradigm shift from monism or dualism 
towards pluralism be of any importance for constitutional courts? Can we really expect that 
national institutions, particularly in this case, constitutional courts, could be immune from such 
substantial changes? 
The answer seems to be rather straightforward at least at first glance and there are two general 
reasons for that. First, constitutional courts have been at the center of the legal conundrum 
surrounding the relationship between different legal orders since their very establishment. They 
have directly shaped the doctrines on the legal status and application of ‘external’ law and legal 
sources in the domestic legal realm, regardless of how precise constitutional provisions have 
regulated this matter. In this sense, due to their role as guardians of the constitution they are 
also one of the crucial institutions in this paradigm shift. Thus it would be barely imaginable 
to discuss these institutions and their role at the present time without going into the changing 
state of the interface among different legal orders.  
Second, the European Union has been one of the hallmarks and most vivid example of the 
above mentioned trend. Even though it started as an international organization established on 
the basis of international treaties it soon emancipated itself from international law and state 
consent and claimed its autonomy as a separate legal order.12 The uniqueness of the EU law is 
that it directly enters the national legal orders. EU legal acts are envisioned not only to be 
applied to the member states but, more importantly, within the states, meaning directly by their 
citizens. This fact shaped the attitude of the CJEU towards the national legal orders and it 
undermined one of the fundamental notions of constitutionalism, that being the idea of 
constitutional supremacy. This drew in the constitutional courts which got heavily involved in 
determining the relationship between the national legal order and the EU legal order. This 
process, I would argue, could best be described and justified as one of constitutional pluralism. 
Therefore, the European legal order and the relations and circumstances surrounding it have 
been driving the paradigm shift.        
These latest developments have been subject to skeptical remarks on both the demise of 
constitutional courts as well as the negative impact that constitutional pluralism might have on 
the rule of law in general. Basically the claim is that constitutional courts are forced to leave 
their comfort zone of constitutional supremacy and well entrenched exclusivity of 
constitutional adjudication and enter an unmarked territory to which they are not capable of 
adapting. This has made some authors argue that there is the demise or creeping loss of 
relevance, Bedeutungsverlust, of these constitutional bodies under the pressure of an ever larger 
internationalization and Europeanization.13 Constitutional pluralism on the other hand, together 
with the conduct of constitutional courts, is often criticized for undermining the grand project 
                                                          
12 The CJEU lead this process beginning with its landmark judgments CJEU, Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Judgment 5 February 1963, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; and CJEU, Case 
6/64 Flamino Costa v ENEL, Judgment 15 July 1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. See for one of many important 
examples Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, (1991) The Yale Law Journal 2403. 
13 Christoph Schönberger, 'Anmerkungen zu Karlsruhe' in Matthias Jestaedt, Oliver Lepsius, Christoph Möllers 
and Christoph Schönberger (eds), Das entgrenzte Gericht: Eine kritische Bilanz nach sechszig Jahren 
Budensverfassungsgericht (Suhrkamp 2011) 57. 
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of further European integration based on the principles and values of EU law primacy, 
coherence, unity and efficiency.14 
This chapter sets the theoretical foundation for arguing against such conceptions and argues 
not only a change of relevance, Bedeutungsänderung/Bedeutungswandel, but also, as part of 
an organic process of adaptation, the establishment of new roles for constitutional courts which 
are best observed through the constitutional pluralism in the context of the European Union. 
Constitutional pluralism enables the accommodation of competing and equally legitimate 
claims for ultimate authority in the European Union. So the aim here is to show how 
constitutional pluralism can achieve two interrelated goals, to further European integration by 
basing it on firmer legal foundations as well as maintaining, if not increasing, the significance 
of constitutional courts in Europe through promotion and furthering of their constructive role 
in this process.  
Following this line of thought and argumentation this chapter in section two puts constitutional 
pluralism in the specific context of the European Union first by arguing the demise of 
traditional doctrines on the relationship between legal orders and then by presenting the main 
tenets of constitutional pluralism in the EU. Taking into consideration that besides the main 
tenets of constitutional pluralism there are different interpretations and views on the very same 
relationship between national and EU legal order section three turns to the analyses of three of 
these views which are arguably the most influential among them. In section four, main 
strengths and weaknesses of constitutional pluralism in general, but also of the specific views 
of this theory, are presented and analyzed. Based on this rather extensive overview of the 
theory/theories the final section puts forward through the lenses of constitutional pluralism the 
three new roles that constitutional courts have developed in the context of the European 
integration, namely providing constitutional legitimacy to EU law, protection of national 
identity and safeguard of the veritical division and exercise of competences in the EU. 
2 The European Union and constitutional pluralism 
2.1 Deconstructing the traditional doctrines of monism and dualism in the EU 
The traditional theories and binary reasoning were dominant and in some circles still dominate 
the reasoning on the relationship between the legal orders in the European Union. Namely, 
according to these views the choice that is essentially supposed to be made is between two 
competing conceptions and narratives, a state-sovereignist conception with national 
constitutional supremacy at its core and European monism based on the supremacy of EU law. 
Different actors are promoting different types of supremacy i.e. ultimate legal rule and propone 
to have the final say.  
                                                          
14 Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ (2008) 14 European 
Law Journal 389. 
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The state-sovereignist conception is deeply rooted in dualism15 according to which the two 
legal orders, national and EU, where the latter in essence, according to this view, is just another 
form of international law,16 are just like “two spheres that at best adjoin one another but never 
intersect”.17 Thus there is the view that the two legal orders are totally separated and not 
integrated. EU law can be applied in the respective national legal order only as result of the 
constitutional authorization provided in the so-called ‘European clauses’ of the respective 
constitutions.18 This is the prerequisite for its validity in the national legal order.19 
In this sense, the states and their constitutions as the expression of the will of the true barer of 
sovereignty, the citizens, are the ultimate source of legal authority and the EU legal order 
derives its own from them and state consent.20 Therefore the EU legal order derives from 
national legal orders. The EC/EU was created by the direct consent of its member states as 
manifested by signing and ratifying the founding treaties. In this way the states are the “masters 
of the treaties”.21 The actual status and effect of EU legal norms in the national legal order does 
not make any difference, because this status and authority was given by the constitution, which 
in the end has the supremacy. Hence the defining feature of national constitutionalism is the 
constitutional supremacy, something that has been traditionally acknowledged as decisive to 
the internally integrated and coherent legal order. 
Such a conception was not only present in the academic debates but it rather found its place 
also in the case law of some constitutional courts, even though I would argue that some of this 
evidence was clearly taken out of the broader context and spirit of the actual decisions. What 
is noticeable in these decisions, particularly the ones of the FCC, is that at the very same time 
they make the argument that supremacy of EU law could be accepted only if the EU becomes 
                                                          
15 See for an opinion that this conception is monist Klemen Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU (OUP 2014) 
3. However, see Walker (n 4) 378, making the argument that both monism and dualism have the same underlying 
meta-principal. For more on this state-sovereignist or national constitutionalist conception see Burchardt (n 10) 
101-139. 
16 Barents (n 9) 434. 
17 Quoting Tripel in Janne E. Nijman and Andre Nollkaemper (n 5) 7-8. 
18 Monica Claes, ‘Constitutionalizing Europe at its Source: The “European Clauses” in the National Constitutions: 
Evolution and Typology’ (2005) 24 Yearbook of European Law 81; Anneli Albi, ‘'Europe' Articles in the 
Constitutions of the Central and Eastern European Countries’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 399. On 
the bridging function of the Acts of Approval of the European Treaties in Germany see Andreas Voßkuhle, ‘The 
Cooperation Between European Courts: The Verbund of European courts and its Legal Toolbox’ in Allan Rosas, 
Eglis Levits and Yves Bot (eds), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives 
on Sixty Years of Case-Law (T.M.C. Asser 2012) 84. 
19 The very fact that even in monistic countries it is as a result of constitutional provision which declares that 
international law dully ratified or EU law is essentially integral part of the domestic legal order is fundamentally 
dualistic. Thus even in countries that are notable examples of the true monistic approach, such as the Netherlands, 
this view of national constitutional supremacy is not false. On this point see Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutional 
Democracy Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement’ in Sujit Choudrhy (ed), The Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas (CUP 2007) 258. See also Franz C. Mayer and Mattias Wendel, ‘Multilevel 
Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek, Constitutional Pluralism in 
the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 134. 
20 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in Neil Walker, 
Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) 505: “There can be no competing sovereignties between the states and the 
EU but just a pooling, sharing or limiting of state sovereignty”. 
21 See for example FCC, Judgment of 12 October 1993 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 Maastricht [1993] BVerfGE 89,155; 
[1994]. See also Jaklic (n 15) 3; Barents (n 9) 434. 
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a federal state eventually.22 However the courts are expected to abide by the ultimate legal rule, 
the constitution, and from an internal perspective it is irrelevant what kind of consequences 
breaking the international or EU law might cause. As long as they act according to the national 
legal order, they are on the safe side. 
The second view, the idea of European monism,23 is a monistic account of the relationship 
between legal orders that envisages a single hierarchically integrated order where the top spot 
is reserved for EU law. In this manner it uses Kelsen’s pyramid24 and declares EU law the 
Grundnorm and in this sense subsumes and subordinates national legal orders including their 
constitutions which through this basically surrender their autonomy.25 According to this 
conception EU law is not ordinary treaty law but due to its, basically self-proclaimed, 
supranational character with an established political link between the peoples of Europe, as 
opposed to a mere expression of state consent26, its application within the member states does 
not require any “domestic constitution-based mediation or reprocessing”.27 Therefore, it 
deserves a special status, which should be seen as constitutional in its nature. This means that 
the ultimate legal authority lies at the European level and with EU law as an autonomous legal 
order28 and it should have primacy as declared by the ECJ through its case law.29 The grounds 
for such a claim are mainly related to the basic rationale of integration and the principle of rule 
of law.30 Namely, if there is no strict respect for the ultimate legal authority of EU law then the 
whole project of European integration will be called into question. As uniform interpretation 
and application of EU law is at the core of the EU supremacy claim any derogation from this 
principle of supremacy by the member states would be contagious and it would at the same 
time jeopardize the very coherence, unity, uniformity as well as legal certainty of the EU legal 
order. 
Both of these conceptions are burdened by several shortcomings that make them mutually 
exclusive and any conflict between the two irresolvable. Consequently they are descriptively 
and normatively inconclusive for the relationship between the two legal orders.31 This 
conclusion can be best illustrated by briefly explaining the main lines of conflicting arguments, 
                                                          
22 For a similar argument see Jaklic (n 15) 1-2. 
23 For a detailed elaboration of this position see Mattias Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in 
Europe? Three Conceptions of the Relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and The 
European Court of Justice’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 351, 353 -362; Burchardt (n 10) 67-100; and 
Jaklic (n 15) 3-4. 
24 On monism see Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Transaction 2006) 363-380. 
25 See more in Barents (n 9) 432-433; and Jaklic (n 15) 3. 
26 Maduro (n 20) 504; and Jaklic (n 15) 3. 
27 Rosenfeld (n 2) 418. 
28 Barents defines the self-referential and autonomous status of a legal order as such: “In principle, a legal order 
is self-referential system, that is a system in which the creation, validity, application and interpretation of a legal 
rule depend exclusively on the order of which that rule constitutes a part”, Barents (n 9) 426 and goes further and 
argues: “if the self-referential character of a legal order is complete that order is according to itself, autonomous: 
the law in that order is the only law of that order” Barents (n 9) 427. 
29 CJEU Costa v. E.N.E.L. (n 12); CJEU Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Judgment of 17 December 1970, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. 
30 Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘Legal Pluralism and Institutional Disobedience in the European Union’ in Matej Avbelj 
and Jan Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 252-254. 
31 See Mattias Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before 
and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262, 274.  
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that are presented without going into their analysis, related to the lack of democratic legitimacy 
of the supremacy claim for EU law, its (non)autonomous character and dependence on state 
consent.   
According to the state-sovereignist conception the EU legal order cannot claim to be 
autonomous legal order emancipated from both international law and state consent as the 
founding Treaties and their revisions are, according to the treaty provisions as well32, still 
directly dependent on state consent for their enactment and entry into force. This preserves the 
position of the member states as masters of the treaties. In this sense the European legal order 
derives from the national legal order based on national constitutional supremacy and the 
opposite can never be the case because of which the supremacy of EU law is denied. This 
argument is further supported by the democratic legitimacy argument33 which points out that 
due to the lack of a European demos and barely existing links with the citizens of the member 
states, the EU suffers from a chronic democratic deficit that makes any claim for EU law 
supremacy unviable.  
The counterargument of European monists is that while direct consent from member states is 
required for any treaty change,34 there are an increasing number of issues that are regulated 
through a legislative procedure based on the qualified majority vote and through an increasing 
role of the European Parliament. This makes such situations possible in which certain member 
states that voted against specific legislation are still obliged to abide by it. Additionally, EU 
law is applied directly in the member states without the need of further constitutional 
authorization thus while state consent might be important for primary EU law this is not really 
the case for secondary EU law. This argument is further strengthened by the fact that even if 
member states are masters of the treaties, they have not abolished or derogated the longstanding 
principle of primacy as defined by the ECJ.35 They had several opportunities to do so however 
this sort of change was never truly on the agenda. Moreover, if supremacy would be left to the 
national legal order then under those circumstances overall unity of EU law would be 
fundamentally impossible as its content and scope would be totally dependent on the 
constitutions of the member states.36  
Summarizing the main arguments made by the traditional conceptions one can conclude that 
there are common tenets that totally reveal their fallacies and that make both of these extreme 
positions not well adjusted to the current reality. Neither of the two competing conceptions can 
completely and accurately describe the existing relationship between the legal orders which 
also includes the court practices, particularly among national constitutional courts. Being well 
                                                          
32 See Article 48 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union [2008] OJ C115/13. 
33 Kumm, Jurisprudence (n 31) 274ff, he refers to this argument as ‘We the People’. 
34 See also on the right to withdrawal and the duration of EU obligations afterwards Daniel Halberstam, ‘Systems 
Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: National, Supranational and Global Governance’ in 
Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 
98. 
35 The state-sovereigntists would claim that the primacy principle is not clear at all and that for the purposes of 
their own legal order it is enough that the constitutional courts have voiced their concern. Vesting on the other 
hand argues that member states have become “Herren” (Master) and “Knechte” (Servant) of the treaties at the 
same time, see Vesting (n 5) 54.  
36 Barents (n 9) 430 and for a specific objection to constitutional pluralism in this regard Baquero Cruz (n 14) 
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entrenched in the hierarchical conception they are unable to present an overarching argument 
that will be able to create an order between the competing orders sought for by both 
conceptions.37 In a situation where both claims over the ultimate legal authority seem to be 
equally valid and there is no objective criteria to break the tie there is no authoritative resolution 
in case of conflict between the two.38 In this sense each hierarchical conception denies the 
existence of two autonomous legal orders. It is simply theoretically not possible to have a 
supremacy claim under which by default one order is subordinate to the other and to still 
maintain that both of the legal orders are autonomous, which is the reality at present. In order 
for the EU law to have its unquestioned supremacy the EU would need to transform into a 
federal state of some sort, something that is not foreseeable even in the more distance future. 
On the other hand the EU law and integration could not really proceed along this path if a 
traditional statist conception of constitutional supremacy is inflexibly maintained.39 Therefore, 
any rigid hierarchical conception is essentially inadequate and alternative conceptions need to 
be accepted. Constitutional pluralism represents the most viable alternative and is at the center 
of the paradigm shift in Europe.40  
2.2 The EU and constitutional pluralism 
Oddly enough one could argue that legal scholars were more entrenched into these forms of 
traditional reasoning then the respective constitutional courts of the member states. Even 
though exceptional by their occurrence, mainly due to the scope of EC law at the time, still 
constitutional courts, in particular, of Italy (ICC) and Germany (FCC) through their case-law, 
manifested a departure from a rigid dualistic stance and shifted towards pluralism best 
perceived through the Solange doctrine of equivalent protection of fundamental rights of the 
FCC and the controlimiti doctrine of the ICC.41 This academic inertia was finally disturbed by 
another landmark decision of the FCC in the decision reviewing the Maastricht Treaty. In this 
                                                          
37 Walker (n 4) 373ff, speaks of an absence of an overarching meta-principle such as state sovereignty once was 
leading to disorder of orders. 
38 Barents (n 9) 435. 
39 Nick Barber, The Constitutional State (OUP 2011) 166, he speaks of the problem of assertion of finality by 
national and European jurisdictions. See also Mayer and Wendel (n 19) 136 and Barents (n 9) 428. 
40 See Kumm Jurisprudence (n 31) 282ff. Commenting on the spread of constitutional pluralism Weiler comments: 
“Constitutional pluralism is today the only party membership card which will guarantee a seat at the high tables 
of the public law professorate…I have begun to wonder: Is there anyone out there who is not a constitutional 
pluralist?…what begins as heterodoxy becomes prevailing orthodoxy, in the case of constitutional pluralism 
suddenly emerges as hopelessly politically correct” Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Prologue: Global and Pluralist 
Constitutionalism – some doubts’ in Grainne de Burca and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European 
Constitutionalism (CUP 2011) 8. 
41 FCC Judgment of 29 May 1974  BvL 52/71 Solange I [1974] BVerfGE 31, 145; FCC Judgment of 12 October 
1993 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 Maastricht [1993] BVerfGE 89,155; [1994], ICC Judgement of 27 December 1973 
Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze, in Andrew Oppenheimer, The Relationship Between European Community 
Law and National Law Vol 1 (CUP 1994) 640; and ICC Judgement of 8 June 1984  Spa Granital v 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato in Andrew Oppenheimer, The Relationship Between European 
Community Law and National Law Vol 1 (CUP 1994) 651. The Solange doctrine has served as an inspiration and 
pattern in recent cases of the ECtHR in Case 45036/98 judgment of 30 June 2005, Bosphorus v Ireland [2006] 
and the CJEU in Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649.  For a slightly different 
position on the latter case see Halbstream (n 11) who claims that the court did not employ this doctrine even 
though it should have just as the AG Maduro has done in his Opinion in this case. 
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way this constitutional court basically initiated the still enduring debate on constitutional 
pluralism.42  
It was one article of Neil MacCormick43 in which he basically defended the reasoning of the 
FCC in Maastricht and argued for the theoretical soundness of this reasoning that stirred the 
water and awoke scholars on both sides of the debate. MacCormick recognized the existence 
of constitutional pluralism even though he did not call it by that name.  
Constitutional pluralism is based on two basic assumptions.44 First, constitutionalism as a 
normative theory of power is not firmly tied to the state and it can exist outside of the state. 
Thus it assumes that constitutionalism can be present in other polities. Second, the 
constitutional discourse in the EU is much more advanced than any such form of discourse at 
the international level thus it assumes that there is a European constitutionalism with at least a 
‘thin’ constitution, in a merely functional sense.45 On the other hand, the particular level of 
homogeneity and initial and subsequent material convergence among EU member states under 
circumstances of the obvious lack of convergence on formal grounds make a very strong case 
for constitutional pluralism in the EU.46 Even though we see many examples of pluralism in 
the international legal realm and an academic debate develops fast arguing for one or another 
                                                          
42 Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), ‘Four Vision of Constitutional Pluralism’, EUI Working Paper Law 
2008/21, 11, 23. Such a stance has been followed by many constitutional courts in Europe particularly in the 
Central and Eastern European States. Very telling quote in this regard is from the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s 
decision on the Accession Treaty: “The concept and model of European law created a new situation, wherein, 
within each Member State, autonomous legal orders co-exist and are simultaneously operative. Their interaction 
may not be completely described by the traditional concepts of monism and dualism regarding the relationship 
between domestic law and international law. The existence of relative autonomy of both, national and Community, 
legal orders in no way signifies an absence of interaction between them. Furthermore, it does not exclude the 
possibility of a collision between regulations of Community law and the Constitution”, PCC Judgment of 11 May 
2005, K 18/04, Poland’s Membership in the European Union (The Accession Treaty) para 12, Available at: 
http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/K_18_04_GB.pdf  last visited 07.10.2018. 
43 Neil MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259. 
44 See below in 0 for a more detailed account of these two assumptions in the context of criticism against 
constitutional pluralism. Loughlin presents three assumptions, or as he terms the same as tenets of constitutional 
pluralism: the foundation of political authority lies in a constitution; that in the context of the EU political authority 
is constituted autonomously at the supranational as well as the national level and cannot be conceived in 
hierarchical terms; and that therefore the issue of ultimate authority either is to be left open(radical pluralism) or 
is re-integrated in a universal order of constitutional principles (pluralism under international law). Martin 
Loughlin, ‘Constitutional pluralism: An oxymoron?’ (2014) 3 Global Constitutionalism 9, 22.  
45 See more on this below in section 4.1.1. 
46 Rosenfeld (n 2) 422-424: “[W]hat is required, ultimately, to preserve cohesiveness and unity in a pluralist polity, 
therefore, is some combination of formal and material points of convergence. The formal would reflect an 
acceptance of the function of the prevailing constitutional and legal order as a means to settle issues over which 
no material agreement among the plurality of competing views within the polity seems possible. The material 
points of convergence, on the other hand, result from a normative commonality or overlap that spreads across a 
vast majority of competing normative outlooks within the polity.” 422. See also Halberstam (n 34) 101, he 
emphasizes the mutual embedded openness and a sense of common cause – shared purpose in Europe, and 
Nollkaemper (n 6) 74-75; Neil Walker, ‘Reconciling MacCormick: Constitutional Pluralism and the Unity of 
Practical Reason’ (2011) 24 Ratio Juris 369, 377-378 but compare to Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and 
Pluralism in Global Context’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European 
Union and Beyond (Hart 2012). 
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form of legal pluralism still, the European Union as the birthplace of constitutional pluralism 
remains the best suited site for this theory.47 
Departing from the traditional theories constitutional pluralism represents a paradigm shift in 
providing a descriptive and normative account of the relationship between national and 
European legal order. It overcomes the inevitable deadlock of blindly following either of the 
equally valid and legitimate legal i.e. constitutional authority claims in Europe by 
accommodating them through a horizontal relationship between legal orders better known as 
heterarchy. The competing constitutional authority claims stem from autonomous and 
separated but interacting and overlapping legal orders that should leave the question of ultimate 
legal rule open because there are no objective criteria to determine a single all-purpose 
authoritative legal answer.48 This enables the legal orders to co-exist as autonomous without 
being exclusive at the same time.49 In order for this openness not to end up in chaos or anarchy50 
constitutional pluralism argues that institutional actors, the respective highest courts above all, 
need to recognize this new reality by developing an attitude of mutual respect and engagement, 
accommodation and interaction and dialogue in order to foster unity and coherence in the 
European legal realm.51 Unity according to constitutional pluralism can be achieved through 
heterarchy.52 In case of irresolvable conflict the ultimate way to solve the issue will be through 
political means while legal theory cannot provide a single solution.53 
Based on the abovementioned, one can distinguish several fundamental tenets of constitutional 
pluralism. Those are: existences of multiple autonomous, separate and interacting legal orders, 
the horizontal positioning of the legal orders and mutual respect and accommodation among 
those orders. These orders are positioned in a heterarchy and imply the need for an attitude of 
mutual respect and engagement and accommodation within the legal orders. It is both the 
descriptive and normative account of constitutional pluralism that is revealed by these 
fundamental tenets. 
2.2.1 Plurality of legal orders 
Constitutional pluralism does not drastically depart from the very foundations of the two 
competing conceptions however it does provide for a different perspective that adapts them to 
the new reality existing in Europe.54 It is true that its starting point is actually dualistic in the 
                                                          
47 This is why legal pluralism might be suited for the global level, however for Europe constitutional pluralism is 
more suitable due to the existing constitutional claim on the EU side. For the differences between legal and 
constitutional pluralism see below in section 4.1.1. For very similar argument see Weiler (n 40) 12.  
48 MacCormick (n 43) 265-266. 
49 Neil Walker, ‘Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 317, 346. 
50 Walker (n 4) 390, explaining the strong form of pluralism writes: “Under this perspective, the new state of 
nature is no longer an anarchy of formally identical states but an anarchy of highly differentiated units and nodes 
of legal authority”.  
51 See particularly the contrapunctual principles Maduro (n 20). 
52 Avbelj and Komarek, Four Visions (n 42) 13. 
53 MacCormick, Maastricht (n 43) 265-266 and Kumm, Jurisprudence (n 31) 293. For more on the distinction 
between political and legal resolutions to such conflicts see Matthias Klatt, Die Praktische Konkordanz von 
Kompetenzen (Mohr Siebeck 2014) 134-154. 
54 Halberstam (n 11) 175. 
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sense that it assumes existence of separate legal orders however there are crucial differences.55 
While the core dualist idea is that essentially there are two legal orders, international and 
national, that at best adjoin each other, pluralism envisages the existence of multiple diverse 
orders that are in constant interaction and overlap.56 Unlike dualism that puts emphasis on strict 
separation of orders on the basis of addressees and subject matter, pluralism’s emphasis is on 
the intersection, and especially on the notion that EU law cannot be distinguished from national 
law on the same basis. After all, it is not required to transform EU law in order to be applicable 
in the national legal order, it has direct effect.57 On the other hand, the intersection and overlaps 
between the orders do not contradict the claim that these multiple legal orders are autonomous. 
In this sense, for constitutional pluralism “any given constitution does not set up a normative 
universum anymore but is, rather, an element in a normative pluriversum”.58 This point brings 
us to the second fundamental tenet of constitutional pluralism, heterarchy. 
 
2.2.2 Heterarchy 
Constitutional pluralism reconciles some of the foundational features of state constitutionalism 
with the post-Westphalian order. It adapts and accommodates both national and EU internal 
perspectives on the common European legal order to the context of pluralism by placing the 
separate legal orders in a heterarchy.59  
Heterarchy is a systemic relationship that includes both horizontal and vertical relations and 
interactions. It is a “system of spontaneous, decentralized ordering among various actors within 
the system…based on constitutional considerations, that is, in the values of constitutionalism 
itself”.60 
While vertical relations are characteristic for the internal perspective of the orders, horizontal 
ones are specific to the external perspective of the relationship between orders in the EU 
context. Unlike in this context, the horizontal relationship, that is well known to exist between 
different national constitutional sites, does not involve substantial overlaps between the orders 
but rather mutual exclusion based on the territorial and jurisdictional criteria.61 Like this the 
                                                          
55 Bogdandy (n 10) 400-401; Kumm, Final (n 23) 375 fn. 48 “It is not dualist, because it does not preclude the 
possibility that there are more than two levels of legal orders”, Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Three Claims of 
Constitutional Pluralism’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European 
Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 82; and Mayer and Wendel (n 19) 137. 
56 MacCormick (n 43) 262: “[O]ne legal system when it applies norms from another legal system, treats them not 
as simple matters of ‘fact’, but as norms of law valid within the system. The relationship of EC law to the legal 
system of Member states is a case in point.” On this lack of strict duality between the lega orders see also Herbert 
Bethge, in Theodor Maunz, Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Franz Klein, Herbert Bethge et al., 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz: Kommentar Band 1 (54th edition C.H. Beck 2018) 148. 
57 Mayer and Wendel (n 19) 137. 
58 Bogadandy (n 10) 401. 
59 Avbelj and Komarek (n 42) 12, 15, Vesting uses the term of “Netzwerk” (Network) to describe the same notion, 
Vesting (n 5) 64. Jaklic places a large emphasis on the “heterarchy minimized” being the common feature, the 
thinnest pluralist principle, being characteristic for theories within constitutional pluralism. Jaklic (n 15) 21-22, 
170-171.  
60 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United 
States’ in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 337. 
61 Avbelj and Komarek (n 42) 8; and Mayer and Wendel (n 19) 134. 
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heterarchy embraces both hierarchy as specific for each legal order in its internal organization 
through a single rule of recognition and pluralism in the existence, and the interaction of 
different legal orders. The ultimate source of validity in each of the orders does not need to 
change. The constitutional court’s point of reference will remain the domestic order and its 
constitution and EU law is the equivalent for the CJEU. EU law will continue to be validated 
and given authority in the member states on the basis of their respective legal order. However, 
constitutional pluralism requires adjustments of these views in order to accommodate the 
claims of the orders.  
Lastly, heterarchy does not exclude all types of preeminence within the interaction of orders. 
What it rules out is an all-purpose superiority of one system over another.62 Therefore 
heterarchy is not incompatible with hierarchy, on the contrary.63 As a matter of fact, 
constitutionalism can also be achieved in the framework of heterarchy.64 Weiler’s criticism of 
constitutional pluralism in that it is juxtaposing essential elements of constitutional orders, 
namely hierarchy and pluralism, and solely focusing on the latter is losing its force in this 
sense.65 
The most important consequence of this horizontal perspective on the relationship between 
orders is that due to law’s inability to provide for the objective criteria in deciding between 
multiple claims of ultimate legal authority the question of ultimate rule and say is left open. 
This might give rise to conflict situations among norms stemming from the multiple legal 
orders but it should not be conceived that every potential conflict will lead to chaos and 
disorder. However, the conflicts that from a legal perspective remain incommensurable could 
be resolved by political means. After all, in this sense of affiliation with politics, law is a 
circular category.66  
2.2.3 Mutual respect and accommodation  
In order to avoid any potential risk of the inherent openness of heterarcy turning into a disorder 
the third essential element is complementing it by foreseeing certain patterns of approach 
towards diversity and multiplicity from both national and EU actors, especially courts.67 
Bearing in mind that the relationship of legal orders in the EU is very much built upon a mutual 
                                                          
62 Neil MacCormick, Questioning sovereignty (OUP 1999) 118, 120. 
63 See for example Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The Structure of Constitutional Pluralism: Review of Nico Krisch, Beyond 
Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Post-National Law’ (2013) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 491, 493; for a very insightful discussion of the relationships of different legal orders and their respective 
legal norms and how they incorporate and reconcile both heterarchical and hierarchical relations in the 
“ordnungsübergreifenden Normenrelationen” of her “Europäischer Normenverbund” see Burchardt (n 15) 196-
198, 331-334. See more on this below in section 3.3. 
64 Halberstam (n 60) 328. 
65 Weiler (n 40) 15. 
66 See more on this in Jan Komarek, ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’ Pluralism’ in Matej 
Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 246-
247.  
67 Maduro (n 55) 82, he explains that: “…dualism does not impose an obligation of mutual accommodation on 
both legal orders. They co-exist and prevalence of one or the other is a simple function of jurisdictional power. 
Constitutional pluralism, on the other hand, requires mutual recognition but also communication and 
accommodation”. 
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embedded openness of orders68 then it is expected that the relationship between the orders and 
their institutions should be based on mutual respect, recognition and accommodation of 
diversity and authority claims.69 Thus constitutional pluralism tries to define the rules of 
engagement70 between the courts and it basically “should tell constitutional courts under which 
conditions they should defer to the EU jurisdiction and instead when they could feel authorized 
to try to create new rules of the game”.71  Hence when deciding their cases at hand both national 
and EU courts should be careful to consider the broader circumstances as well as the effect and 
consequences of their decisions. When interpreting respective legal norms each court should 
have due regard to the claims and authority of the other legal orders, even in cases when they 
are seriously contested. If the shared vision is to establish a common European legal order72 
then it would be advisable for them to interact more with other legal orders and courts either 
through formal or informal paths of judicial dialogue generating legal and judicial cross-
fertilization.73  
In this manner doctrines such as consistent interpretation, equivalent protection of fundamental 
rights, respect for national i.e. constitutional identities, and arguably application primacy of EU 
law (Anwendungsvorrang), margin of appreciation and so on, are developed and employed by 
the courts on a regular basis, thereby proving the reality of pluralism and its constructive 
force.74 They all serve the purpose of accommodation of diversity, a conditional deference, 
without necessarily eliminating but rather recognizing and fostering it. 
Therefore one should not fall into the trap of identifying constitutional pluralism with a 
constitutional conflict in the EU, a sort of conflict extinguisher.75 Constitutional pluralism 
provides the framework under which it will be possible to avoid or manage inevitable conflicts 
and not to perceive them as breaking points of the common European legal order but rather 
accepting them as an essential feature.76 
3 The numerous perspectives of constitutional pluralism 
The above described tenets of constitutional pluralism might leave a wrong impression that it 
is one single coherent theory that explains the new relationship between legal orders. However, 
                                                          
68 Halberstam (n 34) 97-98; and Halberstam (n 11) 175. 
69 Halberstam (n 11) 161. 
70 See more on this in Maduro (n 20) 524ff. 
71 Avbelj and Komarek (n 21). 
72 Halberstam (n 34) 99-100. 
73 For more on these concepts see Anne Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard 
International Law Journal 191. See also Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of 
Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism’ States’ in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel 
P. Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 
358.  
74 See for example Bogdandy (n 10) or on the matter of human rights and importance of margin of appreciation 
see also Ferdinand Kirchhof, ‘Kooperation zwischen nationalen und europäischen Gerichten’ (2014) 49 
Europarecht 267, 275. 
75 Maduro (n 20) 532ff, he basically argues that constitutional pluralism is not only about exceptional situations 
of conflict but rather it should guide the ordinary state of affairs. 
76 Kumm (n 31) 269, Kumm argues that constitutional pluralism “Aims to ensure that remaining constitutional 
conflicts are procedurally transformed into moments of constructive deliberative engagement”. 
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this is not the case. Constitutional pluralism encompasses divergent views and perspectives 
under its banner. These perspectives do share the tenets altogether, however they differentiate 
themselves on their level of pluralism and whether they are trying to tame this pluralism 
characterized by high probability of irresolvable conflicts with a more moderate forms of 
pluralism. Thus among the different theories, dependent on how much pluralism is tamed and 
framed, we can distinguish between radical and moderate versions of pluralism.77 The former 
accepts the existence of incommensurable constitutional claims and perceives the potential 
conflicts not as destructive or immensely jeopardizing the rule of law, as law cannot find an 
objective tie-breaking criteria. However, despite recognizing the existence of two separated 
legal sites radical pluralists claim that the relations between the two are not constitutional.78 
The latter however tries to frame these potential conflicts either by providing meta-principles 
for judicial conduct and interpretation to avoid the conflicts or focus on common values as to 
how to legitimize them.79 Jan Komarek and Matej Avbelj have distinguished six currents of 
pluralism in Europe. Those are socio-teleological constitutionalism, the epistemic meta-
constitutionalism, the best fit universal constitutionalism (i.e. cosmopolitan constitutionalism), 
harmonious discursive constitutionalism, multilevel constitutionalism and pragmatic 
constitutionalism.80 However, even such an exhaustive classification made from experts is 
contested. The most notable example is regarding the first one among the six. 
Joseph Weiler has opposed any identification of his views with constitutional pluralism as he 
is essentially criticizing this theory. His theory on constitutional tolerance putting forward the 
notion of the voluntary acceptance and obedience to EU law by member states81 does not fit 
well into the main features of constitutional pluralism.82 It does reject the notion of heterarchy 
as not compatible with constitutionalism and insists on the value of hierarchy along with 
pluralism.83  
Developing from a thought provoking and challenging intellectual exercise constitutional 
pluralism is slowly taking over the legal discourse on the relationship between legal orders.84 
                                                          
77 Neil MacCormick (n 62) 97-122 points to radical pluralism as opposed to the pluralism under international law, 
Walker (n 4) 390 makes a distinction between strong and moderate pluralism, Nico Krisch, ‘The Case of Pluralism 
in Postnational Law’ in Grainne de Burca and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European 
Constitutionalism (CUP 2011) 219ff, he differentiates between systemic and institutional/interpretative pluralism. 
78 Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012), 24. For a more detailed argumentation 
see Krisch (n 77). 
79 See below section 3.2 on Maduro and section 3.3 on Kumm. 
80 Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek, ‘Introduction’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism 
in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012), 5-6. This classification is based on a previous one in Matej 
Avbelj, ‘Questioning EU Constitutionalism’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1, 11ff. 
81 Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg’ in Joseph H.H. Weiler 
and Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond the State (CUP 2003) 21. Weiler is promoting a 
federal constitutional discipline which, however is not rooted in a statist-type constitution. However, there are 
authors that define this theory as constitutional pluralism, see Jaklic (n 15) 69-101. 
82 As a matter of fact, MacCormick as early as 1993 criticized a very similar Austin inspired view of habit-of-
obedience sovereignty as being monocular view, which is not sustainable due to the complexity of the existing 
legal picture. See more on this Neil MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law 
Review 1, 5. 
83 Weiler (n 40) 13, 15-18. 
84 Weiler (n 40) 8. 
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Increasing number of authors are arguing for constitutional pluralism even in different 
contexts85 or are using it to make other claims that sometimes are even quite remote form the 
theory itself.86 While there are views that go beyond the judicial and systemic aspects in the 
EU context by broadening the concept to include other institutions the focus here is put on the 
European context and particularly on the judicial aspects of constitutional pluralism. This is 
mainly result of the view held here that the whole issue of competing constitutional claims in 
the EU unravels before the courts and they are the most visible sites of the frictions so far and 
presumably in the future.87 Therefore the arguments presented here are mainly limited to the 
features that will help shed some light on the actual role of constitutional courts in the EU under 
this theoretical framework.  
3.1 Laying the bait – Neil MacCormick 
Neil MacCormick paved the way for constitutional pluralism with his groundbreaking article 
on the FCC’s decision in the Maastricht case.88 Through this article he sat the stage for his 
brainchild to occupy a prominent role in the legal discourse but then he became afraid of his 
own creation and partially abandoned it.    
Inspired by certain sociological and anthropological accounts of legal pluralism as well as the 
theory of federalism89 MacCormick analyzed the existing reality at the time in the EC context 
in the wake of the Maastricht decisions. He argued that under the circumstances of existences 
of autonomous legal orders, of the EU and its member states respectively, that are “distinct but 
interacting”90 pluralistic analysis offers more convincing explanation than any other alternative 
view.91 MacCormick averred that: 
Where there is a plurality of institutional normative orders, each with a functioning 
constitution (at least in the sense of a body of higher-order norms establishing and 
conditioning relevant governmental powers) it is possible that each acknowledge the 
legitimacy of every other within its own sphere, while none asserts or acknowledges 
constitutional superiority over another. In this case, ‘constitutional pluralism’ 
prevails.92  
The reason why pluralism prevails is because it recognizes that in a case of a conflict between 
these legal orders there will be no possibility for a legal solution not due to the “absence of 
                                                          
85 Arpita Gupta, ‘Constitutional Pluralism, a Recent Trend in International Constitutional Law: European Origins 
and the Third World Concerns’ (2011) 36 South African Yearbook of International Law 37. For views on 
constitutional pluralism in a broader, global context see for example Halberstam (n 11); and Walker (n 78). 
86 Tatjana Evas and Ulrike Liebert, ‘Enhancing Democratic Legitimacy through Constitutional Pluralism? The 
Czech, German and Latvian Lisbon Rulings in Dialogue’ in Tatjana Evas and Richard Bellamy (eds), Multileyered 
Representation in the European Union: Parliaments, Courts and the Public Sphere (Nomos 2012).  
87 Walker (n 78) 21, 24. 
88 MacCormick (n 43). For a longer overview of MacCormick’s work related to constitutional pluralism see Jaklic 
(n 15) 13-30. 
89 Nico Kirsch, ‘Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational Space’ 
(2011) 24 Ratio Juris 386, 387-388.  
90 MacCormick (n 43) 264. 
91See on the two monocular views, national and European, in MacCormick (n 82) 388; and MacCormick (n 43) 
264. 
92 MacCormick (n 62) 104. 
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legal answer to given problems, but of superfluity of legal answers.”93 In this manner “the 
supremacy of Community law is not to be confused with any kind of all-purpose subordination 
of Member State law to Community law”.94  Thus under this conception these problems are 
legally left open and transferred to the political arena. This is basically the definition of the 
radical pluralism as MacCormick himself labeled it.95 
However MacCormick’s fear of unstable and conflict prone radical pluralism96 even though 
initially not an insurmountable obstacle and an acceptable caveat, soon turned out to be a major 
reason for his shift towards a kind of monism. He initially believed that radical pluralism will 
drive both national and EU courts to avoid, to a very large extent, irresolvable conflicts, thus 
he did not completely abandon it. However later he noticed that the openness of radical 
pluralism creates situations where the probability of irresolvable conflicts is too high. They 
lurk and inevitably lead to embarrassment and fragmentation of EC law. Without going deeper 
into the argument of the virtues of openness and the lack of finality that are brought by radical 
pluralism he makes these arguments very clear:  
“The problem is not logically embarrassing, because strictly the answers are from the 
point of view of different systems. But it is practically embarrassing to the extent that 
the same human beings or corporations are said to have and not have a certain right. 
How shall they act? To which system are they to give their fidelity in action?97  
Simply to remit state courts an unreviewable power to determine the range of domestic 
constitutional absolutes that set limits upon the domestic applicability of Community 
law would seem likely to invite a slow fragmentation of Community law. Yet it is a 
clear mutual international obligation of states not to fragment the Community by 
unilateral decisions either judicial or legislative (or, for that matter executive).”98 
In such cases according to MacCormick the newly coined ‘pluralism under international law’99 
provides a much more stable framework within which the conflicts between the legal orders 
are resolved through legal means.100 Avoiding any political enmeshment in cases of conflict 
between the legal orders of member states and the EU, that remain in a pluralist relationship, 
                                                          
93 MacCormick (n 43) 265. 
94 MacCormick (n 43) 264. For further development of this in Amaryllis Verhoeven, European Union in Search 
of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory (Kluwer Law International 2002) 299. 
95 See more in Neil MacCormick, ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal Legal 
Studies 517; MacCormick (n 62); and Klatt (n 53) 14. 
96 MacCormick (n 62) 110, his fear of a situation of either revolt or revolution played a big role in his later shift 
as his article where he announces the shift is titled as “Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe”. See 
MacCormick (n 95) 523, “The risk [of constitutional collision] is certainly there, but it need not materialize, and 
need not be incurable or disastrous if it does” alluding that under radical pluralism they could be incurable and 
disastrous, see also MacCormick (n 62) 121 for a milder formulation using only ‘incurable’. For more on this see 
Neil Walker, ‘Reconciling MacCormick: Constitutional Pluralism and the Unity of Practical Reason’ (2011) 24 
Ratio Juris 369, 377; and Krisch (n 89). 
97 MacCormick (n 43) 265. 
98 MacCormick (n 62) 120; and MacCormick (n 95) 531.  
99 MacCormick (n 95) 527. 
100 In the context of MacCormick’s work on the pluralism under international law see Walker (n 96) 379-383 
where he presents three options presenting possibilities on reaching unity of law under the conditions of plurality: 
covering-law universalism, reiterative universalism and “thinner bond universalism”. 
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they are put under the umbrella of international law and its principle of pacta sunt servanda.101 
Even though directly contradicting his earlier critic of such a monistic view of subsuming both 
legal orders under international law102 he ended embracing a concept that echoes Kelsen’s 
monism much more than any pluralism.103 
His elaboration stops at this point leaving a lot of unanswered questions on the modality of this 
type of conflict resolution.104 It is very questionable if even with pluralism under international 
law the ‘practically embarrassing’ situation will be resolved. Namely, it is highly doubtful that 
the individual in such a case will be able to reach an eventual international arbitration. Thus 
the lack of absolute legal certainty and predictability that is characteristic even in national, 
hierarchically integrated, orders are present in such a case as well. More importantly under the 
present circumstances the crucial relationship between EU law and international law totally 
departs from his vision on this specific relationship. The Kadi105 case has made things much 
more complicated and significantly more pluralistic than MacCormick has obviously 
anticipated.106  
On the other hand, the fear of political solutions107 does not seem to be justified if one takes 
the circular nature of law into consideration. Political solutions are most frequently made 
through legal means.108 Basically every legally irresolvable conflict that occurs before the 
highest courts initiates a political process that ends in a law-making procedure creating bases 
for possible legal solutions to similar future conflicts. And as Komarek puts it “constitutional 
pluralism, with its contestation of finality only reinforces this circular exchange among various 
actors”.109  
While MacCormick made a drastic move from radical pluralism to pluralism under 
international law, this sort of taming of pluralism has been more subtly done by other authors 
who did not depart as much from the very foundations of constitutional pluralism.110 Without 
any wish to underrate the importance and significance of other contributions to the issue,111 the 
more moderate versions of constitutional pluralism that place judicial aspects at their center 
                                                          
101 MacCormick (n 62) 108; and MacCormick (n 95) 520. 
102 MacCormick (n 43) 263-264.  
103 MacCormick (n 62) 121; see also Loughlin (n 44) 18. However, for a view that pluralism under international 
public law is still a pluralistic theory see Jaklic (n 15) 171. 
104 Walker (n 96) 379 and Maduro (n 20) 533. 
105 CJEU, Case C-402/05 and C-415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Fundation v. Council and 
Commission, Judgment of 3 September 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461. 
106 See for example, Stone Sweet (n 63) 498-499; Denis Preshova, “Legal Pluralism: New Paradigm in the 
Relationship Between the Legal Orders” in Marko Novakovic (ed), Basic Principles of International Law: 
Monism & Dualism, (PF, IUP, IMPP 2013). 
107 MacCormick (n 95) 531; and on these objections to political solutions by pluralist accounts of the relationship 
between legal orders see Burchardt (n 10) 31-32. 
108 Komarek (n 66). 
109 Komarek (n 66) 246. For a similar argument see Maduro (n 20) 537. The logical remark to such an argument 
would be: why haven’t the Member States solved the supremacy conundrum then. Perhaps because the supremacy 
conundrum is in the phase of constitutional pluralism which is accepted and recognized by the relevant actors. 
110 Walker (n 78) 24. 
111 In this regard one must point out to the very influential and rich work of scholars such as Daniel Halberstam, 
Inglof Pernice, Franz C. Mayer to which I frequently refer. 
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such as Maduro’s concept of contrapunctual law and Kumm’s best fit principle renamed into 
cosmopolite constitutionalism are further covered.  
3.2 Maduro – contrapunctal law – harmonious dissonance  
Maduro’s very influential theory of contrapunctual law represents an answer to the fears over 
radical pluralism raised by MacCormick.112 His theory basically further develops some of 
MacCormick’s recommendations on mutual regard of national and European courts on the 
authority claims and norms of other legal orders and envisages certain principles113 and 
guidelines of judicial behavior when the interface of legal orders is concerned. The main goal 
is to achieve a European legal order that maintains its unity and coherence amid a context of 
pluralism. In order for such a relationship of legal orders not to jeopardize the unity and 
coherence of the European legal order it is necessary for the courts to be committed, 
voluntarily, to the fulfillment of four requirements that are named as harmonic principles of 
contrapunctual law. Those are: pluralism, the consistency and vertical and horizontal 
coherence, universalisability and institutional choice.114 
In his view pluralism incorporates both the respect of identity between the legal orders, each 
being able to preserve its own viewpoint115 on the same set of norms and the highest level of 
participation in order to achieve a judicial discourse in the European legal order that would be 
based on equal participation of different actors.116 Therefore pluralism is characterized by 
heterarchy based on mutual recognition and accommodation and it should be accepted by the 
courts.  
Under consistency and vertical and horizontal coherence as the second contrapunctual principle 
Maduro points to the underlying shared commitment among courts of building a common 
coherent legal order.117 Generally taken, in deciding their cases courts in both legal orders 
should try to fit their rulings with the previous decisions of other courts. Namely, on both 
vertical, meaning the relationship between the national and EU courts, and on a horizontal 
level, between national courts of different member states themselves, there should be a judicial 
discourse based on coherence by respecting and furthering uniform application and 
interpretation of EU law by adjusting national law and EU law to these requirements. The 
perception of national courts that they are actually a contributing factor, along with all other 
courts, in a broader European legal order should serve as catalyst in strengthening the judicial 
discourse and thus accomplishing consistency and coherence.  
The third principle of universalisability is closely linked to the second principle and it 
complements it. According to this principle, “any national decisions on EU law should be 
argued in ‘universal’ terms” and it “must be grounded in a doctrine that could be applied by 
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any other national court in similar situation”.118 This should prevent any deviations, from 
national courts in particular, from the path of coherence and unity in the European legal order.  
Institutional choice is the last among the contrapunctal law principles. As pluralism is reality 
in the European legal order and the questions of the final say and ultimate rule are left 
unanswered a priori every court should be aware that it cannot be the only or final venue for 
conflict resolutions and that there are variety of institutional alternatives.119 Therefore, due to 
such institutional choices there is a “need to do adequate comparative institutional analysis to 
guide courts and other actors in making those choices”.120 This principal entails, as he explains 
in his later work:  
“an element of meta-interpretation: which institution [either other courts or political 
institutions] is in a better position to give meaning to the values inherent in the relevant 
legal rules and to arbitrate the competing legal or constitutional claims that they give 
rise to.”121  
There are two lines of criticism of Maduro’s contrapunctual law principles. First, the principles 
serve the purpose of avoiding constitutional conflicts without really tackling the possibility of 
actual occurrence of conflicts.122 In the exceptional case of an ultimate constitutional conflict 
the contrapunctual law principles have not been effective and the story ends at this point. It 
seems like contrapunctual law principles are devised to guide only the ordinary state of 
affairs.123 
Second, his overarching concerns and goals are the attainment of unity and coherence of the 
European legal order and the principles should assist to achieve this in the context of pluralism. 
Subsequently, the principles can be claimed to limit and suppress pluralism and diversity more 
than fostering them. Somehow Maduro insists on the convergence in Europe under EU law, to 
a certain extent disregarding national specificities, which would eventually turn constitutional 
pluralism in sort of a temporary phenomenon. Once the appropriate level of convergence is 
accomplished pluralism will not be the reality anymore. In this way the theory of 
contrapunctual law has a monist tone and no wonder that certain authors have tried to argue for 
this link with monism.124  
The very logic of contrapunctual principles such as consistency and coherence and 
universalisability lack adequate level of flexibility that is necessitated by pluralism. They do 
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not seem to be responsive enough to certain national specificities that in very exceptional cases 
can justify a limited divergence. Even though he accepts, in a very limited and implicit sense, 
that there are certain national specificities that could be used as “constitutional exit” he adds a 
very strong qualification. Such specific cases should “be of such importance as to affect the 
entire constitutional relationship between the European Union and the Member State”.125 
Additionally, the principles dictate a view that perceives national courts in their ‘European’ 
role and somehow overlooking their primary locus of legal fidelity to the  national legal order 
and its constitution.126 It is exactly this weakness of his argumentation that he addresses in his 
later elaboration of these principles and the implications of pluralism on courts and their 
interpretation of law. As he points out his assumption became much more modest as he argued 
that “courts act to maximize the integrity of their legal order, but that does not mean that they 
should not be aware of the external impact of or on their decisions”.127 This awareness is 
present due to the internal requirements on the legal order for such openness or as result of the 
stronger emphasis on the substantive rather than formal integrity of their legal order.128  
This type of moderation of the initial arguments and principles in his later work indicates a 
certain influence that he has had from the debate surrounding constitutional pluralism. 
Therefore, the interpretation that Maduro has been influenced by Kumm’s theory should not 
come as surprise. As a matter of fact Kumm’s theory of best fit now renamed cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism, not only is compatible with Maduro’s view but also complementary at the 
same time as it provides tools to cope with exceptional cases in which constitutional conflicts 
actually happen.129 Because of this type of connection between the two theories Kumm’s view 
will be presented next in order to complete the big picture of how a very influential tenet of 
constitutional pluralism can provide a sound theoretical framework to analyze the role of 
constitutional courts in pluralist Europe. 
3.3 From the best fit principle to cosmopolitan constitutionalism – Mattias Kumm  
Mattias Kumm was one of the first authors, following MacCormick, to articulate his pluralist 
conception of the relationship between legal orders in Europe. He laid the groundwork for his 
pluralist theory in an article that focused on the issue of the final arbiter on constitutionality in 
Europe in the context of the FCC’s decision on the Maastricht Treaty.130 Building upon the 
same underlying idea and logic that can be traced throughout his work he started first with the 
common European constitutionalist approach that further developed into the jurisprudence of 
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constitutional conflict i.e. constitutionalism beyond the state131 only to end at this point with a 
broader approach exceeding the borders of the EU named as cosmopolitan constitutionalism.132 
In this sense it is rather vivid how Kumm’s focus has been dominantly on the question of who 
is the final arbiter of constitutionality in Europe133 and it is basically the search for the answer 
or better said providing arguments how not to pose the question of who has the final say that 
is at the core of his theory.134  
Kumm understands the final authority and ultimate say, similarly to MacCormick, as a matter 
of all-purpose institutional and jurisdictional superiority of one legal order over the other.135 
Therefore, arguing for his pluralist vision Kumm claims that this issue should be left open and 
refuses to provide any answer saying that “within a pluralist framework, it does not make sense 
to speak of a final arbiter of constitutionality in Europe”.136 However he provides guidelines 
and principles for situations of conflict in which either national courts or the CJEU ought to 
have the ‘provisional final say’. In this way he implies the compatibility of heterarchy with a 
limited, provisional, form of hierarchy between the legal orders.  
“Instead, common principles underlying both national and international law provide a 
coherent framework for addressing conflicting claims of authority in specific contexts. 
These principles will sometimes favor the application of international rules over 
national – even national constitutional – rules. At other times they will support the 
primacy of national rules.”137  
It is arguable though, on which legal authority this type hierarchy will be based on. Kumm is 
arguing that it is this framework of principles that guides the conduct and is the source to 
legitimate authority. Such a stance, on the other hand, has inspired criticism of this type of 
account of the relationship as being just another form of monism thus denying it any pluralist 
character.138   
In designing guidelines for courts Kumm starts off from a basic idea, common to most 
constitutional pluralists, that there are overarching liberal democratic principles that are 
common to the member states and to the EU.139 Thus Kumm argues that “[l]egal and political 
practice both on the level of the EU and on the level of member states are informed by the same 
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basic normative principles”.140 Both the European Union and its member states declare to be 
founded on the principles of liberty, equality, democracy, and the rule of law. These principles 
are not to be seen just in their abstract form but also as applied in the practice by institutions at 
both levels, courts in particular.141 
Such common value foundations create conditions that make constitutional conflicts highly 
unlikely. Nevertheless, although exceptional, constitutional conflicts in Europe are still 
possible and there should be legal principles and guidelines in place to navigate courts in such 
conflict situations and not simply leave it right away to the political actors to solve the issue. 
While Maduro’s concern is more related to the ordinary state of affairs in the relationship of 
the two orders, Kumm is generally dealing with the exceptional situations of constitutional 
conflicts between the orders in cases where the principles of mutual engagement of the orders 
and courts are not able to prevent such an occurrence. In this sense he provides guidance for 
courts in such situations and by this creates a further “legal” step in tackling the issue of 
conflicts between orders. This does not mean however that he excludes all types of political 
solutions as some tend to claim.142 As a matter of fact not only does he not exclude political 
solutions143 as such but he also recognizes the limitations that the law faces in such situations 
arguing that “[l]egal interpretation is no substitute for institutional reform”.144 
Under such circumstances in which both legal orders and practices are based on common 
values Kumm argues for a shift from the search of the ultimate legal rule to the principle of 
best fit.145 According to this principle: 
“The task of national courts is to construct an adequate relationship between the 
national and the European legal order on the basis of the best interpretation of the 
principles underlying them both. The right conflict rule or set of conflict rules for a 
national judge to adopt is the one that is best calculated to produce the best solution to 
realize the ideal underlying legal practice in the European Union and its Member 
States.” 146 
Even though it might seem that the principle of best fit has an easy task to achieve, several 
other countervailing principles do pull in different directions of legitimizing either the national 
or European constitutional supremacy claims. Thus Kumm’s theory is trying to reach an 
optimal balance to the relationship of legal orders not by conceiving it “as clash of absolutes”147 
                                                          
140 Kumm (n 31) 289, also on this line see on the voice, rights and expertise as the three values form a kind of 
grammar of legitimacy. Halberstam (n 34) 99ff.   
141 Kumm (n 31) 289. 
142 Komarek (n 122) 34. 
143 Kumm (n 23) 361; and also see Kumm’s exchange with Krisch, Mattias Kumm, Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism: A Response to Krisch, 2009, p. 2-3, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/cosmopolitan-
constitutionalism-a-response-to-nico-krisch/ last visited 07.10.2018. 
144 Kumm (n 23) 386. This can be seen as another mutual point with Maduro’s contrapunctual principles 
particularly the principle of institutional choice. See similar also in Komarek (n 122) 38. 
145 Kumm (n 31) 286-288; and Kumm (n 23) 375 where the same principle was named as the principle of 
constitutional fit. For a very similar and further developed argument in the theoretical framework of “Europäische 
Normenverbund” see Burchardt (n 10) 185-340. 
146 Kumm (n 31) 286. 
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but through pluralist logic of envisaging “more differentiated and contextually sensitive 
conflict rules [that] ought to be adopted, that allow the relevant principles to be realized to the 
greatest extent, given countervailing concerns”.148 
The first principle that is strongly pulling in the direction of EU law supremacy is the formal 
principle of legality149 or also termed as the ‘principle of expanding rule of law’.150 Under this 
principle, strongly promoted by the CJEU, unless EU law is applied throughout the Union in 
an effective and uniform manner thus safeguarding regularity, predictability and certainty and 
achieving a coherent and integrated legal order, then EU law loses its basic logic of integration 
and its raison d’etre. This would inevitably happen if national courts could easily derogate 
from EU rules, so the argument goes.151 As the reasons stated are rather convincing Kumm 
claims that there should be a general presumption that EU law should be the one to be applied 
and abided by in cases of constitutional conflict.152 
But how would a national court accept European constitutional supremacy when this goes 
directly against loyalty to the national legal order and one of its defining features?153 Kumm 
explains that national constitutional supremacy is not “a defining feature of national 
constitutional practice”154 thus a shift to accepting supremacy of EU law would not amount to 
a constitutional revolution.155 “Acknowledging the supremacy of EU law would merely be 
another step along a path of legal integration that has guided the development of national 
practice for some time”.156 EU law has entered the national legal realm to such an 
unprecedented extent that acceptance of EU law supremacy cannot and should not be seen as 
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a controversial move. After all it has been accepted by all national courts, in one way or another, 
that EU law has primacy over national legislation, statutes. Nevertheless, the general 
presumption of EU law supremacy is not unconditional and it is rebuttable.157  
A national court dealing with EU law should be informed by and take into account both national 
constitutional law and EU constitutional law.158 When national constitutional provisions are 
interpreted, the broader EU context in which the respective member state is part of should be 
taken into consideration by national courts. As a matter of fact most constitutions do envisage 
such recourse in their European clauses, Article 23 GG being one of the examples.159  
“National constitutions should be read in light of a strong interpretative principle 
according to which nothing in the national constitutional provision prevents the 
enforcement of EU law, unless national constitutional provisions address or 
compensate for structural deficiencies on the level of the EU.”160   
In this sense it is claimed that there are certain limits to the supremacy of EU law. In fact, there 
are very strong reasons in specific areas for a justified resistance by national courts in which 
national constitutional supremacy seems to be a better option in the advancement of common 
underlying values. Accordingly principles directly related to the liberal democratic 
governance161 clearly manifested in three areas of national resistance are presented by Kumm 
that can rebut the general presumption. In this sense they are competing and, occasionally, 
conflicting principles to the principle of expansion of rule of law on supranational level. 
Therefore these principles gain or lose their strength depending on the structural deficiencies 
present on the EU level particularly related to the liberal democratic governance and 
democratic legitimacy.162 
The first is a substantive principle tied to the protection of fundamental rights. The second 
principle is jurisdictional and has to do with subsidiarity and jurisdictional boundary in Europe 
i.e. Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The last one is procedural, the principle of democratic legitimacy 
and specific national constitutional provisions.163 Thus the effective and uniform application 
and the coherence of EU law cannot be taken as an absolute principle but just as a very 
important one competing with the principles presented above that under the present 
circumstances of structural deficiencies on the EU level legitimize a restricted deviation from 
EU law in favor of national constitutional law in situation of exceptional constitutional 
                                                          
157 Kumm (n 31) 299, “This does not mean that acknowledging the supremacy of EU law is what national courts 
should be doing either now or after the Constitutional Treaty has been ratified.” Kumm (n 31) 285 
158 Kumm (n 31) 286. 
159 One of Kumm’s main cliams in his fisrt article is that the German Basic Law was not normatively appropriately 
interpreted by the FCC its Maastricht decisions, see Kumm (n 23). 
160 Kumm and Comella (n 150) 483. 
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Kumm (n 23) 376. 
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constitutional conflicts will remain an integral part”. For the latest account see Kumm (n 154) 65. 
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conflicts. Over the long run occasional or exceptional deviations from EU law can bring a lot 
more coherence than it could be foreseen from a rigid stance of unconditional application of 
EU law.164 Constitutional conflicts in this way could be “procedurally transformed into moment 
of constructive deliberative engagement”.165 
This pluralist logic is best framed in one of the last articulations of his theory named as 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism stating that: 
“The refusal of a legal order to recognize itself as hierarchically integrated into a more 
comprehensive legal order is justified, if that more comprehensive order suffers from 
structural legitimacy deficits that the less comprehensive legal order does not suffer 
from. The concrete norms governing the management of the interface between legal 
orders are justified if they are designed to ensure that the legitimacy conditions for 
liberal-democratic governance are secured. In practice that means that there are 
functional considerations that generally establish a presumption in favor of applying 
the law of the more extensive legal order over the law of the more parochial one, unless 
there are countervailing concerns of sufficient weight that suggest otherwise.”166 
It is clear that there is a strong emphasis in Kumm’s theory on the common liberal democratic 
values in Europe and the structural deficiencies, particularly seen through democratic 
legitimacy aspects, on the EU level in arguing for pluralism in the European legal space. It 
might be perceived that he is partly siding with the argumentation developed by the national 
constitutional courts, especially the FCC.167 Hence it can be interpreted as to mean that once 
this democratic legitimacy is achieved at the EU level then the possibility of conflicts will 
disappear. If the disappearance of structural deficiencies at the EU level means that it will mark 
a transformation of the EU to a federal state, then it might be arguable that under such 
circumstances there will be a very clear supremacy clause resembling the ones of other federal 
states. Consequently, there will be no room for conflicts of this kind. In any case this does not 
seem to be a reasonable expectation, not even in the more distant future.168 
This particular feature of Kumm’s theory has drawn some criticism. Some authors claim, 
rightly so, that constitutional conflicts will not eventually disappear as result of establishing a 
firmer democratic legitimacy in Europe. On the contrary, by expansion of EU law in more and 
more sensitive areas of national legal orders the points and occasions for friction might 
increase. For example, the improvement of structural deficiencies in the EU will not erase the 
problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, it might even increase it.169 The fundamental rights 
protection will not cease to be an issue by providing a legally binding status to the Charter of 
                                                          
164 Kumm (n 31) 304. 
165 Kumm (n 31) 269. 
166 Kumm (n 154) 43, 65. 
167 See for example remarks made by Baquero Cruz (n 42) 17-18. 
168 Kumm (n 31) 301: “The foreseeable future of European Constitutionalism, then, is a future in which the 
constructive negotiation over constitutional conflicts will remain an integral part”. 
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Kumm has done because it is detached as a problem from the issue of structural deficiencies in the EU because of 
which different rationale should be provided. 
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Fundamental Rights and accession to the ECHR. In any case they should not be exaggerated 
and these are concerns that Kumm has already anticipated.  
Namely, Kumm points out three characteristic features of constitutionalism beyond state. First 
of all, it is universally applicable. Then it is dynamic because it is adaptable to changing 
realities in both national and EU legal orders.  But above all, this theory provides “only a 
starting point and structuring device that facilitates the task of elaborating doctrines by asking 
the right questions and deals with the right problems”.170 In this way, reliance on democratic 
legitimacy and structural deficiencies is just a starting point and the resolutions in the three 
areas of national resistance will be dynamic and diverging. Additionally, the openness that 
Kumm promotes by arguing to leave the question of ultimate authority in Europe open is also 
an essential feature of all pluralists. Envisaging direct and specific guidelines firmly binding 
courts’ conduct and which would eventually lead them into a binary choice would amount to a 
monistic perception, something he has also received criticism for by some. 
This overview of the three very influential versions of constitutional pluralism enables one to 
understand how the common tenets of constitutional pluralism are interpreted and used as well 
as notice the differences, or the nuances, that exist between them. It is the combination of the 
main characteristics of these versions of constitutional pluralism that pave the way to making 
the case for the new perception of the role and place of constitutional courts in the realm of 
European integration. However, what this overview has not revealed and has not really dealt 
with, but only touched upon, is the issue of the main shortcomings or “sins” of constitutional 
pluralism and the counterarguments it provides by defending the “virtues” of the theory in face 
of mounting criticism.  
4 ‘Sins’ and ‘virtues’ of constitutional pluralism 
Challenging old paradigms and questioning well entrenched doctrines, just as constitutional 
pluralism does, is not the best way to remain outside the reach of severe criticism putting the 
‘sins’ out in the open. Neither is one able, on the other hand, to argue for his view without such 
an exchange of arguments. As a matter of fact, this sort of exchange pointing out the ‘sins’, 
shortcomings, is the only way to try and make a stronger case for constitutional pluralism 
emphasizing its ‘virtues’.  
In this sense constitutional pluralism has stirred criticism from both the EU and national 
constitutional camps. In essence there are four main areas in which one can classify all the 
critical accounts taken on behalf of this theory.171 The first combines two themes that are 
generally related to the coupling of constitutionalism and pluralism and the assumption of EU 
constitutionalism that constitutional pluralism has at its core. The second line of criticism is 
oriented towards denying the very pluralist nature of constitutional pluralism claiming that it 
is just another form of monism and not a doctrine of its own. In the third, critics argue that 
                                                          
170 Kumm (n 31) 300. 
171 For a similar approach to the shortcomings of constitutional pluralism see Walker (n 78); and Jaklic (n 15) 
190-225. 
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constitutional pluralism jeopardizes the rule of law by underrating the emphasis on legal 
certainty and stability and as such puts the whole European integration project into danger. The 
fourth area on which critics are focused is related to the claims that constitutional pluralism is 
a purely descriptive theory without a strong normative value. They claim that this theory does 
not provide solid arguments justifying and promoting a stand that all its features and tenets are 
something that should be strived for because of which they perceive it as a rather temporary 
phenomenon.  
Among these four areas of criticism the first two are aimed at the constitutional pluralism 
specifically while the rest of the four are objections to pluralism in general, be it radical or 
constitutional. 
By tackling these major lines of criticism constitutional pluralism is able to neutralize the 
seriousness of its shortcomings and shows with its virtues that it is a very viable if not the right 
alternative for the new circumstances in Europe.  
4.1 How constitutional is constitutional pluralism? 
The criticism against constitutional pluralism under the banner of ‘true’ constitutionalism has 
been two folded. On the one hand, there is a challenge stemming from a broader debate on EU 
constitutionalism and finality that goes at the heart of constitutional pluralism’s basic 
assumptions. On the other, it has been argued that constitutionalism and pluralism are 
essentially mutually exclusive notions that simply cannot be combined together. Thus there can 
be either a pluralist or a constitutionalist approach towards the relationship between orders the 
claim goes. 
4.1.1 Is there an EU Constitution and EU constitutionalism? 
Constitutional pluralism bases its logic on assumptions that the EU already has a kind of a 
constitution and that there is an EU constitutionalism.172 These assumptions go deep into the 
long enduring debates on the legal nature of the European Union and whether it can have a 
constitution properly so called. As they are part of these contentious debates the very 
assumptions of constitutional pluralism are often put under heavy scrutiny that has produced a 
backlash for the credibility of this theory among some authors. Without going into the massive 
amount of literature devoted to these issues the argumentation here will be confined only to the 
very essential points rejecting such criticism and proving the abovementioned assumptions 
right.  
The criticism over these issues is mainly originating from authors strongly promoting certain 
traditional conceptions of the constitution.173 Their arguments can be summarized into three 
                                                          
172 Maduro (n 55). 
173 Dieter Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 283; Dieter Grimm, The 
Constitution in the Process of Denationalization in Joakim Nergelius (ed), Constitutionalism: New Challenges, 
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Mattias Kumm, 'Beyond Golf Clubs and the Judicialization of Politics: Why Europe has a Constitution Properly 
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general points. First, they are insisting on an exclusive statal definition of the notion of 
constitution. Their state-centeredness is following the Westphalian paradigm of either state or 
international organization reasoning and it is not conceiving seriously enough the process of 
denationalization of the constitution and its consequences.174 Their argument against 
constitutional pluralism is that one cannot speak of an EU constitution as EU itself is not a state 
and a non-state entity cannot have a proper constitution. Consequently the only way the EU 
can get its constitution would be for member states to explicitly decide on this and surrender 
their sovereignty by becoming part of a federal state instead of federation of states.175 
Second, the EU does not have the necessary democratic credentials, above all an actual 
constituent power located in a genuine European demos, which are crucial preconditions for an 
enactment and existence of a constitution.176 The EU is therefore missing this direct democratic 
link of legitimation of its authority that as such cannot be claimed to be autonomous but 
heteronymous instead.  
Third, the EU’s founding documents are international treaties by their legal nature177 and are 
solely dependent on state consent that makes the claim of legal authority of the EU derivative 
of state authority. The treaties cannot fulfill the standards required for them to transform into a 
constitution. Those standards, according to Grimm, consist of democratic origin, supremacy 
and comprehensiveness.178 Consequently, the member states are and remain masters of the 
treaties.  
The criticism boils down to the question: can you really have a constitutional pluralism in a 
case where one of the claims to legitimate authority is not constitutional? If the answer is 
negative this would mean that a setting in which the EU is denied a claim to constitutional 
authority creates a situation under which the EU law, founded on international treaties, is 
subordinated, from a constitutional aspect, to national constitutions. In this sense the relevance 
of the foundational assumptions of constitutional pluralism are totally undermined.  
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Even though these claims have a sound theoretical base and logic still the fact that they cannot 
come to terms with the changing reality and explain the actual legal practice in Europe179 in 
the last couple of decades deprives these arguments of substantial strength. The changing role 
and status of states in the global context as well as the process of denationalization of the 
constitution requires a slightly more flexible approach.180 Just as the notion of the state is 
altering so is the notion and meaning of the constitution subject to modification.181 
 
“…European integration not only challenges national constitutions (the usual terms of 
the debate); it challenges constitutional law itself. It assumes a constitution, without a 
traditional political community defined and presupposed by that constitution; or it 
requires a new form of political community. European integration also challenges the 
legal monopoly of States and the hierarchical organisation of the law (in which 
constitutional law is conceived of as the “higher law”)…”182  
 
Even some of the premises that this traditional conception of the constitution is based upon 
such as the state-centeredness and deep rootedness in the pouvoir constituant do not have an 
undisputed historical proof.183 There are cases of constitutional treaties that have been 
concluded between states in the past which then became constitutions or founding documents 
of a new polity. One can take as examples the Constitution of the German Empire for the former 
or the Act of the Union when the UK is concerned for the latter claim.184 This shows also that 
the legal nature of the EU Treaties cannot represent a decisive argument in this debate. In this 
sense Kumm points out that: 
“It is a defining feature of constitutions that they, unlike other laws, can not derive the 
status they claim from the procedure that was used to enact them. Constitutions can 
claim legitimate authority only by virtue of what they succeed in doing.”185  
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On the other side, the level of development and expansion of the EU and its law particularly 
seen through its fundamental principles of direct effect and primacy, which make legal acts 
applicable directly for the citizens of the member states and not just for states themselves and 
sometimes regardless of the absence of state consent, implies certain constitutional credentials 
of the EU.186 These characteristics of EU law do come in odds with any definition of a classical 
international organization particularly that all this is supported by a firmly established 
institutional structure and mechanisms of operation and control envisaged by the EU founding 
documents. The EU treaties in this regard fit perfectly well with the formal and functional,187 
i.e. material meaning of the constitution,188 however they are certainly characterized with  “the 
weakness of the self-authorization and societal element”189 because of which one can speak of 
a “low intensity”190 constitutionalism with a “thin” constitution.191 Nevertheless not all 
pluralists share this view of “thin” constitutionalism for EU law. Namely Maduro and Kumm 
offer an alternative view of EU having a thick normative constitution. Maduro in making his 
point on the existence of the EU constitution speaks of a constitutional added value with respect 
to national constitutionalism as seen through the inclusiveness, regain of control over 
transnational processes and a form of self-imposed external constitutional discipline on 
national democracies that EU constitutionalism represents.192 Kumm makes an even stronger 
claim of EU having a constitution properly so called in explaining that besides fitting in the 
formal and functional meaning it also represents a constitution in a strong normative sense by 
drawing its authority from the republican principles it embodies and not so much from the 
member states.193 Nonetheless and regardless of these types of characterization it is claimed 
here that the EU has a legitimate claim for constitutional authority that is not unconditional 
particularly that there are existing structural deficits. In this sense a thinner conception of 
constitutionalism is taken into consideration here. Thus the question posed should be not if EU 
has a constitution at all but rather how it is or how much can it resemble a state constitution.194 
This assumption however should not be exaggerated into a claim for a full-blown constitution 
of the EU that would very much resemble a federal constitution under which there is a clear-
cut supremacy rule that does not allow for any contestation of its supreme authority. It would 
go directly against the very core idea of constitutional pluralism namely the existence of 
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competing claims of constitutional authority in Europe.195 Constitutional pluralism is not trying 
to frame the EU constitution and its claim of legitimate constitutional authority under national, 
statist, terms,196 however it is also not willing to embrace unreservedly the vision promoted by 
the CJEU either.197 On the contrary, constitutional pluralists aware of the structural deficiencies 
at the EU level that are difficult to overcome without substantial transformation argue that there 
are some limited grounds on which a claim for an ultimate authority from the EU level could 
be disputed and rebutted by the member states. As a matter of fact the states still retain the 
status of being the key locus for pursuing and accomplishing constitutional values but they are 
certainly losing their absolute centrality as other fora are gaining more influence.198  
4.1.2 Constitutionalism v. pluralism 
The previous discussion does not end the debate on the criticism over the ‘constitutional’ 
aspects of constitutional pluralism. Namely there is another objection to this theory that is 
defined as a “dispute within a family”,199 that is among pluralist themselves. It is basically a 
dispute over the ‘purity’ of constitutional pluralism and whether it is pluralist enough.200 
It is claimed by pure or radical pluralists that pluralism should be decoupled from 
constitutionalism as they are mutually exclusive and incompatible. There are strong reasons, 
according to this argument, to proceed with a process of innovation, creating a totally new 
concept, instead of sticking with the old paradigm of constitutionalism and translating it to the 
European and global context.201 The latter is not a viable option because it would require a 
drastic departure from conventional constitutionalism and that cannot be justified.202 
Constitutionalism,203 especially in its “philosophical underpinnings”,204 is strongly founded on 
the “grand idea of order”.205 It is only through uniformity in the legal order that all other values 
of constitutionalism could be achieved.206 Thus it is through the strict hierarchy of legal norms, 
which is protected by the ultimate arbiter, that diversity and differences are substantially 
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reduced and that eventually leads to uniformity. Even if we try to transplant or “translate” this 
idea, regardless of its deep entrenchment in the state, on the European or global level the logic 
will remain the same. There is no room for diversity and pluralism in any of these conceptions. 
As matter of fact this objection goes on in saying that constitutionalism is not able to cope with 
diversities even in the national context and not to mention the international or European where 
this level of diversity is greater.207 The model of accommodation of diversity within a 
constitutional framework might present a viable compromise but it suffers from possible 
shortcomings that are endangering the basic foundations of constitutionalism. In essence they 
cannot reconcile the accommodation of diversity with hierarchy without jeopardizing the latter 
or causing instability.208 However, by pointing out the deficiencies only, such as instability or 
disintegration and ineffectiveness of the decision-making process and through it of the rule of 
law itself, without referring to the successful examples of the model of accommodation, Krisch 
seems to overlook that this very same logic of objecting this model applies a fortiori to 
pluralism. Both of these concepts, accommodation and pluralism, rely extensively on the will 
and readiness of actors to mutual respect and accommodation, thus, to a certain extent, 
discarding this model of accommodation is not as convincing.   
In this way, just as the attempts to fit the principle of accommodation of diversity into the 
framework of constitutionalism are to be welcomed, so too can the attempt to conceptualize 
constitutionalism in the European i.e. EU context be treated as legitimate.209 We have seen 
above that the adaptation of the conventional meaning of constitution or constitutionalism 
should not be seen as a controversy to the extent that even some of its basic assumptions are 
disputed. This conventional account of constitutionalism and its values presumes that all these 
values are safeguarded by the uniformity and hierarchy in the legal system.210 However the 
values that constitutionalism strives for can stand in a competing relationship and thus they 
should not be seen as absolutes. Namely, in certain cases rigidly insisting on uniformity can be 
more disastrous to stability and integration than taking a more flexible approach. Under 
circumstances of competing constitutional claims in Europe, insisting on total unity and 
uniformity will just cause more rifts and frictions, as the issue of ultimate authority cannot be 
solved absent a firm constitutional framework. Instead, constitutional pluralism tries to 
reconcile such pluralism with unity in Europe by promoting a more flexible approach that does 
not turn the blind eye to the constitutional character of the plurality of claims of legitimate legal 
authority that exist.  
This is a viable proposition and goal due to the fact that pluralism is essentially part of 
constitutionalism.211 On a national level pluralism can be perceived in all the processes of 
governance through the promotion of participation and inclusion where the aim of 
constitutionalism is to frame all of them into a constructive relationship and provide unity to 
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the extent possible. Besides all other forms of pluralism, it can also take the form of institutional 
and interpretative pluralism.212 Thus, in the national realm there are always several institutions 
that compete over providing the proper meaning and interpretation of constitutional norms.213 
However, the crucial difference, emphasized by Krisch, from the EU context is that in the 
national context this competition is conducted under and over a single legal framework 
emanating from the national constitution.214 As result this cannot be qualified as systemic 
pluralism, one that arises from separated legal orders and which operates without a common 
frame215 that is argued for at the European level. This simplification nevertheless would amount 
to defying the reality and the practice of the status and application of external legal norms 
particularly in the case of the EU law or even the ECHR.216 Courts have in certain cases 
extensively modified their inflexible stance towards external sources of law in a way that is 
departing from established doctrines of either a modified monism or dualism, which has been 
sometimes codified into a new constitutional norm.217 On the other hand, it is still possible that 
different national institutions or courts, even within the internal judicial system, more 
specifically, try to claim their authority and supremacy by referring to a different authority of 
external norms.218 
In this way constitutional pluralism provides an opportunity for the interface between legal 
orders whitin which occasional conflicts are to be framed by legal means, but not necessarily 
in a hierarchical manner, and not immediately left to a political solution. Put in the words of 
Walker 
“the constitutional pluralist seeks to retain from constitutionalism the idea of a single 
authorizing register for the political domain as a whole while at the same time retaining 
from pluralism a sense of the rich and irreducible diversity of that political domain”.219 
This extended hand of legal regulation creates a form of loose framework which provides 
principles and guidelines but does not impose given solutions. Frictions and conflicts that occur 
are most frequently related to fundamental constitutional issues, such as fundamental rights, 
division of competences or respect for constitutional identity.220 Only if the conflicts are 
irresolvable then the political means should eventually be employed.  
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4.2 How pluralist is constitutional pluralism? 
While the radical pluralists claim that there should be no coupling of constitutionalism and 
pluralism as they are incompatible, other critics of constitutional pluralism claim that it already 
has too much constitutionalism in it thus it does not differentiate itself from other traditional 
doctrines. Thus the claim that constitutional pluralism as result of the essential characteristics 
of constitutionalism amounts to no more than a modified version of monism represents the flip 
side of the previous objection. In this sense constitutional pluralism finds itself in between two 
caveats, either it emphasizes convergence and unity and ends becoming a new monism or it 
does not provide any type of overarching frame thus being accused of becoming a theory of 
disintegration by allowing arbitrariness.221  
All three of the previously presented variants of constitutional pluralism do come under fire of 
disputes of having a monistic overtone.222 Actually the critics have very often used the example 
of Neil MacCormick’s conversion to monism. As a result of his angst facing the possibility that 
radical pluralism provides for existence of irresolvable conflicts, he transformed his radical 
pluralist vision into pluralism under international public law; a very monistic conception, as he 
himself admits.223 This proves the point of the critics that in essence this should be the case 
with all other theories based on his initial vision.224 Namely, providing principles for mutual 
engagement of the legal orders most frequently results in substantial shrinkage of national 
constitutional courts’ maneuvering space.225 On the other hand, creating a framework of 
common principles that is supposed to guide courts in situations of conflict presumes the 
application of EU law.226 In both cases pluralism is limited therefore opening the way to unity 
and uniformity under the banner of monism. Thus constitutional pluralism is becoming, if it is 
not already, a theory of convergence that resonates with European monism providing strong 
arguments for EU law supremacy.227 
Furthermore Somek’s strong criticism of pluralism claims that it is nothing other than a 
modified version of monism.228 Interpreting monism in a pretty broad manner he starts his 
deconstruction of pluralism by striking at its starting point, namely, denying credibility to 
dualism as an opposing paradigm to monism. Abandoning most of the conventional definitions 
of monism, not claiming for unconditional supremacy of international law, and never properly 
defining it but only through via negative definition he seems to be putting everything in the 
monistic basket. Thus he argues that “[l]aw is intrinsically monistic” and that pluralism cannot 
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be legal as such, it is not possible.229 Therefore there is no other theory besides monism. In this 
way constitutional pluralism cannot even provide the best descriptive account because what 
the practice shows is that it is only a modified form of monism under national law. National 
courts are not prevented from acting against EU law through so-called “false decisions”, which 
do not bring any consequence of declaring EU acts void,230 whereas the EU does not have an 
effective mechanism of enforcement of its law. Like this it is obvious that national law has the 
supremacy. Insisting on the inevitability of the legal solution to the competing constitutional 
claims in Europe his argumentation essentially boils down to the choice between monism and 
monism.231 
This type of account obviously leaves out the nuances that EU law brings, such as the European 
mandate of national courts or the relatively high level of compliance and effectiveness without 
necessarily having legitimate power of coercion but through other forms of law 
implementation.232 However, the “false decisions” argument can be turned on its head.  
Namely, one could argue that if the CJEU decides, as it did in the Kreil case,233 alluding that a 
national constitutional provision is not in total compliance with EU law and if such a decision 
is accepted and implemented  by national authorities by amending the relevant constitutional 
provision does this prove the supremacy of EU law? This would be ‘false’ from a national 
perspective after all. As a matter of fact, the decisions cannot be false or right if it is not seen 
through the prism of EU law which only confirms the European mandate of national courts in 
such cases to apply and interpret EU law. This point is not elaborated by Somek further, thus 
it leaves many gaps that need to be filled in order to have a real strength.      
True, pluralism is tamed through constitutionalism but it is not suppressed. As a matter of fact, 
basic pluralist logic is at the heart of this theory. There is no all-purpose supremacy of any of 
the legal orders; there is no hierarchical relationship between them but heterarchy, which leaves 
the question of the ultimate authority and final say open. This is the crucial differentia specifica 
distinguishing constitutional pluralism from monism. This point is well formulated by Kumm 
writing that: 
“….constitutional pluralism: it is not monist and allows for the possibility of conflict 
not ultimately resolved by the law, but it insists that common constitutional principles 
provide a framework that allows for the constructive engagement of different sites of 
authority with one another.”234  
If such a pluralist account lacks this constitutional element it will lose its appeal, it will not be 
able to provide a proper descriptive account of reality and in the end it will be much more prone 
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to criticism of jeopardizing the rule of law, and thus the stability of the legal orders, in turn 
causing disintegration. It is precisely the latter arguments that are also aimed against 
constitutional pluralism that will be analyzed next.  
4.3 Rule of law under siege? 
One of the basic tenets of constitutional pluralism is the heterarchy and that it leaves the issue 
of ultimate authority open, not framing it totally in a legal framework. This is actually the 
underlying idea, uniting all pluralist.235 However this lack of hierarchy in the relationship of 
legal orders and the feature of openness has been one of the main practical concerns expressed 
against pluralism. Namely, it has been argued that pluralism jeopardizes one of the most 
important values of every constitutional order, which is basically the precondition for all other 
values which an order tries to accomplish, the respect for the rule of law.236 
Baquero Cruz has provided the most frequently referred to critical account in which he 
elaborates several points criticizing pluralism. He claims that constitutional pluralism is not a 
neutral account, because it is impossible to stay neutral under the present circumstances of 
competing claims, and that it is much closer to national constitutional courts and their views.237 
In this manner it weakens the rule of law at the European level jeopardizing legal integration. 
In his first point he claims that constitutional pluralism endangers legal certainty and effective 
protection of fundamental rights by justifying rather instable institutional relations in Europe. 
Under such conditions it is just a matter of time before chaos unravels.238 Second, the lack of 
uniformity and unity is resulting from the possibility of parallel interpretation of EU law by 
national constitutional courts thus undermining its authority and effectiveness. Unilateral 
declarations of derogation from EU law are not acceptable in this regard.239 Third, the 
eventuality of the occurrence of irresolvable conflicts, as a feature of constitutional pluralism, 
results from the lack of any hierarchy, not even a generally accepted precedence of application 
of EU law. This ends up in a fierce competition among different jurisdictions where the only 
thing on the table is prestige and power while integration and rule of law are being 
undermined.240 Even though in his later work241 he provides a kind of justification for 
exceptional situations of resistance by national constitutional courts in a form of “tamed civil 
disobedience”,242 Baquero Cruz still maintains his point on these very same shortcomings of 
pluralism.243 
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These arguments are very legitimate however they are very formalistically framed without 
going deeper into the effect and consequences of the ever more present constitutional pluralism 
in the EU. Even though he takes the perspective and arguments of only the EU law side, his 
points could easily be turned on their head and used as arguments for the defense of the 
positions of national constitutional supremacy. The pluralistic European legal order has neither 
come to an end nor disintegrated itself regardless of occasional frictions and minor 
disobediences, even in light of the Landtova case244 and decision of the Czech Constitutional 
Court.245 Furthermore, the potential threats of irresolvable constitutional conflicts in Europe 
are substantially lesser than usually presented. Constitutional pluralism does not perceive such 
episodes as tragically and disastrously as some European monists do. The latter are strongly 
adhering to a rigid and formal principle of supremacy without looking into the substance and 
principles underlying certain national, judicial, acts.  
“Any debate on overarching supremacy and hierarchy among orders is burdened by 
rigid formalism because supremacy is a formal principle, blind for substances and effect 
and rule of law, on the other hand, is not.”246 
As a matter of fact, such a rigid formalism could be less favorable to individual rights and 
overall development of law as it might appear at first glance. Therefore, the values of hierarchy, 
stability and predictability should not be turned into fetishism. 
The value of hierarchy is very often overestimated. It does not lead to total uniformity and 
absolute stability in every case.247 While national constitutional orders are seen as bastions of 
this type of hierarchy of legal norms this is not always the case. If one defines hierarchy through 
its characteristic that one entity has the final say, one might argue that even some developed 
European states are not characterized by this type of hierarchy even though they are often taken 
as examples for the respect of the rule of law.248 Thus this formalistic vision of hierarchy, 
mirrored from the national realm to the European, should be relaxed in order to be able to 
accommodate and manage diversity and pluralism. Any type of preemption cannot be 
presumed rather it has to be earned on substance in every single case that reveals a potential 
conflict.249 In this regard the major advantage of constitutional pluralism and the heterarchial 
positioning of orders is that it creates a situation “where no court and no political body can 
finally just stop listening because they get the final word”250 thus through this self-reinforcing 
mechanism of judicial dialogue it essentially promotes stability much better than under rigid 
hierarchy. 
                                                          
244 C-399/09 Marie Landtová v Česká správa socialního zabezpečení, Judgment 22 June 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:415. 
245 CCC, Judgment of 31 January 2012 Pl. ÚS 5/12 (Holubec) of the Czech Constitutional Court. 
246 Nollkaemper (n 6) 73. 
247 See more on Kelsen’s hierarchy and uniformity in Nick Barber, ‘Legal Pluralism and European Union’ (2006) 
12 European Law Journal, 308-316. 
248 Gregory Shaffer, ‘A Transnational Take on Krisch’s Pluralist Postnational Law’ (2012) 23 The European 
Journal of International Law 9. 
249 In the context of international law see Nollkaemper (n 6) 68. 
250 Avbelj and Komarek (n 42) 20. 
102 
 
The court practice, such as the Solange saga or Kadi decisions, has also shown that one should 
not jump to conclusions too quickly. These decisions, paradigmatic for constitutional 
pluralism, have led to an increase in the level of respect and protection of fundamental rights 
certainly more than it would have been the case otherwise.251 In this sense constitutional 
pluralism has opened the doors for more experimentation and contestation that has improved 
the position of the individual.252 By promoting contestation and debate it depicts the virtues of 
its openness leading to a limited convergence and thus stability, more than initially assumed.253 
This stability is mainly seen by the absence of such a fierce damaging competition between 
national and European courts. As a matter of fact, constitutional pluralism turns this 
relationship into a more constructive one than under circumstances of hierarchy. In this way 
constitutional pluralism serves as incentive for mutual accommodation and respect instead of 
a fierce competition and unilateralism. Barber explains this very well by saying that, 
“[c]ompeting claims of supremacy arm national and European courts with weapons that 
may help ensure mutual respect and restraint…in the event of actual conflict, one side 
will, probably, emerge from the crisis as a victor: whilst it is unclear who will win, each 
side has an interest in avoiding the contest.”254 
It cannot be denied that such a pluralistic constellation leads to a feeling of concern over legal 
certainty and predictability.255 There will be perhaps a point when there will be abundance of 
constitutional review creating situations where an individual will not be able to tell to which 
law it should abide having no tiebreaking institution or rule. However, what constitutional 
pluralism envisages is that such situations will only last temporarily and no specific issue will 
be left unresolved, either through legal or political means. Nonetheless no general rule or 
authority will be given. But at the same time one should not exaggerate the level of legal 
predictability at a national level as well. National constitutions do not provide the answer to 
every constitutional problem very often all what they do is provide the guidelines and principles 
how to frame the issue.256 Additionally institutional pluralism is very much present at the 
national level and such situations of unpredictability and uncertainty are not unimaginable.   
Taking this into consideration constitutional pluralism cannot be discarded on the basis that it 
endangers rule of law. The substantive aspects of the rule of law should be taken into 
consideration along with the multiplicity of values that are frequently in a competing 
relationship in order to have a true stabile legal order. Stability does not always come from 
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imposition but through achieving the optimal balance between them. In this sense constitutional 
pluralism tries to achieve this by managing the competing constitutional claims.  
4.4 Just a descriptive theory? 
There is rarely a dispute that constitutional pluralism provides the best descriptive account of 
the pluralist reality in Europe. Neither of the traditional doctrines and views can provide such 
an account.257 However there is an objection against constitutional pluralism that is expressed 
by both supporters 258 and critics259 of this theory that its value stops at this descriptive account. 
There is nothing more to pluralism than its descriptive value, as argued by the critics. It is 
claimed that it lacks any normative account which makes it a rather temporary phenomenon. 
While pluralism can best explain the current relationship between the orders it cannot provide 
arguments why this is the preferable situation over other alternatives. In other words, 
heterarchy and openness will always be the second best solution after hierarchy, thus it is the 
latter that is promoted and strived for instead of any pluralism.260 Thus this objection boils 
down to a claim which most often acknowledges the descriptive account of pluralism. However 
not only does it not accept to promote pluralism, but on the contrary, it tries to change this 
unwelcome situation into a new one that fits the traditional doctrines much better.261 
Nevertheless, constitutional pluralism has its normative value and justification why it is better 
not to proceed with the perception of traditional doctrines and mindset. The above discussion 
has already drawn some of the contours to the main normative values therefore here they will 
be further developed. 
The initial normative value of pluralism is based on the very descriptive superiority that it has. 
Namely there is a great normative value in having an “accurate understanding of the world”.262 
It does represent the first step towards embracing and recognizing pluralist reality and thus 
helps the justification of its existence further. This recognition creates a motive to make the 
best out of it without ending up in illusions and constant feelings of threat and fear that the 
ideals of either of the constitutional sites, national or EU, will never be fulfilled. Thus it sheds 
new light on the self-understanding of crucial actors and their role in this reality.263 This is the 
reason why Walker refers to this aspect of pluralism as epistemic pluralism, it creates the 
knowledge of a new starting point of analyzing the present conditions of competing 
constitutional claims.264  
Constitutional pluralism does not stop here and it further differentiates between mere plurality 
and pluralism of legal orders.265 Not only does this theory clearly depict the existence of 
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plurality of legal (i.e. constitutional authority) claims it also envisages the means through which 
we can have these orders “interact and cohere in a sustainable fashion”266 even under the 
present and enduring circumstances which do not pave the way to an authoritative resolution 
of this competition of overlapping legal orders.267 It is this latter aspect that portrays the 
normative side, pluralism, as opposed to plurality. In this sense, constitutional pluralism 
designs the principles of mutual engagement between the orders in a way that forges loyalty 
and develops into a limited convergence among the orders and that brings a sustainability and 
stability of the relationship between the legal orders. This loyalty is being built not on the basis 
of a competition between courts but rather on the cooperation and trust that could be only 
foreseen in a heterarchy which does not promote any subordination but cooperation268 and 
complementarity. Under such circumstances national courts, having the impression that they 
are a part of, and represent equal actors in, the European legal space, will make their role more 
constructive in developing a judicial dialogue and exchange. Only like this will it be possible 
to avoid and overcome the false alternative and choice between revolt against EU law or 
revolution in national constitutional law that national courts face under the traditional 
hierarchical accounts.269 This promotes on the other hand the high level of adaptability 
provided by constitutional pluralism which is well suited to the changing and complex reality 
in a less formalized, more opened to redefinition, way than under the rigid requirements of the 
traditional doctrines. 
One should not conclude however that constitutional pluralism demands total deference by 
national courts. On the contrary, when there are sufficiently strong reasons to contest the 
authority of EU law as seen through the decisions of the CJEU, then the national courts should 
take this challenge.270 In a sense this is a welcome development as it will provide for checks 
and balances, not allowing any of the legal orders or consequently any court instances to take 
the dominant position and supremacy, thus being able to ignore the countervailing concerns of 
other actors within the heterarchical relationship. As a consequence of this equidistance of 
constitutional pluralism from either of the competing constitutional claims, but nonetheless 
comprehending them both, it leads to a development and advancement of the common values 
and principles shared among the member states and the EU itself, including the rule of law.    
Taking this into consideration there is a strong case to promote and justify constitutional 
pluralism, not only as the dominant descriptive account but also because of the normative 
values that it promotes and advances. 
5 New roles for constitutional courts  
Turning away from a rather theoretical explication of the theory of constitutional pluralism this 
section serves as passarelle in order to reach the chapters discussing the practical relevance 
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and consequences of the principles and guidelines developed by different versions of 
constitutional pluralism. 
The above overview and analysis has shown that constitutional pluralism is arguably the new 
paradigm in viewing the relationship between legal orders in Europe and there are strong 
reasons to accept it. However, if constitutional pluralism argues for the adaptation and change 
of deeply entrenched conventional conceptions of constitutionalism and traditional doctrines 
of relationship between legal orders then it could hardly be possible that this does not affect 
whatsoever the status and powers of national constitutional courts. On the contrary, by basically 
challenging or better said adjusting one of the foundational ideas of constitutionalism, the one 
of constitutional supremacy, constitutional courts have been deeply affected by this new reality. 
This reality though gave rise to critical observations of the role and place of constitutional 
courts in the changing legal world of internationalization and, even more, Europeanization. 
Constitutional courts have to cope with an increasing pressure of decentralization of the 
centralized model of constitutional review and the partial surrender of some of the powers, as 
important as the protection of constitutional rights, to supranational and international courts. 
Therefore, it could be said that this is a tough position for them as they are challenged from the 
CJEU and the ECtHR. One author has even claimed in the context of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany, the most powerful and influential constitutional court, that there is a 
creeping loss of relevance of constitutional courts amidst this Europeanization and 
internationalization.271 Consequently constitutional courts do hinder the process of furthering 
European integration. This would basically be the intuitive, even though one-sided, way of 
thinking about the issue. Nevertheless, constitutional pluralism can be used to prove the 
opposite.  
Managing competing constitutional claims does not have to be a zero-sum game, something 
that has been the consequence of the binary logic of traditional doctrines. Accordingly 
constitutional courts are key sites where this is supposed to occur and they have a very delicate 
role to play.272 They are most frequently at the heart of constitutional pluralism.273 Therefore it 
is argued that constitutional pluralism foresees that the constitutional courts preserve their 
position and authority through preservation of their internal point of reference, by adjusting it 
to the new reality and at the same time abiding by the obligations stemming out of the European 
Union which are frequently defined in the respective provisions of national constitutions. It 
does not require national constitutional courts to abandon their internal perspective. Such a 
position, which is essentially required by European monists, would break the crucial tie that 
provides legitimacy to these institutions. Constitutional courts are “not to change their 
constitutional allegiance but to adjust their forms of reasoning and institutional role to their 
new constitutional context”.274 The same line of thought can be recognized in Kumm’s work 
where he clearly acknowledges this position by saying that “[t]rue, national courts will rarely, 
if ever, be required to say that national constitutional rules are trumped by the presumption of 
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international law’s legality established by the cosmopolitan paradigm”.275 This type of 
adjustment means that they should recognize that they are part of a larger European legal space 
and they should function and decide in a manner that takes this into consideration. Being part 
of this broader legal space means, at the same time, that they have a greater possibility to 
influence and take part in shaping it. In this sense not only are constitutional courts not losing 
their relevance as much as argued by some but they are expanding their existing powers both 
in territorial and substantial scope. Not only are they compensating for their partial surrender 
of powers, but they are gaining influence. Thus the argument is made here that constitutional 
courts have developed new roles in the context of the European integration that are acceptable 
and beneficial as seen from both national and supranational perspectives. This is possible due 
to the fact that also through their new roles they will help shape and advance the common 
values shared by all actors in this European legal space. Constitutional courts are incorrectly 
being noticed in the European context only in periods of frictions and potential conflicts 
between the legal orders and their constructive role is often being overlooked. Their resistance 
should not always be perceived as threat. Constitutional courts are therefore supposed to be a 
“constructive corrective force” 276 or to have “die Wächterfunktion der nationalen Gerichte”. 
277 Just as constitutional pluralism is not merely a conflict management theory, and should not 
be identified only with constitutional conflicts in Europe, so do constitutional courts have their 
constructive role.278 
The prism provided by both the contrapunctual principles and the jurisprudence of a 
constitutional conflict enables us to differentiate three new roles of constitutional courts in 
European integration. It is only through this prism, as it provides guidelines and principles for 
courts, that these roles could be best construed and understood. Under any other paradigm they 
would be strongly contested and not recognized, even though quite visible in the reality. In this 
sense being important actors in the European legal space constitutional courts have been 
providing constitutional legitimacy to EU law, protecting the respective constitutional identity 
and safeguarding the division of competences in Europe from unwarranted concentration of 
competences at the EU level. 
This classification of the new roles might come under fire for leaving out one of the most 
important powers and functions of constitutional courts, protection of constitutional rights. 
This would be a very legitimate point. Nevertheless, the answer to such an objection could be 
summarized in two points. First, this important role of constitutional courts is not left out but 
included in the new role of protection of constitutional identity. It will be shown that under this 
specific new role there has been a strong intertwinement of fundamental right and constitutional 
identity and this is best seen by the first occasion in which the FCC has used its constitutional 
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identity review, in the Data Retention case.279 Second, the European dimension of protection 
of constitutional rights by constitutional courts has been a feature until now very strongly 
related to the European Convention on Human Rights and so it would involve a more robust 
triangulation of national courts, the ECtRH and the CJEU that exceeds the scope of this project. 
5.1 Providing constitutional legitimacy to EU law  
The first role has to do with providing constitutional legitimacy to EU law. The substantial 
dependency of EU law on national courts and institutions for its enforcement as well as the 
mandate of national courts to interpret and shape EU law necessarily leads to a conclusion of 
the bottom-up character of legitimacy of EU law.280 Furthermore, it was mainly through 
preliminary references, stemming from national courts and litigants, that the CJEU was able to 
develop the authority of EU law.281 Only through such a social acceptance it was possible for 
EU law to reach a point of making a constitutional claim.282 Taking into consideration the status 
and role of constitutional court within the national institutional structure then it should not 
come as a surprise that they have a prominent role in this bottom-up building of EU law 
legitimacy. However, one should not be confused, it is not political legitimacy that is argued 
but constitutional legitimacy of EU law that is provided. Accordingly, it is through different 
processes and occasions of interaction with sources of EU law that constitutional courts are 
initiating a debate by allowing access under certain conditions to such a discourse to individuals 
and groups directly affected by EU law which otherwise could not be in a position to influence 
it283 and also sensibilizing the broader public getting certain aspects of EU law closer to it. 
However, this is just one, internal, aspect of this deliberative role of constitutional courts. The 
external aspect is to be seen by entering into informal and formal forms of dialogue on a 
horizontal level with other constitutional courts by more frequently engaging with their case 
law as well as with the CJEU especially through the preliminary reference procedure. By being 
able to precisely frame constitutional issues arising from EU law they are leading the debate at 
a European level sending directly or indirectly signals to each other.  
5.2 Protecting constitutional identity 
Among the three lines of national constitutional courts resistance, fundamental rights, 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz and protection of constitutional identity, the last one is gaining the 
biggest space under the spotlight. Particularly since the Constitutional Treaty debate and then 
once Lisbon Treaty entered into force the respect for national identities of member states, 
Article 4(2) TEU, has become one of the central points in the relationship between legal orders. 
From the perspective of constitutional pluralism this specific provision has provided an EU law 
basis and at the same time legitimation for the exceptional cases of resistance. Therefore it 
should be no wonder that constitutional identity of member states gained such a prominence in 
                                                          
279Judgment of 2 March 2010, 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08 and 1 BvR 586/08 Data Retention [2010], BVerfGE 
125,260. On the relationship between the three lines of review, fundamental rights, ultra vires and identity review 
see in Klatt (n 53) 120-121. 
280 Maduro (n 20) 517, Halberstam (n 11) 170. 
281 Maduro (n 20) 517-518, 522. 
282 Krisch (n 77) 260. 
283 Krisch (n 77) 230-234, Maduro (n 20) 523. 
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the legal discourse.284 Taking into consideration that constitutional courts are best placed to 
provide the meaning to this type of constitutional identity they are at the forefront of its 
protection also in light of EU legislation.285 That is the main reason why in its Lisbon Treaty 
decision286 that the FCC developed the third thread of its often indirect scrutiny of EU law, the 
constitutional identity review. Many constitutional courts have followed suit. The first instance 
of this type of review by the FCC in the Data Retention case287 actually showed how this rather 
abstract notion of constitutional identity is intertwined not only with the special constitutional 
commitments of respective states but also with specific constitutional rights. 
5.3 Safeguarding vertical division of competence in the EU 
It is a well-known fact that one of the driving forces for the introduction and spread of 
constitutional review was to achieve an adequate safeguard for structural constitutional 
provisions i.e. federalism. Thus, very often constitutional review and constitutional courts have 
been established for this purpose. As a matter of fact, Kelsen’s original design of centralized 
constitutional review had this particular role at its heart. However, this feature of the centralized 
model is not present in all countries that have a constitutional court. Unitary states have not 
developed this power of constitutional courts as much as the ones in federal states. 
Accordingly, most of the constitutional courts have gained this new role in the European 
integration, which has many federal features, to safeguard subsidiarity and serve as a check on 
the unwarranted concentration of power at the EU level. They would counterbalance the 
existing centralizing tendencies in Europe.288 As the spread of the authority and scope of EU 
law was most frequently related to the activity and case-law of the CJEU, the motor of legal 
integration, then the most suitable way to check on this spread of authority is through the check 
from constitutional courts. The early-warning mechanism alone cannot suffice without the 
judicial checks on the EU powers. 
All three of these roles will be discussed in greater detail in each of the subsequent chapters 
respectively. Discussion will revolve not only around the descriptive aspect but also on the 
normative values. Guidelines will be provided in each case on how to optimize the relationship 
of constitutional court to European integration in order to increase their constructive role. The 
discussion will be also imbued with an analysis of a recent trend of the spread of constitutional 
review and debates on possible establishment of constitutional courts in countries with a weak 
or even without any experience with constitutional review. This trend will be tackled from an 
aspect that argues that countries are most frequently better off with a certain form of 
constitutional review and even more so with constitutional courts in the context of European 
integration. 
                                                          
284 See for example Kumm and Comella (n 150). 
285 See for example CJEU, Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Opinion of AG 
Maduro 8 October 2008, ECLI:EU:C2008:544, para 30. 
286 Judgment of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 
182/09, BVerfGE 123, 267. 
287 FCC Data retention (n 278). 
288 Avbelj and Komarek (n 42) 23, here Walker explains the two caveats over constitutional pluralism particularly 
the centralizing tendencies of federal structures entering a new type of hierarchy. 
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Chapter 4 
The Deliberative Nature of Constitutional Courts and Their Place 
in the Judicial Dialogue in Europe 
 
1 Introduction 
Under the circumstances of the existing heterarchical relationship between the legal orders in 
the EU there is a great deal of importance put on determining the terms of mutual engagement1 
among the orders and their institutions. In preventing and managing the potential conflicts 
stemming from the inherent openness of heterarchy, constitutional pluralism develops avenues 
and mechanisms through which the process of accommodation of diversity could take place. 
In this sense constitutional pluralism as a theory which explains the multilevel cooperative 
exercise of judicial power2 puts forward judicial dialogue as an instrument for achieving mutual 
recognition and accommodation among the legal orders as one of its main tenets. Therefore, 
judicial dialogue is very often promoted and its importance and constructive role emphasized 
as one of the main elements of constitutional pluralism.3 Nevertheless, the question then arises 
why and how constitutional courts should be part of this judicial dialogue in the EU especially 
in light of earlier reluctance of constitutional courts to participate in such a dialogue. Moreover, 
considering that also according to Kelsen’s initial design4 constitutional courts are not part of 
the ordinary judiciary but positioned above the three branches of power, is there essentially any 
institutional feature of these courts which particularly qualifies or disqualifies them within the 
judicial dialogue in Europe? Are there any advantages when it comes to judicial dialogue that 
might be brought by these specialized constitutional institutions?     
There is often a tendency in Europe today to discuss constitutional court’s role in the European 
integration only when some problems occur in this process. Constitutional courts are frequently 
considered and set under the spotlight only when a potential conflict among the legal orders is 
on the verge of happening thus creating an image of these courts not having any substantial 
constructive role in the process of European integration. Such misconceptions often presented 
to ‘neutralize’ or discredit constitutional courts as a hindrance towards further integration are 
essentially hurting the very same process. By ignoring the fact that the constitutional courts 
have a different place and role in the EU compared to the ordinary national courts these views 
are turning a blind eye towards the specificities of these institutions and what they are bringing 
                                                          
1 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in Neil Walker 
(ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) 524ff. 
2 Pola Cebulak, ‘Constitutional Review of the European Post-Crisis measures by National Constitutional Courts: 
“no influence over either the sword or the purse’, UK IVR Conference 2014, LSE Law. 
3 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of 
Legal and Constitutional Pluralism’ States’ in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 374ff; and Aida Torres Perez, 
Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (OUP 2009) 66ff. 
4 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Transaction 2006) 268-269. 
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to the European common legal space. One such feature of constitutional courts, as specialized 
constitutional institutions in charge of safeguarding the constitution positioned between law 
and politics, is their deliberative role in the constitutional and political system. In the national 
realm their legitimacy is based on the so-called deliberative expectations and reason-giving 
role for striking down legislative acts.5 This deliberative nature of these institutions finds its 
positive manifestation also in the EU context even though this tends to be occasionally 
downplayed.    
It is because of these reasons that this chapter is devoted to arguing the constructive role of 
constitutional courts as external deliberators at the European level, meaning, when EU law is 
concerned. The chapter will shed a new light on this role of constitutional courts in Europe 
claiming that when this institutional feature is manifested at a European level it has even an 
additional value if one bears in mind the chronic democratic deficit as well as the bottom-up 
construction of the legitimacy of EU law.6 In this sense, the particularities of the constitutional 
discourse at the national level are partly reflected at the EU level which brings us to the specific 
aspect of this new role of constitutional courts.  
Following this line of thought, this chapter will be further organized, subsequent to this 
introduction, in three sections. The second section will analyze the theoretical aspects of the 
special role of constitutional courts as deliberative institutions in European integration which 
is a direct result of their place in the national constitutional system as well as the particularity 
of the constitutional discourse.7 Perceiving their function distinguished from adjudication of 
ordinary courts as well as the legislative function of the parliaments it shall become more 
obvious that while constitutional courts do have their own ‘European mandate’,8 as do all other 
national courts, still their role in the legal integration is slightly different. The claim is that this 
difference is resulting also from the positioning and institutional logic of constitutional courts 
in the national legal order and because of those reasons it cannot be identified with either 
ordinary adjudication or legislation. Based on this abstract theoretical premise the next two 
sections contain a presentation of two manifestations of the deliberative nature of constitutional 
courts at the EU level. The third section initially discusses the two central notions of judicial 
dialogue and constitutional legitimacy. In this sense the section goes into the issue of how 
constitutional courts are directly involved in providing constitutional legitimacy to EU law 
especially through two forms of indirect judicial dialogue, constitutional review of EU treaties 
and their amendments but also through the review of national acts implementing secondary EU 
law. This legitimizing function is fulfilled by anchoring EU law in the national legal order, 
clarifying certain constitutional particularities and signaling potential contentious areas 
through their reasoning in cases involving EU law. The fourth section discusses the role of 
constitutional courts in the direct judicial dialogue with the CJEU through the preliminary 
                                                          
5 John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Constitutional Courts as Deliberative Institutions: Towards an 
Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice’ in Wojciech Sadurski (ed), Constitutional Justice, East and West: 
Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
(Springer 2003) 27. 
6 Maduro (n 1) 517. 
7 Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A European Perspective (Yale 
University Press 2009) 36. 
8 Monica Claes, The National Court’s Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart 2006) 385ff. 
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reference procedure. After going through the main reasons behind the longstanding refusal of 
constitutional courts to enter the direct judicial dialogue this section focuses, through the lenses 
of constitutional pluralism and constitutional legitimacy, on the developing new trend of 
establishing the direct dialogue between constitutional courts and the CJEU. It is argued that 
this new trend once again proves how constitutional courts could have a constructive role in 
the judicial dialogue and European integration but at the same time claims that constitutional 
courts have good reasons to maintain their cautious attitude towards the direct judicial dialogue 
especially until their specific role is not recognized by the CJEU and some procedural 
adjustment have taken place. Lastly, this section reveals another constructive role of some 
constitutional courts in securing that ordinary judiciary respects its obligations to contribute to 
the uniform interpretation and application of EU law, through the use of the preliminary 
reference procedure, which are foreseen by EU law but also safeguarded under the national 
constitutional provisions. The chapter will end with a brief summary and conclusion of the 
arguments presented which prove that constitutional courts have a much more important role 
in the success of the European integration process and are definitely not marginal players in 
this process. Constitutional courts are no longer solely focused on the national legal order 
isolated from the external legal developments which might have been the case some time ago. 
In the recent period constitutional courts have become more and more engaged with EU law 
devising doctrines and notions which could serve the cause of thoroughly grounding integration 
in Europe on sound legal basis. 
2 The constitutional discourse and the role of constitutional courts in European 
integration  
2.1 The particularities of constitutional discourse and constitutional review 
Constitutional courts are not an essential and unavoidable feature of the institutional design of 
a state. These institutions are relatively new dating only as back as 1921, or more precisely 
1942. As a matter of fact, there are several states in Europe which have not incorporated the 
centralized model of constitutional review or have no constitutional review at all.9 Therefore 
one has to take a look at what added value they bring to a political and constitutional system 
and what difference does their establishment bring. One of those added values10 could be 
recognized in their specific deliberative performance which is directly related to the specificity 
of the constitutional discourse and constitutional review. Accordingly, discussing the 
deliberative nature of constitutional courts necessitates an overview of the nature of 
constitutional discourse and constitutional review. In this sense when arguing for the special 
role of constitutional courts in the legal discourse in Europe one has to look into the 
particularities of the constitutional discourse in general.  
                                                          
9 For more on the European model of constitutional review see Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: 
Constitutional Politics in Europe (OUP 2000), 31-49. Member States which do not have a centralized model of 
constitutional review or do not have constitutional review at all are: Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, Cyprus, Malta and the UK. 
10 For a very elaborate overview of the advantages and disadvantages of the centralized constitutional review 
model see Cristopher F. Zurn, Deliberative Democracy and Constitutional Review (Springer 2002). 
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According to Victor Ferreres Comella the constitutional discourse, which is mainly created and 
led by constitutional courts, is characterized by its relative autonomy from other legal and 
political discourses.11 Different from the other discourses “[c]onstitutional discourse, then, at 
its idealized best, is the moral discourse of the constitutional community.”12 It goes without 
saying that this is the result of the nature and content of the constitutional texts which 
necessitates a different approach towards the comprehension and interpretation of the 
constitutional provisions. However, the autonomy of the constitutional discourse also is the 
result of, in particular, two features of the institutional design and the place of constitutional 
courts in the national legal and political systems. The first feature has to do with the institutional 
positioning of constitutional courts as neither part of the ordinary judiciary nor of the legislature 
and outside of the trias politica.13 As a result of this detachment, constitutional courts are not 
bound by the requirements and methods of either the legislative process or the ordinary 
adjudication even though they often have certain things in common. Therefore, constitutional 
courts develop their own specific form of conduct and methodology.14   
The second one has to do with the diverse composition of these institutions.15 They very often 
include both experienced lawyers, from the academia and the ordinary judiciary, and 
government officials, in some cases even former politicians.16 This feature clearly indicates the 
often present diversity in the viewpoints and approaches of its members which are often 
reflected in the internal deliberations and decisions. Such a composition also brings a higher 
level of awareness of the effects of their decision as well as the political consequences which 
is another point of support for the claim of relative autonomy of the constitutional discourse.    
In support of this relative autonomy of constitutional discourse one has to return to the claim 
that the main function of constitutional courts, constitutional review, could be distinguished 
from other related processes in the constitutional system with which constitutional review is 
usually associated. In keeping with the relative autonomy of the constitutional discourse, 
constitutional courts are not supposed to cross the line of becoming either a positive legislator 
or turning into an ordinary court.17 Consequently, it could be argued that parliamentary 
legislation and adjudication by ordinary courts could be distinguished from constitutional 
review in several respects. 
 Adjudication represents a legal process, a form of legal problem solving exercise or function, 
which entails a rather technical application of norms to specific facts at hand. It consists of 
                                                          
11 Comella (n 7) 45-50. 
12 Andras Sajo, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in Light of Discourse Theory’, quoting Michael J. Perry, Morality, 
Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 158 (1998) in Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (eds) Habermas on 
Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges (University of California Press 1998) 364.  
13 Sajo (n 11) 338. 
14 The doctrine of proportionality of the FCC is perhaps the most prominent example or horizontal effect of 
constitutional rights and similar examples. 
15 Jan Komarek, ’The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review, 
425; and Allan F. Tatham, Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU Membership: The Influence 
of the German Model in Hungary and Poland (Martinus Nijhof 2013) 37. 
16 The French Conseil Constitutionnel is the well-known example here. Namely, former presidents of the French 
Republic are members of the CC ex officio. Stone Sweet argues also for the example of Italy in same regards, 
Stone Sweet (n 9) 46-49. See also Comella (n 7) 42. 
17 Comella (n 7) 50. 
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syllogistic reasoning which does not require such a creative input by judges.18 This sort of 
understanding of adjudication by the ordinary judiciary does not fit even the core function and 
role of constitutional courts. Claiming that constitutional courts merely adjudicate would 
substantially narrow their true function. In this sense one could argue that there are three main 
reasons why constitutional review is different from ordinary adjudication. 
First, as result of the nature of constitutional provisions which often incorporate broad 
language, open ended clauses and ambiguous phrases, there is an obvious need for 
constitutional review to be more creative than adjudication.19 The very fact that constitutional 
review involves a determination of constitutionality of statutory norms that consists of an 
analysis of abstract principles and comparison of legal norms with different legal strength 
surely makes the difference.20 In other words, constitutional courts engage in a complex 
analysis of abstract principles of political morality that involves both normative and policy 
considerations.21 Therefore it simply cannot be reduced to a pure legal syllogism.22 In this sense 
it could be said that constitutional review is “more creative and discretionary than ordinary 
adjudication but less than legislation.”23 However this argument should also not be 
overemphasized because a constitution is part of the same legal order as all other ordinary laws 
and the application and interpretation of constitutional provisions cannot be fundamentally 
different from the application and interpretation of other legal acts. It should be borne in mind 
that decisions of constitutional courts are supposed to be implemented and abided by the 
ordinary judiciary as well and therefore they should follow their line of reasoning and 
methodology to certain extent.24  
Second, the effect and scope of the decision of constitutional courts is a crucial point of 
differentiation from ordinary adjudication. Different from ordinary courts, the decisions of 
constitutional courts are valid erga omnes instead of inter partes. Furthermore, the effect of a 
constitutional review by constitutional courts could be the pronouncement of certain legal acts 
null and void and not only their non-application as it is the case in the decentralized model of 
constitutional review.25 Lastly, there is no possibility of appeal against a decision of a 
constitutional court. Therefore, the leverage of a particular decision rendered by constitutional 
                                                          
18 For more on this Sajo (n 11) 360-362. 
19 Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Bobbs-Merril 1971) 63; Mauro Cappelletti, 
The Judicial Review Process in Comparative Perspective (OUP 1989) 144; and Sajo (n 12) 361-362. 
20  Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 5) 30-31: “Constitutional adjudication seen this way seems inherently political, in 
the sense that a constitutional court must deliberate and choose from among alternative normative rules for 
regulating social conduct” and ”Their powers were to be exercised by politically appointed judges, usually drawn 
from people particularly competent at making abstract comparisons among text, and with the capacity to deliberate 
about norms and explain decisions, and not necessarily from those with judicial experience”, 31. 
21 Patricia Popelier and Aida Araceli Patino Araceli, ‘Deliberative Practice of Constitutional Courts in 
Consolidated and Non-Consolidated Democracies’ in Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmanyan and Werner 
Vandenbruwaene (eds) The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2013) 221; Mauro 
Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Bobbs-Merril 1971) 63, 145; Comella (n 7) 46-47; and 
Sajo (n 12) 360-361. 
22 Cappelleti refers to it as technical application of statutes in Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Review Process in 
Comparative Perspective (OUP 1989) 133; also Cappelletti (n 20) 63. 
23 Corando Hübner Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy (OUP 2013) 74. 
24 Popelier and Araceli (n 20) 220; see also Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 5) 33-35; and Sajo (n 12) 363. 
25 Komarek (n 15) 424-425. 
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court is a lot bigger than those of ordinary courts. The consequences of such decisions are 
broader and more serious.       
Third, very closely related to the previous point as well as to the appointment procedure and 
composition of constitutional courts is the issue of their political sensibility. Constitutional 
review involves not only a normative but also policy considerations and therefore it leads to a 
greater awareness of constitutional courts of the scope and effect of their decisions. It is already 
well known that “[c]onstitutional hard cases are qualitatively different from ordinary cases 
because of politics, not because of law”.26 In this way they are led and required to be more 
politically susceptible. Their legitimacy and their authority depend in many ways on the 
acceptance of the reasonability of their arguments which are addressed to a broader audience27 
as the constitutionality of a statute is a matter of public interest.28 Accordingly, they need to 
have the ability to predict the level of acceptance or resistance to their views, first of all, by the 
political elites but also among the general public. Then again, the higher level of political 
susceptibility and responsiveness is determined by the diverse composition of constitutional 
courts and the method of appointment of constitutional judges.29 
On the other hand, we should look at how constitutional review differs from ordinary 
legislation. In essence there are serious structural and procedural specificities between the two 
processes. There are two crucial points which prove that constitutional review is different from 
legislation.30 
First, the character and scope of decisions of constitutional courts and parliaments is one of 
most serious differences. While constitutional courts are, at least theoretically, defined as 
‘negative legislators’31 because they could only decide on the validity of legal acts, legislation, 
that is, the positive legislator is the one that actually enacts and gives content to legislation. In 
this sense constitutional courts are not involved in law-making stricto sensu32 while this is the 
main function of parliaments.33 Accordingly, constitutional review focuses on problematic 
areas which are supposedly not in conformity with the constitution through a procedure which 
cannot be initiated sua sponte but only externally, usually by a very limited circle of subjects. 
                                                          
26 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 80. 
27 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy’ in Patricia Popelier, Armen 
Mazmanyan and Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds) The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance 
(Intersentia 2013)  190-191, discussing the five ‘communicative circles‘ which serve the purpose of legitimization, 
first involving the judge(s)and the parties to the trial, second involving more than one court within the same trial, 
third involving the professional interpretative community, fourth involving a public forum and fifth involving the 
whole public sphere of society. See also Sajo (n 12) 348.  
28 Hans Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American 
Constitution’ (1942) 4 The Journal of Politics 187, 191; and Hübner Mendes (n 23) 80. 
29 Maria Dicosola, Cristina Fasone and Irene Spigno, ‘Constitutional Courts in the European Legal System After 
the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-Crisis’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1319; and Kelsen (n 28) 187-188. 
30 Komarek (n 15) 425. He essentially points out five distinct aspects why this is the case and they are related to 
time and resources of constitutional court and judges, possible participation of other institutions in the proceedings 
before them, attention of the general public and slight possibility to avoid hard cases, diverse composition and 
shorter term of office. 
31 Kelsen (n 28) 187ff, he argues that it is actually a legislative function but then again it really depends on the 
actual legal effect of the decision and whether they have a retroactive effect.  
32 Van Hoecke (n 27) 185. 
33 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 78. 
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Legislation, however, deals with the regulation of a specific subject in its totality and the 
process could usually be initiated both internally and externally.      
Second, there are significant differences in the nature of the processes. While legislation is 
dominated by political debates and discourse,34 constitutional review represents a specific form 
of a legal discourse. It is true that besides the normative considerations constitutional courts go 
into the policy implications nevertheless they are confined to law and by legal argumentation 
and reasoning on which their decisions are supposed to be grounded. Essentially their 
legitimacy and authority hugely depend on the reasonability of their legal arguments. 
The singularity of the constitutional discourse and its relative autonomy from other types of 
legal, but also, political discourses reveal the specificities of constitutional courts. It becomes 
evident that these institutions which create and lead the constitutional discourse have special 
role in the national institutional setting. However, explaining the different nature of 
constitutional review as opposed to ordinary adjudication and parliamentary legislation and the 
detachment of constitutional courts from both the ordinary judiciary and parliaments does not 
reveal the actual perception of constitutional courts. Saying that something is sui generis does 
not tell what it is it only distinguishes it from other related categories. In this sense, sui generis 
is not a definition but only a demarcation. In order to argue for deliberative nature of 
constitutional courts one needs to dwell on the notions depicting and characterizing 
constitutional courts in this deliberative sense. 
2.2 Constitutional courts as ‘public reasoners’, interlocutors or deliberators? 
The complex nature and function of constitutional courts have lead authors to label this 
institution under different names such as guardians of the constitution,35 guardians of the 
fundamental rights,36 guardians of the transition towards the democratic rule,37 guardians of 
the democratic order38 and positive39 or negative legislator.40 However, these and similar 
notions of constitutional courts do not encompass all the images and roles that they possess 
today. Taking this diversity of perceptions of constitutional courts as the starting point of his 
research Hübner Mendes has distinguished five images or notions depicting the character of 
constitutional courts which have been presented in the literature so far.41 The first two images 
are the ones that have dominated the debate on the constitutional courts and have been 
mentioned above. The first one is the image of constitutional courts as veto force under which 
                                                          
34 However, see Stone Sweet (n 9) 73ff, who discusses the influence of constitutional courts on parliamentary 
debates turning law-makers in constitutional judges. 
35 Hans Kelsen, Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein? (Mohr Siebeck 2008) Robert Chr. van Ooyen (ed); and 
Lars Vinx, The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law, 
(CUP 2015).  
36 Aida Torres Perez, ‘The Challenge for Constitutional Courts as Guardians of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union’ in Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmanyan and Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds) The Role of 
Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2013) 49-77. 
37 Wojciech Sadurski, Rights before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Springer 2005) 43-44. 
38 Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts (CUP 2015), 
9.  
39 Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Study (CUP 2013). 
40 Kelsen (n 4) 268-269. 
41 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 2-3. 
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these courts are supposed to put checks on the law-making processes in the legislative and 
executive powers by ruling on the constitutionality of the decision taken in those processes.42 
In this sense the constitutional courts are working to establish the institutional balance within 
the system. The second image is broader and perceives the constitutional courts as guardians 
of the constitution essentially guarding the supremacy of the constitution in the legal order and 
the values and principles which are enshrined in it. This special role is bestowed by drafters of 
constitutions to these specialized constitutional institutions distinguishing them from the 
ordinary judiciary by their nature, institutional design and character and placing them outside 
of the traditional separation of powers doctrine.43  
While these two images reflect the typical perception of the traditional function of the 
constitutional courts, the other three images are directly related to the discursive or deliberative 
nature of these courts. Characterizing constitutional courts as “exemplary deliberative 
institutions”44 does not reveal the true depth of the deliberative nature of these institutions and 
requires further explanation of this idea.  Therefore, by focusing on either the external or 
internal aspects45 of this deliberative nature the three images are further clarifying the view that 
constitutional courts are deliberative institutions. These three images perceive constitutional 
courts as public reasoners, interlocutors and deliberators.  
The starting point in discussing the three ‘deliberative images’ of constitutional courts is the 
notion of constitutional courts as ‘custodians of public deliberation’.46 This minimalist notion 
stems from the work of theorists of deliberative democracy, most notably Habermas,47 and it 
depicts the role of these institutions in securing and promoting the procedures within the 
decision and law-making processes which are supposed to ensure deliberation. In other words, 
these courts should not have any substantive or paternalist role but rather serve as silent 
custodians which would only control the parliaments’ work and not scrutinize its legislative 
outcomes. In this sense the focus of this notion is not on the deliberative performances of the 
constitutional courts themselves but rather their role of securing the deliberative aspects of the 
work of other institutions.48 
Broadening such a narrow understanding of the deliberative aspects of constitutional courts 
Hübner Mendes distinguishes the three roles based on the level of their manifestation. These 
notions depict the engagement of constitutional courts in deliberation which “aims at critically 
evaluating, and perhaps changing, goals or preferences”49 and not just safeguarding the 
deliberation in other institutions. In order to better understand this one could group the three 
                                                          
42 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 2. 
43 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 2. 
44 Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 5) 22. See more on this in John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University 
Press 2005) 213-236. 
45 John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe’ (2004) 82 Texas 
Law Review 1692. 
46 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 85-86. 
47 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT 
1996) 
48 It is interesting to note that Komarek has taken Habermas’ procedural paradigm of law and used it despite his 
vision of constitutional courts. See Komarek n 15 and Jan Komarek, ‘National Constitutional Courts in the 
European Constitutional Democracy’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 525. 
49 Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 5) 23. This is essentially Aristotle’s conception of deliberation. 
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images in two categories, external deliberation and internal deliberation. First, the external 
deliberative aspects are best seen through the notions of constitutional courts as public 
reasoners and interlocutors.50 According to these images, constitutional courts are perceived 
through their interaction with other subjects from the political system and society in general 
without looking at how the deliberation takes place within the court itself.  
The constitutional courts as public reasoners are essentially perceived as the one that deliver, 
through their decisions and opinions, the principles and public reason to the society upon which 
legitimacy of political authority is being founded. It is according to these principles and reason 
that an action should be judged in a society. Consequently, the broader social discourse should 
incorporate them. Thus, constitutional courts serve as ‘forums of principles’51 or ‘exemplar of 
public reason’52 which is created with development of ‘sound and correct arguments’ expressed 
by these courts. Furthermore, such an argumentation by the court is conducted through the 
exercise of ‘Socratic contestation’, questioning the rationality and legitimacy of certain public 
acts. In this sense, according to Kumm, constitutional courts represent a “form of legally 
institutionalized Socratic contestation”.53 Based on this notion one can observe that the 
constitutional courts as public reasoners engage in a one-sided deliberation. They provide the 
public reason and principles for the other branches and subjects and they are supposed to be 
respected within the constitutional and political system.  
Through the second external deliberative image, constitutional courts are perceived as 
interlocutors. Here the constitutional courts are perceived as an institution which has the role 
to initiate and stimulate dialogue in which it participates both actively and passively.54 
Therefore, according to this notion, constitutional courts engage in an actual exchange of 
arguments and reasons, a true dialogue, with other institutions.55 
As it could be seen, both of these notions are very much interrelated and there is only a subtle 
difference between the two. In the words of Hübner Mendes “the qualifying difference is that 
an interlocutor, unlike a public reasoner, is attentive to the arguments voiced by other branches 
and dialogically responds to them.”56 Accordingly, while the constitutional court as public 
                                                          
50 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 86-91. 
51 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 87; and Gerhard van der Schyff, Judicial Review of Legislation (Springer 2010) 63, both 
of them referring to Ronald Dworkin. For more on law and judicial review as forum of principle see Ronald 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press 1985) and Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Forum of Principle’ 
(1981) 56 New York University Law Review 469. 
52 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 87 referring to John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason’ in James Bohman and William 
Rehg (eds) Deliberative Democracy: Essay on Reason and Politics (MIT 1997). 
53 Mattias Kumm, ‘Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights Paradigm, Legitimate 
Authority and the Point of Judicial Review’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 4. 
54 Barry Friedman,’ Dialogue and Judicial Review’ (1993) 91 Michigan Law Review 668. Referring to Michael 
J. Gerhard, ‘The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory’ (1991) 60 George Washington 
Law Review 84, Friedman argues that: “Courts play two roles in the dialogue: the role of speaker and the role of 
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55 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 90-91; or perhaps even conversations according to Margit Cohn, ‘Sovereignty, 
Constitutional Dialogues and Political Networks’ in Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland and Alison Young (eds), 
Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European and International Perspectives (OUP 2013) 248; and Monica Claes, 
Maartje de Visser, Patricia Popelier and Catherine Van de Heyning, ‘Introduction: Constitutional Conversations 
in Europe’ in Monica Claes, Maartje de Visser, Patricia Popelier and Catherine Van de Heyning (eds), 
Constitutional Conversations in Europe: Actors, Topics and Procedures (Intersentia 2012) 3-5. 
56 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 87. 
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reasoner takes a kind of paternalistic approach by providing the public reason and principles 
which should be followed only through its active participation, the interlocutor takes on also 
the passive role of listener in the deliberation and tries to reflect upon the arguments presented 
by other institutions and participants in the broader deliberation on the specific issues at hand.    
Second, the internal deliberative manifestations57 are encompassed by the notion of 
constitutional courts as deliberators.58 According to Ferejohn and Pasquino “[i]nternal 
deliberation by group is the effort to use persuasion and reasoning to get the group to decide 
on some common course of action.”59 Putting a large value on unity and coherence, legal 
systems with centralized form of constitutional review by constitutional courts tend to be more 
internally deliberative.60 Nevertheless, this fact does not infer that they are involved to a lesser 
extent in external deliberation thereof, as the two are not mutually exclusive, but on the 
contrary.61 Taking into account, not only the structure and composition of these institutions, 
but also their place within the institutional structure, the internal deliberation is certainly a 
defining feature which is not covered by the notions depicting the external deliberative aspects 
of these courts. While the previous two notions have set the constitutional courts in relation to 
the external actors and their influence thereupon, constitutional courts as deliberators reflect 
the actual deliberation within the institution itself. It reveals how constitutional justices interact 
in the ‘decisional phase’62 and what forms of ‘collegial engagement’63 are present in the process 
of making well-reasoned and coherent decisions. Lastly, this notion goes into the question 
which factors influence the internal deliberative performances of the courts.  
This overview of the main notions depicting the true character of constitutional courts clearly 
shows the deliberative character of these institutions, both internal and external. Constitutional 
courts in the national realm not only deliberate within the institution but also, more importantly, 
initiate the debate outside of it in which they actively participate. 
2.3 Constitutional pluralism and constitutional courts as deliberative institutions 
Revealing the specific deliberative aspects of the function and nature of constitutional courts 
sheds perhaps a new light on these institutions but nevertheless it does not explain its relevance 
in the specific context of European integration. Therefore, one has to try and put the different 
notions of constitutional courts as deliberative institutions in this context and relate them to the 
theory of constitutional pluralism.  
While all three notions discussed above are relevant for constitutional pluralism and the role 
of constitutional courts in the judicial dialogue in Europe it is the notions of constitutional 
courts as external deliberators which are supposed to be emphasized here. As a result of the 
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Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (OUP 2009). 
58 This image of constitutional courts is the main focus of Hübner Mendes’ book. With the general risk 
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59 Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 45) 1692. 
60 Ferejohn and Pasquino (n 45) 1692. 
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62 Hübner Mendes (n 23) 109-113. 
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importance of the interactions between the distinct legal orders and between the judicial 
instances, respectively, the focus is put particularly on the notion of constitutional courts as 
external deliberator. This does not reflect, nevertheless, the intention of underestimating the 
internal aspect of deliberation of constitutional courts which is also very important. It only puts 
the focus on the external aspects for the purposes of the present discussion. 
Even among the two notions of constitutional courts as external deliberators one can recognize 
the most fitting notion for constitutional pluralism in Europe. Constitutional courts as 
interlocutors are in the best position to contribute to the realization of the normative principles 
of constitutional pluralism. In contrast to the notion of constitutional courts as public reasoners, 
interlocutors are both ‘active listeners’ and ‘active speakers’ as they enter into two or more 
sided exchange of legal arguments. Seen from the perspective of the European Union they have 
a say in providing clear answers as well as posing well-reasoned questions relating to EU law. 
Under circumstances of existing constitutional pluralism constitutional courts cannot be the 
sole public reasoner in Europe as they are required to engage with, above all, CJEU but also 
other constitutional courts in the process of defining the public principles and reason of the 
common European constitutional area. Through their active engagement and participation in 
the judicial dialogue as interlocutors, constitutional courts become essentially more attentive 
and conscience of their potential constructive role in the EU. 
Constitutional pluralism, unlike the traditional theories of the relationships of different legal 
orders, does not insist on the finality64 and “last word”65 in the legal discourse, which is usually 
the result of the hierarchical perception of this relationship, but it insists on the circularity66 
and heterarchy.67 Consequent to this reality, as observed by constitutional pluralists, none of 
the highest judicial institutions in the different legal orders can deny participation in the judicial 
dialogue in Europe without taking a risk of being deprived of the opportunity to contribute to 
the common legal order68 thus being potentially marginalized. It is only through contestation 
and dialogue under circumstances of heterarchy that convergence and stability could be 
secured.69 Potential conflicts under constitutional pluralism could be managed only through the 
                                                          
64 Stone Sweet (n 9) 115 and 132; Zurn (n 10) 285; Sajo (n 12) 367-368, he argues that “[…] constitutional 
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68 Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), ‘Four Vision of Constitutional Pluralism’, EUI Working Paper Law 
2008/21, 20. 
69 Lars Viellechner, ‘Responsiver Rechtspluralismus: Zur Entwicklung eines transnationalen Kollisionsrechts’ 
(2012) 51 Der Staat 559, 575; and Nico Krisch, ‘The Case of Pluralism in Postnational Law’ in Grainne de Burca 
and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds) The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2011) 260-261. 
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interaction of courts in Europe.70 Furthermore, as Maduro claims, under circumstances of 
competitive legal sovereignty71the integrity and coherence of EU law are very much 
conditioned by the judicial dialogue.72 This explains the strong emphasis that constitutional 
pluralism puts on the openness and dialogue particularly among judicial institutions in Europe.  
Against this background, the notion of constitutional courts as interlocutors fits perfectly into 
the conception of constitutional pluralism. In the words of Hübner Mendes “[d]ialogical courts 
[interlocutors] know that, in the long run, last words are provisional and get blurred in the 
sequence of legislative decisions that keep challenging the judicial decisions irrespective of the 
court’s formal supremacy.”73 In the more complex context of the EU, compared to the national 
one, Hübner Mendes’ conclusion is mirrored into a larger image. While the national 
parliaments are being continuously deprived of effective power and the European parliament 
is struggling to find its place under the sun, national constitutional courts in relation to EU law 
are mostly ‘challenged’ by the CJEU.74 The latter has stepped in to compensate for the absence 
of a stronger and genuine legislative power and has become ‘the motor of legal integration’ in 
Europe. In this way the interaction of the highest judicial instances of the legal orders has an 
increased significance in the process of legal integration. In this sense constitutional courts 
represent the most suitable interlocutors on constitutional issues in the constitutional discourse 
in Europe.75  
Taking this into consideration one should look at another connecting point between 
constitutional pluralism and the notions of constitutional courts as external deliberators. 
Namely, Hübner Mendes in his discussion on constitutional courts as public reasoners refers 
to the work of Mattias Kumm, one of the most prominent representatives of constitutional 
pluralism. Hübner Mendes argues that Kumm is one of the authors which reflect the notion of 
constitutional courts as public reasoners by arguing that these institutions are incorporating a 
form of legally institutionalized practice of Socratic contestation.76 This practice involves the 
critical assessment of whether the acts of public authorities are based on good reasons.77 The 
critical assessment in essence represents the courts engagement with public authorities in which 
there is an exchange of arguments by posing question and receiving answers.78  However, such 
an assessment and engagement are not really a one sided delivery of public reason by the 
constitutional courts, as claimed by Hübner Mendes. Rather, this represents a conversation in 
which “the parties are the ones that advance arguments” while the court is the one asking the 
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71 Maduro (n 1) 521. 
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Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 302; Marta Cartabia, ‘Europe 
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76 Kumm (n 53) 3. 
77 Kumm (n 53) 13ff. 
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questions.79 Therefore it seems like Kumm’s views are inadequately simplified and conclusions 
are drawn based on the analysis of only one of his articles dealing with constitutional courts.80 
Additional arguments proving Hübner Mendes’ conclusion wrong in this sense could be found 
elsewhere in Kumm’s work. Namely in several of his articles Kumm perceives constitutional 
courts in the EU context essentially as interlocutors participating in the exercise of “mutual 
deliberative engagement”81 as well as “constructive deliberative engagements.”82 This sort of 
engagement resembles very much the same one referred to within the practice of Socratic 
contestation. While in the latter constitutional courts are engaging a larger number of national 
public authorities, in the EU context they engage with their judicial counterpart, the CJEU. 
This broader view of Kumm’s work leads us to the conclusion that he perceives constitutional 
courts much more as interlocutors than as public reasoners. Even if the practice of Socratic 
contestation is taken on its own, still, constitutional courts have a role to play in the European 
realm. The practice of questioning the basis of certain legal acts is the essential part of the 
judicial dialogue with the CJEU through the preliminary reference procedure.   
Arguing that constitutional courts as interlocutors fit perfectly well within the perception of 
constitutional pluralism on the present relationship between legal orders does not, however, 
reveal much about the specific added value which these institutions bring to this relationship. 
Analyzed through the framework of constitutional pluralism it is argued that one can recognize 
three advantages of the involvement of constitutional courts in EU matters compared to other 
institutions in the national setting, above all ordinary judiciary.  
First, constitutional courts adequately channel the dialogue by providing clarity83 to the 
arguments of a contention against EU law providing an adequate deliberative forum pooling 
different types of interests and claims,84 including those of the national disempowered groups 
as result of the European integration.85 Constitutional courts, as both reason givers and 
interlocutors, are funneling the main arguments presented by different parts of the national 
institutional structure especially when delicate issues and fundamental constitutional principles 
are concerned.86 In this sense they are bringing a qualitative difference at the EU level, 
mirroring their interlocutor image already existent at the national level. This qualitative 
difference is manifested also in relation to the ordinary judiciary which is often unsuitably 
positioned, especially in civil law countries, to grasp the particularity of the constitutional 
discourse amid the huge amount of workload and inapt judicial training in this regard.87 The 
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clarity that the constitutional courts bring in this sort of judicial dialogue is that they distinguish 
constitutional issues from technical legalism.88 
Second, considering their institutional role constitutional courts are sending credible warning 
signals89 to Luxembourg, also to other national and EU institutions, thus drawing their attention 
to the seriousness of issues at hand.90 Building upon the previous point of clarity, one could 
argue that constitutional courts are explicitly indicating that fundamental questions of 
constitutional law are at stake for which there are usually no evident and clear answers as it is 
the case when a technical legalism is concerned.91 Such signals should be welcomed by the 
CJEU in order for it to pay a particular attention to the issue at hand also in light of its duty to 
respect for constitutional identity of member states.92 In this sense the principle of deference to 
certain claims made by the constitutional courts should be employed by the CJEU as well. 
Therefore, when it comes to constitutional issues constitutional courts are the most important 
counterparts for this court.  
Third, aware of the impact of their decisions as result of both their institutional design and their 
placement between law and politics, constitutional courts are more likely to be prudent in 
exceptional situations of conflict between the legal orders. If this type of sensibility of the 
constitutional courts is already visible in the national realm it could be even more recognizable 
at the EU level where the possible impact of their decisions is even greater.93 It should make 
constitutional courts more willing to enter and engage in a judicial dialogue with its European 
counterpart instead of isolation and one-sided rulings on issues based solely on the national 
perspective. Nevertheless, prudence is and should also be manifested in their relations with the 
CJEU. 
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One might object to these three roles of constitutional courts in Europe based on the argument 
that they are not exclusive and that also the ordinary judiciary could realize them as well. This 
argument might seem to be convincing, but only on a first glance. It is exactly due to the 
specificities of the constitutional discourse and the special place and mandate of constitutional 
courts that they have a special weight and leverage in fulfilling the three roles. Even though 
other ordinary courts might serve some of these roles they cannot, as result of the differences 
between ordinary adjudication and constitutional review, bring the true added value as 
constitutional courts could. As a matter of fact while ordinary courts might be fulfilling similar 
roles “[c]onstitutional courts, however, tend to do so with more force and more success, as a 
result of their special mandate and authoritative position in the national legal order.”94    
These advantages are best observed when put in two contexts. First, the constitutional 
legitimization of EU law in cases of constitutional review of EU legal acts. Second, the possible 
development of a constructive role of constitutional courts in the context of preliminary 
reference procedure, especially, after the latest shift in the attitude of these courts.95 This sort 
of engagement of constitutional courts in direct or indirect forms of judicial dialogue will be 
the subject of the subsequent sections. 
3 Constitutional courts and constitutional legitimacy of EU Law 
The deliberative performances of constitutional courts in the EU could be best perceived in two 
contexts which are part of the broader phenomenon of judicial dialogue. One of these two 
specific contexts is related to a function of constitutional courts which is rarely discussed, also 
in the national realm, the legitimizing function of constitutional courts. This function becomes 
particularly evident in the EU context. In order to tackle and dwell on this specific role of 
constitutional courts in more detail, one needs to provide first the framework and define the 
crucial notions of judicial dialogue and constitutional legitimacy. Only after such an 
explanation can one turn to the specific aspects of constitutional courts’ role in the judicial 
dialogue in Europe.       
3.1 Judicial dialogue in Europe and constitutional courts    
The interactions between national courts and the CJEU have been the driving force for legal 
integration in Europe. This relationship has played a significant role in the empowerment of 
the CJEU becoming the ‘motor of integration’ in Europe. Because of this reason it is of the 
utmost importance to put this relationship into a proper theoretical framework that could help 
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us analyze the different patterns of interactions. In this sense, the dominant paradigm for the 
interaction between national courts and the CJEU has been the one of judicial dialogue.96  
Judicial dialogue as a notion poses a great challenge in the endeavor of providing a single 
definition for it. Namely, there has been great confusion over the actual scope of the notion as 
well its precise meaning.97 Different understandings of the notion range from exchange of 
information and ideas in diverse judicial networks,98 the referral to decision of foreign and 
international courts99 or the interaction between international and national courts.100 Be that as 
it may, for the purposes of this chapter the third understanding seems to be most fitting as the 
overarching focus here is put on the interaction between national constitutional courts and the 
CJEU.  
Having this understanding of judicial dialogue as a starting point one can distinguish three 
characteristics101 of judicial dialogue. First, the judicial dialogue is rather prospective than 
retrospective in a sense that it does not involve review of previous decisions of other courts.102  
Thus the focus of the interaction is put on future cases and the resolution of future legal issues 
and the implications thereof. Therefore the only instance in which they turn to previous cases 
is for such purposes.103 For example, the preliminary reference procedure is aimed at providing 
interpretation of EU law for resolving the case before the national courts and not for any type 
of review of their previous decisions by the CJEU. 
The second one has to do with the bi-directionality of judicial dialogue.104 It reflects the idea 
that both sides have equal opportunities to participate and contribute to the judicial dialogue. 
In this sense, if genuine judicial dialogue is to exist under circumstances of bi-directionality, 
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then the dialogue is supposed to be conducted among co-equals and under equal opportunities 
for participation.105 Accordingly, there are no privileges for either of the sides and this is the 
result of lack of any type of subordination between the sides in this type of relationship. 
Therefore, even the possibility of mutual review of judicial decisions on both sides does exist 
under the bi-directionality. However, the bi-directional interaction does not mean that both or 
all sides will be equally active, especially not at the same time. How active one or another side 
will be essentially depending on the specificities at hand. On the other hand, for actual and 
genuine bi-directionality to take place there should be continuity over some time.106 This is 
once again the result of the circularity of law and of judicial review,107 particularly in the 
European context which necessitates a long term constructive dialogue, especially among 
courts, in order to reach an agreement or a solution by exercise of mutual respect, 
accommodation of diversity and convergence.108 Also here the preliminary reference procedure 
serves as a very good example. National courts send questions on specific application and 
interpretation of EU law to the CJEU but how active they will be within this procedure will 
depend on them. Whether they will provide and suggest to the CJEU any alternatives for 
resolving the legal question at hand or not is also a matter of their own finding. The complete 
issue is not necessarily resolved in all cases with the first answer of the CJEU but it happens 
that the same or some other national court follows up on the ruling and reasoning of the CJEU 
particularly in cases when this does not seem to be satisfactory.109 Additionally, in these latter 
situations, also disobeying certain aspects of the CJEU reasoning might be conceivable under 
bi-directionality.  
The third characteristic of judicial dialogue is its voluntariness.110 Courts are free to engage 
with other courts in this sort of interaction; they are not forced or strictly obliged to do it. This 
is also an aspect of the previous characteristic because it stems as well from the underlying idea 
of the limited role of judicial power in the dialogue between the courts. In the words of Ahdieh, 
“[n]either court enjoys authority over the other; hence, their engagement is a dialogue rather 
than a monologue.”111 Put again in the EU context, national courts have a certain level of 
discretion in deciding whether to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU or not.112 Even in 
                                                          
105 Rike Krämer and Judith Janna Märten, ‘Der Dialog der Gerichte – die Fortentwicklung des 
Persönlichkeitsschutzes im europäischen Mehrebenenrechtsverbund‘ (2015) 50 Europarecht 174: „Kernstück 
eines Dialoges ist damit auch, das Gespräch auf Augenhöhe.“ And Torres Perez (n 3) 126ff. 
106 Torres Perez (n 3) 129; and Claes, de Visser, Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 55) 3, they term this as 
“successive exchange of legal arguments by courts”, 3. Cf Bruno de Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional 
Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process’ in Paul Beaumont, Carole Lyons and Neil 
Walker (eds.) Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Hart 2002) 41. He claims that in EU it is 
not the case. 
107 Jan Komarek, ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds.), 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 246-247; and Hübner Mendes (n 23) 
90-9. 
108 On these positive effects of dialogue see Torres Perez (n 3) 112-130. 
109 Torres Perez (n 3) 129. 
110 Ahdieh (n 102) 2053. 
111 Ahdieh (n 102) 2053. This characteristic is also recognized by Torres Perez. She is terming it as a separate 
characteristic of judicial dialogue in which there is a lack of complete authority over the other in a sense that 
“[e]ach court should have the capacity to exercise some pressure over the other systems’ courts, but not to impose 
its will.” Torres Perez (n 3) 124. 
112 Torres Perez (n 3) 139-140 referring to Renaud Dehousse, The European Court of Justice (St. Martin’s Press 
1998); and Monica Claes, The National Courts Mandate in the European Constitution, (Hart 2006) 249.  
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the case of the highest national courts, when they decide in the last instance,113 still there is 
substantial leeway for them not to refer the case to the CJEU.114  
Furthermore, there are different types of classification of judicial dialogues. The first important 
classification is based on the status of the courts and whether the dialogue is led between 
counterparts with same status, such as between national courts only, or with different status. 
Accordingly there is horizontal and vertical judicial dialogue.115 The former is related to the 
interaction of courts of same status regardless if national, supranational or international.116 The 
most common example is the referral and use of case-law between the highest national judicial 
instances such as supreme or constitutional courts. On the other hand, there is ongoing 
horizontal judicial dialogue between international and supranational courts such as ECHR and 
CJEU.117 
The vertical dialogue is the dialogue which is conducted between national courts and 
supranational or international courts. The prime example for this type of dialogue is the one 
that takes place between national courts and the CJEU, particularly within the framework of 
preliminary reference procedure. This dialogue is the most structured in comparison to other 
forms of vertical dialogue.118  
Taking into consideration this distinction one should not, however, draw the wrong conclusion 
that vertical dialogue in essence draws to the hierarchical relationship between courts of 
different status.119 More specifically even in a vertical judicial dialogue of courts of distinct but 
overlapping jurisdictions there is a lack of significant dimension of power.120 Therefore terming 
this type of dialogue as vertical does not contradict the relationship of heterarchy of the 
different legal orders.121 As a matter of fact, exactly this type of inaccurate assumption has 
guided certain authors122 to argue for a horizontal dialogue among national courts and the CJEU 
even though they have a different status, national and supranational courts respectively. 
Nevertheless, these views could also be defended on the grounds of different importance given 
to the actual status of courts and focusing more on the judicial power dimension, or the lack of 
it, and the directness of the dialogue. Accordingly, as result of the lack of hierarchy between 
                                                          
113 CJEU, Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich, Judgment of 30 September 2003, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:513. 
114 CJEU, Case C-283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, Judgment 6 October 
1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335. See Daniel Sarmiento, ‘The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves’ in Matej Avbelj and 
Jan Komarek, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 313-314, on the wide 
discretion for national courts. 
115 Slaughter (n 96) 103ff. 
116 Slaughter (n 96) 103; and Allan Rosas, ‘The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of 
Judicial Dialogues’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 2, 13. The horizontal dialogue represents the fifth 
category in his classification of judicial dialogue.   
117 Slaughter (n 96) 105-106. 
118 Slaughter (n 96) 106ff; and Krämer and Märten (n 105) 175. 
119 Rosas (n 116) 6-7; and Krämer and Märten (n 105) 174.  
120 Ahdieh (n 102) 2056, 2157. 
121 In relation to this type of judicial dialogue the lack of hierarchy is argued even outside of the European context. 
See Tara Leigh Grove, ‘The International Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the 
Conversation’ (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 2058-2059. 
122 Groussot (n 75) 320. He claims that direct dialogue has a vertical character while indirect has a horizontal 
character as it is mostly conducted between national constitutional courts and the CJEU. See also Torres Perez (n 
3) 117. 
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the judicial instances of different legal orders these authors perceive the interaction as 
horizontal.           
The second classification is based on the level of responsiveness and mutuality of engagement 
of courts participating in the dialogue.123 Accordingly, judicial dialogue could be direct or 
indirect. More precisely, the crucial criterion for distinguishing direct from indirect dialogue is 
“the awareness on the part of both participants of whom they are talking to and a corresponding 
willingness to take account of the response.”124 While this awareness is clearly present in the 
case of direct dialogue, this is not so clear when indirect dialogue is concerned.125 On the one 
hand, applying this classification to the European context it could be claimed that we have a 
direct judicial dialogue when national courts are communicating with the CJEU through the 
preliminary reference procedure. On the other hand, indirect dialogue is conducted when the 
communication does not follow this structured path and without a direct interaction but rather 
arguments and views are communicated to the counterpart through a reasoning presented in 
decisions. Martinico refers to this type of interaction as a ‘hidden dialogue’ which is consisted 
of “unorthodox avenues of judicial communication, that is, methods of judicial communication 
other than the preliminary ruling procedure […] which are not formalized according to the 
letter of the treaties.”126 
Lastly, consistent with the distinction drawn in the previous section between constitutional 
discourse and other legal discourses and between constitutional courts and ordinary judiciary 
one is supposed to follow this line of thought also when judicial dialogue is concerned. Namely, 
when fundamental constitutional issues are part of this dialogue then national constitutional 
courts are potentially taking part in a particular form of judicial dialogue. This dialogue has 
been named by some authors as constitutional dialogue.127 Nevertheless, and regardless of the 
fact that this needs to be kept in mind here the notions of judicial and constitutional dialogue 
will be used interchangeably. This is done in order to avoid the confusing debate over the exact 
meaning of constitutional dialogue and for the sake of clarity since there is obvious difficulty 
in distinguishing the two meanings.128 On the other hand, constitutional dialogue has been first 
used in order to address a phenomenon of a different type of “exchanges” between courts 
                                                          
123 Slaughter (n 96) 113. 
124 Slaughter (n 96) 113. 
125 Slaughter argues that this sort of interaction is not a dialogue at all but rather a monologue, Slaughter (n 96) 
113. 
126 Giuseppe Martinico, ’Judging in the Multilevel Order: Exploring the Techniques of ‘Hidden Dialogue’, King’s 
Law Journal (2010), 258. On other unconventional or ‘silent’ modes of judicial communications see Sarmiento 
(n 114) 285ff. 
127 Groussot (n 75); Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community’ in Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds.) The European Court and the National Courts: Legal 
Change in its Social, Political, and Economic Context (Hart 1998); and Sally J. Kenney, William M. Reisinger 
and John C. Reitz, Constitutional dialogues in Comparative Perspective (Palgrave 1999). 
128 On this differentiation see for example Monica Claes, The National Courts Mandate in the European 
Constitution, (Hart 2006) 391, 401, 423ff. She terms the constitutional dialogue taking place in the EU as 
constitutional – constitutional dialogue in order to distinguish it from the national constitutional dialogue. Tatham 
(n 15) 282. He defines constitutional dialogue as following: “Constitutional courts – together with other national 
actors e.g., national and regional parliaments and governments, as well as public opinion – participate in 
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conducting constitutional review and legislative institutions in the purely national context.129 
While judicial dialogue seems to be a broader term than constitutional dialogue, still it is more 
precise for the present context as it addresses the judicial interactions, however on the issue of 
constitutional relevance. Therefore, the notions of judicial and constitutional dialogue will be 
used interchangeably. 
In sum, discussing the role of constitutional courts in judicial dialogue in Europe it is quite 
reasonable that the focus here is put on the vertical dialogue, both direct and indirect. While 
the next section is discussing the direct vertical dialogue between constitutional courts and the 
CJEU in this section it will be further discussed how constitutional courts provide constitutional 
legitimacy to EU law through indirect dialogue with CJEU. But before I turn to the specific 
practice of how constitutional courts do this one should first define constitutional legitimacy.       
3.2 The legitimizing function of constitutional courts and the constitutional legitimacy of 
EU law 
There are many core functions of constitutional courts in the national legal and political 
systems. Stone Sweet argues that among the four basic functions of constitutional courts is also 
the one in which these courts legitimize public policy as enacted through statutes and 
government acts.130 This legitimization function131 provides a “certificate of authenticity”132 
for national legislation. However this legitimization is symbolic and it does not reflect any type 
of agreement or disagreement with the details of the enacted public policy as to their general 
appropriateness.133 The most a constitutional court can do is check whether the legislative 
output could be “qualified as a collective judgment of reason”134 based on the values and 
principles set out in the constitution. Thus the result of this function of constitutional courts 
can be perceived as the determination of existence of sufficient procedural assurances that the 
legal acts are not unjust.135 In this manner law receives its constitutional legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, this legitimizing function of constitutional courts is not as evident as one might 
conclude. Namely, out of all the member states of the EU, only in the Italian constitution is 
constitutional legitimacy related to the constitutional court. No other constitution in Europe has 
                                                          
129 For instance constitutional dialogue has been first used and it is most often used in the national context as a 
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Note’, Review of Central and East European Law (2007) 443, 453, commenting the Southwest decision he argues 
that “its [FCC’s] task was not to examine the wisdom of the act but, rather, the legality thereof.” 
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such a wording on this matter.136 Nevertheless, while constitutional legitimacy in this case is 
used as synonymous for constitutionality of only national sources of law137 the same notion in 
our context is slightly broader. It involves a bit more than just a symbolic exercise of testing 
the conformity of one legal text with another.  
But how is this legitimizing function of constitutional courts relevant for EU law? As a matter 
of fact, this function of constitutional courts is, although not as apparent, even more important 
in the EU than in the national context. Bearing in mind the lack of genuine legislative power 
in the EU and the continuing democratic deficit, it becomes easier to claim that the legitimacy 
of EU law is drawn from a complex relationship between national and EU institutions. As 
Maduro argues “EU law is the product of discourse among the actors of a broad European legal 
community in which the voice of some of those actors may even oppose the will of the Court 
of Justice.”138 Within this European legal community national constitutional courts are very 
important actors and sometimes oppose the CJEU on fundamental constitutional issues. In this 
sense it could be easily claimed that the EU law legitimacy is constructed from the bottom-
up.139 The input of national courts and particularly of national constitutional courts is very 
important because they are contributing to the development of the constitutional discourse in 
Europe. As participants in the interpretation and application of EU law under their European 
mandate they are very important in this construction of legitimacy.140  
As a result of this understanding of constitutional legitimacy and the legitimacy of EU law it 
is argued here that constitutional courts have developed a specific role in Europe in which they 
are providing EU law with constitutional legitimacy in the national legal order.141 
Constitutional courts are best placed and represent the only national institutions which are 
empowered to deliver the constitutional legitimacy to EU law. Their deliberative nature, or 
better said, constitutional courts as interlocutors through their different communicative 
arrangements directly contribute to the legitimacy of EU law since these types of arrangements 
                                                          
136 The Constitution of the Italian Republic, Art. 134, Art.136 and Art. 137, see also Lukas Prakke and Constantijn 
Kortmann (eds) Constitutional Law of 15 EU Member States (Kluwer 2004) 528-531, Giuseppe Franco Ferrari, 
‘The Conceptual Definition of the Constitutional Court in Italy’ in Shimon Shetreet (ed) The Culture of Judicial 
Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace (Martinus Nijjhof 2014) 159. 
137 The Constitution of the Italian Republic, Art. 134. However, see Franco Ferrari (n 135) 166ff speaking about 
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138 Maduro (n 1) 520. 
139 Maduro (n 1) 517, 522. 
140 Maduro (n 1) 518. The study of the role of national courts and other national legal actors is crucial to an 
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by the Court of Justice.  
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general legitimazing function of the balancing of principles and values in the context of pluralism and more 
specifically in her “Europäischen Normenverbund” in Dana Burchardt, Die Rangfrage im Europäischer 
Normenverbund: Theoretische Grundlagen und dogmatische Grundzüge des Verhältnisses von Unionsrecht und 
nationalem Recht (Mohr Siebeck 2015) 264-266. 
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are rather broken in the EU.142 Therefore it should not come as a surprise, for instance, why 
arguments relating to the constitutional legitimacy of EU law have been used in debates on the 
introduction of a constitutional court in some countries which do not have one, such as the 
Netherlands.143  
While the democratic legitimacy is provided through the consent of national parliaments, 
constitutional legitimacy of EU law is provided by constitutional courts.144 The latter is done 
through several means. First, it is done through the determination of the specific place and force 
of EU law in the national legal order and the conformity with the constitutional provisions. 
Second, it is through signaling the national institutions and the EU institutions, including the 
CJEU, concerning specific issues related to the legitimacy of EU law that constitutional courts 
are contributing to EU law gaining constitutional legitimacy. Lastly, this type of legitimacy is 
provided to EU law by constitutional courts by triggering a broader social debate on the process 
of European integration and EU law.145 On the other hand, even more specifically, 
constitutional courts also provide a deliberative forum and voice for the so-called 
disempowered groups or the ones that are not involved in the mobility scheme of using the 
advantages of the European integration and its four freedoms.146 They are enabling them to 
tackle the ‘inherent bias in favor of the mobile.’147 Even though constitutional legitimacy in 
this sense is mostly provided through a form of indirect dialogue, in the process of 
constitutional review of EU primary law or indirect review of secondary EU law, it could be 
argued that it is also done within the direct dialogue between national constitutional courts and 
CJEU.  
Furthermore, one has to take a look at the actual practice of constitutional courts and also the 
CJEU and to which extent they have embraced these abstract and theoretical arguments. It is 
rather evident that there is a large discrepancy between the constitutional courts and the level 
of their engagement with EU law and the CJEU.148 While indirect dialogue has been present 
for some time now the direct dialogue between constitutional courts and the CJEU through the 
mechanism of preliminary ruling is a very recent phenomenon. Accordingly, in order to be able 
to draw conclusions and more specific recommendations one has to analyze the concrete 
aspects of indirect and direct dialogue between constitutional courts and the CJEU through the 
prism of constitutional pluralism and constitutional legitimacy. 
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143 The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), Rediscovering Europe in the Netherlands, 
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3.3 Constitutional courts, constitutional legitimacy and indirect dialogue in the EU 
Indirect dialogue has been argued to represent the “unorthodox avenues of judicial 
communication”149 which do not follow the regular and structured path of judicial interaction 
between national courts and the CJEU. Hence all other forms of interaction between national 
courts and the CJEU aside from the preliminary ruling procedure as regulated in Article 267 
TFEU and interpreted in the CJEU case-law are referred to as indirect dialogue. 
Martinico identifies six techniques of indirect or, as he names it, ‘hidden dialogue’ through 
which constitutional courts have facilitated the application of EU law in harmony with the 
constitutional provisions by preserving the position of constitutional courts at the same time.150 
Nevertheless, he does not dwell on the overarching function of these and similar techniques. 
Namely, constitutional courts realize their constructive role of providing constitutional 
legitimacy to EU law through indirect dialogue, first, by anchoring and empowering EU law 
in the national legal order151 and second, by contributing to the development of European 
constitutionalism and increasing the effectiveness of EU law.152 
There are essentially two avenues through which constitutional courts enter into an indirect 
dialogue. First, the main avenue of indirect dialogue and for legitimizing EU law is through 
the constitutional review of the EU treaties or their subsequent revisions.153 While for some 
courts this power has been envisaged in the constitution154 others had to develop special paths, 
sometimes very contentious, in order to reach this possibility on deciding on the 
constitutionality of primary EU law.155 The second avenue is through the review of national 
implementing acts of EU secondary law. Very often constitutional courts have resorted to this 
avenue as they were trying to avoid dealing directly with EU law and potentially entering into 
a direct conflict with the CJEU. 
These two avenues have been determined by procedural and jurisdictional aspects of 
constitutional review. Namely, when it comes to the review of primary law, indirect dialogue 
is the only alternative since there is no possibility for preliminary reference to the CJEU in such 
cases. On the other hand, indirect review of EU secondary law is usually determined by the 
fact that in most cases we have so-called incidenter proceedings as part of a concrete control 
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150 Martinico (n 126) 261. 
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instead of a main, principaliter, proceedings in an abstract control case. In the latter cases 
constitutional courts are the first and last instance and accordingly are obliged, at least formally, 
to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. Contrary, in the 
incidenter proceedings constitutional courts are just resolving the constitutionality issue of a 
legal act as a preliminary question in a specific ongoing case before the ordinary judiciary.156 
Nevertheless, this means that constitutional courts in such cases might not be obliged to send 
a preliminary reference. However they can decide to do this anyway, of course, if they find it 
appropriate.157 This line of thinking in essence draws on the debate over the importance of the 
so-called issue of ‘last word’ and ‘first word’ when it comes to the initiative for preliminary 
reference.158 Be that as it may, for a long period of time this is has been part of theoretical 
debate only and therefore the two main avenues of indirect dialogue have been crucial in 
providing EU law with constitutional legitimacy. 
3.3.1 Constitutional review of EU Treaties 
It has been previously emphasized constitutional review of EU treaties represents the main 
avenue of indirect dialogue, and at the same time, of legitimizing EU law. Even though this 
type of review was not as important during the first decades of the European Communities, it 
drew significant attention in the aftermath of the creation of the EU with Maastricht Treaty and 
the rapidly increasing scope and penetration of EU law into the national legal order. The FCC 
and ICC, the only two constitutional courts159 among the founding member states, until the 
entry of Spain and Portugal in the EC, have not paid so much attention to EC law especially 
not until the 70’s. During this period these constitutional courts have managed to accommodate 
EC law within the existing doctrines on the relationship between national constitutional law 
and international law and further on even devised the particular status of EC law.160 
Nevertheless, since the Maastricht Treaty and the decisions on the, direct or indirect, 
constitutionality review by the constitutional courts, above all the FCC, this form of indirect 
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dialogue has been taken rather seriously.161 The review of EU treaties has offered the 
constitutional courts an opportunity to anchor EU law in the national legal order by determining 
and clarifying, among other things, its status within the hierarchy of norms, declaring the limits 
of application of EU law and the manner in which the scope of EU law has to be interpreted. 
For this purpose, constitutional courts have created specific constitutional doctrines. Through 
them constitutional courts have designed the framework within which EU law could be applied 
and enforced in the member states. They have clarified how EU law could fit under the often 
very broad and unclear national constitutional provisions.162 On the other hand, constitutional 
courts have safeguarded the domestic procedural requirements for the entry of an external 
source of law into the domestic legal order. In this way they have provided constitutional 
legitimacy understood in its narrower sense. As Sadurski puts it constitutional courts have tried 
securing that “[p]arliament must not change the Constitution “by the back door” for example 
by ratifying a Treaty containing provisions that conflict with it, but rather that any change to 
the Constitution can be only made by using the proper amendment procedures.”163   
At the same time, through this constitutional courts have signaled and warned both national 
institutions and EU institutions on the possible shortcomings of EU law and possible 
incompatibility with the existing constitutional provisions. This has often been done in lengthy 
and extensive decisions of constitutional courts often stating abstract and theoretical arguments 
supporting them. Taking into consideration that the treaties are living instruments, these 
decisions have served as a basis or framework on their own for future decisions in which 
specific doctrines would be developed and shaped or reshaped in order to adapt to the 
circumstances.164 In this manner the indirect dialogue has been furthered and in certain cases 
it has led to the establishment of direct dialogue.  
There are numerous examples that could be pointed out supporting the above argument. In this 
regard perhaps one should take the practice of the most influential constitutional court in 
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Europe, the FCC. Actually, this constitutional court, along with CC165 and SCT166, has started 
this practice of constitutional review of EU treaties and EU primary law. First it was in its 
Maastricht decision167 and then in its Lisbon decision 168 that it drew significant attention. In 
these two, widely discussed, decisions the FCC has in a rather extensive manner 169 reviewed 
the compatibility of these treaties with the constitutional provisions and principles. Through a 
highly contentious constitutional maneuver the FCC created a sort of actio popularis for the 
review of the compatibility of EU law through a broad interpretation of the right to vote 
envisaged in Article 38 GG.170 Even though in essence its decisions had an Euro-friendly 
outcome conditioning the ratification of the treaties with the enactment of certain legal acts and 
provisions in the national legal order, the FCC nevertheless took the opportunity to address 
contentious and potential conflicting aspects of the treaty provisions, but also of the actual 
practice of the European integration. In doing so it has positioned and accommodated EU law 
in the national legal order by designing new constitutional doctrines which on the one hand 
declare the openness of the German constitutional order towards EU law but on the other set 
limits to EU law and European integration.171 Thus, in its Maastricht decision FCC has drawn 
the line on the issue of the genuine source of sovereignty declaring that Germany and the 
member states of the EU are in essence the Masters of the Treaties – Herren der Verträge – 
arguing for the right of withdrawal of Germany, something that was not envisaged in the 
Maastricht Treaty.172 For the first time the FCC set up a new instrument of constitutional review 
of EU law which is in breach of the principle of limited attribution of powers to the EU and is 
thus out of the scope of powers and competences of the EU as bestowed to it by Germany 
through its constitution and consent. These so-called ultra vires acts of the EU, if declared as 
such by the FCC, could not be applied by any institution in Germany. The ultra vires review 
of EU law would be conducted solely by the FCC. Lastly, building up on the Solange saga, the 
FCC declared that when it came to the protection of fundamental constitutional rights and the 
issue of applicability of EU secondary law in Germany it was positioned towards the CJEU in 
a relationship of co-operation.173  
                                                          
165 The CC has reviewed the Maastricht Treaty on three occasions, CC, Treaty of Maastricht I, n. 92–308 DC of 
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1 (CUP 1994) 556, 574. 
173 Claes (n 112) 605-606. 
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In the Lisbon decision the FCC followed a similar reasoning174 in which in an even more 
extensive manner it tackled, among others, the main issues of the status and place of EU law 
in the national legal order. Following up on Maastricht it conditioned the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty with the enactment of legal provisions which would protect the powers and 
influence of the Bundestag in EU matters. As a matter of fact, this was another example in the 
line of efforts of the FCC to support the democratic legitimacy of EU law and the support for 
a more significant role, place and power of national parliaments in the EU.175 Taking this 
opportunity the FCC also used an older principle of friendliness of the constitution towards 
international law - Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit176 – in order to establish the principle of 
friendliness of the constitution towards EU law – Europarechtsfreundlichkeit.177 With this 
principle it stated that the constitution was to be interpreted and applied in a Euro-friendly 
manner, within certain limits, acknowledging the constitutional bases and obligation for 
Germany’s European integration.178 This principle should be also borne in mind when the 
determination of the limits of the application of EU law is concerned.179  In this sense, parallel 
to the ultra vires review, it designed a new instrument of review of conformity of EU laws with 
the constitutional identity of Germany. Relating the constitutional identity of Germany with 
Article 4(2) TEU the FCC has provided itself with the power to conduct this type of review.180 
In both of these cases the Court was subject to severe criticism from both domestic and 
international ‘Euro-friendly audience’ for creating new obstacles for European integration, for 
being trapped in an anachronistic and nationalist understanding of sovereignty and democracy, 
and caring only for its own power and status.181 As a matter of fact every single decision of this 
court on EU matters has been put under heavy scrutiny. However, because of the significance 
of the constitutional framework of abstract principles and doctrines under which EU law should 
be applied that were designed in this type of constitutional review they came under the 
‘magnifying glass’ of critics. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight one could argue that 
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such criticism was obviously overblown.182 The underlying argument has come to be that every 
critical observation of EU law and European integration must be seen as euro-skepticism and 
a conservative nationalist attitude creating obstacles for further integration in Europe.183 
Nevertheless, these and similar decisions of other constitutional courts need to be seen in a 
specific context and reevaluated from the perspective of constitutional legitimacy and the 
deliberative role of constitutional courts. Their input in the protection of the rule of law in 
Europe should not be undervalued as well as their constructive role in the integration process. 
Both Maastricht and Lisbon have drawn serious social and academic attention. The abundance 
of literature clearly demonstrates the level of debate that these decisions have initiated, 
academic as well as broader social debates, which have served the purpose of EU 
legitimatization. As a matter of fact certain decisions have filled the gap left from the lack of 
substantial political debate on European integration by initiating the ‘constitutional’ or ‘legal 
debate’, such as in the case of the Maastricht decision.184 On a more specific note, they have 
served as basis for further judicial dialogue, both indirect and direct, between the national 
courts and the CJEU but also of the very same constitutional courts.185 For instance, the issue 
of constitutional identity and ultra vires review both found their important place in the 
preliminary reference and decision of the FCC on the issue of the OMT.186 Additionally, the 
FCC through the constitutional complaint on a breach of Article 38 GG, even though seriously 
contested, has enabled a broader group of potential applicants, which do not have a say and are 
not represented in the parliament during the ratification procedure, to have access to the court 
and present their arguments. In this manner, constitutional courts have demonstrated their 
deliberative role as both interlocutors and public reasoners by expanding the deliberative forum 
on EU issues in the national realm. 
Other courts have followed this pattern set by the FCC. The FCC has had a huge influence in 
this sense on several constitutional courts,187 but particularly on the constitutional courts of 
Central and Eastern European countries in general.188 In a similar fashion other courts have 
followed this pattern of creating new constitutional doctrines in order to accommodate and set 
limits for unwarranted expansion of the scope of EU law. The SCT has, for instance, in its 
Constitutional Treaty decision distinguished between supremacy and primacy thus drawing the 
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line between the status of the constitution in the national legal order and the place of EU law.189 
In the same way it has also made the distinction between dis-application and non-application 
of national acts not conforming to EU law.190 The CEEC constitutional courts have often 
referred to and incorporated the FCC doctrines in their decisions however they have not always 
had the same combative style.191 In certain cases, these constitutional courts have been 
procedurally confined to only a posteriori review as their constitutions envisage both ex ante 
and ex post constitutional review of international agreements.192 Namely, their hands were 
rather tied as with the ratification of a treaty international obligations are accepted and thus the 
state is obliged to obey the treaty regardless of its conformity with the constitution. Therefore, 
any decision of unconstitutionality might have broader international consequences and 
compromise countries international standing. Therefore, the practice of ex post, or a posteriori, 
review of EU primary law has not proven to be well suited for this type of indirect dialogue.193 
3.3.2 Indirect dialogue through constitutional review of national implementing acts 
The indirect dialogue does not stop at the level of constitutional review of EU treaties. As a 
matter of fact, the latter has in certain instances served as a trigger for the development of an 
even larger case law that deals with indirect review of secondary EU law, that is, through the 
review of national implementing acts. This line of case-law has frequently been used to further 
develop, discuss and adjust the doctrines and principles elaborated in previous decisions and 
sometimes even to design new doctrines and principles generally aimed at providing or even 
revoking the constitutional legitimacy of EU law in national legal realm. On the other hand, 
one could also notice that the subsequent decisions have come as a reaction to the CJEU case 
law in which it has developed certain aspects of EU primary law and the need to adjust the 
already designed doctrines to the new reality and court practice. The overarching reasons why 
constitutional courts have opted for this type of indirect dialogue instead of entering a direct 
dialogue through preliminary reference have to do with their initial tendency not to get involved 
with EU law and to avoid any type of direct conflict with the CJEU, especially when the case 
at hand does not involve a fundamental constitutional issue.194 Taking into consideration the 
rapid expansion of the scope of EU law one could easily question whether this type of approach 
of the constitutional courts is the most appropriate one. EU law scholars have frequently 
criticized this reluctance of constitutional courts to enter a direct dialogue especially in light of 
the obligation for national courts of last instance stemming from Article 267 TFEU. 
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There are numerous instances in which this type of indirect dialogue has turned out to be very 
constructive. Constitutional courts have continuously taken over their three roles of providing 
clarity to the issue at stake, signaling potential problems while at the same time being prudent 
over the possible negative consequences of their decisions and their possible domino effect.   
Perhaps the clearest example for this has been the so-called Solange saga. Even though at the 
beginning seriously condemned among scholars195 the FCC through the two Solange decisions 
has achieved much more than any other constitutional court through a preliminary reference.196 
Solange I has essentially initiated the process in which the EU and CJEU started developing an 
EC/EU approach to protection of fundamental rights. On the other hand, Solange II’s doctrine 
of equivalent protection has become so influential that both the CJEU197 and the ECtHR have 
‘borrowed’ it in their case law and thus has become the cornerstone of the development of 
fundamental rights in Europe and management of the triangle between ECHR, CJEU and 
national constitutional courts.198 Furthermore, in Solange II the doctrine of primacy in 
application in Germany, as a type of collision norm based on national constitutional law,199 has 
been clarified by distinguishing between the primacy in application and primacy in validity 
entailing the differentiation between primacy and supremacy which enabled the perception of 
the horizontal relationship between the legal orders.200 The FCC has frequently referred to it, 
the last instance being in the Lisbon decision, for the purpose of accommodating the EU law 
and its primacy doctrine with the status of constitutional provisions in the domestic legal 
order.201 
While the Solange decisions were delivered prior to the practice of constitutional review of EU 
treaties many other examples of this sort of indirect dialogue can be traced in correlation to the 
decisions reviewing treaties. Since the outset of the practice of constitutional review of EU 
primary law one could recognize a pattern in the relation between the different types of indirect 
dialogue. Namely, once the framework has been set in an extensive and detailed reasoning with 
a rather strict tone the subsequent decisions on the conformity of national implementing acts 
are delivered in a more moderate manner. Taking the FCC, but also some of the more activist 
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constitutional courts, as an example one can notice this pattern through several examples. First 
in this line of examples is the Banana saga.202 The Banana Market II203 essentially was a follow 
up to the Solange decisions and the Maastricht decision.204 In this decision, which was 
delivered several years after the Maastricht decision and its declaration of the relationship of 
cooperation in the sphere of fundamental rights, the FCC confirmed the equivalent protection 
doctrine and practically left the jurisdiction for protection of fundamental rights and review of 
EU law to the CJEU, while reserving for itself the possibility of review of EU law and national 
implementing acts only under exceptional circumstances.205 This doctrine and principle is 
applied in cases where EU law does not leave any type of margin of discretion for national 
implementing authorities.206 On the other hand, another important doctrine, the ultra vires 
review, originating from the Maastricht decision, was qualified by a subsequent decision, the 
Honeywell decision,207 further clarifying the way in which this type of review would be 
conducted.208 This decision of the FCC came after a much debated and criticized Mangold 
decision of the CJEU.209 In this manner the FCC made certain concessions in regard to EU law 
and the CJEU which eventually led to the first preliminary reference following the ultra vires 
review procedure as set with the Honeywell decision. 
Another line of examples involving several other constitutional courts in Europe had to do with 
the national implementing acts transposing provisions from secondary EU law which foresee 
certain level of discretion for the member states. In the first example the constitutionality of 
the national acts implementing the framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 
as well as the validity of the Framework Decision was challenged before several constitutional 
courts.210 The courts have mainly resorted to an indirect review of EU law sending clear signals 
to the CJEU and national institutions on the contentious aspects of the EAW even though 
different constitutional courts have used different methods to do this.211 However, this type of 
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dialogue has not always born tangible results and it seems like the CJEU has not even taken 
into consideration the fact that several constitutional courts have raised concerns over EAW 
and signaled this through their decisions and reasoning. Even the FCC decision on the 
unconstitutionality of the national implementing act, on bases of infringement of constitutional 
rights, has not influenced the CJEU in this regard. This stance has not changed also in light of 
preliminary references from three constitutional courts - direct dialogue - that is from the 
Belgian,212 French213 and Spanish Constitutional Tribunal214 on the one side, and the CJEU, on 
the other, on different aspects of the very same issue.215 Finally, apparently also as a response 
to the Melloni decision of the CJEU, the FCC has reacted on the matter of EAW for the second 
time216 and the problems concerning the trial in absentia in Italy by reversing and remanding a 
decision of a Higher Regional Court on extradition of a foreign national to Italy due to a 
possible breach of fundamental rights protected and safeguarded by the German Basic Law and 
the Framework Decision. In this sense it did not question the validity of either the Framework 
Decision or the national implementing act. However, declaring the possibility of applying 
identity review in cases of lowering of standards of protection of constitutional rights the FCC, 
in light of Melloni, sent a warning signal217 against the existing interpretation of CJEU on 
Article 53 of the Charter218 thus reviving the Solange doctrine as in its first EAW decision.219 
In all of these cases the role of the constitutional courts has been to protect the constitutional 
rights and the values related to the rule of law and not to demonstrate a Euro-skeptic attitude. 
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Belgian cases related to EAW see Cloots (n 212) 661. 
219 Martinico and Pollicino (n 209) 80. 
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In certain cases, the level of protection of constitutional rights, such as in Spain and Germany, 
has caused concerns over the true role of the Charter and its Article 53, and the CJEU in 
protection of fundamental rights as well as over the true relationship of these fundamental 
rights with the national constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the CJEU has put the uniform 
application of EU law and the absolute primacy of EU law on a first place.220  
In a similar situation involving again several constitutional courts221 over the Data Retention 
Directive222 once again the indirect dialogue was widely employed in signaling the problems 
regarding both the validity of the directive and the threat to fundamental rights that certain 
provisions of the directive pose. However, in this saga the direct dialogue has proven to be 
more effective than in the EAW as the CJEU finally recognized some of the problematic 
aspects of the Directive upon a preliminary reference lastly sent by the Austrian Constitutional 
Court and the Irish High Court.223  
In both of these sagas the CJEU has left the impression not to take into account the special role 
and place of constitutional courts in the European legal realm, somehow denying the specificity 
of these institutions and of constitutional discourse including the specific deliberative qualities 
of the constitutional courts. Even though the indirect dialogue has involved numerous 
constitutional and high courts, the CJEU has remained on its rather rigid position of blindly 
sticking to the ‘absolute’ primacy doctrine and its practice with only occasional and exceptional 
instances in which it has taken the position of constitutional courts into consideration.224  
Based on the discussed above the indirect judicial dialogue between constitutional courts and 
the CJEU is definitely not a one-act but rather a multi-act ‘play’, involving a certain level of 
continuity in the indirect judicial dialogue and its intertwinement with direct dialogue.225 This 
form of dialogue definitely serves as a constructive form of interaction however rather often 
                                                          
220 See for instance Albi (n 183) 796ff; Torres Perez (n 214) 322; and Leonard F. M. Besselink,’The ECJ as the 
European “Supreme Court”: Setting Aside Citizens’ Rights for EU Law Supremacy’ (Verfassungsblog, 18 August 
2014). 
221 RCC, No 1.258 decision of 8 October 2009; FCC, 1 BvR 256/08, judgment of 2 March 2010, CCC, Pl. ÚS 
24/10, decision of 22 March 2011; and HCC, no. 1746/B/2010, decision of 19 December 2012. For more on this 
see for instance Ludovica Benedizione and Eleonora Paris, ‘Preliminary Reference and Dialogue between Courts 
as Tools for Reflection on the EU System of Multilevel Protection of Rights: The Case of the Data Retention 
Directive’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1727; Theodore Konstadinides, ‘Destroying Democracy on the Ground 
of Defending It? The Data Retention Directive, the Surveillance State and Our Constitutional Ecosystem’ (2012) 
1 European Current Law 722; Hendrik Wieduwilt, ‘The German Federal Constitutional Court Puts the Data 
Retention Directive on Hold’ (2010) 53 The German Yearbook of International Law 917ff; and Albi (n 183) 824-
829.  
222 EC Directive 2006/24 of 15 March 2006, O.J. 2006 L 105/54.   
223 CJEU, Case C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources et al and Kärtner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others, Judgment 
8 April 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. A request for making a preliminary reference to the other constitutional 
courts was made by the petitioners in their respective such as in the case before the FCC but this was refused and 
the focus was put solely on the national constitutional issue raised by the implementing acts. For more on this see 
Tatham (n 15) 124ff. For a critical view of the FCC in this regard see Eva Julia Lohse, ‘The German Constitutional 
Court and Preliminary References – Still a Match not Made in Heaven?’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1501-
1503. 
224 Leonard F.M. Besselink, ‘Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, Judgment 
of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 December 2010’ (2012) 49 Common Marker Law Review 689. For a more 
detailed account on the CJEU attitude towards the constitutional courts see Komarek (n 15). 
225 Torres Perez (n 3) 110-112. 
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the CJEU has proven not to be aware of the leverage, especially of certain constitutional courts, 
making it more difficult for the latter to enter the dialogue. While perhaps substantial and 
tangible results have often been missing still the value of the indirect dialogue is not to be 
underestimated as it subtly serves its constructive purpose of clarifying and signaling. 
Additionally, the prudence of the constitutional courts has been shown to be in the avoidance 
of direct conflict with the CJEU while still managing to fulfill their role. Therefore this role is 
also a matter of judicial wisdom in avoidance of direct confrontation that should not be 
mistaken for a judicial ego.226 As Bobek formulates it “[t]rue cooperation may not always mean 
to be active. Perhaps even more importantly, sometimes it includes the sensible decision to 
remain silent, i.e., not to ask certain questions.”227 Nevertheless, with the developing trend of 
constitutional courts starting to resort to direct dialogue this judicial ‘play’ has become more 
complex often involving more than two interlocutors. In which way this new trend is to be 
perceived will be discussed in the next section.  
4 Direct dialogue through preliminary reference 
Just as in everyday life, in some cases, direct dialogue cannot be replaced by anything else and 
one simply needs to have its say directly in order to get his or her points across. Therefore, the 
role of constitutional courts as the most important interlocutors on constitutional matters in 
Europe, might be argued, could be best perceived through their direct dialogue with the CJEU. 
Through this type of dialogue essentially arguments are brought from the hidden dialogue out 
into the open.228 In this way the potentially constructive role of constitutional courts in the 
process of European legal integration and the constitutional legitimization of EU law are even 
more visible, particularly through the looking glass of constitutional pluralism. Their active but 
cautious participation in this dialogue might be mutually beneficial for both their status, 
nationally and in Europe, and for the overall European integration. Nevertheless, this benefit 
is not as straightforward and therefore the constitutional courts have been reluctant to enter the 
direct judicial dialogue. This attitude has been subject to change lately. The reasons behind this 
new development and how one could perceive constitutional courts’ participation, as well as 
its limits, in the direct judicial dialogue from the perspective of constitutional pluralism will be 
discussed in this section.  
4.1 The evolution of the attitude of constitutional courts towards the preliminary 
reference  
The preliminary reference procedure as regulated with Article 267 TFEU represents the most 
developed and structured form of direct judicial dialogue between courts of different legal 
orders. While the legal integration in Europe has benefited greatly from the direct judicial 
dialogue between ordinary national courts and the CJEU for a long time national constitutional 
                                                          
226 Komarek (n 47) 543ff; and Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Judicial Ego’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 1. 
227 Michal Bobek, ‘Landtova, Holubec, and the Problem of an Uncooperative Court: Implications for the 
Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 89. 
228 Monica Claes, ‘Luxembourg, Here We Come? Constitutional Courts and the Preliminary Reference Procedure’ 
(2015) 16 German Law Journal 1337. 
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courts have avoided using this instrument of judicial dialogue. Particularly until 2008 only two 
constitutional courts229 of the EU member states had developed a practice of entering into a 
direct dialogue with the CJEU. The grounds on which constitutional courts have refused to 
employ the instrument of preliminary reference to the CJEU could be put in three categories. 
First, constitutional courts have claimed that they are not “courts or tribunals” under the 
respective articles of the EU treaties230 but more of ‘a court of courts’ or ‘a court beyond mere 
courts’231 and thus they are under no obligation to refer a case to the CJEU.232 Second, they 
have distinguished between the role of ordinary courts to apply EU law as well as to conduct 
so-called compatibility review between national and EU or international law and the role of 
constitutional courts to conduct a constitutional review thus avoiding of getting involved with 
EU law.233 Third, closely related to the second ground or category, some constitutional courts 
have used procedural peculiarities such as the constitutionally set time constraints234 or the 
nature of the proceedings before them, meaning the incidenter or concrete constitutional 
review,235 which represented an obstacle for sending a preliminary reference. 
                                                          
229 Austrian CC with five and Belgian CC with 26 preliminary references, even though the latter court prior to 
2007 was named Court of Arbitration with initially a different institutional role and powers which were narrower 
than that of constitutional courts but which have been increased throughout the years. For more on this see Monica 
Claes, ‘The Validity and Primacy of EU Law and the ‘Cooperative Relationship’ between National Constitutional 
Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2016) 26 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 165-166. 
230 The CJEU has never really clarified this for the constitutional courts specifically in its case-law. It has hinted 
on two occasions: ECJ Annual Report 1998 and 2002; and CJEU, Case C-239/07 Sabatauskas and Others, 
Opinion AG Kokott of 12 June 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:344, paras. 15-19. See Aleksandra Kustra,’Reading the 
Tea Leaves: The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ (2015) 16 German Law 
Journal 1544.  
231 Bobek (n 227) 84. 
232 For example, the ICC. See Claes (n 112) 439; Repetto (n 156) 1455; Michal Bobek, ‘Learning to Talk: 
Preliminary Rulings, the Courts of the New Member States and the Court of Justice’ (2008) 45 Common Market 
Law Review 1632 – 1633; Cartabia (n 72) 24; Zdenek Kühn and Michal Bobek,’What About that ‘Incoming 
Tide’?’The Application of EU Law in Czech Republic’ in Adam Lazowski (ed) The Application of EU Law in the 
New Member States (Asser 2010) 349-350. 
233 Darinka Piqani, ‘The Role of National Constitutional Courts in Issues of Compliance’ in Marise Cremona (ed), 
Compliance and the Enforcement of EU law (OUP 2012) 136-137. In France this is related to the differentiation 
between constitutionalite and conventionalite. See for example CC, Decision No. 2010-605, decision of 12 May 
2010, at point 16; also Pierre-Vincent Astresses,’The Return of Huron, or Naïve Thoughts on the Handling of 
Article 267 TFEU by Constitutional Court when Referring to the Court of Justice’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 
1714-1715. Belgium has applied the same differentiation see Marc Bossuyt and Willem Verrijdt, ‘The Full Effect 
of EU law and of Constitutional Review in Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment’ (2011) 7 European 
Constitutional Law Review 359 and 362. For Italy see Claes (n 112) 440; Cartabia (n 72) 24; and Repetto (n 156) 
1453-1455. For Spain and generally see Martinico (n 156) 224-225. For the Czech Republic see on the case of 
Czech Republic see Kühn and Bobek (n 232) 346-347. 
234 On this point see The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, 1958, Article 61(3) “In the cases provided for 
in the two foregoing paragraphs, the Constitutional Council must deliver its ruling within one month. However, 
at the request of the Government, in cases of urgency, this period shall be reduced to eight days.” Ordinance no 
58-1067 constituting an institutional act on the Constitutional council, Section 23-10, “The Constitutional Council 
shall give its ruling within three months of the referral being made to it”, Dyevre (n 213) 159 and Francois-Xavier 
Millet and Nicoletta Perlo,’The First Preliminary Reference of the French Constitutional Court to the CJEU: 
Revolution de Palais or Revolution in French Constitutional Law’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1471. 
235 On the case of ICC see Roberto Miccu, ‘Toward a (Real) Cooperative Constitutionalism? New Perspectives 
on the Italian Constitutional Court’ in Jose Maria Beneyto and Ingolf Pernice (eds), Europe’s Constitutional 
Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law of National Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011) 128; Martinico 
(n 156) 229; and Repetto (n 156) 1451ff. For PCT see Kustra (n 230) 1556 and 1564-1567. 
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These peculiarities could also be traced to other jurisdictional limitations of constitutional 
courts and the constitutional procedural law, such as in Germany, under which there are rare 
occasions in which EU law is directly concerned and invoked before the constitutional court.236 
In any case, some constitutional courts have not openly denied the possibility of sending a 
preliminary reference but have simply foreseen that for the future without ever actually using 
it.237 Therefore one could argue that, in essence, the underlying reason seemed to be related to 
the avoidance of entering a direct conflict238 with the CJEU and the preservation of the status 
of these institutions and their constitutional monopoly of constitutional review which seemed 
to be jeopardized by the CJEU, the doctrines of EU law and the decentralizing tendencies of 
its Simmenthal doctrine.239 More precisely, constitutional courts were careful not be placed in 
a subordinate position to the CJEU by entering a direct judicial dialogue.  
Against this background, the increasing number of referrals from constitutional courts starting 
from 2008 represents a beginning of a new or recent trend and development. One can recognize 
several factors why 2008 has demarcated a turning point in constitutional courts position 
towards preliminary reference. Namely several developments on EU, but also on national level, 
have influenced their decisions to start using preliminary reference.240 The first factor is the 
enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. This treaty incorporated the Charter on fundamental rights and 
thus provided it with a legally binding force. This meant that the EU and the CJEU have gained 
a greater impact in the sphere of fundamental rights and in that manner entered a very sensitive 
area of jurisdiction of constitutional courts.241 On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty envisages 
in Article 4(2) TEU a very important obligation for EU institution to respect national identity 
of member states. This latter provision and the protection of constitutional identity have 
actually been interpreted by the constitutional courts as their last bastion of safeguarding the 
national constitutions from EU law.242 Actually it could be argued that this provision has 
encouraged constitutional courts to enter a judicial dialogue reassuring them that at the end of 
the day they might have the provisional ‘last say’ i.e. have a legal possibility in exceptional 
situations to disobey the ruling of the CJEU.243  
                                                          
236 More specifically on Germany see Lohse (n 223) 1492 – 1498. On the same point in the case of Italy see Miccu 
(n 235) 117. 
237 Bobek (n 232) 1632. 
238 Preferring to resort to a ‘mute conflict’ instead, Marta Cartabia, ‘Europe as a Space of Constitutional 
Interdependence: New Questions about the Preliminary Ruling’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1792. See also in 
Damian Chalmers, ’The Dynamics of Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 5/04 33. He claims that reason for non-referral by constitutional courts might found elsewhere. 
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The overwhelming majority of cases involved significant commercial interests where speedy resolution and legal 
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of last resort do not refer.” 
239 Dicosola, Fasoneand and Spigno (n 28) 1319-1320; Torres Perez (n 35) 61; Cartabia (n 72) 28; Andreas Orator, 
‘The Decision of the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: An Instrument 
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240 Dicosola, Fasone and Spigno (n 28) 1321-1325; and Claes (n 228) 1340. 
241 Cartabia (n 72) 5ff; Bobek (n 227) 34; and Miryam Rodriguez-Izquierdo Serrano, ‘The Spanish Constitutional 
Court and Fundamental Rights Adjudication after the First Preliminary Reference’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 
1517 and 1526. 
242 For more on this see chapter 5. 
243 Claes, de Visser, Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 55) 9.  
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Second, the combination of an increasing scope of both EU law and constitutional review has 
made the constitutional courts revise their approach towards the preliminary reference. 
Namely, it was on the one hand, the euro crisis and the introduction of new legal instruments 
in an effort to tackle it which have caused a concern over the unwarranted broadening of the 
scope of EU law.244 On the other hand, the increasing constitutionalization of many areas of 
law at the national level245 along with the rapidly increasing general scope of EU law especially 
with the Lisbon Treaty has somehow forced constitutional courts to get more involved with EU 
law and consider entering a direct dialogue with the CJEU. This higher level of direct exposure 
of different areas of law to both EU law and constitutionalization broadened the areas in which 
constitutional courts have powers and jurisdiction and where they cannot avoid getting 
involved with EU law. This has brought to a changing perception of constitutional courts 
concerning EU law and their place in the European integration.246 Their adjustment to this new 
perception has brought to a developing shift from a defensive to a more cooperative attitude.247 
The perception shift and adjustment by the constitutional courts also has its national dimension 
as their position not only to the CJEU but also their relation to other high instance domestic 
courts has been affected and jeopardized as result of the empowerment of the ordinary judiciary 
through EU law.248  
Nevertheless, these factors have not led to an unconditional acceptance of the preliminary 
reference but to a less reserved position of constitutional courts.  Even though 9 out of 18 
constitutional courts in the EU have already sent a preliminary reference to the CJEU for most 
of these courts this has been done only in exceptional situations.249 
Even though criticized for their rigid position, constitutional courts have enough arguments to 
maintain their cautious attitude250 especially under circumstances in which the CJEU still does 
not recognize the special place and role of constitutional courts251 which is supposed to be 
reflected at the EU level from their place and role in the national constitutional systems. The 
CJEU has never taken into serious consideration the difference between ordinary and 
constitutional legality and between supranational and constitutional legality.252 While it might 
be true what Monica Claes argues that the preliminary reference procedure does involve a 
                                                          
244 Dicosola, Fasone and Spigno (n 28) 1323-1325; and Claes (n 228) 1340. 
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jurisdictional exclusivity rather than hierarchical superiority,253 still one cannot deny that it 
involves an assumption of obedience.254 This assumption is the result of two factors. First, the 
preliminary reference procedure is based on logic of a single procedural round where further 
exchange on the specific issue at hand is not possible.255 The only possibility to have any further 
exchange of arguments is by re-referrals over the same issue. Second, it is related to the actual 
purpose of the preliminary ruling procedure. Namely, the main rationale behind the preliminary 
reference is the uniform and effective interpretation and application of EU law. One could also 
argue that behind this rationale hides the underlying goal which consists of further 
strengthening of the principle of primacy of EU law.256 Nevertheless, the direct rationale is not, 
for example, the protection of fundamental rights. On the other hand, the latter, along with the 
safeguarding of constitutionality, are the main roles and purposes of constitutional courts in the 
national legal order.257 Therefore, the direct judicial dialogue is being conducted between 
institutions with goals which do not always overlap. Bearing this in mind, the differing 
institutional rationale, the cautious attitude of constitutional courts seems reasonable. The 
principle of uniform application cannot represent an overriding argument in this sense 
especially in light of other values and principles which are, inter alia, safeguarded by 
constitutional courts.258 For instance, it was also because of this reason that the Melloni 
decision of the CJEU has been often criticized by constitutional scholars259 in view of lowering 
the constitutional standards for fundamental rights protection. In the words of the CJEU a 
higher national standard of protection of fundamental rights might be applied according to 
Article 53 of the Charter ”provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as 
interpreted  by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby 
compromised.”260 
It is exactly this latter development in Melloni261 which was the main reason for the FCC’s 
reaction in its second decision on EAW, labeled by some as Solange III,262 sending a clear 
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warning signal263 also by referring to Melloni that this development goes out of constitutional 
bounds.264 
Nevertheless all the above still does not represent a decisive argument for complete insulation 
and isolation of constitutional courts from using the preliminary reference procedure regardless 
of the point made above that their approach towards it should remain cautious particularly until 
the CJEU becomes more responsive to national constitutions’ particularities and constitutional 
courts.265 Through their direct engagement constitutional courts could demonstrate their 
constructive role in the legal integration more successfully and get engaged in the common 
endeavor of constructing the common European constitutional area. More importantly, by 
entering the dialogue they will be able to compensate for the limits set on its national monopoly 
and exclusivity for constitutional review by being able to contribute and influence the creation 
and development of legal doctrines and values on a European level.266 
4.2 The role of constitutional courts in direct dialogue through the prism of constitutional 
pluralism  
Placing the cautious approach in a theoretical framework, only at first glance might this specific 
approach of constitutional courts contradict constitutional pluralism. As a matter of fact, 
constitutional pluralism does speak of intersections and overlaps between the legal orders, but 
nevertheless this does not deny in any way the existing autonomy of the legal orders and the 
protection thereof.267 Accordingly, the orders are not interchangeable and therefore any 
absolute subordination of constitutional courts to the CJEU and to EU law denies the existing 
relationship between the legal orders and the specific role of constitutional courts.268 But which 
are the specific roles and added value of constitutional courts in regard to their participation in 
direct judicial dialogue in Europe as seen through the prism of constitutional pluralism? 
Analyzing the direct judicial dialogue within the framework of constitutional pluralism we 
need to get back to the constructive roles of constitutional courts as interlocutors and their place 
as part of constitutional pluralism in the judicial dialogue generally. Namely, constitutional 
courts bring an added value by making their roles in the EU particularly evident in the context 
of the preliminary reference procedure. Through the engagement of constitutional courts in 
direct judicial dialogue in Europe they actually bring up the existing pluralism to the fore in 
Europe confronting the CJEU and EU as whole with this type of diversity thus neutralizing the 
risk of possible constitutional homogenization.269 Even though it might be too early to discuss 
this recent development since there are not so many referrals, and only from half of the 
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constitutional courts in the EU, still one could recognize certain advantages of the involvement 
of constitutional courts in the dialogue based on the particularities of these institutions and 
constitutional review in general.   
In order to have a true constitutional conversation270 in Europe constitutional courts need to 
enter into a direct judicial dialogue with the CJEU. This is the main reason why Comella argues 
that “[t]he constitutional courts should be the entity that talks to Luxembourg in the name of 
ultimate principles rooted in the national constitution.”271 The main reason behind this is that 
references brought by ordinary judges are not formulated as questions about constitutional 
matters.272 It frequently occurs that ordinary courts are neither good at recognizing the relevant 
EU law nor at properly phrasing the actual questions and issues in the preliminary reference to 
CJEU, especially when at stake are constitutional issues or more abstract norms or principles.273 
Constitutional courts, however, as result of their specificities, as well as of the ones of the 
constitutional discourse, are able to better funnel the constitutional arguments and issues at 
stake and therefore could be perceived as the only viable interlocutors of the CJEU in a direct 
constitutional dialogue in Europe. Furthermore, even the constitutional tradition of 
constitutional review itself has influenced the attitude of ordinary courts towards entering a 
direct judicial dialogue which has led authors to call for ‘juristocracy’ in some countries lacking 
this tradition and belonging to so-called majoritarian democracies.274 In this sense 
constitutional courts bring their added value both directly and indirectly when it comes to 
judicial dialogue. 
Discussing the difference between lower ordinary courts and the last instance courts there have 
been proposals and suggestions according to which the highest national courts as courts of last 
instance, including constitutional courts, would be the only interlocutors in the preliminary 
reference procedure. Such a narrowing of the possibility to refer a question to the CJEU would 
essentially limit the preliminary reference to truly important issues. Thus this proposal is 
primarily based on the arguments related to rationalization of the preliminary reference 
procedure before the CJEU putting it in a position of becoming a genuine supreme or 
constitutional court of the EU by dealing with fewer cases involving fundamental legal issues 
and increasing the quality of the national judicial procedure by respecting the internal judicial 
hierarchy.275 As a matter of fact it is inherent in the actual design of the procedure of 
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Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary Reference to the European Court of Justice (OUP 2010) 49-52. 
275 For more on this see Komarek (n 256); Broberg and Fenger (n 274) 33-34; and in the context of Landotva case 
Bobek (n 227) 77. Also on this but in the context of the discussion on advisory opinions by the ECHtR see Jean 
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preliminary reference in the EU, which has been based on national procedures for addressing 
constitutional courts with preliminary constitutional questions, under which procedure only 
important issues (i.e. constitutional issues) are sent to the court.276 However the analogy with 
the national procedures should not be overemphasized in other areas due to evident differences 
and the existence of the element of hierarchical relationships between the different national 
judicial instances.277 
Accordingly, what constitutional courts bring to the preliminary reference is more leverage by 
raising complex constitutional issues before the CJEU.278 By doing this, constitutional courts 
are essentially feeding constitutional principles directly to the CJEU which are supposed to 
lead the latter into providing strong and more reasoned arguments in delivering its decisions 
creating the impression of a shared endeavor.279 Constitutional courts are thus clarifying certain 
national specificities and demarcating and enriching the general principles of EU law and one 
of their primary sources –the constitutional traditions common to the member states.280 This 
depicts more clearly the external or EU dimension of the role of providing clarity to 
constitutional issues and arguments. Constitutional courts by addressing the issues at the same 
time are signaling the possible conflicts and incompatibilities between the orders, however, 
different from the forms of indirect dialogue they are addressing them directly to the CJEU and 
forcing it to respond to them.281 
In turn the more responsive the CJEU is in such an occasion the more the constitutional courts 
would be encouraged to enter into direct dialogue.282 Unfortunately, judged by the dominant 
style employed by the CJEU in its decisions that is often subject to criticism also because of 
ignoring national sensibilities, the prospects of drastic expansion of such dialogue is not that 
                                                          
Paul-Jacque, ‘Preliminary Reference to the European Court of Human Rights’ in Dialogue between judges, 
European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, (2012), 23. 
276 Komarek (n 256) 109. On the practice in Germany see Sturm and Detterbeck (n 206) paras. 29-30; and Heiko 
Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen: Die Entwicklung eines Modells zur Lösung von Konflikten 
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278 Orator (n 239) 1445; and Repetto (n 156) 1450 where he claims that the ICC is “injecting constitutional blood 
at EU level.” 
279 Torres Perez (n 35) 64; and Claes and De Witte (n 99) 96-97. 
280 CJEU, Case C-4/73 Nold KG v Commission, Judgment of 14 May 1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51; or Treaty on the 
European Union (Maastricht), Official Journal C191, 29.07.2011, former provision F and later Article 6 and 
Article 2. See additionally Claes and De Witte (n 99) 94ffl; Tatham (n 15) 302; Cloots (n 212) 653 claiming that 
the constitutional court is elucidating the specificities of the Belgian federal system, Torres Perez (n 35) 64; 
Cartabia (n 72) 26. Cartabia even designates a sort of amicus curiae of the CJEU role to constitutional courts. 
Nevertheless, this could be the case only when a constitutional court sends the preliminary reference directly and 
not in any other way. For the actual problem in Ladntova in this regard see in Bobek (n 227) 28; Torres Perez (n 
3) 117. According to her it should be noted that the more state courts engage in dialogue, the more influence they 
might have in defining the meaning of supranational rights where the influence of constitutional courts is crucial. 
281 Torrez Peres (n 35) 64; and Cloots (n 212) 654. 
282 This response can be either ‘loud’ or ‘silent’. On the latter see Sarmiento (n 114) 285ff. 
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promising.283 Therefore one is inclined to conclude that there is a lack of care for a true judicial 
discourse by the CJEU.284     
One might argue that constitutional matters are not exclusive only to constitutional courts and 
that such matters have occasionally been brought also by the highest ordinary courts i.e. 
supreme courts.285 This fact cannot be denied, indeed, supreme courts deal with questions and 
issues of law and the unity in its application leaving the determination of facts to the lower 
court instances. However this does not contradict the difference between supreme and 
constitutional courts as earlier discussed.286 Nevertheless, even the highest ordinary courts of 
the member states are involved in a form of regular adjudication thus applying legal norms to 
the facts of a case. They are not able to cope with the differentiation between ordinary and 
constitutional legality287 which incorporates the difference between the technical application 
of law to facts and deciding on the validity of legal norms based on abstract constitutional 
principles.288 Judges even at the highest instances are often not in a position to engage in the 
elaboration of abstract constitutional principles and values as they are more concerned with the 
goal of case solving in an efficient manner. This is also often the result of the fact that their 
dockets are quite full thus they are also facing a heavy time constrain which makes the abstract 
form of reasoning rather impractical and inefficient.289 In this sense, comparing the 
constitutional courts with the US Supreme Court, Zurn rightly argues that when it comes to the 
latter “the relevant constitutional issues are systematically distorted by their consistent 
entanglement with the technical legal principles designed for the management of appellate 
adjudication.”290  
Furthermore, most of the judiciaries in Europe are based on the principle of career judiciary 
and bureaucratic hierarchy which essentially means that ordinary judges are neither in a 
position to use nor well equipped with the interpretative methods and argumentation required 
by constitutional review.291 The latter requires a more elaborate style of reasoning which is 
different from the mere adjudication also conducted by the supreme courts.292 
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In order for this dialogue to be constructive, constitutional courts need to have a proactive role 
providing alternative solutions and reading of the contentious issues forcing the CJEU to 
reflect. The style, beside the leverage of the court,293 of the reference can play a decisive role 
as on it depends whether constitutional courts will force the CJEU to take their arguments into 
serious consideration and respond to them adequately, be it even in a ‘silent judgment’.294 The 
reference should depict one of the main discursive roles of constitutional courts through 
funneling and refining the arguments which even in certain instances have already been 
previously made by other judicial instances. By doing this constitutional courts bring order and 
clarity in the debate by providing all the required information and explain the importance of 
the constitutional issue at stake.295 This clarity, as well as importance, would be further 
increased if constitutional courts would use a wording and reasoning in phrasing the questions 
which is more universal and which other judicial instances and legal order of other member 
states could relate to, thus achieving a certain level of universality of the issue at hand.296 
Taking into consideration the design of the preliminary reference procedure, with only one 
single possibility for the court to present the arguments as they are excluded from further 
proceedings before CJEU,297 it is recommendable for constitutional courts to provide 
alternative solutions and answers. Actually this goes in line with a proposal at the EU level for 
the introduction of the so-called ‘green light’ procedure298 in which the highest courts, and 
particularly constitutional courts, could have a crucial input.299 According to this procedure 
upon a preliminary reference in which a national court, preferably, includes suggestions how 
to answer the question the CJEU has two options.300 One is to give the green light to the 
suggestions made by the national court or, the other, to enter into a more elaborate disposition 
of the case. This is a procedure which has already been part of the German legal system and 
practice in which ordinary courts need to put forward their suggestions in their references to 
the FCC for a concrete constitutional review.301    
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While there are different classifications of the character of preliminary references from 
different constitutional courts as constructive or aggressive,302 it should be argued that the style 
of the reference should be analyzed above all from the aspect of the debate that it initiates and 
the outcome it has.303 For instance the referral from the SCC in the Melloni case has been 
praised on many grounds nevertheless the outcome and the answer of the CJEU has often been 
criticized.304 On the other hand the OMT referral of the FCC, often criticized for its aggressive 
tone and setting ultimatums to the CJEU, seems like it has forced the CJEU to dwell on the 
issue more seriously in search of middle ground. It has in the end led to a ‘peaceful settlement’ 
of the issue, under certain conditions.305 If the latter are not met it might lead to reopening of 
the issue once again.306 As a matter of fact, the second preliminary reference of the FCC307 to 
the CJEU on the Quantitative Easing, which is closely related to the ECB’s OMT program 
being also part of the instruments and measures aimed to resolve the financial crisis in the EU, 
can be interpreted as a continuation of this judicial dialogue. Although in a slightly different 
context, this reference clearly refers to the general interpretation and conditions of monetary 
policy instruments in the EU as defined by the CJEU in Gauweiler.308 In this sense, the OMT 
saga has opened the door for further judicial dialogue requiring clarifications of certain 
previously unresolved questions. Lastly, the ICC’s third preliminary reference in the Taricco 
case309 is the latest instance of an initiated judicial dialogue between a national constitutional 
courts and the CJEU which clearly resembles the FCC’s stance and the OMT saga however 
with a rather conciliatory tone.310 It has raised a lot of interest over its outcome particularly 
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because this reference directly challenges CJEU case law and it confronts the CJEU with the 
constitutional identity doctrine forcing it to address this contentious issue of broader 
importance.  
Be that as it may the track record so far does not allow drawing any firm conclusions yet. Even 
though the CJEU has declared the preliminary reference to be an instrument of cooperation,311 
still this instrument, as Voßkuhle argues: 
“decisively depends on the extent to which the CJEU is willing to include national legal 
traditions in the interpretation of Union law and to admit differing interpretations as 
well should the occasion arise.”312  
 
Based on the limited experience of preliminary reference by national constitutional courts so 
far one could argue that this is not really the case when the CJEU is concerned. For instance, 
in the case of Data Retention Directive and the preliminary reference, inter alia, from the ACC 
the CJEU turned out to be rather receptive only after mounting pressure from several other 
constitutional courts and supreme courts in the previous years.313 On the other hand, in the 
OMT case referred to the CJEU by the FCC there was only partial recognition of the arguments 
of the constitutional court314 while in Melloni, referred by the SCC, there was almost none.315 
Actually this latter decision of the CJEU has caused the anticlimax of the SCC which in its 
final decision on the matter avoided acknowledging the binding effect of the preliminary 
reference treating the decision of the CJEU as a mere interpretative tool thus moving away 
from any dialogue following the attitude of the CJEU.316 This was accompanied by a reference 
to the controlimiti317 which depicted the SCC’s “reluctance to be placed under interpretive 
authority of the CJEU.”318 Therefore, it could be easily argued that the much criticized 
preliminary ruling of the CJEU, on the one hand, muted the judicial dialogue with the SCC, 
but on the other provoked reactions from other constitutional courts. When it comes to the well-
known Italian doctrine in this context, the controlimiti, it remains to be seen how the issues 
raised in the Tarrico saga will be tackled in future as they remain partly unsettled and could 
potentially have much broader impact when it comes to the relationship not only between the 
judicial instances but also legal orders in the EU. Thus these developments in the Taricco saga 
                                                          
(Taricco Decision), English version available at: 
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S_2018_115_EN.pdf last visited 
30.01.2019. For more on this saga see Lukas Staffler, ‘Verfassungsidentität und strafrechtliche Verjährung; Das 
(vorläufige) Ende des Konflikts zweier Höchstgerichte in der Rechtssache Taricco’ 45 Europäische Grundrechte 
Zeitschrift (2018) 613-619; and Chiara Amalfitano and Oreste Pollicino, ‘Two Courts, two Languages? The 
Taricco Saga Ends on a Worrying Note (Verfassungsblog 5 June 2018), available at: 
https://verfassungsblog.de/two-courts-two-languages-the-taricco-saga-ends-on-a-worrying-note/  last visited 
30.01.2019. 
311 CJEU, Case C-167/01 Inspire Act, Judgment of 30 September 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:512. 
312 Voßkuhle (n 196) 90.  
313 CJEU Digital Rights (n 223) and see all the references in fn. 219. 
314 CJEU Gauweiler (n 308). 
315 Besselink (n 259) 9; Komarek (n 15) 433-434; and Torrez Perez (n 212) 318. 
316 Besselink (n 259) 9, 21; and Torrez Perez (n 212) 321ff. 
317 Torrez Perez (n 212) 320. 
318 Torrez Perez (n 212) 323. 
154 
 
have the potential to determine some of the future developments based on willingness of the 
CJEU to take the arguments of national constitutional courts into serious consideration.319 
4.3 Disobeying the CJEU and EU law as part of the judicial dialogue 
There is another reason related to constitutional pluralism why constitutional courts are the best 
interlocutors when it comes to constitutional issues. According to the theory of judicial 
dialogue, there is no dialogue between two courts if there is an element of hierarchy. In this 
sense bi-directionality, as an essential feature of judicial dialogue, exists only among co-
equals.320 As De Witte argues the dialogue cannot be led under circumstances of either 
European or national diktat.321 Therefore by denouncing the ‘last word’ conception 
constitutional pluralism, basically, fosters the establishment of this type of direct judicial 
dialogue. Influenced or informed by constitutional pluralism one could argue322 that 
constitutional courts are continuously adjusting their position towards EU law. In this sense 
constitutional courts with their reasoning and by developing new doctrines, when EU law is 
concerned, are essentially creating flexible legal solutions and thus serving the purpose of 
legitimizing EU law also by establishing the direct dialogue. Namely, constitutional courts 
have been constructive in anchoring EU law and providing instruments for its direct application 
in the national legal order, but also they have set the limits and provided themselves with the 
role of putting checks on the CJEU.323 In this manner constitutional courts have designed a 
conditional acceptance of EU law primacy, which in contrast is promoted by the CJEU in an 
unconditional and absolute manner.324  
Taking the latter into consideration and placing it in the framework of judicial dialogue it could 
be argued that only if constitutional courts are able, under very limited circumstances, to 
disobey a decision of the CJEU is it possible to have a true dialogue which is not burdened by 
the ‘last word’ or struggles over supremacy.325 As a matter of fact and as a result of the 
accommodation and adjustments made in the process of providing EU law with constitutional 
legitimacy constitutional courts’ disobedience and non-subordination can, according to the 
heterarchical relationship of legal orders, be legitimized and explained through EU law and, at 
the same time, not represent infringement of EU law.326 Furthermore the disregard by 
constitutional courts under circumstances in which neither interpretative efforts nor discursive 
engagement with the CJEU has born any result in the safeguarding of fundamental 
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constitutional principles327 can be perceived as one of the basic presumptions of constitutional 
pluralism and its descriptive and normative account of the current relationship between legal 
orders in Europe.328 This is the reason why it has been claimed that in certain cases “[t]he 
degree of principled judicial disobedience compensates for the judicial obedience” to a CJEU 
diktat.329 
The risk of abuse of such a possibility of disregard and judicial non-compliance is contained 
by the prudence of constitutional courts and their awareness of the possible effects of such 
decisions and their limits in present institutional setting. More precisely, constitutional courts 
need to pay attention to the views of other relevant judicial and political bodies in order not to 
end up isolated and discredited in their disobedience, especially under circumstances of a broad 
consensus among these institutions and the public opinion on both the issue at hand and a strong 
pro-European stance.330 Additionally, since a decision of non-compliance to EU law and a 
CJEU decision has leverage also outside of national bounds and can cause a negative domino 
effect, the constitutional courts would definitely resort to such an option only under very 
restrictive circumstances. Departing from this logic might cause a serious blow to the 
credibility and authority of constitutional courts. Therefore in such a situation Dyevre rightly 
argues that “[f]ar from an indication of strength, the decision to disapply EU law may in fact 
constitute evidence of domestic court’s institutional weakness”.331    
Following this line of thought it could be argued that constitutional courts have started entering 
into a direct judicial dialogue because of their ‘ace up their sleeve’, that is the respect for 
constitutional values and principles of the member states through identity or ultra vires review. 
This sort of reasoning is also reflected in the extra-judicial opinion of the president of the FCC, 
Voßkuhle, where he clearly argues that the ‘emergency brake mechanism’ best serves when 
not used.  
“‘Emergency brake mechanisms’ are most effective if they do not have to be applied. 
Precisely because of their existence – and not despite their existence – it has never 
‘come to the crunch’. This has made it possible for the Federal Constitutional Court to 
complement the ultra vires review with the identity review in its Lisbon judgment 
without having to fear that it would more frequently get into conflict with the Court of 
Justice.”332 
This emergency break idea333 is the one that is supposed to make the CJEU more responsive, 
receptive and sensitive to the claims and arguments made by national constitutional courts 
creating a balance between these institutions. Such a balance could be sustained only if the 
threats for disobeying EU law are credible and not previously discredited or driven by wrong 
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reasons.334 Moreover, the FCC in its recent case law related to EU law, namely, the OMT 
preliminary reference and decision and its latest decision on the EAW, has made this sort of 
stance rather clear and arguably in a rather aggressive manner. In both of these cases the FCC 
has introduced and announced the possibility of using the constitutional identity review 
mechanism in case the CJEU radically departs from the suggested reasoning and interpretation 
of the FCC that is deemed to be compatible with the constitution. The ICC has recently 
developed its contralimiti doctrine in its third preliminary reference on the Taricco case in the 
same direction as the FCC. Using a milder tone the ICC has faced the CJEU with very important 
questions as well as the possibility of Italian national courts not applying CJEU Taricco 
judgment335 as result of its incompatibility with the fundamental principles of the Italian 
constitution.336     
Contrasting this type of approach, the CCC, in a very drastic and impulsive response in the 
Slovak Pensions saga, actually used the emergency brake mechanism Voßkuhle refers to. The 
CCC in its Holubec decision declared the Landtova decision of the CJEU337 on the matter of 
Slovak pensions to be ultra vires.338 The reaction was rather overblown and did not really 
achieve its goal besides drawing significant attention to the actual internal institutional conflict 
between the Supreme Administrative Court and the CCC. Nevertheless, the CCC’s decision 
could be partly justified by the evident lack of sensibility of the CJEU on this complex and 
unique matter as well as its involvement in an internal institutional struggle in which it has 
ignored the CCC’s arguments. Namely, the CJEU has rejected, on procedural grounds, the 
letter from the CCC explaining its stance and reasoning on the matter as there was no other 
way for this national court to communicate its views in the proceeding. The Czech government 
took the side of the Supreme Administrative Court and thus it did not really reflect on the stance 
of the CCC in its position before the CJEU. Therefore, the CCC was left in a position not only 
of its case law being subject to direct attack before the CJEU but also without any opportunity 
to be represented in the proceedings.339 
This attitude of the CJEU comes in stark contrast with its attitude towards the CC, for instance, 
in the Melki case in which we had a very similar internal institutional struggle in France.340 Not 
only has the CJEU acted uncharacteristically swiftly under the expedited procedure, paying 
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Amalfitano and Pollicino (n 310). 
337 CJEU, Case C-399/09 Landtova, Judgment of 22 June 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:415. For a comment of this 
decision and its potential consequences see Jan Komarek, ‘Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional 
Court’s Ultra Vires Revolution’ (Verfassungsblog 22 February 2012); and Arthut Dyevre, ‘The Czech Ultra Vires 
Revolution: Isolated Accident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon?’ (Verfassungsblog 29 February 2012). 
338 CCC, Pl. US 5/12 Holubec, plenary judgment of 31 Jan. 2012. For a more detailed account of the whole saga 
see Bobek (n 227). 
339 Bobek (n 227) 79-80. 
340 For a detailed analysis of this internal struggle see Arthur Dyevre, ‘The Melki Way: The Melki Case and 
Everything You Always Wanted to Know about French Judicial Politics (But Were Afraid to Ask)’ (2011) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1929807 last visited 08.10.2018; also on Melki 
see Bobek (n 227) 79; Bossuyt and Verrijdt (n 231) 379. 
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due attention to the procedural constraints surrounding the proceedings before the CC,341 but it 
has also had a broad radar for the messages and explanations sent by CC in its other unrelated 
decisions; that is, through an indirect dialogue with the CJEU.342 Different from Landtova 
though, the CC’s position was reflected by the national government in its observations before 
the CJEU.343 This raises the issue of the possible differentiated treatment of courts of different 
member states as well as the deficiencies of the preliminary reference procedure.  
The outcome of the Slovak pensions saga, additionally, opens the dilemma whether the CCC 
should have sent a preliminary reference on its own, thus taking the advantage of having the 
‘first say’. However, while this might have avoided a direct clash in this case it would not have 
prevented similar situations occurring in future. Additionally, such a pre-emptive strike would 
open the race of exclusion of the other domestic interlocutors and constitutional courts being 
often the last instance or last resort court would be disadvantaged.344 Equally problematic for 
this sort of situations is the approach of resending a preliminary reference by a constitutional 
court subsequently to an already sent, by an ordinary national court, and answered preliminary 
reference. In this sense the CJEU would have a broad possibility to declare such a preliminary 
reference coming from a constitutional court inadmissible because the issue has already been 
resolved.345 
Therefore it becomes very evident that the absence of a reverse preliminary reference 
mechanism in which the CJEU could refer a question to a national constitutional courts or any 
other way in which, for example the CCC in this case, could have elaborated its views on the 
matter has taken its toll and, inter alia, led to the first ever decision of a constitutional court 
declaring a CJEU decision ultra vires.346 This type of mechanism, which has been promoted 
for some time now, would be totally compatible with the bottom-up legitimization of EU law 
which was discussed above.347 In this way the reverse preliminary reference would serve an 
important purpose when significant and fundamental constitutional issues are at stake. 
Additionally, the reverse preliminary reference would also provide opportunity for the highest 
courts including constitutional courts to bring back the benefits of the national judicial 
hierarchy through the back door in instances in which lower ordinary court have referred the 
                                                          
341 See also the preliminary reference from CC to CJEU Jeremy F. (n 213). On this point see The Constitution of 
the Fifth French Republic, 1958, Article 61(3) “In the cases provided for in the two foregoing paragraphs, the 
Constitutional Council must deliver its ruling within one month. However, at the request of the Government, in 
cases of urgency, this period shall be reduced to eight days.” Ordinance no 58-1067 constituting an institutional 
act on the Constitutional council, Section 23-10, “The Constitutional Council shall give its ruling within three 
months of the referral being made to it”; Dyevre (n 213) 159; and Millet and Perlo (n 234) 1471. 
342 See CC decision No 2010-605 (n 233) points 14-16; also see Dyevre (n 213) 158-160. 
343 Bobek (n 227) 79. 
344 Bobek (n 227) 81; and Serrano (n 241) 1527. 
345 Bobek (n 227) 81-82. 
346 Monica Claes, National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotiation? In Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina 
Alcoberro Llivina (eds) National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia 2013) 136; Cartabia 
(n 238) 1796; and Bobek (n 227) 83 and Florence Giorgi and Nicolas Triart, ‘National Judges, Community Judges: 
Invitation to a Journey through the Looking-glass- On the Need for Jurisdictions to Rethink the Inter-Systemic 
Relations beyond the Hierarchical Principle’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 716  
347 Maduro (n 1) 517, 522. 
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case to the CJEU without allowing it to go through this hierarchy.348 For that reason, this 
example of negative consequences resulting from a dysfunctional judicial dialogue manifests 
the importance of this sort of judicial interaction. The introduction of a reverse preliminary 
reference from the CJEU to constitutional courts, under limited conditions which would not 
overburden the judicial procedure, could increase the presence of bi-directionality and the 
quality of judicial dialogue. Especially when the case-law of a constitutional court is being 
challenged before the CJEU, such as in Landotva, the CJEU should be obliged to provide the 
constitutional court with an opportunity to reflect on the matter.349 Similarly, a reverse 
reference could be considered in instances in which it is evident that a fundamental 
constitutional issue is at stake and there is no relevant case-law from the respective 
constitutional court. This sort of procedure would be based on an existing proposal of 
‘mechanism of prior involvement of the CJEU’ designed for streamlining the relationship 
between the ECtHR and CJEU upon the accession of the EU to the ECHR,350 or it could 
potentially resemble the so-called certification procedure present in the judicial federalism in 
the US where federal courts refer questions concerning state law to state courts.351 In this sense, 
the introduction of the reverse preliminary reference would represent a firm step in reserving 
for constitutional courts the place which they should occupy in the European constitutional 
order.   
4.4 Constitutional courts as guardians of the constitutional obligation of ordinary courts 
to send preliminary references  
Constitutional courts role in the direct judicial dialogue in Europe cannot be judged only by 
their direct involvement. Constitutional courts have resisted for a long time to make a reference 
for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU and they have only recently begun to loosen up their rigid, 
cautious attitude. However, they have found another path352 to encourage and support judicial 
dialogue in Europe which often seems to be undervalued.  
Following the lead of the FCC several constitutional courts with a constitutional power to 
protect constitutional rights and freedoms through the mechanism of a constitutional complaint 
have coupled the obligations stemming from Article 267(3) TFEU and the respective 
constitutional provisions related to different aspects of the right to judicial protection. 
Embracing the heterarchical relationship between the legal orders constitutional courts have 
created a link and translated the EU law obligation in to a constitutional one adding a new 
power in the realm of protection of constitutional rights. More precisely, these constitutional 
                                                          
348 Komarek (n 256) 112-114. On such benefits of the proper functioning of the national judicial hierarchies see 
Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, ‘How can the European Court of Human Rights Reinforce the Role of National Courts in 
the Convention System?’, Dialogue between judges, European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, (2012) 
12.  
349 Bobek (n 227) 81. 
350 Council of Europe, Fifth Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group and the European 
Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights: Final report 
to the CDDH’, 47+1(2013)008rev2, 10 June 2013, 13,18 and 27, referred to also by Bobek (n 227) 84. 
351 Mayer (n 255) 423-424. For more on this procedure see in Jonathan Remy Nash, ‘Examining the Power of 
Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law’ (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 1673ff. 
352 For indirect influence of constitutional review in constitutional democracies in Europe on the attitude of 
ordinary courts towards preliminary reference see section 4.2 text accompanying fn. 274. 
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courts have created a constitutional obligation, together with the one envisaged in the EU 
Treaties, for national courts of last instance to refer questions for preliminary ruling to CJEU 
in cases where the interpretation and validity of EU law is at stake and crucial for resolving the 
case at hand. The arbitrary refusal353 of these national courts to refer has been interpreted to 
represent an infringement of specific constitutional rights which could be protected through the 
instrument of constitutional complaint. 
The importance of such a safeguard of the constitutional rights and of EU law obligations is 
even greater if one takes into consideration that the preliminary reference procedure is 
essentially left to ordinary courts.354 There are two reasons for this. First, it is the division of 
labor between powers of ordinary and constitutional courts regarding the distinction between 
constitutional review and so-called review of compatibility.355 Second, it has to do with the fact 
that constitutional courts are rarely directly faced with EU law issues and often not in the 
capacity of a court of last instance, that is, EU law is frequently invoked in an incidenter 
procedure or procedure of a concrete constitutional review.  
This engagement of constitutional courts can be observed differently. Some authors, like 
Groussot,356 have tended to classify this role of constitutional courts as an indirect dialogue. 
However, this misses the very nature of this role. This role of constitutional courts is primarily 
aimed at ordinary courts and respect of their constitutional obligation related to EU law and in 
this way it is directly assisting the functioning of the direct dialogue between ordinary national 
courts and the CJEU. Constitutional courts, different from other forms of indirect dialogue in 
which they have entered so far, are not addressing the CJEU and messages are not supposed to 
be conveyed to the latter. On the other hand, in these cases constitutional courts are not acting 
as courts of last instance and thus are not under the obligation stemming from Article 267(3) 
TFEU to enter into a direct dialogue.357 Therefore instead of focusing on the abstract 
classification of the type of judicial dialogue this role fits in, one should focus on the function 
it fulfils in order to comprehend it adequately. Through this instrument constitutional courts 
have basically dispelled a longstanding myth which goes that national superior courts are not 
favoring the access of the lowers courts to the CJEU and are also creating obstacles for the 
implementation of judgments of the CJEU in the national legal order.358 
Effectuating this instrument of protection of constitutional rights, based on whether CJEU is 
recognized as a lawful judge or not,359 constitutional courts have taken two approaches. The 
                                                          
353 On the different meaning of the notion of arbitrary in the case law of constitutional courts in this context see 
Cleila Lacchi, ‘Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a 
Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1677- 1686. See also 
Bethge (n 170) 175 and Barczak (n 217) 53, para. 89. 
354 Lohse (n 223) 1498. 
355 For an example from the Czech Republic of longstanding division of task between ordinary courts and 
constitutional courts in this respect see Kühn and Bobek (n 232) 347; and from Spain see Serrano (n 241) 1512 
and 1514. 
356 Groussot (n 75) 326 
357 Regina Valutyte, ‘Legal Consequences for the Infringement of the Obligation to Make a Reference for a 
Preliminary Ruling Under Constitutional Law’ (2012) 19 Jurisprudence 1174-1175. 
358 Bobek (n 227) 75. 
359 The CJEU has been recognized as a lawful court in Solange II. See on this Claes (n 112) 427; Martinico and 
Pollicino (n 209) 83. 
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first one treats such an arbitrary refusal as a violation of the right to a lawful judge,360 while 
the second as the violation of the right to an effective judicial protection361 or the right to a fair 
trial.362 As for the latter, also the ECtHR has stepped in with several decisions confirming this 
interpretation that the arbitrary refusal of national courts to refer to CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling goes against the right to a fair trial as regulated with Article 6 ECHR.363   
In analyzing whether there is an infringement of individual rights constitutional courts have 
also differed from one another. Even though starting from the CJEU standards still 
constitutional courts have designed and added new procedural elements to the abstract 
principles of acte clair and acte eclaire enabling them to monitor the respect of these 
constitutional obligations.364 The character and the level of arbitrariness of the decisions for 
non-referral as well as the substantiation of these decisions by the national courts of last 
instance have been subject to differently developed set of standards.365 In any case, regardless 
of all these differences the outcome under both of these approaches and diverging standards 
has been the same, constitutional courts have created a new constitutional avenue for the 
indirect review and enforcement of EU law obligations by national courts of last instance.366  
By taking these measures and employing the mechanism of constitutional complaint in this 
regard the respective constitutional courts have been manifesting and fulfilling their 
constructive role which could be perceived from three aspects. 
First, under the existing conditions in which on the one hand, there is no effective legal remedy 
for either the enforcement or review of implementation of the obligation of the last instance 
courts in light of Article 267(3) TFEU, on the other hand the CILFIT principles provide a great 
                                                          
360 FCC, Solange II, 2 BvR 197/83 of 22 October 1986, of 11 December 1995, however ACC confined this 
possibility only in the case of administrative decision and not decision of either administrative or ordinary courts; 
CCC, Pfizer, Case No. II. ÚS 1009/08 of 8 January 2009; and SCC has announced that it has such a power of 
review and protection of the constitutional right to a lawful judge and the right to a fair trial; SCC, Case No. III. 
US 151/07 of 29 May 2007 and Case No. IV. US 206/08-50 of 3 July 2008. For more see Lacchi (n 353) 1669-
1673; Valutyte (n 357) 1175-1180; for Germany see Christoph Degenhart, ‘Art. 101: Ausnahmegerichte’ in 
Michael Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz (8th Edition C.H. BECK 2018) paras. 19-20; Bethge (n 170) 172-173; Barczak 
(n 217) 53, para. 88-89 and for Slovakia see Michal Bobek and Zdenek Kühn, ‘Europe Yet to Come: The 
Application of EU Law in Slovakia’ in Adam Lazowski (ed), The Application of EU Law in the New Member 
States (Asser 2010) 374-375. 
361 SCT, Case No. STC 58/2004, 19 April 2004. For more see Lacchi (n 353) 1674-1677, Valutyte (n 357) 1180-
1181 and Serrano (n 341) 1516. 
362 SCC, Case No. Up-1056/11, 21 November 2013. For more see Lacchi (n 353) 1677.  
363 ECtHR, Dhahbi v. Italy, App. No. 17120/09, 8 April 2014 and ECtHR, Schipani and others v. Italy, Appl. No. 
38369/09, 21 July 2015. See also Regina Valutyte, ‘State Liability for the Infringement of the Obligation to Refer 
for a Preliminary Ruling Under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 19 Jurisprudence 7-20. 
364 CJEU CILFIT (n 114) para. 21. See Lacchi (n 353) 1689ff; and Valutyte (n 357) 1177. 
365 There are essentially 3 different approaches in which arbitrary decision not to refer represents a violation of 
constitutional rights: (1) First approach is German/Austrian where there are three cases in which this could occur 
1) fundamental disregard of the obligation to make a submission, 2) deliberate deviation without making a 
submission and 3) incompleteness of the case law of the CJEU, (2) Second approach is Czech/Slovenian and is 
connected to the fact whether national judges gave reasons for their refusal to send a preliminary reference and 
(3) Third approach is the one of the Spanish CT according to which a national judge cannot decline to apply a 
national provision without a prior confirmation of the CJEU through a preliminary reference within the limits of 
the acte clair and acte erclair doctrines. For more see Lacchi (n 353) 1677- 1686; and Valutyte (n 357) 1175-
1181. 
366 Lacchi (n 353) 1668. 
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margin of discretion for national courts,367 constitutional courts have supported the 
effectiveness and uniform application of EU law.368 More precisely, constitutional courts, 
along with the ECtHR, through their practice have filled in the legal gap which exists in EU 
law in creating constitutional instruments for the enforcement of the obligation of the highest 
national courts.369 
Second, constitutional courts have created a possibility to remedy and thus assist the member 
states in avoiding its state liability under EU law. Namely, the CJEU through its Köbler 
decision370 has taken control over the respect of last instance court’s obligation to refer a 
preliminary question to the CJEU by declaring that individuals are entitled to a right of payment 
of damages for state liability for judicial decision.371 By reviewing the decisions of last instance 
courts not to refer to the CJEU in light of a possible infringement of constitutional right, 
constitutional courts have provided a constitutional instrument which could help the member 
states remedy situations which could lead to its state liability for damages under EU law.372  
Third, through this practice, constitutional courts have created another constitutional avenue 
for the protection of individual rights in light of EU law obligations. In this regard 
constitutional courts have strengthened the judicial protection of individuals by broadening the 
interpretation of specific constitutional rights to include the obligation of national courts under 
EU law and the constitutional control over the respect of these obligations.373 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the first role which constitutional courts in Europe have developed in 
their relationship with the CJEU and EU law. This role consists of providing constitutional 
legitimacy to EU law through different forms of judicial dialogue. In this sense it reflects a 
procedural aspect of the relationship between these institutions. While it could be argued that 
this role is also fulfilled by national ordinary courts, the particular institutional features of 
constitutional courts lead to the conclusion that their input in the judicial dialogue in Europe 
has a certain added value which needs to be recognized. Since constitutional review is 
differentiated from ordinary adjudication and legislation it could be convincingly argued that 
constitutional courts bring something to the judicial dialogue in Europe that cannot be brought 
by other national institutions. This is due particularly to their deliberative nature closely tied to 
the special character of constitutional discourse which finds its specific reflection at the EU 
level. In this sense, constitutional courts represent the most appropriate interlocutors of the 
CJEU on constitutional matters in Europe. First, they provide clarity by channeling the 
dialogue. Second, as result of their main institutional role, they are able to send credible 
warning signals over serious constitutional inconsistencies involving EU law. Third, 
                                                          
367 On the need for the reform of the CILFIT doctrine see Sarmiento (n 114) 313-315.  
368 Lacchi (n 353) 1693. 
369 Lacchi (n 353) 1700; and Valutyte (n 357) 1172. 
370 CJEU Köbler (n 113). 
371 Komarek (n 256) 97; and further Lacchi (n 353) 1693ff. 
372 Lacchi (n 353) 1695. 
373 Valutyte (n 357) 1172 and 1182. 
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constitutional courts due to their political sensibility are more prudent than ordinary courts 
when engaging in the judicial dialogue. These advantages of constitutional courts are 
manifested in different forms of both the direct and indirect judicial dialogue particularly if 
seen through the lenses of constitutional pluralism.  
When it comes to the indirect dialogue, the most frequent opportunities so far in fulfilling 
constitutional courts’ role of providing EU law with constitutional legitimacy have been 
through the constitutional review of EU Treaties and of domestic legislation implementing EU 
law. Even though often underestimated, the indirect judicial dialogue has been rather 
instrumental in anchoring EU law and providing instruments for its direct application in the 
national legal orders. Thus constitutional courts’ constructive role has been demonstrated also 
in these instances regardless of the fact that they have taken such opportunities of indirect 
dialogue also to set certain limits or condition the application of EU law. Taking into 
consideration that until now there are no situations in which constitutional courts have placed 
insurmountable obstacles to any form of EU law it could be convincingly argued that they have 
taken accommodation and mutual respect of EU law in the national legal order rather seriously.  
Contrary to the frequency of indirect judicial dialogue, constitutional courts have not been fond 
of entering into direct judicial dialogue with the CJEU through preliminary references. On the 
other hand, the emerging trend of intensification of direct judicial dialogue between 
constitutional courts and the CJEU is still at an early stage which does not allow drawing firm 
conclusions. However, the reluctance of constitutional courts does not have be taken negatively 
as their cautious attitude towards direct judicial dialogue finds strong justification in the 
procedural deficiencies at the EU level and, generally, the stance of the CJEU towards 
constitutional courts. Under such circumstances the possibility of irresolvable legal conflict 
occurring is rather higher and therefore this cautiousness is even welcomed. In any case, the 
involvement of constitutional courts in the direct judicial dialogue enables the feeding of 
constitutional principles directly to the CJEU which are supposed to lead the latter into 
providing strong and more reasoned arguments in delivering its decisions. Furthermore, 
constitutional courts constructive contribution to direct judicial dialogue is not limited to their 
direct involvement in either indirect or direct forms of judicial dialogue. On the contrary, 
constitutional courts have been engaged in safeguarding the respect by the national ordinary 
courts of their obligation stemming from both EU law and national constitutions for sending 
preliminary references to the CJEU. In this manner, looking at the arguments presented in this 
chapter, the case for the special role and added value of constitutional courts in the judicial 
dialogue in Europe is firmly grounded.   
163 
 
Chapter 5 
Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Constitutional Identity 
in the EU 
 
1 Introduction 
The second in the row of new roles developed or acquired by the constitutional courts in light 
of the European integration is the one of being guardians of the constitutional identity. This 
role of constitutional courts has never been envisaged in their respective constitutions and has 
surfaced as result of a triggering external factor. Namely, the introduction of the new wording 
of the duty for the EU institutions to respect national identity of the member states in the Lisbon 
Treaty, and the importance given to this provision in the recent case-law of several 
constitutional courts have made this duty a very strong line of defence of the national legal 
order from the absolute primacy of EU law as well as, to some extent, a defence from the on-
going EU competence creep.1 In this manner the EU national identity clause has drawn 
significant attention in a very short period and has become one of the central issues in 
discussions on the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law. 
Even though such a clause existed since the Maastricht Treaty, it never found a firm place in 
the legal radar of either constitutional courts or the CJEU. It was conceived more as a political 
declaration than as a legal obligation for the EU. However, the latest changes and clarifications 
made to this provision, even though minor at a first glance, added a truly new feature. Above 
all it tied the national identity to the respective constitutional identity of member states, or 
better said it has given substantial grounds for such an interpretation. In this manner this 
feature, it has been argued, meant that the EU law has become more open to national 
constitutions2 and thus national constitutions have received a firmer status, visibility and 
recognition in EU law.3 This sort of respect of constitutional identity and recognition of 
national constitutions in EU law could raise some high hopes of finally solving the conundrum 
of the relationship between the two legal orders in creating a ‘meeting point’ instead of a 
‘battleground’.4 Nevertheless the practice has still not confirmed these claims because neither 
a true meeting point nor a battleground has occurred over this provision, yet.  
                                                          
1 Barbara Guastaferro, ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the 
Identity Clause’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 263. She divides these two aspects and labels them as 
exceptional and ordinary functions of the identity clause. 
2 Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill, ‘Die Achtung der nationalen Identitӓt unter dem reformierten 
Unionsvertrag. Zur unionsrechtlichen Rolle nationalen Verfassungsrechts und zur Überwindung des absoluten 
Vorrangs’ (2010) ZaöRV Heft 4 715. 
3 Bruno De Witte, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and National Constitutions. More or Less Europeanisation?’ in C Closa 
(ed), The Lisbon Treaty and National Constitutions (ARENA 2009) 32. 
4 I borrow the phrases from Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Cases 
and Materials (2nd edition CUP 2010), 202: “interpretations of Article 4 (2) TEU will become the battleground 
or the meeting point, where the limits of the authority of EU law lie”. See also more on the analysis on this 
comment in Denis Preshova ‘Battleground or Meeting Point? Respect for National Identities in the European 
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But why is this provision so important for the role of constitutional courts in European 
integration? The importance is twofold. First, from a theoretical aspect this provision - and 
through it issues related to constitutional identity, its content, scope and application in both the 
national and EU legal realm - is making the conceptions and framework set by the theory of 
constitutional pluralism very visible and plausible. In this sense this clause puts an additional 
emphasis on the importance of judicial dialogue and moderation of the rigid supremacy stances 
on both sides of the debate making constitutional courts a more constructive counterpart. 
Second, from an institutional aspect this provision has additionally increased the role and 
visibility of constitutional courts at the EU level as it has given them the sword and/or the 
shield,5 hence empowering them in their endeavour to advance their position on the relationship 
between the two legal orders. The national identity clause could be easily interpreted as 
representing a certain limit to further European integration, however, this should not be 
construed in absolute terms. Following this line of thought this chapter will present the 
arguments confirming these two points.  
Accordingly, this chapter will be divided into three sections. The first, a brief overview of the 
wording, scope and context of the national identity clause - that is the exegesis and the systemic 
analysis - will be presented in order to shed some light on the actual origin and meaning of the 
national identity clause. The second, the recent case-law of both national constitutional courts 
and the CJEU related to this clause will be analysed. It will be seen how the whole issue 
developed since the Solange decision up until the latest OMT saga by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court going through the most important decisions of the constitutional courts 
and the CJEU. The third section is devoted to the theoretical analyses of the national identity 
clause and the role of constitutional courts within the framework of this clause as seen through 
the lenses of constitutional pluralism, particularly by focusing on two of its main tenets, 
heterarchy and judicial dialogue, which is argued are incorporated by this clause. These 
theoretical notions and arguments are applied to a recent episode in the constitutional identity 
story, the OMT, in order to depict the possible weaknesses and shortcoming of the approach 
taken in the preliminary reference and decision which should illuminate the way forward for 
constitutional courts on this matter. At the end a summary of the main arguments on the 
national identity clause and the role of constitutional courts in light of the constitutional 
pluralism will be presented in the conclusion.       
2 Respect for national identities of the member states – Article 4 (2) TEU 
2.1 The background of the national identity clause  
The respect for national identities has existed before its enactment in the Constitutional Treaty 
(CT) and as of latest in the Lisbon Treaty. Thus this provision is nihil novi. This type of duty 
                                                          
Union – Article 4 (2) of the Treaty on European Union’ (2012) Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 
267. 
5 Theodore Konstadinides, ‘Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order within 
the Framework of the National Constitutional Settlement’ (2010) 13 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies 195. 
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for the institutions of the EU first appeared in the Treaty of Maastricht (TM) in Article F (1).6 
The enactment of this clause basically represented a sort of concession resulting from the huge 
leap forward made in the European integration expanding the scope of action. Namely, this 
Treaty brought the establishment of a new entity, the European Union, and introduced 
provisions which, directly or indirectly, ‘invaded’ powers and matters that were traditionally 
related to and formed part of national constitutions and sovereignty.7 Powers related to the 
Economic and Monetary Union, the EU citizenship or cooperation in the realm of security and 
foreign affairs and justice and home affairs are the most evident examples. Nevertheless, one 
could not argue that this provision served the purpose of setting the external limits of European 
integration8 or truly balancing national sovereignty with the visible federalist tendencies at the 
EU level.9 Nothing changed even with the renumbering of this provision in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (TA). The best proof for such a position is the fact that the national identity clause 
from both TM and TA was not invoked by the CJEU in its case-law.10 Among the national 
constitutional courts this clause was invoked only once by the Federal Constitutional Court in 
its Maastricht decision.11 
This lack of significance of the national identity clause did not, however, reflect the true stance 
of the member states towards the federalist tendencies. Therefore, the rewording and 
strengthening of the status of this clause was set high on the agenda during the deliberations 
and drafting of the Constitutional Treaty.12 In order to achieve this aim there were several 
proposals or models which were suggested by different sides at the Convention ranging from 
suggestion to enlist the core and exclusive competences of member states (Constitutional 
Model) through the negative EU competence clause (Community Model) and the Charter of 
Member States’ Rights (Political Model) ending with a suggestion on adjustment and 
supplementation of the existing national identity clause (Union Model).13 In the end the so-
called Christophersen Clause inspired by the compromise based on the Constitutional and 
Union Model that produced the final version of Article I-5 of the CT regulating the relationship 
between the Union and member states.14 This compromise consisted of providing a clarification 
of the notion of national identity by tying it to the fundamental structures inherent in the 
                                                          
6 “The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded 
on the principles of democracy”. Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht), Official Journal C191, 29.07.2011. 
7 De Witte (n 3) 33. 
8 Thomas Oppermann, Europarecht (2nd edn C.H. Beck 1999) §11, para 885; and Thomas Oppermann, Claus 
Dieter Classen and Martin Nettesheim, Europarecht (4th edn C.H. Beck 2009) §5 para 8. Cf Armin von Bogdandy 
and Stephan Schill, ‘Article 4 EUV’ in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf and Matthias Ruffert (eds), Das Recht 
der Europäischen Union, Kommentar I (C.H. Beck 2011) para 38. 
9 Jan-Herman Reestman, ‘The Franco-German Constitutional Divide: Reflections in National and Constitutional 
Identity’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 374, 376. 
10 Leonard F.M. Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon’ (2010) 6 Utrecht Law 
Review 41. 
11 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Maastricht Treaty 1992 Constitutionality Case, 2 BvR 2134 and 
2159/92 in Andrew Oppenheimer, The Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law Vol 
1 (CUP 1994) 556, 574. 
12 For a more detailed overview of the procedure see Guastaferro (n 1); and Adelheid Puttler, ‘Article 
4 EUV’ in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV Kommentar (5th edition C.H. 
Beck 2016) paras. 5-7; and CONV 251/02, 3. 
13 Guastaferro (n 1) 274-275. 
14 Guastaferro (n 1) 289. 
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political and constitutional structures of the member states including regional and local self-
government but excluding other elements and notions.15   
After the unsuccessful ratification of the CT the national identity clause was inserted, with 
certain modifications, in the Lisbon Treaty as Article 4(2) TEU. An additional element was 
added to it on the national security as an essential state function. Basically it is again part of an 
article which regulates the relationship between the EU and the member states even though 
Article 4 does not carry that title. Certain authors have referred to this article in different ways 
thus either labelling in an EU-friendly ‘principles of fundamental federal structure’16 or having 
a more realist approach in viewing this article as ‘a strong reaffirmation of the non-federal 
nature of the European Union’.17  
2.2 The exegesis and systemic interpretation of the national identity clause 
Article 4 TEU regulates different aspects of the relationship between the Union and the member 
states and consists of several important principles. In order to grasp the proper understanding 
of the national identity clause one has to begin this endeavour with analysis consisting of two 
components.18 First, determine the meaning of the specific provision through the analysis of 
the exact wording of the provisions. Second, analyse how this meaning fits in the specific 
context of the respective provision meaning the relationship with other paragraphs of the very 
same article and then with the other treaty provisions. Only after this type of exegesis and 
systemic analysis, which will shed light on the meaning and the scope of the clause, can one 
turn to the case-law of the national constitutional courts and the CJEU in order to complete the 
picture.    
 
2.2.1 The meaning and the scope of the national identity clause 
Article 4 TEU incorporates several principles: the reaffirmation of the principle of conferral of 
powers or limited powers of the EU in the first paragraph;19 the loyalty or fidelity principle in 
                                                          
15 See CONV 357/02, 10-12 and CONV 400/02, 13. Inter alia those were language, national citizenship and 
church-state relations. Some of these elements however found their place in other provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Article 3(3) TEU and Article 22 Charter on language, Article 20 TFEU on national citizenship. However, see the 
CJEU, Case C-202/11 Anton Las v PSA Antwerp NV, Opinion of AG Jaaskinen 12 July 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:456, para. 59 fn. 39 where he draws a distinction between ‘national identity’ (Article 4(2)TEU) 
and ‘linguistic diversity’ (Article 3(3)TEU) stating: “The concept of ‘national identity’ therefore concerns the 
choices made as to the languages used at national or regional level, whereas the concept of ‘linguistic diversity’ 
relates to the multilingualism existing at EU level.” Nevertheless, the wording and content recommended in 
CONV 357/02 p 10-12 was only partly adopted and it did not include the choice of language. See also on this 
Reestman (n 9) 381. 
16 „Prinzipien der föderativen Grundstruktur”, von Bogdandy and Schill (n 8). 
17 De Witte (n 3) 35. 
18 More on the actual value of different methods of interpretation of Article 4(2) TEU see Elke Cloots, National 
Identity in EU Law (OUP 2015) 127ff. 
19 Article 4(1) refers to Article 5, where conferral of power principle is basically regulated, and restates the last 
sentence of paragraph two. See more in Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis 
(CUP 2010) 84. See also CONV 375/02 in the context of the CT referring to the objective of Article I-5: “The 
article would therefore not constitute a definition of Member State competence, thereby wrongly conveying the 
message that it is the Union that grants competence to the Member States, or that Union action may never impact 
on these fields”. 
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regard to accomplishment and achievement of Treaty tasks, obligations and objectives in the 
third; and reserves the second paragraph for the three duties prescribed for the Union 
institutions. The latter are often seen as central in the interpretation of Article 4, particularly 
when the relationship between Union law and national constitutions is concerned. The three 
basic duties set forth for the Union institutions by Article 4(2) TEU are the respect for equality 
of member states before the Treaties,20 the respect for national identities and the respect for the 
essential state functions.21  
The vagueness of the previous identity clause as enacted in Article F(1) TM and Article 6(3) 
TA necessitated the change of the wording that would clarify the meaning and the scope of the 
provision. This has been mainly due to the vagueness of the notion of national identity and the 
separate component notions ‘nation’ and ‘identity’. The difficulty of precisely defining the 
latter two notions is even more evident for the notion of national identity. In this regard 
Reestman argues that even “[under the] most common reading of national identity it is very 
hard, if not impossible to define with any measure of objectivity what the Union’s duty to 
respect the national identity of its member states entails.”22 In this sense this notion “fans out 
in all direction” but it seems hardly towards any connection to constitutional structures.23 The 
common understanding of national identity is more frequently associated with the social, 
political, cultural and even psychological aspects of this notion than with any legal or 
constitutional aspect.24 As result of such a broadness and generality this provision has been 
regarded more as a political declaration than as a legal provision capable of any significant 
legal effect.25 
There is another difficulty in the proper comprehension of this provision, Article 6(3) TA, 
related to the usage of national identity in a plural form in the English version.26 Specifically, 
the use of national identities could have been easily associated and interpreted with the 
existence of different types of identities in diverse societies such as national, ethnic, religious 
or linguistic identity. Under such an interpretation a very broad scope of this provision could 
have been conceived one which would include cultural,27 historical, political and other 
                                                          
20 Giuliano Amato and Jacques Ziller, The European Constitution (Edward Elgar 2007) 108: “This reference did 
not add anything new to the Union’s institutional arrangements, though it did underscore the need to avoid an 
asymmetrical federalism. The definitive version of article I-5 loses in elegance that which it gains in precision [. 
. .]”. Compare Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Lisbon decision, 2 BvE 2/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 
292; and also to Piris (n 18) 85-86. 
21 von Bogdandy and Schill (n 2) 709. 
22 Reestman (n 9) 380. 
23 Reestman (n 9) 379, 376. 
24 Bengt Beutler, ‘Article 6’ in Hans von der Groeben and Jürgen Schwarze (eds), Vertrag über die Europäische 
Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Band 1 Art 1-53 EUV (6th edition Nomos 
2003), para.201 states: „Nationale Identität bedeutet aber auch mehr als Verfassungsidentität. Über diese Mehr 
entscheidet der Mitgliedstaat selbst. Als Beispiel werden in diesen Zusammenhang Sport, Kultur und Bildung 
aber auch die interne Staatsorganisation, die Familienstrukturen und die sozialen Sicherungssysteme…“.  von 
Bogdandy and Schill, (n 2), 712 citing Flaggenbeschimpfungs-Beschluss of the FCC “Nationale Identität meint 
dann gleichgerichtete psychische Vorgänge der Staatsbürger.” 
25 Guastaferro (n 1) 286. 
26 The German version operates with “nationale Identitӓt” in a singular form.  
27 Christoph Strumpf, ‘Artikel 6’ in Jürgen Schwarze (ed), EU-Kommentar (2nd edition Nomos 2009) para. 39. In 
the context of working languages of the EU Institutions see Oppermann (n 8) § 6, para.18. 
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identities. In this manner it could have been possible to argue that every national singularity 
could have served as a justification to limit the exercise of the EU competences.28 
It is mainly because of these reasons that the new Article 4(2) TEU, being based on the previous 
Article 6(3) TA, tries to clarify the notion of national identity by relating it to the fundamental 
and constitutional structures of the member states, inclusive of regional and local self-
government.29 Therefore it is argued that the new national identity clause brings a specific 
aspect of this identity, namely, the constitutional identity, to the surface and by putting 
emphasis on the fundamental political and constitutional structures it excludes the other 
dimension and aspects of the national identity from the scope of this provision.30 If one reads 
the English version this conclusion is even more evident. This version of the provision operates 
with the notion of ‘inherent’ instead of ‘finds expression through’ (Zum Ausdruck kommt) in 
the German version which makes the link between the national and constitutional identity 
stronger in the context of this provision.31 In this sense it could be argued that only the core 
fundamental values of the constitutions making up their identity are to be respected leaving out 
pre-constitutional elements and features from the scope of this provision.32 By such a 
demarcation of the notion of national identity in this provision it’s too extensive comprehension 
was to be avoided. As a matter of fact we can see this intention of the drafters by reserving 
other provision for certain other national particularities such as the linguistic and cultural 
diversity33 in Article 3(3) TEU and Article 22 of the EU Charter regulating EU institutions’ 
duty to respect this. This is in contrast to Article 149(1) TEC, where such a duty of respect did 
not exist.34 Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that by relating national identity to 
constitutional identity all conundrums and riddles are solved. The notion of constitutional 
identity might be more precise than national identity but it certainly is not easy to define.35   
                                                          
28 Besselink, (n 10) p 42-43. 
29 „The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of  regional and local self-
government....“ TEU available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655.en08.pdf last visited 
05.10.2018. 
30 Puttler (n 12) para.14; von Bogdandy and Schill (n 8) para.14; and Besselink, (n 10) 44. Cf. Rudolf Geiger ‘Art. 
4 EUV’ in Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus Khan and Markus Kotzur (eds), EUV/AEUV (6th edition C.H. Beck 
2017) para.3. 
31 Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under 
the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Law Market Review, 1427-1428; von Bogdandy and Schill, (n 8), para.14. 
32 On the difference between national and constitutional identity see Jose Luis Marti, ‘Two Different Ideas of 
Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution V. Identity of the People’ in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina 
Alcoberro Livina (eds) National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia 2013) 31-32. But 
cf Cloots (n 18) 165-170 where she argues that even though there are certain overlaps and significant connection 
national identity and constitutional identity cannot be equated in this context. 
33 For a secondary role of cultural identity under Article 4(2) TEU see Besselink, (n 10) 44. 
34 “[R]especting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of 
education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity” Art. 149 TEC. See also CJEU, Case C-160/03 
Kingdom of Spain v Eurojust, Opinion of AG Maduro 16 December 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:817, para 24. He has 
referred to both Article 6 TEU and 149 TEC thus showing that both of these articles regulate the linguistic identity 
i.e. diversity. 
35 On the issue and difficulties of defining constitutional identity see Jose Luis Marti (n 31), how he discusses two 
different meanings of constitutional identity: the identity of the constitution and the identity of the people or the 
political authority ruled by such constitution. Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Identity’ in M Rosenfeld and A 
Sajo (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2011) and G.J. Jacobsohn, 
Constitutional identity, (Harvard University Press 2010); see also Cloots (n 18) 165-170. 
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Apart from the difficulties of the definition of the notion of national identity this clause leads 
also to the question of determination of the extent of obligation or duty that is placed on EU 
institutions. In this context it can be claimed that the notion of ‘respect’ refers to a legal 
obligation36 for the Union and not just a political commitment as might have been previously 
implied. However, the precise scope of this legal obligation is open for discussion. In this sense 
von Bogdandy and Schill argue that the duty to respect national identity in Article 4(2) TEU 
does not necessarily conceive an absolute protection or preservation of national identity,37 and 
consequently does not imply the absolute primacy of constitutional provisions regulating 
specific constitutional values over EU law as a matter of principle.38 However this does not 
negate that this type of duty to respect represents a legal obligation for the Union. This 
obligation basically foresees the need of striking a balance, compromise and co-operation 
between the institutions of the legal orders in cases of conflicts of values and norms between 
them. Nevertheless, the particular mode of this co-operation and the way in which the balance 
is to be reached is a matter of contention. Numerous issues are open for debate such as which 
institutions will be determining national constitutional identity, the scope of application of the 
identity clause and whether this should be left to judicial or political institutions and how, if 
any, division of competences should there be among these institutions at both national and EU 
level. Contrasting these sorts of conceptions of the national identity clause there are voices 
which promote a more rigid stance. For instance, Puttler claims that basically the national 
identity clause just confirms what is clear in national law, the supremacy of the national 
constitution. In a case of conflict between the core values and principles of the constitutional 
identity of the member states and the exercise of Union competences, which would occur only 
in exceptional situations, the former should prevail.39 According to this view then there is no 
room for any type of balancing in this sort of situations. On the other hand, the duty to respect 
the national identity is said to incorporate two functions: exceptional, the constitutional 
limitation of the primacy of EU law; and ordinary, which is related to the additional limits or 
derogations on the exercise of EU competences.40  
This does not mean that there are no other open questions when the exact wording of the 
national identity clause is concerned. Article 4(2) TEU relates the national identity of the 
member states to the fundamental constitutional structures and makes no mention of the 
constitutional values or principles. In this way it leaves the door open for a possible restrictive 
reading41 which the notion ‘structure’ invokes. Accordingly it could be argued that the national 
identity clause under the common understanding of the notion ‘structures’ essentially refers to 
matters of institutional design and organization of state power while not covering the 
fundamental constitutional and political values.42 Even though this might have been a strong 
                                                          
36 Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 8) para 33; and Puttler (n 12) para. 22. 
37 Cf Beutler (n 23) para. 201 „Sie [Die Achtung] nicht nur Respektierung, sondern vor allem auch Förderung der 
jeweiligen nationalen Identität,“. 
38 von Bogdandy and Schill (n 8) para.33. 
39 Puttler (n 12) para.22. 
40 Guastaferro (n 1) 
41 Cf CJEU, Joined Cases C-428/06 to C-434/06, Unión General de Trabajadores de La Rioja (UGT-Rioja) v. 
Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya and Others, Opinion AG Kokott of 8 May 2008, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:262, para. 54. 
42 De Witte (n 3) 34. 
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argument as there is a substantial difference between ‘structures’ and ‘values’ still neither the 
travaux preparatoire nor the case-law of the CJEU and the academia leave a lot of room for 
such a restrictive interpretation.43 National identity which is inherent in the fundamental 
structures of the member states, both political and constitutional, cannot exclude major 
‘fundamental decisions’ such as the principle of separation of powers, rule of law, protection 
of constitutional rights and similar principles and values envisaged in the fundamental 
structures.44 All these are essentially elements of the national identity as clarified by the latest 
changes in this provision.      
Lastly, besides the fundamental political and constitutional structures Article 4(2) TEU invokes 
another element to clarify the understanding of national identity. Thus besides the central, the 
national dimension of this notion the identity clause refers also to the regional and local-self-
government in the member states, which was another addendum to the previous wording of 
Article 6(3) TA.45 Therefore regional and local self-government are emphasized as being a part 
of the fundamental political and constitutional structures which gives the notion of national 
identity a particular focus in comparison to the previous version of the clause.46 Taken 
together47 with the inclusion of these structures within the subsidiarity principle this aspect of 
the identity clause only reinforces the duty on the side of the Union to respect this aspect of the 
national identities of the member states.48 Nevertheless, regional and local self-government 
remain, at the EU level and according to the CJEU, indirectly related to the national identity, 
thus through the member states and their constitutions.49  
2.2.2 Systemic analysis of Article 4(2) TEU 
Even though the textual analysis shed some light on the meaning and scope of the identity 
clause the limits of the exegesis are already known. This is the reason why one turns to the 
systemic analysis in the quest to comprehend the complex treaty context in which this provision 
is placed. Therefore, Article 4(2) TEU must be read, first in the context of Article 4 itself and 
then in relation to other related provisions such as Articles 2, 5, 7 and 3(3) TEU. Accordingly, 
the national identity clause should be interpreted in the light of, above all, the principle of 
                                                          
43 On the travaux preparatoire see for instance CONV 357/02 and CONV 400/02, more on this in Guastaferro (n 
1) 9ff; Ingolf Pernice, ‘Der Schutz nationaler Identität in der Europäischen Union’ (2011) 136 Archiv des 
öffentlichen Rechts 185 189,190 von Bogdandy and Schill (n 8) para.28 and Puttler (n 12) para.16. On the case 
law of the CJEU on this issue see in the next section. 
44 Pernice (n 43) 189,190. He referes to them as Strukturentscheidungen der nationalen Verfassungen. 
45 Puttler (n 12) para.216. Also cf Beutler (n 23) para.204, focusing on the regional self-government. 
46 Amato and Ziller (n 19) 81; CJEU, Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SPRL v Commune d’Uccle and Région de 
Bruxelles-Capital, Opinion of AG Trstenjak 4 June 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:317, para 85. 
47 See also Article 263(3) TFEU which gives the Committee of Region the right to file actions before the CJEU 
for infringements of the infringements of the subsidiarity principle by legislative acts of the Union.  
48 Amato and Ziller (n 19) 190. 
49 This is best illustrated by the fact that within the German constitutional identity embodied in Article 79(3) local 
self-government is not part of this identity while regional self-government is. See Puttler (n 12) para.19. 
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conferred powers50, and then the subsidiarity51, proportionality52 and loyalty principle.53 In this 
way the national identity clause should be understood as representing the limits on the exercise 
of EU competences conferred on it by the member states hence tackling the encroachment of 
the EU in member states competences not directly conferred, i.e. the competence creep.54 
According to Guastaferro and based on her analysis of the context of Article 4(2) TEU and its 
‘legislative history’ the identity clause represents ‘a general clause on the exercise of Union 
competences protecting some national core responsibilities.’55 Even in the case of Article 6(3) 
TA it has been argued by some that regardless of the status of this Treaty provision it did 
incorporate the same limits on the exercise of competences.56 On the other hand, the identity 
clause should be read in relation with the loyalty principle of ‘full mutual respect’57 which 
infers the duty of the Union not to take any actions that would undermine the fundamental 
political and constitutional structures of the member states. This conclusion is strengthened by 
the fact that the loyalty clause is placed in a subsequent paragraph in Article 4, right after the 
identity clause. Therefore the identity clause qualifies the loyalty principle with an additional 
duty for the Union institutions incorporating the respect of national identity of member states.58  
An additional argument related to the content of Article 4 itself is in line with the claim that 
the identity clause represents a general clause on the exercise of the Union competences. 
Namely, the insertion of the first paragraph regulating the principle of residual powers of the 
member states and, in essence, repeating the same principle which is stated in Article 5 can be 
also interpreted that Article 4 has to do mainly with the issue of competences. As a matter of 
fact, even in the context of the CT Article I-5 was discussed in the framework of the issue of 
delimitation of powers between the Union and its member states.59 
Even if there are strong arguments which would claim that the respect for national identity 
entails an external limit for the exercise of Union competences still it is not clear whether this 
limit is absolute and to what extent the Union institutions can be limited in this sense. The 
answers are provided by reading Article 4(2) TEU in conjunction with Article 2 TEU. The 
limitation on the exercise of the conferred powers to the Union cannot run counter to the values 
of the EU as provided in the latter article.60 In case an interpretation of these limitations, as 
seen through the respect for national identity, breaches the values set in Article 2 TEU as 
                                                          
50 Articles 5(1), 4(1) and 2 TEU; Guastaferro (n 1) 288. 
51 Article 5(3) TEU; Beutler (n 23) para.205; and Christoph Strumpf (n 26) para. 38, in the context of Article 6(3) 
TA. 
52 Article 5(4) TEU; von Bogdandy and Schill (n 8) para.33, put the emphasis on the proportionality and are not 
referring to the subsidiarity para.33; while Puttler refers to both, see Puttler (n 12) para.10. 
53 See Article 4(3) TEU; Guastaferro (n 1) 282. Further she claims that this conclusion is even more evident in the 
Lisbon Treaty, 285. 
54 See more on this ‘ordinary’ function of the identity clause which is also confirmed by the debates and drafting 
procedure during its initial enactment in the Constitutional Treaty, travaux preparatoires of the ‘Christophersen 
clause’ in Guastaferro (n 1) 271ff. 
55 Guastaferro (n 1) 289. 
56 Beutler (n 23) para.206. 
57 Article 4(3) TEU „Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in 
full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties” (emphasis added). 
58 Puttler (n 12) para.10. 
59 Puttler (n 12) para.14. 
60 In the context of Article 6(1) and (3) TA see Beutler (n 23) para. 205.  
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interpreted by the CJEU then this court could intervene and assess national identity in light of 
EU law and deny claims of limitation of this sorts.61  
While this conventional legal interpretation sheds light on the actual status it is only through 
the analysis of the case-law of both the national constitutional courts and the CJEU that the 
scope and meaning of this clause is slightly clearer. However, once the stances of the courts 
are reviewed it will be possible to discuss the actual role of constitutional courts in this complex 
issue of constitutional identity and argue for the constructive role of this institution.    
3 The role of constitutional identity and Article 4(2) TEU in the case-law of 
national constitutional courts and the CJEU 
The complexity of the issue as well as the vagueness of the wording of the national identity 
clause necessitate getting an insight from the case-law of the constitutional courts and the CJEU 
in the endeavour of further determining the meaning and scope of the national identity clause. 
In doing this one needs to discuss and provide answers to several crucial questions surrounding 
the respect of national identity in the EU. These questions address the issue of the responsibility 
for determining the manner in which this clause would be applied. Who is competent to 
determine the content of the national/constitutional identity? Who is supposed to decide on the 
conformity of EU acts and actions with this identity? The search for the answers to these and 
similar questions leads us through the case-law of national constitutional courts and the CJEU 
in order to be able to comprehend the practical relevance of this provision and later analyze its 
broader influence on the relationship between the legal orders as well as their respective 
judicial structures. 
3.1 The relevance of constitutional identity in the case-law of national constitutional 
courts on EU matters I: Setting the stage 
3.1.1 Relating constitutional identity with national identity in light of Article 4(2) TEU 
If the above analysis has shown that national identity in the context of Article 4(2) TEU is 
directly related to the constitutional identity and if this latter term is most frequently related to 
the notions, values and principles treasured by the constitutions, then the constitutional courts 
are supposed to be best placed institutions to determine their meaning and scope. In other 
words, if the national identity clause is associated with the actual identity of the constitutions 
then these institutions as result of their role and position are the ones to be addressed. This has 
been confirmed even in some of the opinions of AG Maduro.62 One might argue that actually 
                                                          
61 Mattias Kumm, ‘Rebel Without a Good Cause: Karlsruhe’s Misguided Attempt to Draw the CJEU into a Game 
of “Chicken” and What the CJEU Might do About it’, (2014) German Law Journal 203, 209 fn. 14, he labeled 
this as ‘reverse ultra vires’ referring to an earlier concept of von Bogdandy and his team of reverse Solange. 
62 CJEU, Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Opinion of AG Maduro 8 October 
2008, ECLI:EU:C2008:544, para 30; CJEU, Case C-53/04, Cristiano Marrosu and Gianluca Sardino v Aziedna 
Ospidaliera Ospedale, Opinion of AG Maduro 20 September 2005, ECLI:EU:C2005:569, para 40; von Bogdandy 
and Schill, (n 2). Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘A Huron at the Kirchberg Plateau or a Few Naïve Thoughts on 
Constitutional Identity in the Case-law of the Judge of the European Union’ in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina 
Alcoberro Livina (eds) National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia 2013) 285. 
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the political institutions, especially the representative bodies, are the ones that should be 
determining this type of identity. Perhaps, but this cannot be an absolute power of these 
institutions especially in cases where constitutional courts are established as specialized bodies 
empowered and entrusted with the task of guarding the constitution and thus also providing the 
adequate interpretation and meaning of the constitutions.63  
At the EU level, on the other hand, the CJEU’s competences are clearly delineated in this sense. 
As a matter of fact, the establishment of the meaning and scope of the national identity would 
necessarily involve interpretation of national law which according to Article 19 TEU is not part 
of the competences of this court. However, the CJEU would nevertheless be involved in the 
interpretation of the national identity clause concerning its application and meaning in the EU 
law and determination of the limits of this clause and thus of constitutional identity in light of 
Article 2 TEU. 
But, then again, how did constitutional courts link the constitutional identity with EU law and 
was this result of Article 4(2) TEU only?  
Almost every European constitution contains a provision which declares, regulates or at least 
alludes to the core elements of constitutional identity.64 However the direct link between the 
national identity as regulated in Article 4(2) TEU and the relevant constitutional provision has 
been of more recent date. Namely, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) was the first 
constitutional court to directly establish the link between the national identity clause and 
constitutional identity as envisaged in Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law (GG). In this 
sense, Rideau argued that essentially besides Germany only France and Poland explicitly refer 
to the constitutional identity while some of the other member states such as Italy, Spain, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic only alluded to such an identity.65 However, this situation has 
changed in 2016 and 2017 when three new constitutional courts explicitly referred to 
constitutional identity in the context of EU law, those being ICC, BCC and HCC.66 
Nevertheless, one should not draw the wrong conclusion that constitutional identity has not 
played a substantial role in cases involving both primary and secondary EU law. The notion of 
national or constitutional identity has not been alien to the national constitutional courts in 
cases dealing with EU law. In the past years and decades, they have been invoking 
constitutional provisions that express core values of the constitutional identity in order to resist, 
more in an abstract and preventive manner, the excessive exercise of Union competences and 
the absolute primacy of EC/EU law.  
As with every other discussion on the relationship between the national constitutions and EU 
law, and also here, one has to begin with the already well-known case-law of the constitutional 
                                                          
63 Cloots (n 18) 149-150; and Herbert Bethge, in Theodor Maunz, Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Franz Klein, Herbert 
Bethge et al., Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz: Kommentar Band 1 (54th edition C.H. Beck 2018) 142. 
64 Joel Rideau, ‘The Case-law of the Polish, Hungarian and Czech Constitutional Courts on National Identity and 
the ‘German Model’’ in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Livina (eds) National Constitutional Identity 
and European Integration (Intersentia 2013) 243.  
65 Rideau (n 64) 243. 
66 See more on this below in this section. 
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courts of Germany and Italy, that is claimed by some authors to have shaped the national 
identity clause.67 
In the early 1970s the FCC started writing the first concrete chapter on the relationship between 
national constitutional law and EU law that influenced so much the future development of this 
never-ending story. In Solange I68 this court reasoned that: 
“it (Article 24 GG) does not open the way to amending the basic structure of the Basic 
Law, which forms the basis of its identity, without a formal amendment to the Basic 
Law, that is, it does not open any such way through legislation of the interstate 
institution.” 69 
This view has been affirmed and developed along this line in its future case-law in first place 
by the Solange II70 and Maastricht decision which referred to Article F(1) Treaty of Maastricht 
in the context of subsidiarity, proportionality and conferral of powers.71 Most significantly the 
value of constitutional identity in light of Article 4(2) TEU has been later emphasized and 
contextualised in the Lisbon decision.72 
The Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) at almost the same time formed its counter-limits 
(‘controlimiti’) doctrine that puts limits to the primacy of EU law by implying the constitutional 
identity.73 In the Frontini case,74 the ICC made clear that EC powers or the exercise thereof 
cannot in any case “violate fundamental principles of our (Italian) constitutional order or the 
inalienable rights of man.” In a case of violation, which according to this court is quite unlikely 
to occur, the ICC has competences to review the acts or actions of the EC and now EU 
institutions. The ICC has affirmed this standard in two other landmark cases, Granital75 and 
Fragd76, but nevertheless, to this date has neither precisely defined what this abstract 
formulation stands for, or better said which principles and values it entails, nor has it applied it 
to EU law. However, the latest development over the CJEU’s Taricco decision77 and the third 
                                                          
67 Reestman (n 9) 380. 
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2159/92, in Oppenheimer (n 11) 556, 574. More on these three cases see Franz C. Mayer, ‘The European 
Constitution and the Courts’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional 
Law (Hart 2006) 295-300. 
72 For more on this see below section 3.1.2. 
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Law 2017/06, 8-15. 
74 ICC, Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze of 27 December 1973, in Oppenheimer (n 11) 640. 
75 ICC, Spa Granital v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato of 8 June 1984, in Oppenheimer (n 11) 651. 
76 ICC, Fragd v Amministrazione delle Finanze of 21 April 1989, in Oppenheimer (n 11) 657. 
77 CJEU, Taricco ECLI:EU:C:2015:555 judgment of 8 September 2015. 
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preliminary reference of the ICC78 to this court over the very same decision seems to pave the 
way towards refining the constitutional identity in the case law of the ICC. The latter has clearly 
threatened in its reference to invoke the constitutional identity review in case the CJEU does 
not reconsider and adjust its interpretation of Article 325 TFEU which is seen to be 
incompatible with the established constitutional principle of legality as part of the fundamental 
constitutional principles of the Italian constitution.79 Even though in the end this ‘threat’of 
applying identity review did not materialize in the ICC decision on the Taricco saga, still, this 
decision has left ample room for this to occur in the not so distant future.80 
Another court has contributed to this debate in the recent years even though its status as a 
proper constitutional court has been sometimes disputed. The French Constitutional Council 
(CC) has voiced its view on the limits of EU law. In this sense at the beginning the CC used a 
broader formula which indicated that in cases in which an act of secondary EU law is in 
contradiction with “an express contrary provision of the Constitution” then the EU legal act 
would be disobeyed.81 Later the court refined this argument and stated that such an 
disobedience of EU law would occur if it is in conflict with a rule or principle inherent to the 
constitutional identity of France, except when the constituting power consents thereto [to the 
application of EU law]. 82 In any case, the bottom line remains the same, the doctrine of ‘reserve 
de constitutionnalite’ as embodied through the constitutional identity sets limits on the exercise 
of EU competences and absolute primacy of EU law.83 
Nevertheless, perhaps crucial for the greater awareness and significance of the national identity 
clause both in France and Spain, and obviously broader, prior to the enactment of Article 4(2) 
TEU as part of the Lisbon Treaty, are the decisions of the CC and the Spanish Constitutional 
Tribunal (SCT). In the respective decisions one could easily recognize that in essence the views 
of the two institutions on the meaning of the then Article I-5 CT in regard to Article I-6 CT, 
                                                          
78 ICC Order 24/2017 (Taricco) of 23 November 2017, English version available at: 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/O_24_2017.pdf last visited 
06.10.2018 
79 ICC Taricco (n 77) para. 6. 
80 ICC Judgment 115/2018 of 10 April 2018 (Taricco Decision), English version available at: 
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S_2018_115_EN.pdf last visited 
30.01.2019. For more on this see Lukas Staffler, ‘Verfassungsidentität und strafrechtliche Verjährung; Das 
(vorläufige) Ende des Konflikts zweier Höchstgerichte in der Rechtssache Taricco’ 45 Europäische Grundrechte 
Zeitschrift (2018) 613-619; and Chiara Amalfitano and Oreste Pollicino, ‘Two Courts, two Languages? The 
Taricco Saga Ends on a Worrying Note (Verfassungsblog 5 June 2018), available at: 
https://verfassungsblog.de/two-courts-two-languages-the-taricco-saga-ends-on-a-worrying-note/  last visited 
30.01.2019. 
81 When the constitutionality of primary law is at stake, then the phrase used by the Council, which represents its 
standard of control in the process of ratification, is for the commitments taken by the treaties not to “call into 
question constitutionality guaranteed rights and freedoms or adversely affect the fundamental conditions of the 
exercising of national sovereignty”. See French Constitutional Council Decision No 2004-505 DC of 19 
November 2004, para 7, and also Decision No 2007-560 DC of 20 December 2007, para 9. 
82 This point was reaffirmed in Decision No 2011-631 DC from 9 June 2011, para. 45. More on the provisions 
which are specific to France and thus are part of the constitutional identity see Reestman, (n 9) 388. Here a note 
should be taken of the possible area of conflict between, the policy, or better said lack of any, on the respect and 
recognition of racial and ethnic minorities in France and the values of the Union envisaged in Article 2 TEU which 
also include the respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities.  
83 Xavier Groussot, ‘Supr[i]macy à la Française: Another French Exception?’ (2008) 27 Yearbook on European 
Law 89, 105-107. 
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the primacy clause, are shared. It was stated that the relation and positioning of the two 
provisions is a clear sign that national identity represents the limit to the primacy of EU law 
over the national constitutions and this is why they did not find the primacy clause to be in 
conflict with the constitution since it did not alter the scope of the already existing doctrine.84  
Since 2004, on the other hand, the pattern created by the FCC and ICC, and now shyly applied 
by the CC, has been followed by the other constitutional courts of the new member states that 
lead Sadurski to name this trend as ‘Solange Chapter 3’.85 However, this trend has been 
characterized by an interesting paradox that is definitely noteworthy. While in the period prior 
to accession to the EU these states put a lot of effort in promoting the integration process as the 
only path for their further democratization, after the accession they have set the limits to EU 
law rooted in constitutional provisions declaring the democratic character of the state based on 
the rule of law.86  
The Czech Constitutional Court (CCC) is an interesting example in discussing the national 
identity clause. The CCC set the tone towards EU law87 in its first case concerning a national 
implementing act in the so-called the Sugar Quotas Case.88 In its Lisbon I89 decision the CCC 
stated that the application of Union law in the Czech Republic has its limits in the 
“untouchable” material core of the constitution. The material core is stemming out of the 
principles of the “democratic state governed by the rule of law” of Article 9(2) and Article 1(1) 
of the Constitution.90 In the follow up to this decision, Lisbon II, it has resisted the pressure 
from the applicants and firmly declined to list the non-transferable competences91 or precisely 
declare the elements of the material core of the constitution in advance92 by which it belied the 
idea of fundamental resemblance with the FCC’s case law.93 The logic behind the reasoning 
appears to be very sound and legitimate. It opted for a division of tasks with the political 
branches (i.e. the legislature) in defining the constitutional identity. The approach taken was to 
avoid the severe criticism that the FCC has undergone for its judicial activism in the Lisbon 
decision and inter alia for going too far with the definition and scope of constitutional identity 
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also Rideau (n 64) 256. 
91CCC, Treaty of Lisbon II, Decision PL. US 29/09, para. 111. Rideau (n 64) 257. 
92 CCC, Lisbon II (n 91) para. 112. 
93 The Editors note and Jan Komarek, ‘The Czech Constitutional Court's Second Decision on the Lisbon Treaty 
of 3 November 2009’, (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 345. 
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and essential state functions. Therefore the CCC justified this move by stating that if it decided 
differently it would cross the line of its competences and in that way encroach the decision-
making powers of political bodies because of which it would unavoidably be labelled as an 
activist court.94 However, such a stance should not be interpreted as a complete restraint of the 
CCC from issues related to constitutional identity. It retained the power, in exceptional 
situations, to review the exercise of competences of the EU when there are indications that 
constitutional identity is being encroached upon. As a matter of fact, this position was 
confirmed in the Slovak Pensions case where the CCC clearly summarized its positions towards 
EU law along these same lines.95  
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal (PCT) was slightly more ‘observant’ of the pattern set by 
the FCC even though not completely. In its Lisbon decision it identified the national 
constitutional identity through enumeration of certain core constitutional provisions96 which 
regulate the powers and competences that may not be subject to transfer to the EU. The 
safeguard for such a limited conferral is foreseen in Article 9097 of the Constitution.98 In this 
manner it determined the constitutional identity as the ultimate limit to the conferral of 
competences to the EU. Similarly to the FCC the PCT relates the constitutional identity, as it 
defines, to Article 4(2) TEU stating that “[a]n equivalent concept of constitutional identity in 
the primary EU law is the concept of national identity.”99 Nevertheless, different from the FCC, 
it leaves the actual determination of the democratic legitimacy of a measure foreseen by the 
Treaty to be applied by the EU institutions to the legislature and the Polish constitution 
maker.100 Additionally, the PCT in this decision provided a substantive overview of the case-
law of several other European constitutional courts on the constitutional review of the Lisbon 
Treaty where it recognized the role of constitutional courts in relation to the respective 
constitutional identity. The PCT referring to the common constitutional traditions of member 
states and the importance of constitutions for state sovereignty determined that “the 
constitutional judiciary plays a unique role as regards the protection of constitutional identity 
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100 PCT Lisbon (n 98) III 2.6, 36; Tatham (n 85) 252; and Rideau (n 64) 253. 
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of the member states, which at the same time determines the Treaty identity of the European 
Union.”101    
Even though the enumeration of core competences and the strong stance on the supremacy of 
the Constitution and sovereignty might leave an impression of an utterly rigid stance towards 
EU law,102 a more EU friendly approach could be recognized. An interesting and in some 
instances awkward balance between Euro-friendliness and strong emphasis on state 
sovereignty still leaves some room for a more constructive interpretation of the PCT’s stance 
towards EU law. Namely, the insistence on avoiding direct collision with EU law is also a 
feature of PCT’s case-law the EU Regulation decisions103 arguably being the last example in 
this light.104 Following the Honeywell decision of the FCC, the PCT expressed its obligation to 
use the preliminary reference option in order to determine the actual content of the EU 
secondary norm prior to deciding on its constitutionality thus declaring its willingness to enter 
a judicial dialogue on the matter.105     
The most recent line of case law of national constitutional courts invoking constitutional 
identity in the context of EU law is of the Belgian Constitutional Court and Hungarian 
Constitutional Court. In a decision from 2016 the BCC106 reviewed the constitutionality of inter 
alia the Act approving the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union on several grounds which were raised by numerous applicants and also 
included the question of breach of the budgetary responsibility and autonomy of the Belgian 
Parliament. In an obiter dictum the BCC for the first time announces specific limits to the 
primacy of EU law. Besides the safeguard of the principle of limited attribution or conferral of 
powers to the EU, the BCC has reasoned that EU law has primacy as long as it does not breach 
the national identity or the basic values of constitutional rights protection.107 Thus the most 
Europhile national constitutional court in Europe has clearly declared its power to conduct 
identity review of EU law which most probably will be applied with substantial restraint.108 
In another case from 2016, the HCC provided an abstract constitutional interpretation of the 
European Council decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015109 on establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, which 
basically introduced the migrant quota system strongly opposed by the Hungarian government 
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led by Victor Orban. In this high profile political case, the HCC essentially served as the last 
bastion of Orban’s anti-migration policies and delivered a rather dubious reasoning introducing 
the limits of EU law supremacy through fundamental rights review and ultra vires review.110 
The latter review, according to the HCC is consisted of sovereignty and identity review111 and 
it is supposed to protect and safeguard the Hungary’s sovereignty112 and constitutional identity 
rooted in its historical constitution.113 While the HCC puts some effort to justify its reasoning 
by referring to the FCC’s and other national constitutional courts’ case law on the relationship 
with EU law, it seriously departs from this path of promoting constructive relationship between 
the legal orders. Not only does the HCC provide an extensive understanding of constitutional 
(self-) identity114 by referring also to an ambiguous notion of historical constitution,115 but it 
does not mention any possibility of entering into a direct dialogue with the CJEU by sending a 
preliminary reference before it conducts an ultra vires review generally reserved for the HCC 
only.116 Even though the HCC roots its identity review to Article 4(2) TEU and reasons that 
this sort of review should be “based on the principle of equality and collegiality, with mutual 
respect to each other”117 the general reasoning of the HCC does not resonate with a constructive 
stance in regard to EU law. In this sense, the HCC developed a very uncooperative stance 
through the invocation of constitutional identity which contradicts the principle of sincere 
cooperation of the Article 4(3) TEU as well as the values upon which the EU is being based on 
as regulated in Article 2 TEU.118 
3.1.2 The Lisbon decision of the FCC  
The decision of the FCC on the Lisbon Treaty has drawn serious criticism because of its, 
arguably, Euro-skeptic tone particularly in projecting its understanding of democracy on the 
EU.119 Some authors went as far as declaring that 30 June 2009, the date when the Lisbon 
                                                          
110 HCC, Decision 22/2016 (n 109) para. 46. Gabor Halmai, ‘National(ist) Constitutional Identity?: Hungary’s 
Road to Abuse’ (2017) EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2017/08, p. 8ff available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962969  See also Gabor Halmai, ‘The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity’ Verfassungsblog 18 January 2017 available at: 
http://verfassungsblog.de/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-and-constitutional-identity/ last visitied 06.10.2018 
and Timea Drinoczi, The Hungarian Constitutional Court of the Limits of EU law in the Hungarian Legal System, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 29 December 2016, available at: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/12/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-on-the-limits-of-eu-law-in-the-
hungarian-legal-system/ last visited 06.10.2018. 
111 HCC, Decision 22/2016 (n 109) para. 54. 
112 HCC, Decision 22/2016 (n 109) paras. 58-60. 
113 HCC, Decision 22/2016 (n 109) paras. 61-67. 
114 HCC, Decision 22/2016 (n 109) para. 64. “The Constitutional Court of Hungary interprets the concept of 
constitutional identity as Hungary’s self-identity and it unfolds the content of this concept from case to case”. 
115 HCC, Decision 22/2016 (n 109) paras. 64-65; and Gabor Halmai, ‘National(ist) Constitutional Identity?: 
Hungary’s Road to Abuse’ (2017) EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2017/08, p. 16 available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962969 last visited 06.10.2018. 
116 HCC, Decision 22/2016 (n 109) paras. 63 “The protection of constitutional identity should be granted in the 
framework of an informal cooperation with EUC[sic]”, Cf. Concurring opinion of Egon-Dienes-Oehm HCC, 
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decision was delivered, will be remembered as a black day in the history of Europe.120  
Nevertheless, the issue of constitutional identity and its association with the identity clause 
were not the target of harsh criticism as it will presented below. 
There are two main reasons why the Lisbon decision of the FCC is discussed separately from 
the case-law of the other national constitutional courts. First, the importance of this decision is 
doubtless when Article 4(2) TEU is concerned in the sense of directly establishing the link with 
the constitutional identity. Second, as it could be noticed in the previous section, the overall 
influence and importance of this institution in shaping the relationship between the national 
constitutional law and EU law is evident.  
Following and further developing121 the position and principles introduced in its previous 
decisions, above all in the Maastricht decision, the FCC in its Lisbon decision122 clarifies and 
contextualises the constitutional identity of Germany on both the national and European level. 
Respecting the aforementioned continuity the court identified the constitutional identity 
through Article 23(1) GG123 in conjunction with Article 79(3) GG124, the so-called ‘eternity 
clause’, and accordingly its duty to protect and guarantee this identity through the instrument 
of ‘identity review’, hence adding a new avenue for review of EU law.125 For this new 
instrument of review in addition to the previous Solange and ultra vires review doctrines126 it 
finds support not only in the GG but also in the TEU, or more precisely Article 4(2). In this 
sense it recognized the mutuality of the obligation under both legal orders that at the same time 
is in conformity with the principle of openness of German law towards EU law and the loyalty 
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clause.127 It declared that “the guarantee of national constitutional identity under constitutional 
and under Union law go hand in hand in the European legal area.”128 With this reasoning the 
FCC established the direct link between constitutional identity of Germany and the national 
identity clause in the TEU. 
However, it did not stop here and went further discussing which competences and powers of 
the German state cannot be transferred to the Union under the existing constitutional 
provisions, a point which led some scholars129 to conclude that the notion of constitutional 
identity includes also some other competences of the state, enumerated in the Lisbon 
decision.130 On the other hand, the authors that noticed this issue criticised the court’s stance 
as far-reaching.131 Indeed, it is undeniably true that it is far-reaching in a sense of being 
selective without any strong grounds and criteria in distinguishing certain competences from 
others as necessary state functions. However, this does not have to be read in a way directly 
relating the list of competences to the constitutional identity. 
An alternative reading of the decision might be plausible on this issue. Challenging the afore-
mentioned interpretation of the FCC’s reasoning, Reestman wrote that “[t]hey (the five 
domains of state power) are, moreover, domains in which the chances of an encroachment of 
other principles belonging to the German constitutional identity seem particularly great” and 
“they are closely connected to it (constitutional identity) via the principle of democracy”. 132 It 
is also affirmed by Grimm that “the list fulfils the function of warning sign: touching these 
matters implies a danger to the identity of the member states.”133 This view can also be traced 
in the wording and reasoning of the FCC134 and it corresponds as well to the one expressed by 
CCC, to a certain extent influenced by the FCC, also in the Lisbon II decision where it 
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last visited 05.10.2018 
134 FCC, Honeywell decision, 2 BvR 2661/06 of 6 July 2010 para 65 referred to also in FCC, OMT referral, 2 BvR 
2728/13 of 14 January 2014, para 25. 
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demarcated the non-transferable competences from the elements of the material core.135 Even 
though these competences are related to the democratic principle, by using the wording 
“[p]articularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state to democratically shape itself“136 
it is not firmly establishing them as inherent part of the constitutional identity and, in light of 
Article 4(2) TEU, they cannot be seen in every case as the fundamental constitutional 
structures. It is in this sense that one has to bear in mind also the third duty regulated in the 
identity clause i.e. the duty to respect the essential state functions in support of this 
interpretation.137 The relation to the national identity clause is present. However, it does not 
mean that these two duties for the Union are identical. The essential state functions do not have 
to be in every case part of the fundamental constitutional structures of the member states. This 
is even more so when one notices that the court states that “principle of democracy... does not 
mean that a pre-determined number or certain types of sovereign rights should remain in the 
hands of the state.”138 
Within the framework of identity review and defining the constitutional identity another 
criticism has been cast on the grounds of the approach taken by the FCC in this decision 
towards judicial dialogue. The FCC has taken a rigid stance on its right to rule on whether an 
EU act is ultra vires or whether it encroaches upon the constitutional identity,139 but it has not 
spoken in favour of a genuine judicial dialogue between national and supranational courts.140 
This sort of approach resonates with a national constitutionalist tone which does not comply 
with the perspectives of constitutional pluralism that should lead to a constructive relationship 
between the legal orders as will be discussed in the next section.  
3.1.3 The post-Lisbon development of the FCC’s doctrine of identity review 
The strong criticism on some issues in the Lisbon decision has toned down, as has the court’s 
actual tone in this decision, has been made more visible in light of the subsequent decisions of 
the FCC. Thus the best way to interpret the main points in this decision is to put them in the 
broader context of the case-law of the FCC. In this sense it could be argued that the Lisbon 
decision is not just an isolated case as shown by two other cases dealing with EU matters that 
immediately followed this decision. The Data retention141 and Honeywell decisions142 showed 
FCC’s restraint and narrow application of the principles introduced or restated in the Lisbon 
decision. As a matter of fact, in some instances it could be said that the FCC has resorted to an 
unjustified judicial restraint that prevented this court from making a constructive intervention 
                                                          
135 CCC Lisbon II (n 91) paras. 111 and 112. The second paragraph in which this court addresses the content of 
the material core from Article 1(1) of the Constitution separately from the non-transferable competences begins 
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136 FCC Lisbon (n 122) para. 252. 
137 Geiger (n 30) para.4 referring to FCC Lisbon (n 122) para. 351 and the way the new EU powers should be 
exercised in the future. 
138 FCC Lisbon (n 122) para. 248. See also Grimm (n 121) 368. 
139 FCC Lisbon (n 122) para. 241. 
140 Konstadinides (n 5) 211; and Tatham (n 85) 307-308. 
141 FCC, Data Retention decision 1BvR 256/08, 1BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08 of 2 March 2010. See Anna-Bettina 
Kaiser, Case Note: ‘German Data Retention Provisions Unconstitutional in their Present Form; Decision of 2 
March 2010, NJW 2010’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 503. 
142 FCC Honeywell (n 134) para. 65. 
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in the realm of the common European constitutional order. On the first occasion after Lisbon 
to deal with an EU secondary act and to invoke the constitutional identity, the Data Retention 
Directive,143 the FCC focused on the leeway provided by the directive for the national legislator 
and the national implementing act. In this way it avoided the need to make a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU even though it mentioned the possibility.144 Furthermore, it invoked the 
constitutional identity in the context of Article 10 GG - privacy of correspondence, posts and 
telecommunications145 – however it did not enter into a review of the EU secondary act but 
only of the implementing act and its conformity with the aforementioned constitutional right. 
It conducted a strict scrutiny since the CJEU already decided earlier dismissing an ultra vires 
challenge of the directive from Ireland.146 Here the FCC missed an excellent opportunity to 
make recourse to preliminary reference to the CJEU and challenge the directive on the basis of 
its encroachment on the fundamental rights and thus constitutional identity,147 something that 
was successfully done a couple of years later by both the Austrian Constitutional Court and the 
High Court of Ireland.148 In this manner the FCC addressed the issue of safeguarding 
constitutional identity and the way it should have implemented the directive to the Bundestag 
and not to the CJEU.149 
In Honeywell150 the FCC withdrew from the rigid tone on judicial dialogue in the Lisbon 
decision and it embraced a friendlier approach towards EU law by substantially qualifying151 
the ultra vires review by ‘invent[ing] meta-standards’.152 It reasoned for providing more leeway 
for the CJEU recognizing the need to let the CJEU have its say on the concrete issue at hand 
before deciding whether an EU act is ultra vires while at the same time according the CJEU 
with the right of tolerance of error.153 Additionally the FCC strengthened also its commitment 
                                                          
143 Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L105/54.  
144 Guataferro (n 1) 314-315, Mattias Wendel, ‘Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy: the 
German Federal Constitutional Court’s OMT reference’ (2014) European Constitutional Law Review 263, 264, 
306. 
145 FCC Data Retention (n 141) para. 218, referring directly to the Lisbon decision: “It is part of the constitutional 
identity of the Federal Republic of Germany that the citizens’ enjoyment of freedom may not be totally recorded 
and registered, and the Federal Republic must endeavour to preserve this in European and international 
connections” (emphasis added). Translation taken from the FCC Press release no. 11/2010 of 2 March 2010. 
146 CJEU, Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council Judgement of 10 February 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:68. 
147 The FCC was aware that the Data Retention Directive was challenged of being ultra vires prior to its decision, 
see Ireland v Parliament and Council (n 124). 
148 CJEU, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights (Data Retention II), Judgement of 8 April 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. Sent as a preliminary reference by the Irish High Court and the Austrian Constitutional 
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149 Konstadinides (n 5) 213. 
150 This decision will be analyzed over the ultra vires review in more details in chapter 6. See more on this decision 
in Christoph Möllers, ‘Constitutional Ultra Vires Review of European Acts Only Under Exceptional 
Circumstances; Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell’ (2011) European Constitutional Law Review 
161; Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Defence of National Identity by the German Constitutional Court’ in Alejandro 
Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Livina (eds) National Constitutional Identity and European Integration 
(Intersentia 2013) 214-217; Matthias Mahlmann, The Politics of Constitutional Identity and its Legal Frame – the 
Ultra Vires Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, (2010) 11 German Law Journal 1407. 
151 Judge Landau disagreed with these qualifications in his dissenting opinion, FCC Honeywell (n 134) para. 94ff. 
152 Möllers (n 150) 166. 
153 FCC Honeywell (n 134) para. 74.  
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towards the instrument of preliminary referencing to the CJEU.154 In this sense it forged ahead 
with the relationship of cooperation.155  
A new and even more relevant chapter in the story on the place of constitutional identity review 
in the case law of the FCC has been opened with the financial and euro crisis in the EU and the 
resulting expansion of powers of EU institutions in tackling it. These cases have dealt with a 
particular aspect of the constitutional identity referred to in the Lisbon decision, the budgetary 
autonomy and responsibility of the Bundestag, through the prism of the principle of democracy 
and the right to vote. In a series of four interrelated cases, EFSF,156 ESM,157 OMT158 and 
reference on the Quantitative Easing to the CJEU,159 the FCC has established and defined the 
budgetary autonomy as a specific aspect of constitutional identity which in this regard is 
supposed to be understood in a flexible manner rather than in absolute terms. In any case, these 
decisions and references have in the end reflected the restraint with which identity review 
should be applied. After the strong criticism of the tone used in the OMT reference as well as 
the reasoning on identity review the FCC in its subsequent decisions has put effort to present 
the constitutional identity and identity review as compatible with EU law and the constitutional 
principle of openness to EU law.160   
As a matter of fact, this sort of constructive tone was based on the first FCC decision after the 
OMT reference in which identity review was applied. Namely, in the FCC’s order from 15 
December 2015161 which involved human dignity, through the principle of individual guilt, as 
part of the constitutional identity of the GG in the context of enforcement of the EAW, the FCC 
dealt with the relationship of safeguarding constitutional identity and its compatibility with EU 
law taking due consideration of its effectiveness and uniform application.162 It emphasized the 
restraints placed on the application of identity review, which is to occur in exceptional 
situations and applied only by the FCC.163 These restraints are also to be seen in the strict 
admissibility criteria envisaged for constitutional complaints invoking this sort of review.164 In 
this manner the FCC set the path to reconciling identity review with EU law, at least according 
to its understanding. 
This brief outline of the respective case-law of national constitutional courts has revealed 
several tendencies among these courts. First, it can be observed that, perhaps apart from the 
FCC which has referred to this notion in other contexts as well, all constitutional courts have 
used this notion, explicitly or implicitly, specifically in the context of EU law, thus making 
constitutional identity instrumental in EU matters. As a matter of fact, the notion of 
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156 FCC, EFSF, 2 BvR 987/10 judgment of 7 September 2011. 
157 FCC, ESM, 2 BvR 1390/12 judgment of 12 September 2012. 
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constitutional identity received its prominence and substantial spot in the constitutional 
discourse solely because of its use in EU related issues with a strong influence coming from 
the FCC. An interesting argument in this line could be found in the dissenting opinion of the 
judges of the PCT, Miroslaw Granat, in the Stability Mechanism decision where he pointed out 
the notion of constitutional identity was introduced for the first time by the PCT in its Lisbon 
decision.165 
Second, there is a certain level of convergence among constitutional courts in terms of the 
definition and meaning of constitutional identity in light of Article 4(2) TEU also in 
conjunction with Article 2 TEU.166 The approach taken by most of the constitutional courts, 
regardless of whether they have directly or only indirectly invoked the notion, has been that 
the constitutional identity has set external limits on EU authority and the exercise of the 
transferred competences. Values, principles and competences envisaged in the constitutions 
and also invoked by the constitutional courts in their reasoning are most frequently related to 
the EU values regulated in Article 2 TEU. This claim, though, does not intend to underestimate 
singularities of national constitutional identities of member states or deny the fact that there is 
still diversity between the identities in terms of interpretation or understanding of these same 
values in different states.167  
Third, it can be additionally observed from the case-law that even in instances in which 
constitutional courts have entered into some kind of designation or enumeration of values and 
core competences that are part of the constitutional identity they have still left substantial 
manoeuvring space to decide upon this further in the future on a case-by-case manner. The 
subsequent case-law of the constitutional courts, meaning after the initial linking of 
constitutional identity with the national identity clause, proves this view right. Therefore, the 
FCC’s case-law, also the Lisbon decision, as analysed here and under this interpretation, might 
also be seen as part of the general tendency of national constitutional courts. The question that 
remains open is how far the FCC as well as other courts are willing and able to go both in light 
of their international obligations taken over through the EU treaties, which will be also 
reviewed by the CJEU, and their respective constitutional provisions. It appears to be evident 
by the number of cases that involve direct confrontation with the EU law and the CJEU, and 
by the reasoning in their cases, that surely a certain level of self-restraint is being applied.168 
 
 
                                                          
165 PCT Stability Mechanism K 33/12, Dissenting Opinion Miroslaw Granat. of 26 June 2013. “In the context of 
that case [Lisbon treaty], the Tribunal introduced “constitutional identity” into its aquis.”  
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186 
 
3.2 CJEU’s stance on the national identity clause 
3.2.1 The CJEU and the respect for national identity under Article 6(3) TA 
Under the relevant treaty provisions determining the powers of the CJEU, Article 46 TEU as 
of Treaty of Nice (TN), the national identity clause regulated in Article 6(3) TA was not to be 
applied or interpreted by the Court. This determined the relevance of this provision in the case-
law of the CJEU prior to its clarification in Article 4(2) TEU and accordingly its justiciability. 
Therefore, national identity has played only a supporting role, if one wants to be generous with 
its status prior to the Lisbon Treaty. There is not a single judgement of the CJEU where this 
court has drawn attention to the duty of the Union institutions to respect the national identity 
as articulated first in Article 6(3) TA.169 In the cases where previously the Advocate Generals 
(AG) have invoked these provisions the Court did not find it adequate to do the same.170 Yet 
the Court, before the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, has implicitly, and only partly, 
recognized the Union’s duty to respect the national identity of the member states this being 
different from recognizing national identity as a legitimate aim in Commission v. 
Luxembourg.171 Basically, it was only in cases involving the derogations from the fundamental 
freedoms of the member states justified by the fundamental rights that the Court took into 
consideration specific constitutional provisions as interpreted by the national courts.  
The first important case from this group is the Omega case. This case dealt with derogation 
from the freedom to provide services based on public policy, protection of human dignity, as 
regulated in the German Basic Law (GG). There are three main points from this case important 
for the issues at hand here. First, the CJEU held that the protection of fundamental rights 
constitutes a legitimate interest within the public policy of the member states and justifies 
derogation from the fundamental freedoms of EC. Restating on this point what the ICC in 
Fragd172 already had held, the CJEU declared that the legitimate interest pursued does not have 
to correspond to a conception shared by all member states. Second, the protection of 
fundamental rights as a public policy has to be interpreted strictly so that its scope cannot be 
determined unilaterally by each member state without any control by the Community 
institutions.173 Third, adding to the previous the CJEU held that such derogation from 
fundamental freedoms can be justified only if it passed the proportionality test. It is precisely 
at this last point that it relied heavily on the assessment of the Federal Administrative Court of 
Germany which can be interpreted as recognition of the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts 
to decide the content of constitutional identity, fundamental rights in this case, and for it to 
                                                          
169 Konstadinides (n 5) 200. 
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review this interpretation in light of EC/EU law. The same logic was followed in later case-
law. Laval174 and Viking Line175 cases are very illustrative in this regard. In the latter the CJEU 
clearly set the roles of both the national courts and the CJEU. Thus it can be concluded that the 
CJEU simply left it to the national courts to determine the proportionality of national acts while 
providing guidance for this discretion.176  
The common denominator of this group of cases is that they all balance between the 
fundamental freedoms of the EU and the fundamental rights as regulated in national 
constitutions. Due to this fact one cannot be too enthusiastic because the CJEU is rather 
following the well-established practice, basically since the Solange I of the FCC, of respect for 
fundamental rights that now are also partly incorporated into the Treaties through the Charter 
of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the degree of protection might turn out to be an issue and 
at this point national identity clause could play a role. 
The crucial point of these cases is that the legal basis for allowing member states to derogate 
from the application of the EU law was found in provisions other than the national identity 
clause, namely, articles 39 and 46 TEC, or better said the latter were not read in conjunction 
with Article 6(3) TA. Maybe it seems that it does not really matter which of these provisions 
are being invoked as the legal consequences are the same, EU law is not applied to the situation 
at hand. However, the difference between them is that whereas provisions regulating 
exceptions in the application of the fundamental freedoms is totally within the jurisdiction of 
the CJEU, Article 6(3) TA, as clarified before, was not. Crucially, the latter provision “clearly 
refers back to the member states.”177 It is not to be inferred from this view that the CJEU should 
invoke only the national identity clause, but rather to affirm the duty that it has under Treaty 
provisions to respect the fundamental constitutional structures of the member states as declared 
in their constitutions and interpreted by their national constitutional courts.  
In contrast to the previous cases in Michaniki,178 a case involving a question of (in-) 
compatibility of a constitutional provision with an internal market directive, the CJEU did not 
follow the same approach as the constitutional provision at stake was not of the same 
importance as the ones regulating fundamental rights.179 As a matter of fact the court did not 
put any attention to the constitutional dimension of the case and it basically trivialised the 
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meaning of the respective constitutional provision.180 But, is it up to this court to decide which 
constitutional provision is trivial for the EU law? Exactly this question draws on the conclusion 
that “a risky enterprise to project an EU ranking of values onto national constitutional law”181 
occurred in this case which arguably would not be quite in line with the national identity clause. 
The AG Maduro was cautious182 in his opinion, which practically followed the reasoning of 
the court in some of the previously mentioned cases, and he drew attention to the respect of 
national identity183 and the fact that this case involved a provision that was subject to a prior 
national constitutional assessment.184 He affirmed the national courts’ discretion to rule upon 
the content and scope of such provisions which is subject to judicial review in regard to 
assessment of the proportionality of the specific national provision.185 By taking this view 
Maduro alluded to the sensitivity of the issue and considerations that needed to be taken into 
account in the application of the proportionality test even though, just as the CJEU itself, he 
did not really go into the Greek context which raises the concern for the appropriateness of the 
finding.186  
The CJEU, on the other hand, in its decision ignored most of these crucial points and applied 
the principle of primacy of EU law as articulated in International Handelsgesellschaft by which 
it suggested the inconformity of the national constitutional provision with the specific directive. 
The decision was not warmly welcomed and it underwent some criticism also because it was 
made in a particularly sensitive moment which could arguably have widened the gap between 
the CJEU and national constitutional courts in the context of the Lisbon decision of the FCC.187   
Comparing Michaniki with Omega, and other related cases, one can notice certain patterns that 
could be illuminating. Namely, when fundamental rights are concerned the CJEU seems to be 
rather ‘cooperative’ and accepts and adheres to the discretion of national courts to determine 
the content, scope and importance of the specific legitimate interest that is the fundamental 
constitutional right. If, however, other constitutional provisions are concerned the CJEU is not 
willing to be so resilient. Bearing in mind that the constitutional identity does not only include 
fundamental rights but also some other elements, it will be difficult for the national 
constitutional courts and the CJEU to resolve issues related to the respect for national identity.  
3.2.2 The CJEU and the respect for national identity under Article 4(2) TEU 
The enactment of the Lisbon Treaty and the change of the former Article 46 TN which confined 
the powers of the CJEU concerning the national identity clause, Article 4(2) TEU, meant that 
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this provision could be applied and interpreted by the CJEU. Following this substantial change, 
the CJEU has, however, invoked this provision and duty of the Union institutions only on five 
occasions so far. Three of them dealt specifically with the status of the official language in the 
member states while one, that being the first case, had to do with a particular aspect of a national 
or constitutional identity of Austria, a ban of nobility titles under the banner of equal treatment, 
and the last one on the national procedural autonomy and the division of competences in a 
federal state.   
In the Sayn-Wittgenstein decision188 the CJEU invoked Article 4(2) TEU for the first time.189 
This case involved a ban on registration and carrying of nobility titles, Austrian or foreign, in 
Austria as part of a person’s name provided in a statute (Law on the abolition of the nobility) 
of constitutional rank implementing a constitutional principle of equal treatment and the 
compatibility of this ban with the freedom of movement in the EU as regulated in Article 21 
TFEU. Similar to some of the cases mentioned before, the CJEU decided that a derogation of 
the freedom of movement under Article 21 through such a ban in a member state can be 
justified and proportional. The latter was determined by the CJEU itself, even though AG 
Sharpston stated that the national court should assess proportionality190, on public policy 
grounds while invoking the duty for respect of the national identity of member states only as a 
secondary argument.191 Here there are two points that need to be emphasized for the purpose 
of the argument presented in this chapter.  
First, the CJEU stated quite clearly that element of national identity, such as the Law on the 
abolition of nobility, which was the only one in this case “may be taken into consideration 
when a balance is struck between legitimate interests and the right of free movement of persons 
recognized under European Union law.”192 By doing this the CJEU inserted national identity 
within the framework of public policy justification and made this a purely free movement case 
not really distinguishing it from any other earlier similar cases regardless of the fact that the 
new national identity clause entered into force.  
Second, Article 4(2) TEU was invoked in the context of the status of Austria as a Republic193 
in applying the proportionality test that raises a set of questions. Namely, while the whole case 
dealt with the equal treatment of citizens and its implementation through the ban on nobility 
titles, the republican status was not really at stake and could not be interpreted as an “obvious 
reason” for the outcome of the case.194 The fact that a certain state is a republic does not 
necessarily mean that it must ban nobility titles and interpret equal treatment in such a manner 
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as Austria does. Thus in this case the republican status is not really an argument for declaring 
the ban proportional. Additionally, the reason for such an outcome of this case can also be 
explained through the clear and explicit decision of the Constitutional Court of Austria upon 
the matter declaring an act by the Austrian authorities different from the aforementioned ban 
as unconstitutional.195 Under such circumstances, any other outcome of this case would put the 
CJEU on a line of direct confrontation with the Constitutional Court something that it obviously 
tried to avoid also by invoking Article 4(2) TEU.  
Bearing all this in mind it could be easily claimed that the proportionality test in essence was 
not applied in this case, something similar to Omega, which was referred to by the CJEU in 
this case.  
“The Court has repeatedly noted that the concept of public policy as justification for a 
derogation from a fundamental freedom must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope 
cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without a control by the 
European Union institutions…Thus, policy may be relied on only if there is a genuine 
and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.” 196 
This stance of the CJEU leads to a shrinkage of any substantial meaning or purpose of the 
national identity clause thus making Article 4(2) TEU very much redundant.197  
In Runevič-Vardyn,198 the CJEU dealt with an issue that involved the Lithuanian rules on the 
spelling of names in the birth and marriage certificates and their compliance with Article 21 
TFEU. These rules were applied in issuing the marriage certificate of a couple, Ms. Runevič-
Vardyn, a Lithuanian citizen with Polish origin, and a Polish citizen, Mr. Wardyn, who got 
married in Lithuania. Among the three separate aspects199 that were recognized by the court 
only in one that had to do with the discrepancy in spelling of the surname of the husband in the 
marriage certificate, Vardyn instead of Wardyn, the court declared that it could represent a 
restriction to the freedom of movement. Such a restriction could be justified by national identity 
concerns such as the protection of the Lithuanian language that has a constitutional status 
confirmed by a decision of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court as pointed out by the CJEU.200 
This second case discussed in this part is important for the issue at hand because of two reasons. 
First, it has been made clear in this case that national identity can represent an independent 
justification ground for the derogation of a member state from freedom of movement. The 
national identity grounds for justification for the first time within the framework of Article 4(2) 
TEU, however, are not related to fundamental rights but rather to the constitutional status of 
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the Lithuanian language.201 This might be a hint for a new development along the one that was 
presented in the previous section related to fundamental rights as a ground for derogation from 
fundamental freedoms in the pre-Lisbon period. Additionally, Article 4(2) TEU has been put 
in a correlation with Article 3(3) TEU which is an interesting aspect of this decision. This 
correlation shows that the question of the official language of the member state is not 
unequivocally part of the fundamental political and constitutional structures.202  
Second, the Court in this context has left to the national court to decide whether the spelling 
rules cause a serious inconvenience for the applicants by assessing the proportionality between 
the free movement and right to private life under both Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 of 
the ECHR on one hand, and national identity on the other.203 This can be seen as a significant 
shift in regard to Sayn-Wittgenstein by providing the necessary leeway for national courts in 
deciding national identity issue.  
Only two weeks after Runevič-Vardyn, the CJEU delivered its next decision related to the 
national identity clause. In Commission v Luxembourg,204, the case was brought by the 
Commission under the failure to fulfil obligations procedure instead of the preliminary 
reference procedure which was the case in the previous two cases. The issue at stake was 
whether the nationality condition to access the profession of the civil-law notary conflicts with 
the freedom of establishment. The Luxembourg government unsuccessfully invoked the 
national identity argument, however, only in the alternative. It argued that since the use of the 
Luxembourgish language was necessary for the performance of notarial activities the 
nationality condition should be seen as a part of preserving of the national identity of 
Luxembourg.205 The CJEU once again accepted that the respect for national identity can indeed 
represent a legitimate aim however it declared that the introduction of the nationality condition 
was not proportionate to the achievement of this legitimate aim.206 In short, the CJEU did not 
enter into any application of the proportionality test and just decided on this issue. 
Another case that refers to the national identity clause in the context of protection of national 
languages is the Las case.207 In this case the Belgian authorities through the Decree on Use of 
Language enacted a duty for all undertakings established in the Dutch-speaking region to have 
all acts and documents required by law and all documents intended for their staff to be drawn 
up by employers in Dutch language. In this sense the preliminary reference from a Belgian 
court put the question whether such a rule infringed the freedom of movement for workers, 
Article 45 TFEU. Justifying such a rule the Belgian Government argued that it intended to 
protect and promote one of the official languages in Belgium. The CJEU accepted and once 
again repeated that the respect for national identities represents an independent legitimate aim 
or interest which could justify restrictions to the freedom of movement for workers. In doing 
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so, it repeated the same argument from Runevič-Vardyn and it made the same correlation 
between Article 3(3) TEU and Article 22 of the Charter with Article 4(2) TEU in regard to the 
linguistic diversity and protection of the official language or languages.208 Interestingly AG 
Jaaskinen was not totally on the same page with this line of reasoning as he tried to draw a 
sharper distinction between the linguistic diversity and the respect for national identity in his 
opinion, basing it on a rather selective legislative history and originalism.209 The CJEU then 
entered into a vague proportionality test without leaving any leeway for the referring court 
explicitly declaring the Decree to be contrary to the Article 45 TFEU. This basically puts the 
very approach of the CJEU in this case in a stark contrast to Runevič-Vardyn in which case also 
the issue of the status of the official language as part of the constitutional identity was referred 
to.   
The latest in the line of relevant cases involving the national identity is Digibet.210 In this case 
at stake was the issue of national procedural autonomy in light of existence of different parallel 
regimes of regulation of betting and gaming in a federal state such as Germany. The relevance 
of Article 4(2) TEU is, again, of secondary importance compared to the rules of freedom to 
provide services as regulated in Article 56 TFEU and its exceptions. However, the CJEU 
clearly reasoned that division of competences in a federal state benefits from the protection 
envisaged in Article 4(2) TEU.211 In this sense, according to the CJEU, it is up to the federal 
member state to decide on how it would regulate the specific sector in the context of fulfilment 
of its obligations in implementing relevant EU law.212 
Looking at these five cases one could recognize certain tendencies, not draw firm conclusions 
though, that are followed by the Court even though there are only a limited number of cases on 
this matter after the enactment of Article 4(2) TEU not seriously involving the fundamental 
constitutional and political structures of the member states. The CJEU has shown that it is not 
as reluctant of invoking the national identity clause as it has previously been the case.213 
Nevertheless the CJEU fits the national identity clause, either as part of the already existing 
grounds or lately as an independent ground, into the foreseen derogations of EU law 
particularly in the realm of freedom of movement. Essentially, this means that the rule of strict 
interpretation of the grounds for derogations to fundamental freedoms continues to apply 
generally without any additional leverage being brought by relying on the national identity.214  
Additionally, depending on the interest at stake, the CJEU has not been consistent in providing 
margins of discretion for the national courts in cases involving the freedom of movement. In 
the only case so far where it left it to the national court to conduct the proportionality test, in 
Runevič-Vardyn, at stake was essentially the balancing between the fundamental right to 
privacy and family life and the linguistic diversity and identity of the state. In contrast to this 
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case in Las, even though the Belgium government relied on the constitutional importance of 
the status of official languages as part of the constitutional identity, the outcome in this regard 
was different.215 Once the economic activity came into play the CJEU was not that willing to 
provide such discretion to the national court but it adopted the outcome approach once again.216  
Be that as it may, none of these developments are really anything new or revolutionary in the 
case-law of the CJEU. The comparison of the case-law from the pre- and post-Lisbon period 
does not show any serious sign that the CJEU has taken the national identity clause seriously.217 
The CJEU actually showed to be very successful in minimizing the effect of the national 
identity clause interpreting it as another independent derogation from EU law.218 Regardless of 
the recognition of the national identity as an independent legitimate interest in derogation of 
EU law still in the cases dealing with the status of the official language of the member states 
they could have been interpreted as another public policy pursued by the respective 
governments similar to Sayn-Wittgenstein.219 Understandably, this development generated an 
even greater disjunction220 between the positions of the CJEU and the constitutional courts on 
the issue of constitutional/national identity which essentially provoked the latter to respond. 
3.3 The relevance of constitutional identity in the case law of national constitutional court 
on EU matter II: The response 
The overview of the CJEU case-law and approach to constitutional identity as part of Article 
4(2) TEU shows that this court has not really embraced or adapted to the duties foreseen in this 
respective treaty provision. Therefore, the CJEU case-law on constitutional identity was very 
soon met with a sharp criticism from the most influential constitutional courts. The FCC took 
on the first more suitable occasion in order to send a serious warning signal to the CJEU. The 
decision on the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) of the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) of 6 September 2012 which empowers the ECB to an unlimited 
purchase of bonds of individual member states of the euro area on the secondary market was 
challenged inter alia to be an ultra vires act because it oversteps the exclusively monetary 
powers provided by the EU Treaties to the ECB. The FCC decided for the first time to send the 
issue to the CJEU through the preliminary reference procedure envisaged in Article 267 TFEU.  
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Even though mainly analysed in light of the application of the ultra vires review and also 
because of its significance as the first ever preliminary reference to the CJEU by the FCC, it 
has also important features on the understanding of this court of the notions of constitutional 
identity and review in light of Article 4(2) TEU. While the Lisbon decision was foremost aimed 
at the political institutions, largely at the national level, in its OMT preliminary reference the 
FCC addressed the CJEU on this issue. Essentially the identity review has been used as a very 
intimidating backup option to the ultra vires claims.221 In the part of the reference prior to the 
actual questions sent to the CJEU the FCC entered into an overview of the relevant legal 
provisions and jurisprudence which inter alia revealed its position on the respective CJEU 
case-law on constitutional identity and the respect thereof.222  
While the FCC has initially claimed the correlation between the constitutional identity and the 
national identity clause in its OMT referral it has made the argument that they do not 
correspond. The FCC in the Lisbon decision has reasoned that “the guarantee of national 
constitutional identity under constitutional and under Union law go hand in hand in the 
European legal area.”223 Similarly, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal also related the 
constitutional identity, as it defines this notion, to Article 4(2) TEU stating that “[a]n equivalent 
concept of constitutional identity in the primary EU law is the concept of national identity.”224 
While reiterating some of the main points in the Lisbon decision that the principles stated in 
the eternity clause, Article 79(3) GG, may not be balanced with other legal interests,225 the 
FCC claims that this is something that has been done by the CJEU in its case-law continuously. 
Referring basically to the CJEU decisions analysed in the previous section it claimed that “the 
identity review performed by the Federal Constitutional Court is fundamentally different from 
the review under Art. 4 sec. 2 sentence 1 TEU by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.”226   
Furthermore, in contrast to the Lisbon decision where there was no mentioning of any judicial 
dialogue in the context of constitutional identity, in the OMT referral the FCC mentions the 
relationship of cooperation in relation to the constitutional identity.227 However, here its 
understanding of the national identity clause also appears to depart from the seemingly settled 
understanding of the judicial cooperation under Article 4(2) TEU in the theory. It seems like 
the FCC forgets that the national identity clause is an EU legal norm after all and it will be up 
to the CJEU and not the FCC to interpret it, regardless that this clause definitely draws back to 
the national constitutional courts.228 Thus the claim made by the FCC that, after receiving the 
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interpretation of the OMT decision by the CJEU, it could directly apply the identity review on 
this decision or its implementing acts without referring another question for a preliminary 
ruling, specifically aimed at Article 4(2) TEU,229 is a sign of inclination for a unilateral action 
in a compound legal setting.230 Then again, this would not be totally in line with the principle 
of openness towards EU law.231 It could be argued that the constitutional identity could serve 
as a limit to absolute primacy of EU law232 as the FCC is correctly suggesting233 also by 
invoking all the numerous cases from the highest courts of different member states on this issue 
pointing to a common or very similar approach towards constitutional identity taken by a large 
number of EU states.234 Still, detaching the identity review completely from Article 4(2) TEU 
was a step too far. 
Lastly, the substantive aspect of the constitutional identity and its use in justifying the position 
of the FCC in this case has been criticized as being on arguably shaky foundations. By 
introducing budgetary autonomy as part of the constitutional identity through the democracy 
principle it substantially overstretches the constitutional identity.235 If it follows this extensive 
line of reasoning the FCC could fit into the constitutional identity issues and areas that no one 
would ever imagine as being part of this notion. On the other hand, the OMT can be perceived 
as a realization of what has been announced by the Lisbon decision in relation to the areas and 
decisions which are “[p]articularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state to 
democratically shape itself” which also include “fundamental fiscal decisions on public 
revenue and public expenditure.”236 
This latter point had been already addressed by the FCC in the decisions related to the euro 
crisis. Namely, the budgetary autonomy of the Bundestag took the central position as one of 
the main aspects of constitutional identity through the principle of democracy and right to vote 
of the German citizens.237 Such a budgetary autonomy is not to be framed in absolute terms, 
but it rather means that the Bundestag should be able to freely express its will on fiscal matter 
affecting Germany thus remaining “the master of its decisions” (Herr seiner Entschlüsse).238  
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In this sense the budgetary autonomy has become the most developed aspect of the 
constitutional identity of Germany.239 This stance of the FCC was later also confirmed in both 
the OMT decision240 and the Quantitative Easing referral to the CJEU241 by directly linking the 
budgetary autonomy to possible use of the identity review in case of considerable limitation of 
this sort of autonomy and responsibility of the Bundestag. However, these decisions are not 
relevant only because of this link. 
The OMT decision, in particular, has to a certain extent remedied some of the weaknesses of 
the OMT referral which were addressed above. Namely, by referring to the EAW II order of 
the FCC from 15 December 2015 it put extensive efforts to reconcile the identity review with 
Article 4 (2) TEU, contrary to the referral and perhaps also responding to AG Cruz Villalon,242 
and frame the identity review as compatible with the principle of sincere cooperation from 
Article 4 (3) TEU. In this sense it reasons that:  
“Art. 4 sec. 2 sentence 1 TEU essentially provides for identity review and therefore it 
also conforms to the institutional situation of the European Union. The European Union 
is an association of sovereign states, of constitutions, administrations, and judiciaries 
(Staaten-, Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungsverbund)”243 
As result, according to the FCC, under such an understanding of the identity review in light of 
the relevant treaty provision the principle of openness to European integration would not be 
compromised.244 This claim is supported with the restraint with which the identity review needs 
to be applied. This restraint includes that identity review is reserved for the FCC and to be 
applied only after a preliminary reference to the CJEU, with due respect to the methods 
employed by the CJEU in its preliminary ruling and its interpretation.245 This was confirmed 
in FCC’s second preliminary reference to the CJEU on the issue of Quantitative Easing.246 
A very similar restraint in framing the potential application of the identity review was also 
manifested by the ICC in its third preliminary reference to the CJEU.247 First, ICC in its referral 
was seeking from the CJEU to reconsider and possibly adjust the interpretation provided in its 
Taricco decision due to the fact that the application of Article 325 TFEU, as interpreted in this 
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decision, directly collides with the principle of legality which is part of the constitutional 
identity of Italy.248 In this manner, the ICC demonstrated its devotion to the values of judicial 
dialogue. Second, through coupling of the identity review with Article 4(2) TEU and arguing 
for its compatibility with the principle of loyal cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU, the ICC tried 
to argue that a limited level of diversity between the legal systems of the member states cannot 
jeopardize the unity of EU law as long as it is confined to the fundamental principles of the 
constitutions.249 
This overview of the relevant case law ushers us in the actual contextualization of the national 
identity clause and its relation to constitutional pluralism and the role of constitutional courts. 
The question then arises: how does the development in the respective case-law conform to the 
ideas behind constitutional pluralism and why is the national identity clause claimed to be the 
gateway to constitutional pluralism? The next section addresses the implications of the national 
identity clause at both the national and EU level and, more particularly, for the future role of 
national constitutional courts in light of this theory.    
4 National identity clause, constitutional pluralism and the role of constitutional 
courts 
Looking at the case-law of the respective courts we can see that the national identity clause has 
created a stir in the relationship between the legal orders which is reflected extensively in the 
academic debate. There are several views on the way in which the national identity clause has 
impacted or perhaps could impact the balance in the relationship between the EU and national 
legal orders. On the one hand, we have authors which have argued that Article 4(2) TEU has 
created the ultimate limits of absolute primacy of EU law from within.250 On the other hand, 
we have authors which are denying this impact on absolute primacy as being far-fetched 
arguing that this clause will essentially provide the obligation for a substantial judicial dialogue 
over the issue of constitutional identity.251 It seems that this contrasting is being slightly 
exaggerated252 as the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and therefore this clause 
essentially brings in large parts of both. Particularly because of these reasons it is often argued 
that the national identity clause is perhaps the clearest manifestation of constitutional pluralism 
in EU law.253 It touches upon the two main tenets of constitutional pluralism. First, by creating 
a strong legal ground for a non-hierarchical, that is heterarchial, relationship between the legal 
orders by narrowing the scope of absolute primacy of EU law. Second, the national identity 
clause through its two aspects and components tends to emphasize the need for judicial 
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cooperation and dialogue among the national constitutional courts and the CJEU. Both of these 
tenets of constitutional pluralism are revealed in light of the empowerment of constitutional 
courts through this clause as they are the most suitable interlocutors to the CJEU on this 
matter.254 
4.1 Invitation to struggle or invitation to debate? 
What seems to be the inevitable consequence of Article 4(2) TEU is the bringing together and 
streamlining of the relationship between two opposing poles.255 The overview of the national 
and EU case-law depicts and reveals two positions of the respective courts. Even though there 
might have been certain expectations from the new identity clause to solve this conundrum, 
still the constitutional courts and the CJEU are not on the same page when it comes to the role 
of constitutional identity.256  
The constitutional courts, obviously, tend to see Article 4 (2) TEU as the final stage of the 
recognition and result of the dialectic between constitutional courts and the CJEU starting from 
Solange I.257 They conceive constitutional identity as the Europeanization of the counter-limits 
doctrine through its incorporation in Article 4(2) TEU.258 Phrases such as the ‘material core’, 
‘constitutional identity’, and ‘fundamental principles’ are a common feature of the reasoning 
of national constitutional courts in determining the limits of the application of EU law,259 that 
now also found their clearer articulation in EU law through Article 4(2) TEU. One can argue, 
judging by the attitude of constitutional courts and their interpretation of national identity 
clause, pre and post-Lisbon, that they see this clause as the ‘weak spot’ of primacy of EU 
law.260 Perhaps a clear signal was sent by the FCC in the Lisbon decision by reserving to it, 
within the national legal order, the duty to define and protect the constitutional identity 
therefore to have the last word on it and, through this, avoid the possibility of being 
circumvented in this regard by lower courts through preliminary references to the CJEU.261  
Be that as it may, one should not rush with getting the impression of constitutional courts being 
rigidly bound to the national perspective strongly protecting national constitutional supremacy. 
Several interesting tendencies have been exposed through the case-law on constitutional 
identity which could be conceived as a form of judicial restraint and concessions in favour of 
EU law. First, constitutional courts introduced a duality of constitutional norms in light of EU 
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law thus creating ‘safeguard clauses’262 against unwarranted encroachment of EU law.263 Thus 
only the core values and principles of the national constitutional orders could serve as limits to 
the exercise of European Union authority and not every single constitutional provision.264 
These safeguard clauses are intended to safeguard the national legal order from EU law or 
further pooling of competences on the EU level which would negatively affect the values and 
principles innate to the constitutional identity. Second, in defining these safeguard clauses 
constitutional courts however tend to counterbalance by putting emphasis on the constitutional 
obligations towards European integration present in their constitutions which could be seen as 
mirroring the fidelity principle or principle of loyal cooperation as regulated under Article 4(3) 
TEU.265 The FCC seems to be the most obvious example here with the principle of openness 
to European law along with its accepted duty to address the CJEU when there is a claim of 
encroachment of constitutional identity by EU law.266 Lastly, constitutional courts have 
continuously claimed that using this type of ultimate limits to EU authority would occur only 
under very exceptional circumstances.267   
On the other hand, we have the CJEU case-law which shows that this court has not really 
seriously embraced the constitutional identity into its doctrine. It might be argued that the cases 
so far were not of that rank, that is, they were involving trivial questions268 mainly related to 
the cultural aspects of constitutional identity not really touching upon the fundamental political 
and constitutional structures.269 Therefore it could be argued that the cases so far have not 
provided the CJEU with an adequate opportunity to develop its stance on the national identity 
clause. That could be the reason why the CJEU has still not taken constitutional identity 
seriously even though one has to be realistic with the expectations. Yet, it is unrealistic to 
expect that the CJEU will authorise under EU law that constitutional identity could serve as a 
direct ground for immediate unilateral non-compliance with EU law. This would require the 
abandonment of a long line of case-law of the CJEU on the primacy of EU law and the uniform 
and effective application of EU law. It is essentially the same line of argument that from a 
national perspective is even more fitting for the justification of the position of constitutional 
courts on national constitutional supremacy. Thus an outright abandonment of the absolute 
principle is not really viable but a narrowing of its scope seems to be inevitable in order to 
avoid or, better said, mitigate conflicts.270  
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The CJEU has interpreted the national identity clause either through its incorporation into the 
already existing grounds for derogation from EU law or, as it was lately the case, as an 
independent ground or legitimate interest for derogation. In this manner the national identity is 
being balanced with other provisions and EU freedoms in the same manner as the other 
legitimate aims, that is, restrictively.271 In other words the CJEU has not really adapted its legal 
reasoning to the newly enacted national identity clause and has not provided any margin of 
appreciation or discretion to the member states which would manifest a form of deference to 
national interests.272 Taking in account the common position of constitutional courts on this 
issue accompanied by the strong wording they use necessitates the narrowing of the absolute 
primacy when the constitutional identity is being encroached by EU law.273 Along this line the 
CJEU should depart from the point of AG Bot who put this rather straightforward in his opinion 
in the Melloni case274 by arguing that “[a] Member State which considers that a provision of 
secondary law adversely affects its national identity may therefore challenge it on the basis of 
Article 4(2) TEU.”275 This needs to be conducted through mutual engagement of both national 
courts and the CJEU in determining the exact scope of Article 4(2) TEU necessarily involving 
the national constitutional courts. Accordingly, this relation between the highest court instances 
of the two legal orders stemming out of Article 4(2) TEU and touching upon the scope of 
primacy of EU law needs to be put in the framework of a genuine “relationship of 
cooperation.”276 Under such cooperation the constitutional courts should play the role of “a 
constructive corrective force”277 in the European Union.  
In light of the above, how is one to locate the meeting-point of the national courts and CJEU 
in the context of Article 4(2) TEU that would require the departure from the initial rigid stance 
on supremacy of these courts?  
4.2 Terms of mutual judicial engagement under the national identity clause 
The terms of engagement under the existing constitutional pluralist setting in the relationship 
between the legal orders make judicial dialogue in light of the national identity clause 
indispensable.278 This clause incorporates two aspects in its understanding and application.  
The first one is the content and scope of constitutional identity that needs to be determined by 
the respective national courts, above all constitutional courts, because it is a matter of national 
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law. The second is the normative relevance of this provision in regard to the limits that it sets 
on the application of EU law and exercise of EU competences which must be determined by 
the CJEU.279 Following such an understanding of this clause the two aspects also reflect the 
division of labour that is foreseen with Article 4(2) TEU between the national constitutional 
courts and the CJEU along these lines.  
National constitutions do not explicitly refer to constitutional identity, as it was seen 
previously, but it is rather the creation of constitutional courts’ interpretation largely in light of 
the newly coined national identity clause.280 Therefore it is evident that the content of this 
clause clearly refers back to national law, or better said, to the interpretation of the 
constitutional courts. Since the introduction of the new wording of the national identity clause 
this provision received its legal meaning, besides the political meaning that existed before, and 
it also gained its justiciability after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, while 
the political institutions in the member states certainly have a large role to play in determining 
the political meaning of the constitutional identity in EU law, constitutional courts have a 
crucial role to play when it comes to the content of the respective constitutional identity in its 
legal meaning.281 In the words of AG Maduro:   
“Doubtless the national authorities, in particular the constitutional courts, should be 
given the responsibility to define the nature of the specific national features that could 
justify such a difference in treatment. Those authorities are best placed to define the 
constitutional identity of the Member States which the European Union has undertaken 
to respect”282 
Even though the above answers the question of who is best placed in the national setting to 
determine the content of constitutional identity, obviously placing a leading role for 
constitutional courts, it does not answer where the meeting-point with the CJEU is. The 
significance of the national identity clause in this sense is in the idea that the best way of 
invoking the constitutional identity argument for a possible derogation from EU law is by 
sending a direct preliminary reference to the CJEU explaining how and why EU law encroaches 
upon constitutional identity. This would represent the initiation of a dialogue on this issue. The 
importance of initiating such a dialogue is even greater if one bears in mind that none of the 
constitutional courts have so far provided an exhaustive list of values, principles or 
competences which are part of the constitutional identity leaving it to be determined in a case-
by-case manner. Nevertheless such a determination should not lead to a so-called interpretative 
anarchy under which constitutional courts would stop at the point of providing content to 
constitutional identity expecting absolute deference of the CJEU.283 On the contrary, the 
constitutional courts in determining the scope of the constitutional identity should be led by 
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Maduro’s contrapunctual principles, i.e. in a manner which will accept pluralism and strive for 
consistency, coherence and universalisability as far as their institutional role allows them to do 
so.284 This requires the courts to enter an exercise of translating the issue from a national 
perspective into a European one.285 Nevertheless arguments related to this notion could be 
brought up also under other procedures before the CJEU not initiated by the constitutional 
courts or even other national courts which does not substantially diminish the role of 
constitutional identity in such proceedings. 
Regardless of the manner in which the issue of constitutional identity is being raised, the 
normative relevance of the constitutional identity argument in light of Article 4(2) TEU needs 
to be determined by the CJEU. Article 19 TEU does not provide jurisdiction for the CJEU to 
determine the content of a specific national identity, which as seen refers back to national law, 
but a total exclusion of any type of jurisdiction over issues related to the national identity clause 
would be implausible.286 After all it is a Treaty provision that is concerned which tends to be 
forgotten by the constitutional courts. In exercising its powers the CJEU has to confirm that 
the respective structures of national identity in the end do not infringe the values of the Union 
set forth in Article 2 TEU or cause significant obstruction to the achievement of the underlying 
principles of the European integration.287 In this sense an invocation of constitutional identity 
of the member states might not be seen as infringing the European constitutional identity.288 
Accordingly in realizing this task the CJEU needs to take into account the definition of 
constitutional identity289 provided by the constitutional courts which on the other hand also 
requires them to be more involved in this dialogue.290 Even in instances where there is no direct 
involvement of the constitutional courts or referral to their case-law in supporting the 
constitutional identity claims the CJEU should use its competence under Article 24 of the 
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Statute of the Court291 in obtaining the necessary information of the issue thus try to 
compensate for the lack of reverse preliminary reference to the constitutional courts.292 
In this sense the CJEU needs to show a certain level of deference towards the fundamental 
national constitutional commitments framing them under a banner of margin of appreciation or 
discretion that needs to be left to the member states.293 In other words, Article 4(2) TEU 
introduces an instrument which is supposed to break with the inertia of the former 
constitutional blindness at the EU level.294 Therefore the actual balancing or the application of 
the proportionality test should be left to the national courts instead of using it to neutralize the 
national identity clause from any substantial meaning.295 
Be that as it may, the CJEU will have to decide which path to choose under the circumstances 
present in a specific case. It could either go with a more flexible approach embracing a limited 
level of constitutional diversity which might affect the effective and uniform application of EU 
law296 and limit the exercise of EU competences or stay on its firm stance of rigidly abiding to 
these principles not willing to balance them with other legitimate interests of member states. If 
the CJEU does not provide very strong justifications and arguments for not providing any 
leeway to member states on an issue of fundamental constitutional relevance, thus encroaching 
on its constitutional identity, then this latter path might lead to a constitutional conflict. The 
national constitutional court not convinced with the argumentation provided by the CJEU 
might decide to opt for the national constitution instead of EU law which would be in line with 
its institutional role. Even though such an act would represent a breach of EU law it would be 
in accordance with the national legal order and thus legitimate. 
4.3 The national identity clause and Kumm’s principle of best fit 
The occurrence of such conflicts, however, should not always be seen as something 
catastrophic. As matter of fact many scholars who are proponents of the concept of 
constitutional pluralism take this as an acceptable risk or consequence of the heterarchical 
relationship, though under exceptional and limited circumstances.297 Among different views 
on constitutional pluralism in the European Union, Mattias Kumm has directly included 
considerations of the national identity clause, even under the Constitutional Treaty, and its 
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impact on the relationship between national law and the EU law, especially in the context of 
primacy, in developing his vision of constitutional pluralism.298 Within the framework of the 
Constitutionalism Beyond State (CBS) and its principle of best fit as a normative 
jurisprudential account of constitutional conflicts, developed by Kumm, it is claimed that the 
national identity clause authorises member states to set aside EU law on constitutional identity 
grounds and that it is something that under certain limited conditions299 should be accepted by 
the CJEU. These limited conditions involve a prior balancing of four principles, first, the formal 
principle of legality which favours the effective and uniform application of EU law and the 
other three principles to which it should be balanced, the substantive principle of effective 
protection of fundamental rights of citizens, jurisdictional principle of subsidiarity and 
procedural principle of democratic legitimacy.300 Following this last principle which draws to 
the still existent democratic deficit on the EU level Kumm argues that: 
“When EU law conflicts with clear and specific national constitutional norms that 
reflect a national commitment to a constitutional essential, concerns related to 
democratic legitimacy override considerations relating to the uniform and effective 
enforcement of EU law.”301 
In arguing his position Kumm further explains certain conditions for both national 
constitutional courts and the CJEU in making this type of constitutional conflicts a moment of 
constructive deliberative engagement302 and transform the role of constitutional courts in a one 
of “a constructive corrective force”303 in the EU. Thus constitutional courts using this clear and 
specific test need to be restrictive in their interpretation in a sense that: 
“it can not be sufficient that the national constitutional court makes the interpretative 
determination that an unclear, vague or evaluatively open constitutional clause (relating 
to, for example, property or the freedom to pursue a profession or safeguarding 
‘sovereignty’) has implications that are not compatible with EU law.”304 
Therefore the underlying principle of best fit,305 as opposed to the ultimate legal rule premise, 
is aimed to lead national courts to rely on both national and EU law.306 Thus in a case of conflict 
claims should not be made as to which legal order will have primacy but it should be an act of 
balancing between competing principles in a way that will best suit the common values 
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underlying both legal orders and practices. Article 4(2) TEU is supposed to be invoked by the 
constitutional courts in relation to their constitutional identity by arguing that a certain act or 
norm of EU law is unlawful as a matter of both national and EU law.307 The above mentioned 
exercise of translation from a national to European perspective is precisely what is meant here. 
Setting aside of EU law by the constitutional courts under such circumstances should be 
accepted by the CJEU as the ultimate consequence of Article 4(2) TEU and should only come 
after a necessary reference to the CJEU by the constitutional courts as discussed previously.308  
Therefore, different from some authors309, the “trump card” is still on the table or up the sleeve 
of constitutional courts in very exceptional situations in which the judicial dialogue does not 
mitigate the friction. It is arguably the ultimate option for constitutional courts that makes the 
dialogue viable.310 By having this option, constitutional courts would more readily enter a 
judicial dialogue with this sort of leverage311 and “no longer fear that a preliminary ruling 
request might raise the expectation of passive obedience to another court.”312 Preliminary 
reference should not be perceived as “part of a hierarchically structured system of judicial 
review” but rather as a part of the “idea of a functional allocation of judicial responsibilities in 
a multi-levelled setting.”313 Additionally the added value of such an interpretation of the 
national identity clause would be to “secure the commitment of all constitutional actors to play 
a vigorous role in preserving coherence and polyphony within the member states as 
independent units of the EU legal order.”314  On the other hand, though, the very possibility of 
using Article 4(2) TEU as a sword or a trump card serves as a reminder for EU institutions of 
their duty to respect national identity.315 Like this the CJEU would take the preliminary 
references coming from constitutional courts or from ordinary courts signalling constitutional 
identity issues at stake more seriously thus preventing or mitigating a potential constitutional 
conflict. Under these circumstances, not only will a Pandora’s Box316 of constitutional conflicts 
remain locked, but also through the engagement of national constitutional courts a relation of 
complementarity between the courts in achieving a common constitutional tradition in Europe 
and furthering European integration will be fostered. Chaos neither came about nor is it on the 
verge of happening but on the contrary a constructive relationship could be forged and 
strengthened.317 Such a dialogue could be very instrumental and lead to a certain level of 
convergence of constitutional identities and thus building a common constitutional identity.318 
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4.4 Is the OMT referral a pattern for future judicial dialogue?  
In order to make the above abstract discussion more tangible and to illustrate the role of 
constitutional courts under the national identity clause the FCC’s OMT preliminary reference 
could serve as an illustration.319 The OMT reference is one of the most noticeable developments 
and a good starting point when it comes to the analysis of constitutional identity in light of 
constitutional pluralism. However, it must be emphasized that constitutional identity is of a 
secondary concern in this case, though not an insignificant one. With these qualifications taken 
into account it remains rather questionable to which extent this decision could serve as a pattern 
or template for other constitutional courts especially bearing in mind the manner in which the 
national identity clause was treated. Namely there are five interrelated points which will be 
briefly discussed: first, the actual value of FCC’s first preliminary reference; second, the 
attempt for universalisability of the whole issue of constitutional identity and on coalition 
building among constitutional courts; third, cutting the link between the constitutional identity 
and the national identity clause; fourth, the narrow understanding of the relationship of 
cooperation in the context of Article 4(2) TEU and; fifth, the extensive approach taken in 
defining the constitutional identity. 
The first two could be termed as rather positive developments while the other three speak 
against the approach taken in the OMT on constitutional identity which should be redefined in 
a possible preliminary reference by the FCC or any other constitutional court in future.     
First, the OMT represents the first ever preliminary reference by the FCC to the CJEU and at 
the same time the first reference which involves constitutional identity. From this perspective 
it could be argued that this decision is a step forward in finally establishing a direct dialogue, 
besides other forms of dialogue,320 between the most influential constitutional court in the EU 
and the CJEU. In any case, it should not be doubted that this move by the FCC will further 
encourage other constitutional courts to reach for the same instrument and enter into a direct 
dialogue with their counterpart on the EU level. This definitely represents a positive 
development in these inter-court relations which could be also seen as resulting from the 
empowerment of constitutional courts brought by the national identity clause. Namely, 
initiating this dialogue the FCC openly criticized the CJEU’s approach towards constitutional 
identity and tried to provide arguments why it could make recourse to identity review of the 
OMT in the future which should be taken into consideration by the CJEU. In this sense the 
FCC in this referral argued for the possible invocation of the constitutional identity review as 
an alternative option, in case the CJEU does not reason in its decision along the lines drawn by 
the FCC, thus invoking it as a weapon of last resort.321 This positive development served as the 
a direct basis for the second preliminary reference on Quantitative Easing322 which seems to 
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remedy, at least, some of the weaknesses of the first preliminary reference in a sense that it 
relates identity review much more to EU law and is compatible with the constitutional principle 
of openness towards EU law. Additionally, this further encourages other constitutional courts 
to engage more seriously with EU law and into a direct dialogue with the CJEU drawing its 
attention to national constitutional aspects thus encouraging a process of convergence.  
Second, in arguing its views on the protection of constitutional identity and limits on the 
transfer of sovereign powers to the EU the FCC relies on more than a dozen decisions from 
several member states’ constitutional and supreme courts. In this way it supports the drawing 
of a red line based also on constitutional identity essentially trying to build a coalition of 
national constitutional courts over a common position towards the limits of EU authority. 
Therefore it aims at stabilizing the role of identity review as the new basis for challenging EU 
law.323 Such reasoning strives for the universalisability324 of the doctrine of identity review and 
the underlying notion of constitutional identity being the ultimate limit to the applicability of 
EU law.325 This move of the FCC was not immune to strong criticism especially from Claes, 
who essentially claims that this represents a false claim to a common ground among 
constitutional courts thus blurring of a reality by the FCC in its try to strengthen its position 
before the CJEU.326 However, as observed in the overview of the relevant case law of national 
constitutional courts there is definitely a convergence of positions of these courts on the issue 
of limits of EU law supremacy also through constitutional identity and this claim is 
strengthened by the latest development in this case law. As a matter of fact, the path paved by 
the FCC is now followed by several other constitutional courts, even though the HCC seems 
to deviate from it besides its efforts to present the opposite. 
Third, although some effort is invested in it this attempt for universalisability is not met with 
an adequate ‘translation’ of this national perspective on an EU level. The FCC, in its OMT 
referral tried to detach the identity review from the national identity clause and its 
understanding of constitutional identity from the national identity foreseen in Article 4(2) TEU. 
Departing from its Lisbon decision and the “hand in hand” approach the FCC327 is not really 
following the restraint demanded by the principle of openness towards European law and its 
responsibility towards the European integration project328 pursuing its own separate path of 
identity review approaching a stance of an absolute national constitutional supremacy. If such 
an unqualified unilateral action is also followed by the other national constitutional courts it 
would seriously jeopardize the effective and uniform application of EU law and the legal 
stability and certainty in the Union. However, this was quickly overturned by FCC’s 
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subsequent decisions, particularly the EAW II and the OMT decision, restraining the identity 
review and coupling it with Article 4 (2) TEU.329 
Fourth, the path chosen by the FCC draws on a ‘specific’ understanding of the relationship of 
cooperation. While acknowledging the distinction between the content and normative 
relevance in the context of the Article 4(2) TEU it seems to reiterate330 its role of having the 
last word on the limits of application of EU law based on constitutional identity. In doing this, 
however, the FCC is not mentioning that this would be done only in exceptional situations or 
by balancing it to other constitutional principles such as the friendliness towards EU law.331 
This could be also inferred by the sequence of steps and proceedings that are supposed to form 
the relationship of cooperation between the two courts according to the FCC. In this 
cooperation the FCC initiates the exchange by sending preliminary reference questions, the 
CJEU provides interpretation of the challenged EU act and then FCC decides whether this act 
encroaches on the constitutional identity. Consequently, the role of the CJEU in this 
relationship of cooperation is reduced solely to providing interpretation of the EU legal act in 
question, but not providing interpretation of Article 4(2) TEU or whether reliance on 
constitutional identity would represent a breach above all of Article 2 TEU.  
Furthermore, even though the FCC recognizes its general obligation to send a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU before actually applying the identity review on an EU legal act, though 
without referring to the Data Retention decision where it adopted such a duty,332 it did so in a 
very restrictive manner when it came to the actual case at hand. It denied the need of making 
any subsequent referral to the CJEU when it comes to any act implementing the OMT decision 
even though it was not at all clear if the CJEU will go into the constitutional identity in its 
reasoning.333 As a matter of fact, the CJEU made no reference in its preliminary ruling so the 
question is raised whether the FCC would still not send another preliminary reference in case 
it activated its threat of applying constitutional identity which was a subsidiary option anyway. 
It could be argued that such a rigid stance of the FCC has some logic behind it in a sense that 
the CJEU is being informed and its attention drawn to the issues raised from the perspective of 
constitutional identity and thus it should be interpreted that the CJEU is not willing to engage 
with this matter and therefore there is no reason for sending another preliminary reference. 
However, this does not change the fact that the protection of constitutional identity was not the 
main issue but rather the claims of ultra vires act of the ECB. In this manner, in a case in which 
the identity review is directly to be applied a preliminary reference should be sent to the CJEU. 
ICC’s preliminary reference illustrates this point well taking into consideration that the CJEU’s 
Taricco decision, which is being disputed, was delivered as ruling to a preliminary reference 
sent by an Italian ordinary court and it did not deal with the issue of constitutional identity.334 
                                                          
329 FCC OMT decision (n 158) para. 140 referring to FCC EAW II (n 161) para. 44. 
330 FCC Lisbon (n 122) para 299, 331 and 332. 
331 See for example FCC Lisbon (n 122) Lisbon para. 340; FCC EAW II (n 161) paras. 43, 45; FCC OMT decision 
(n 158) para. 141, 
332 Wendel (n 144) 264; and Thym (n 223) 247. 
333 FCC OMT (n 158) para. 102-103; Wendel (n 144) 285-286 and Mayer (n 221) 131-133. 
334 CJEU, Taricco (n 76). 
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Fifth, the content given to the constitutional identity evidently goes beyond Kumm’s clear and 
specific constitutional rule test which leads the FCC away from being a constructive corrective 
force. The democratic principle is so broad that it could be overstretched to include many 
aspects of the particularly sensitive areas stated in the Lisbon decision which were already 
criticized to have been drawn arbitrarily.335 Even if it could be argued that ECB’s OMT 
decision is ultra vires and it cannot be taken to be part of the monetary mandate of the ECB it 
is hardly imaginable that a decision such as the one on OMT could be able to encroach on the 
constitutional identity in such a manner that would legitimize the move of setting it aside. 
Hence the FCC should adopt a narrower definition of constitutional identity which would as 
result lead to higher level of authority and legitimacy of its claims also for other courts in the 
EU. 
Looking at this preliminary reference in light of constitutional pluralism one has to ask: Was 
this an en garde or a touché aimed at the CJEU? In the same way as the Lisbon decision was 
analysed also the OMT needs to be put in a broader context of FCC case-law in order not to 
exaggerate the effects of this case. As stated before the OMT referral in light of the 
constitutional identity issue needs to be interpreted as a warning signal which points out the 
dissatisfaction of the FCC on the use and interpretation of Article 4(2) TEU in the CJEU’s 
case-law. As a matter of fact, it was accurately argued by Möllers in his case note on Honeywell 
where he commented on the possibility of the FCC sending a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU. 
“The preliminary ruling procedure may in this context be interpreted as a warning 
signal. When we send one of our cases to you we are ready to fight, therefore, you 
should better take care of the problem yourself.”336 
Nevertheless, this does not deny the fact that detaching identity review from the national 
identity clause, extensive interpretation of the constitutional identity as well as narrowing of 
the content of the relationship of cooperation are not the most suitable forms of forging a 
dialogue. Even though this reference is very important because of the initiation of a circular 
process of dialogue,337 nevertheless future preliminary references from constitutional courts 
should adjust the presented weakness in order to have a more constructive use of the national 
identity clause. As a matter of fact, this seems to be already taking place judging by the recent 
preliminary references from the FCC and ICC. The latter reference seems as a rather 
constructive even though the ICC demonstrates a rather clear stance on the fundamental 
constitutional principles at stake. Thus, it remains to be seen how the CJEU will respond as the 
issue of constitutional identity as a potential limit to EU law’s absolute primacy is directly 
raised and it will have to deal with it.338 
                                                          
335 Halberstam and Möllers (n 119) 1249-1251. For more see the section 3.1.2. 
336 Möllers (n 150) 166; and Grimm (n 121) 241. 
337 Jaklic (n 298) 176. 
338 Paris (n 80) 17-20; and Fabbrini and Pollicino (n 73) 11-15. 
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5 Conclusion  
Contrary to some early expectations that the national identity clause has the potential to solve 
the conundrum of the relationship between the legal orders in Europe, this has not come to be 
true. So far it has neither been the meeting point nor the actual battleground of the national 
constitutional law and the EU law. Nevertheless, this chapter has demonstrated that even 
though the national identity clause has not met these expectations it still has brought a new 
feature in this relationship impacting the balance between the courts in Europe. This clause has 
served as bases for the empowerment of constitutional courts adding a new role for them as 
guardians of constitutional identity in Europe, a role never foreseen or regulated in the 
respective national constitutions. This empowerment and shift of balance in favour of 
constitutional courts could be perceived through two main points. First, by setting limits to the 
doctrine of absolute primacy of EU law, the exercise of EU competences as well as the future 
transfer of competences to the EU through the respect of constitutional identity guarded by 
constitutional courts. Second, adding leverage to constitutional courts’ position in a future 
direct judicial dialogue with the CJEU and providing an incentive for these courts to enter such 
a dialogue more readily. 
 
Such a conclusion has been reached through three lines of argumentation. The textual and 
systemic analysis of the clause was the first. It showed that the actual clarification of the 
previous version of the national identity clause has not been a minor undertaking with a lack 
of significance. Judging by the wording used to explain the national identity of the member 
states and the legislative history documents, along with the placement of this provision in the 
Constitutional Treaty, and later in the Lisbon Treaty, it could be argued that it hints that this 
clarification has a potential for a broader impact with its newly gained legal meaning.  
Nevertheless, this latter point could be better grasped only by looking into the second line of 
argumentation, being the case-law of the constitutional courts and the CJEU. The first line in 
the sand was drawn by the constitutional courts as they related the national identity clause to 
the constitutional identity and interpreted it as the ultimate limit of EU law authority. Here it 
was the Lisbon decision of the FCC which clearly set the stage for such a conclusion also by 
the introduction of the new instrument of identity review. The CJEU did not seem to be 
bothered too much leaving the impression that the national identity clause is not taken 
seriously. However, the response from the constitutional courts came rather soon. Particularly 
the most recent preliminary reference from the FCC and ICC sent a clear warning signal 
expressing the dissatisfaction with the treatment of the constitutional identity at the EU realm. 
ICC’s preliminary reference on the Taricco decision could potentially represent a ‘game 
changer’ in a sense that a judicial dialogue over the constitutional identity was initiated and 
that the whole story over the relevance of this notion might develop more intensely. In this way 
the sequence of decisions showed that the national identity clause definitely created a new 
avenue in the relationship between the courts shifting the balance towards the constitutional 
courts. 
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The third line of argumentation proves what the previous two have not been able to do 
completely. As a matter of fact, put in the context of constitutional pluralism, the national 
identity clause incorporates two very important tenets of this theory which in a most direct way 
point to the empowerment of the constitutional courts. On the one hand, the constitutional 
courts’ claim for limits of absolute primacy of EU law has essentially been seen as entrenching 
the heterarchy existing between the two legal orders, national and EU. Particularly Kumm’s 
CBS makes the argument clear that constitutional courts have a legitimate claim under certain 
limited circumstances and conditions to legitimately set aside EU law if it contradicts the 
constitutional identity. On the other hand, constitutional courts have strengthened their position 
through the national identity clause in the ongoing process of establishing the direct judicial 
dialogue between them and the CJEU. This development should lead to their more active 
participation in the creation of the common legal space in Europe as long as constitutional 
courts act as a genuine constructive corrective force, unlike the HCC’s most recent invocation 
of constitutional identity.    
Accordingly, what is even more important for constitutional pluralism is that through the 
normative component of this theory, the path has been illuminated, especially through the 
example of OMT referral, for constitutional courts to represent a genuine constructive 
corrective force in Europe and something that will positively serve the process of European 
integration.
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Chapter 6 
Constitutional Courts and the Distribution and Exercise of 
Competences in the European Union 
 
1 Introduction 
The issue of distribution and exercise of competences in multilevel settings has always been a 
contentious issue. The resolution of such contentions requires arbitration by a neutral arbiter 
which is perceived to be impartial and legitimate and that is not always an easy task to achieve. 
Therefore, the search for an appropriate vertical balance of powers among the different levels 
of government and the proper structural mechanisms to oversee and preserve the balance has 
been subject of many theoretical debates. Constitutional courts have a very important place in 
these debates. Namely, constitutional review has been closely related with federalism and the 
safeguard of vertical separation of powers.1 There are even authors which have argued that 
actually federalism has led to the introduction of judicial and constitutional review.2 In the case 
of Belgium for instance, such a relationship between federalism and constitutional review has 
been quite obvious.3 This has been the case because constitutional courts have often been 
perceived as neutral arbiters confined by law to legal arguments receiving their legitimacy 
directly from the constitutions that necessarily include a large bulk of provisions dealing with 
the distribution of powers and competences which constitutional courts are supposed to protect. 
Therefore, this federal mandate of constitutional courts, i.e. adjudication of vertical competence 
disputes, has found a prominent role among constitutional courts’ powers, especially in federal 
states but also in states that are declared as regional.4 
The European Union as a multilevel structure5 is faced with the same challenge of dealing with 
a similar competence conundrum. The division of competences between the EU and the 
                                                          
1 Lars Vinx, The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law 
(CUP 2016) 72; Maartje de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Hart 2014) 55-57, 
155-163. 
2 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press 1987) 183; Martin Shapiro, ‘The Success 
of Judicial Review’ in Sally J. Kenny, William M. Reisinger and John C. Reitz (eds), Constitutional Dialogues in 
Comparative Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan 1999) 194-196; Martin Shapiro, ‘The Success of Judicial Review 
and Democracy’ in Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), On Law, Politics and Judicialization (OUP 2002) 
149-151; Vinx (n 1) 72; Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Spread of Constitutional Review’ in Keith E. Whittington, Daniel 
R. Kelemen and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2008) 85; but cf. 
Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg, ‘Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?’ (2014) 30 Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization 587.  
3 de Visser (n 1) 56-57. 
4 de Visser (n 1) 156-163; and Monica Claes and Maartje de Visser, ‘The Court of Justice as a Federal 
Constitutional Court: A Comparative Perspective’ in Elke Cloots, Geert De Baere and Stefan Sottiaux (eds) 
Federalism in the European Union (OUP 2012) 86-96. 
5 Werner Vandenbrwaene, ‘The Judicial Enforcement of Subsidiarity: The Quest for an Appropriate Standard. 
Comparative Insights on Judicial Methodology’ in Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmanyan and Werner 
Vandenbrwaene (eds) The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012) 133. Here 
Vandenbrwaene uses the term multilevel government and argues that this is a system in which “public power is 
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member states has not been smooth and without problems. Principles such as conferral of 
powers, subsidiarity and proportionality have found a prominent place in the treaties and 
debates over the division and exercise of competences in the EU. However, shortcomings have 
been continuously present. Even though political safeguards have been advanced especially 
with the latest treaty reforms, still the judicial safeguards have not been properly tackled. As a 
matter of fact, the CJEU has come to be known as the motor of integration mainly because of 
the extensive interpretation of fundamental freedoms and overstretching of EU competences 
through which it furthered integration. This development has led to a perception of the CJEU 
as a ‘constitutional court’ of the EU which is required to have the last say on these matters 
drawing certain parallels with federal states in the EU and abroad.6 Such a conception, which 
is also based on certain treaty provision such as Article 19 TEU, as well as the respective case 
law of the CJEU has been very often subject to serious criticism. 
Bearing this in mind, several dilemmas arise. How can the CJEU be solely responsible for 
solving the competence riddle and have the last say on competence disputes in the EU under 
the existing heterarchical relationship between the legal orders and institutions? How could 
one assume that the EU could represent a clear-cut federal structure without an unambiguous 
supremacy of EU law? Isn’t there an inherent need of placing external checks on the CJEU 
under circumstances of existing constitutional pluralism in the EU? Who could serve this 
purpose of externally controlling the respect for the basic principles of conferral of powers, 
subsidiarity and proportionality?     
These and similar dilemmas have been creating headaches in the EU for decades. In providing 
answers to them this chapter argues that constitutional courts are the most suitable institutions 
to take over the role of judicial checks on the CJEU when it comes to distribution of 
competences and their exercise in the EU. Such a role of constitutional courts should be limited 
to exceptional situations and with due consideration for the principle of loyal cooperation as 
well as the unity of the EU legal order which is not to be overemphasized though. This type of 
external check is totally in line with constitutional pluralism both descriptively as well as 
normatively and only modalities of this type of review should be adapted to optimally suit the 
interests of both the EU and member states. Through this sort of control and review 
constitutional courts have gained a new power which has not been foreseen in the respective 
national constitutional provisions but has stemmed directly from the process of European 
integration and the adaptation of constitutional courts to the new reality. Even national 
constitutional courts of unitary states enter into the review and control of the vertical 
distribution and exercise of competences in the EU.  
In making the case and arguing for this new role of constitutional courts one needs to clarify 
certain notions in order to place the issues within a proper framework because misconceptions 
have led to a debate in which scholars sometimes seem to talk past each other. In the second 
section the notion of federalism in the EU context will be discussed and how the use of this 
                                                          
exercised at different levels, with each layer retaining a degree of autonomous decision-making power vis-à-vis 
the other(s).” [references omitted] 
6 On this sort of analogies see for instance Koen Lenaerts, ‘Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution – The 
Case of the European Union’ (1997) 21 Fordham International Law Journal 746.  
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notion under the same meaning and in a same manner as in the case of states leads to certain 
misplaced implications and allusions which are ignoring the reality of neo-federalism and 
constitutional pluralism in the EU. In the third section the main principles of distribution and 
exercise of competences in the EU contained in Article 5 TEU will be discussed. This section 
will reveal that strengthening the political safeguards for the respect of subsidiarity have also 
had certain positive effects on the judicial safeguards but, nevertheless, the main weaknesses 
are still not resolved and therefore there is the necessity for the existence of external check on 
the CJEU in this regard. The fourth section will discuss why and how constitutional courts are 
the most suitable national institutions to conduct the external control on the CJEU, through the 
ultra vires review of EU acts, in relation to the distribution and exercise of EU competences 
which are conferred to it by the member states. If the main weakness is located in the approach 
and practice of the CJEU then it is quite logical that there is a need for an external judicial 
check through an exercise of a so-called external federal mandate. In this section, the evolution 
of this type of review will be analyzed through its elements, scope and comparative overview 
as seen through the case law of the constitutional courts in the EU. The fifth section, puts the 
ultra vires review in the framework of constitutional pluralism in order to discuss in which 
manner the external federal mandate of constitutional courts can be used to fend off excessive 
centralization without unreasonably jeopardizing the effectiveness and unity of EU law. 
Therefore, the ultra vires review needs to be reconceived and its substantive and procedural 
elements readjusted in order for the external federal mandate to be perceived as a constructive 
external check in the process of further integration. The conclusion will summarize the main 
arguments. 
2 The federalism discourse and the relationship between the legal orders in the 
EU 
2.1 The development of the federalism discourse in the EU  
Since the very beginning of European integration, the whole project has been continuously 
related to federalism. Whether it was Winston Churchill7 at the initiation or Joschka Fisher 
announcing the idea of creating an EU Constitution as an essential feature of a future 
federation,8 proponents of ‘United States of Europe’ and of the EU as a federal super-state of 
some sort have projected their visions of future political goals of European integration through 
their federalism discourse.9 As a matter of fact ‘federalists’ have implied the so-called finalite 
of the integration process through this form of discourse. As a result, even though federalism 
could be associated with different tendencies when it comes to the relationships between the 
                                                          
7 Winston Churchill, speech delivered at the University of Zurich, 19 September 1946, available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/16806981f3 last visited 15.10.2018. 
8 Joschka Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the finality of European Integration, Humboldt 
University in Berlin, 12 May 2000, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do?docId=192161&cardId=192161 last visited 15.10.2018. 
9 On the multitude of these discourses which often have different motives behind them see Stefan Oeter, 
‘Federalism and Democracy’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds) Principles of European 
Constitutional Law Second Revised Edition (Hart 2008) 55ff; see also Mark Gilbert, ‘European Federalism: Past 
Resilience and Present Problems’ in Sergio Fabbrini (ed) Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and 
the United States: Exploring Post-National Governance (Routledge 2005) 27ff. 
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central authority and component entities, an integrative and centralist overtone has always been 
clearly associated with the federalism in the EU.10 This is the main reason, bearing in mind the 
European tradition of federalism,11 why there is a huge reluctance among the member states 
for using the “F” word and why the term federalism has not found its place in any of the 
founding documents of the EU, that is, the EU Treaties.12 Such federalism discourses in the EU 
context have challenged two main pillars of the European tradition. These pillars are related to 
that only a state could be a federation and that the sovereignty is indivisible and thus there can 
be no dual sovereignty in the EU as it rests solely with the member states and it cannot be 
divided.13 Therefore one could observe that there is continuously a lack of so-called federal 
intent and clear will among the member states to become federalized in the EU which intent 
and will are usually expressed in a constitution.14 
Be that as it may, the projection of political goals through a specific form of discourse or 
reflection on the overly broad debate on whether the EU is a federation or not has been almost 
an obsession of political scientists, especially in drawing parallels with the U.S. federalism, 
since the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty.15 However, this does not mean that 
contextualizing the EU in federalist terms does not have any legal implications which are rather 
important for the debate over the relationship between the legal orders and their respective 
institutions. Such an argument resonates even more loudly if one bears in mind that federalism 
and its development in most cases carry a judicial mark.16 Focusing only on this legal aspect 
of the debate over EU and federalism it is argued that this debate has had a certain effect on 
                                                          
10 For more on the different meaning of federalism such as integrative and devolutionary see Lenaerts (n 6) 749; 
and on centralizing and decentralizing tendencies of federalism see Elazar (n 2) 198-223. 
11 For more on this tradition see Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure 
of European Law (OUP 2009) 30-38. 
12 Mary L. Volcansek, ‘Judicially Crafted Federalism: EU and USA’ (2005) EUSA Ninth Biennial International 
Conference 4, available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/3019/2/Judicially_Crafted_Federalism-1.doc last visited 15.10.2018, 
she claims that this is also the case for the US Constitution though and therefore this cannot represent a decisive 
argument. On the reference to federalism in practice see Andreas Auer, ‘The Constitutional Scheme of Federalism’ 
(2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy 419, 423. 
13 Schütze (n 11) 30-38. 
14 Soren Dosenrode, ‘Federalism’ in Soren Dosenrode(ed) Approaching the European Federation? (Ashgate 2007) 
21, Thomas von Danwitz, Vertikale Kompetenzkontrolle in föderalen Systemen: Rechtsvergleichende und 
rechtsdogmatische Überlegungen zur vertikalen Abgrenzung von Legislativkompetenzen in der Europäischen 
Union (2006) 131 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 510, 558ff; and Daniel J. Elazar, ‘The United States and the 
European Union: Models for Their Epochs’ in Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds) The Federal Vision: 
Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (OUP 2001) 52. 
15 For instance see George A. Bermann, ‘European Community Law from a U.S. Perspective’ (1995) 4 Tulane 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, 5; Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty: 
The European Union in Comparative Context (The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001); Elke Cloots, Geert De 
Baere and Stefan Sottiaux (eds) Federalism in the European Union (OUP 2012); Andrew Glencross and 
Alexandre H. Trechsel (eds) EU Federalism and Constitutionalism: the Legacy of Altiero Spinelli (Lexington 
Books 2010); Anand Menon and Martin A. Schain (eds), Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the 
United States in Comparative Perspective (OUP 2006); Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds) The Federal 
Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (OUP 2001); 
Florentina Harbo, Towards a European Federation?: the EU in the Light of Comparative Federalism (Nomos 
2005) and etc. 
16 Volcansek (n 12) 1; and Hans-Peter Schneider, Jutta Kramer and Beniamino Caravita di Toritto (eds) Judge 
made Federalism? The Role of Courts in Federal Systems (Nomos 2009).  
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the role of constitutional courts of placing external check on the distribution and exercise of 
competences in the EU.  
2.2 The EU as a federal and heterarchical structure – introducing neo-federalism 
There are numerous definitions which are being used as a starting point in discussing whether 
the EU represents a federal structure or not. For instance, Volcansek borrows a rather broad 
and neutral definition from Daniel J. Elazar who defines federalism as:  
“the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an overarching 
political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a 
manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both.”17 
Another definition is the one used by Claes and de Visser in which it is stated that federalism 
represents: 
“a vertical divided powers system based on a constitutional document which lies 
beyond the reach of any of the levels acting alone under the procedure for the adoption 
of ordinary legislation.”18   
These and similar definitions have outlined several elements and features of federalism through 
which it is usually assumed that the EU is a federation. Those are related to the existence of a 
central authority with an established set of institutions;19 which institutions are entrusted with 
certain competences through a document of a constitutional character that enacts the division 
of powers between the central authority and the component entities;20 this document creates 
rules for safeguarding the autonomy of both the central authority and component entities21 and 
these rules are politically safeguarded as well as, usually, judicially enforceable in situations 
where the political process proves to be unsuccessful.22 Even though these features are present 
in the EU still there are some elements which are heavily disputed. 
All these definitions and conceptions share common flaws. They all end up in the ‘blueprint 
trap’23 which is the result of misapplication of notions and terms initially related and developed 
for the nation state without any further adjustments or clarifications to an EU context and thus 
make inaccurate analogies between a nation state and the EU, even though the EU is not a 
                                                          
17 Volcansek (n 12) 4. It is interesting to note that Elazar himself clearly claimed that the EU is a confederation, 
see Elazar (n 14) 38ff. However, despite this some authors such as Weiler used his work to argue for the EU as a 
federation, for instance see Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg in 
Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the 
United States and the European Union (OUP 2001) 54ff. 
18 Claes and de Visser (n 4) 86 [emphases added]. 
19 Schütze (n 11) 52-56, he labels this as the institutional dimension of the federation and Lenaerts (n 6) 752ff. 
20 Schütze (n 11) 56, he calls this division a functional dimension of the federation; Auer (n 12) 423-426; Elazar 
(n 2) 157ff, 166. 
21 Lenaerts (n 6) 752, 781, 795, he puts emphasis on this balance between the autonomy and the central authority; 
Auer (n 12) 421-422; and Elazar (n 2) 64ff. 
22 Claes and de Visser (n 4) 85; Lenaerts (n 6) 796-797; and Auer (n 12) 426. 
23 Franz C. Mayer and Mattias Wendel, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism’ in Matej 
Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 132. 
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state.24 According to the European tradition of federalism there is a nationalist perspective 
which ties federation to a state and argues only for the constitutional nature of the federation, 
thus denying the possible international foundational element.25 Based on this sort of 
conception, one is faced with an oversimplified binary choice of the EU being categorized as 
either a federal state or an international organization which at best is confederal.26 Not being 
able to define the EU as a federal state under the present circumstances or in the conceivable 
future one is left with the only choice of defining the EU as a mere international organization 
based on the initial character of its foundational documents, its treaties. However, this is a 
mistaken conclusion as the emancipation of the EU and its legal order from international law 
has been accomplished decades ago with the crucial difference being that EU legal norms are 
being directly applied in the member states through its doctrine of direct effect.27 Thus, 
regardless of the fact that the EU was initially established through an international treaty, now 
the EU primary law is part of a new autonomous legal order.28 Such a view is very much 
supported by the foundational dimension of the American tradition of federalism which proves 
that a federation could have a mixed or compound nature of incorporating both elements of an 
international and national character.29 This is one of the main reasons why this American 
tradition has been taken as bases for arguing the EU federalism. However, this approach has 
its own limits as well due to the specificities of both the U.S. federalism and the EU. Therefore, 
currently the EU could at most be labeled as a pre-federal Staatenverbund structure.30 This is 
exactly what the FCC has, from the onset, declared in its case-law starting from the Maastricht 
decision terming the EU a Staatenverbund as an association of sovereign national states which 
                                                          
24 Federico Fabbrini, ‘The European Multilevel System for the Protection of Fundamental Rights: A ‘Neo-
Federalist’ Perspective’ (2010) Jean Monnet Working Paper 15/10 27-28; Ulrich Everling, ‘The European Union 
as a Federal Association of States and Citizens’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds) Principles of 
European Constitutional Law (2nd Revised Edition Hart 2008) 731ff; on the general lack of epistemology of 
federalism see Francois-Xavier Millet, ‘The Respect for National Constitutional Identity in the European Legal 
Space: An Approach to Federalism as Constitutionalism’ in Loic Azoulai (ed) The Question of Competence in the 
European Union (OUP 2014) 267; and Guillaume Tusseau, ‘Theoretical Deflation: The EU Order of Competences 
and Power-conferring Norms Theory’ in Loic Azoulai (ed) The Question of Competence in the European Union 
(OUP 2014) 39-40, calling these as the defect of ‘federalism talk. 
25 Schütze (n 11) 30-38. On treaty federalism see Sergio Fabbrini, ‘Is the EU Exceptional? The EU and the US in 
Comparative Perspective’ in Sergio Fabbrini (ed) Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and the 
United States: Exploring Post-National Governance (Routledge 2005) 9.  
26 Fabbrini (n 25) 9, “The EU process of federalization asks for a reconsideration of the various federal species to 
verify whether their traditional distinctions resist the test of empirical analysis. This test concerns primarily the 
historical distinction between federation and confederation.” See also, Pavlos Elefthieriadis, ‘Federalism and 
Jurisdiction’ in Elke Cloots, Geert De Baere and Stefan Sottiaux (eds) Federalism in the European Union (OUP 
2012) 46-47; Schütze (n 11) 58-69; and Everling (n 24) 731.  
27 Martin Shapiro, ‘The US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice Compared’ in Anand Menon and 
Martin A. Schain (eds), Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative 
Perspective (OUP 2006) 210; and Fabbrini (n 25) 9-10. Also on this see chapter 3. 
28 ECJ, Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL in Andrew Oppenheimer, The Relationship Between EC Law and National Law: 
The Cases (CUP 1994) 66-67. See also Joseph H. H. Weiler and Ulrich R. Haltern, ‘Constitutional or 
International? The Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-
Kompetenz’ in Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds) The European Court and 
National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Context (Hart 1998) 340-341. 
29 Schütze (n 11) 69-73; and Claes and de Visser (n 4) 84-85. 
30 von Danwitz (n 14) 558 -560. But cf. Herbert Bethge, in Theodor Maunz, Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Franz 
Klein, Herbert Bethge et al., Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz: Kommentar Band 1 (54th edition C.H. Beck 2018) 
137-138. 
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does not represent a federal European state31 and where the member states preserve their core 
sovereignty.32 While this stance of the FCC essentially reflects the postulates of the European 
federal tradition and the doctrine of the nation state still it does not reflect the reality in which 
this state sovereignty has essentially been limited with the membership in the European 
Union.33 As result this notion of Staatenverbund has been the base for some other counter-
notions such as Verfassungsverbund or multilevel constitutionalism which found its place in 
the case-law of the FCC just recently.34  
Another common flaw has to do with an assumption which is related to the hierarchical 
relationship35 between the different levels of the federation and their legal orders that is present 
in all definitions of federalism and could also be recognized in the above two definitions 
through the phrases of ‘overarching political system’ and ‘constitutional document’.36 Such an 
assumption, which is the result of the coupling of federalism with a state-centered view, 
inherently belongs to the so-called federal principles or requisites of federalism according to 
constitutional lawyers.37 As a matter of fact this is clearly argued by Claes and de Visser 
claiming that “[t]he supremacy of the federal constitution is essential in a full-fledged federal 
                                                          
31 FCC, Maastricht Treaty (Brunner) 2 BvR 2134 and 2159/92, judgement of 12 October 1993, paras. 90, 112; 
FCC, Case 2 BvE 2/08 Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, para. 229; FCC, 2 BvR 2735/14, order of 15 December 
2015, para. 44; FCC, OMT 2 BVR 2728/13, judgement of 21 June 2016, para 140. Different form these decisions 
the FCC in Honeywell noted that “highly federalised, cooperative organizational structure of the European Union, 
which is analogous to a state in many areas both as to the scope of its competences and in the organizational 
structure and procedure, but does not have a character of a federal state.” FCC, Honeywell 2 BvR 2661/06, order 
of 6 July 2010, para. 65. 
32 On this see also Paul Kirchhof, ‘The Balance of Powers Between National and European Institutions’ 5 
European Law Journal (1999) 225, 230; and in the context of the Lisbon Treaty decision Mayer and Wendel (n 
23) 143. 
33 Everling (n 24) 732. 
34 FCC, 2 BvR 2735/14, order of 15 December 2015, para. 44; FCC, OMT decision 2 BVR 2728/13, judgment of 
21 June 2016, para 140. On this see also Everling (n 24) 732; and Mayer and Wendel (n 23) 132, 143. 
35 Elazar (n 2) 200-201: “The study of federal systems not to speak of the understanding of federalism itself has 
suffered because political scientists [same applies for lawyer] have generally accepted the center-periphery and 
hierarchical models as normative and have tried to force federal systems into their mold, not only their terminology 
(for example, when they speak of “levels” of government in the federal systems as in others an obvious 
contradiction in terms) but, far more important, by obscuring accurate analysis.”  
36 Hans Kelsen was rather critical over this type of hierarchy calling it a ‘paradox of the theory of the federal 
state’, see in (Vinx n 1) 72-75. But see also Millet (n 24) 268, where he argues that “both the word and the idea 
behind it [integration or integrative federalism] emphasize the establishment of a hierarchically organized unity 
made up of an upper and a lower level” [references omitted]  
37 Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘Constitutionalizing the Federal Vision?’ in Anand Menon and Martin A. Schain (eds), 
Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative Perspective (OUP 2006) 
60-61; Auer (n 12) 421-423; Elazar (n 2) 157-168; Amie Kreppel, ‘Understanding the European Parliament from 
a Federalist Perspective: The Legislature of the United States and European Union Compared’ in Anand Menon 
and Martin A. Schain (eds) Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative 
Perspective (OUP 2006) 262; Adam Sheingate, ‘Agricultural Biotechnology: Representative Federalism and 
Regulatory Capacity in the United States and European Union’ Anand Menon and Martin A. Schain (eds), 
Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative Perspective (OUP 2006) 
314; Olivier Beaud, ‘The Allocation of Competences in a Federation – A General Introduction’ in Loic Azoulai 
(ed) The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP 2014) 24; Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Process in 
Comparative Perspective (OUP 1989) 312-313; Koen Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and Many Faces of 
Federalism’ (1990) 38 The American Journal of Comparative Law 205, 263: “Federalism is present whenever a 
divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of 
the common legal order.” 
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system”38 and even more elaborately by Weiler pushing for the federalist analogy arguing that 
in the EU:  
“there is the grand principle of supremacy every bit as egregious as that which is found 
in the American federal constitution itself…. [put] differently, the constitutional 
discipline which Europe demands from its constitutional actors – the Union itself, the 
Member States and State organs, European citizens, and others – is in most respects 
indistinguishable from that which you would find in advanced federal states.”39  
Such statements and conclusions have been extensively used to confirm and entrench the 
supremacy of EU law and support the constitutional narrative in the EU.40 In this sense the 
federalism argument has been instrumental in denying the existing reality of seriously disputed 
absolute supremacy of EU law by the constitutional and supreme courts of several member 
states. Even if it is argued that the EU has a constitution in a functional sense this does not 
change anything as its supremacy is contested.  
Furthermore, the hierarchy assumption has been also applied in securing the ultimate say of 
the central authority, which is the EU, in judicially enforcing EU law through the CJEU, and 
in this manner promoting judicial supremacy.41 Accordingly, it is argued that federalism 
requires a single legal and jurisdictional framework, instead of plural, which could guarantee 
the basic values of constitutionalism such as the rule of law and legitimacy.42 Therefore 
Eleftheriadis argues that ‘if there is no central constitutional law and no central scheme of 
jurisdiction, there is no federation.’43 
However, in the same manner as for EU law the ultimate authority of the CJEU has also been 
questioned by the highest judicial instances of the member states.44 Additionally, the CJEU 
cannot really represent an absolute central judicial authority in classic federalist terms 
especially if one bears in mind that it does not have a jurisdiction or power to conduct direct 
review of national law by interpreting or invalidating it in light of their (in)compatibility with 
                                                          
38 Claes and de Visser (n 4) 85. But see also Auer (n 12) 426; Heidrun Abromeit, ‘Constitution and Legitimacy’ 
in Soren Dosenrode (ed) Approaching the European Federation? (Ashgate 2007) 40; Dosenrode (n 14) 22; and 
Gilbert (n 9) 29. 
39 Weiler (n 17) 56. 
40 Lenaerts (n 6) 776, 778; and Matej Avbelj, ‘The Pitfalls of (Comparative) Constitutionalism for European 
Integration’ (2008) Eric Stein Working Paper No. 1/2008 6-7. 
41 Jan Komarek, ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 234; Lenaerts (n 6) 796-797; Kreppel (n 
37) 262; and Avbelj (n 40) 11. This is sort of hierarchy very much resembles to the relationship existing between 
constitutional courts in Germany, federal and Lander. However, Sauer himself denies this analogy claiming that 
“[z]war hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht mit der dargestellten Entscheidung der Hierarchisierung Vorschub 
geleistet, aber die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeiten stehen eben nicht so unverbunden und ohne jede klare Hierarchie 
nebeneinander wie die Gerichte in überstaatlichen Mehrebenensystemen.” For more see Heiko Sauer, 
Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen: Die Entwicklung eines Modells zur Lösung von Konflikten zwischn 
Gerichten unterschiedlicher Ebenen in vernetzten Rechtsordnungen (Springer 2008) 152-153.  
42 Eleftheriadis (n 26) 53-59. 
43 Eleftheriadis (n 26) 53. 
44 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United 
States’ in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 335; and Avbelj (n 40) 11-12. 
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EU law. Therefore, this ‘indication of the presence of federalism’45, argued by Lenaerts, is 
denied under circumstances of existing heterarchy in the relationship between legal orders in 
the EU today. Without a legitimacy and acceptance by the national courts, the CJEU is not able 
to tune up the federal legal framework, as Elazar puts it.46 The EU, conceived under such classic 
federalist terms, is totally incompatible in this sense47 with constitutional pluralism which is 
both descriptively and normatively superior to any other existing conception or theory. The 
only way of mitigating these counter-arguments to the hierarchy assumption is to note that this 
challenge to supremacy of EU law and CJEU’s ultimate authority is only related to its absolute 
character while the relative primacy is accepted, however, under the respective national 
constitutions.48 
Even if one extensively broadens the features of the American tradition of federalism still this 
last flaw cannot be fixed and thus the EU could not be declared a fully-fledged federation even 
according to this tradition. The supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution cannot be simply put 
aside. Therefore this sort of analogy between the EU and the U.S. has no other intention then 
the one of promoting “a monist, hierarchical, functionally state-like vision of integration.”49 
The existing interpretative pluralism in the U.S. mainly refers to the horizontal relationship of 
the federal institutions and not to the vertical separation of powers or the existence of separate 
but overlapping constitutional orders within the overarching political system.50 One has to note 
that even according to the much referred author on this issue, Schütze, the EU has elements of 
cooperative or horizontal federalism but only if the argument is confined to the legislative 
implementation as opposed to executive application or any other aspect of federalism.51 
Therefore his claims should not be overstretched in the legal context of the EU and federalism 
discussed here.   
Against this background, only if one recognizes that federalism and the federal principle under 
the changing circumstances in Europe can exist beyond the state and detaches federalism from 
a purely hierarchical perspective the EU could be declared a federal structure. Therefore, in the 
absence of any alternative conception there is a need for a new broader view on federalism 
which could define the EU structure and existing relationship between it and its member 
states.52 As a matter of fact, Elazar has argued for this detachment of the federal principle from 
                                                          
45 Lenaerts (n 6) 778. 
46 Elazar (n 2) 159. 
47 Claes and de Visser (n 4) 85. 
48 Avbelj (n 40) 21-22. 
49 Avbelj (n 40) 25. Fabbrini misses the point by criticizing that Avbelj, as many other European scholars, has 
misunderstood the true nature of American federalism Fabbrini (n 24) 31. 
50 Halberstam (n 44) 329-336, drawing the difference between constitutional and interpretative pluralism. On this 
note I disagree with Fabbrini’s reading of Goldsworthy’s arguments claiming that the U.S. system knows no 
hierarchy or monist constitutional arrangement. See Fabbrini (n 24) 30 and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘The Debate 
About Sovereignty in the United States: A Historical and Comparative Perspective’ in Neil Walker (ed) 
Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) 423. 
51 Schütze (n 11) 5-10, making the parallel with the American tradition. On a different understanding of dual and 
cooperative federalism see Dosenrode (n 14) 25; Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, ‘The Federal Order of 
Competences’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds) Principles of European Constitutional Law Second 
Revised Edition (Hart 2008) 285; and Fabbrini (n 25) 14. 
52 Tusseau (n 24) 61. He argues that “[u]sing the vernacular of federalism could be regarded as a kind of 
compensatory attitude in front of the disruption of established habits of thinking and their inappropriateness to 
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the state or any other specific set of institutional setting and instead to focus on the 
institutionalization of the relationship between the actors within the multilevel setting.53 
Through such a broader understanding of federalism, focused on the actual dynamics of this 
type of relationships, one is provided with some space for redefinition of the notion of 
federalism and the federal principle in the EU context. Therefore, paraphrasing Tusseau, the 
federal lens will be used to tackle the developments in the EU for the sole purpose of 
rationalizing legal analysis.54  
In this sense a ‘neo-federalist’ approach which bundles federalism with constitutional pluralism 
could be used as a conceptual framework that would better elucidate the issue of distribution 
and exercise of competences in the EU which is the true functional dimension of federalism 
and basis for the balance between the interests and autonomy of both the EU and its member 
states.55 Accordingly, one would couple the shared goal of both federalism and constitutional 
pluralism which is related to achieving a fair balance between unity and diversity.56 Actually, 
such a new approach has been proposed by Koopmans as early as 199257 and the birth of the 
EU declaring the quest for proper federal discourse for the EU among the existing conditions 
a wrong debate and proposed, back then, to link federalism to legal pluralism.58 As matter of 
fact Elazar clearly points out that “[t]he model that is needed to build the European Union is a 
matrix or a mosaic and not a power pyramid or a center-periphery model”.59 Accordingly, one 
could state that under the neo-federal understanding the EU represents a ‘federative but not a 
hierarchical structure’ existing beyond the state.60 Under such a conception federalism 
represents “a species of the genus constitutional pluralism”61 according to which there is a 
different reading of both the traditional doctrine and principles of federalism and the basic 
doctrines of EU law and its safeguards on the distribution and exercise of powers in the EU 
which leads to a rather practical significance instead of a purely theoretical debate.62 This move 
would tackle two issues, the conundrum of (in)divisible sovereignty, that is one of the biggest 
                                                          
confront current phenomena, as exemplified in the EU legal order, but which are more general (the disaggregation 
of the post-Westphalian order, the end of former hierarchies, the empowerment of new transnational actors, the 
heterarchical relationships between autonomous legal spheres, the fragmentation of international law into a 
multiplicity of specialized regimes, societal constitutionalism, global constitutionalism, global administrative law, 
etc.).”[reference omitted], Daniel Halberstam, ‘Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional 
Law: National, Supranational and Global Governance’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds) Constitutional 
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 93; Fabbrini (n 25) 9, “A federal political system or 
federalism is a genus to which different empirical species arguably belong” and Beaud (n 37) 30. 
53 Elazar (n 2)11-12. 
54 Tusseau (n 24) 62. 
55 For more on neo-federalism see Fabbrini (n 24). Weiler and Haltern use a notion of “neo-constitutionalism” to 
describe this reality, Weiler and Haltern (n 28) 363. See also Schütze (n 11) 56-58; Koen Lenaerts, ‘EU Federalism 
in 3-D’ in Elke Cloots, Geert De Baere and Stefan Sottiaux (eds) Federalism in the European Union (OUP 2012) 
13-15; Millet (n 24) 266-275, he is speaking of a new kind of federalism in the European Union, Beaud (n 37) 23, 
referring to Marcel Bridel, Precis de droit constitutionnel et public suisse (Lausanne: Payot, Vol. I, No. 66, 1965) 
170, and 30-37. 
56 Millet (n 24) 266, 274. 
57 Thijmen Koopmans, ‘Federalism: The Wrong Debate’ (1992) Common Law Market Review 1047-1052. 
58 Lenaerts (n 55) 13-15. 
59 Elazar (n 14) 42. 
60 Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill,’Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under 
the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Law Market Review 1417, 1425. 
61 Fabbrini (n 24) 30-31. 
62 Eleftheriadis (n 26) 47. 
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problems with the European tradition which is successfully solved through the American 
experience, and the lack of a strict hierarchy among the legal orders. 
If this theoretical explanation is taken as a starting point, then how is this structure supposed to 
tackle the centralizing tendency that is present in every proper federation due to their structural 
bias becomes the first question through which neo-federalism should manifest its practical 
relevance.  
3 The centralizing tendencies in the EU, the constitutional principles of EU law 
and the insufficiency of the safeguard  
Just as every federal structure has centralizing tendencies, also the development of federal 
features has inevitably led to a similar outcome of centralization.63 It could be argued that these 
tendencies could be recognized by looking at the high level of judicial activism of the CJEU, 
especially in the past, through the creation of the fundamental doctrines of EU law which were 
applied in expanding the scope of EU competences by providing them with a functional 
definition. In this sense the legal basis for EU action was broadened through judicial means 
and interpretation. In certain instances, the centralizing tendencies in the EU were even more 
noticeable than in other full fledge federations. Ironically, the calls for further integration and 
integrative federalism have assumed more centralization even though this essentially 
contradicts the very essence of the notion of federalism which implies more autonomy and 
power for the federal units.64 Therefore once the question of deepening of European integration 
through the establishment of the European Union was put on the agenda the issue of 
safeguarding sovereign rights, competences and autonomy of member states was opened.65 In 
this sense, the introduction of the basic constitutional principles, already present in federal 
states, such as the conferral of powers, subsidiarity and proportionality, which would serve the 
purpose of safeguarding the vertical division of powers and competences in the EU, came as a 
logical step.66 Thus, ever since the Maastricht Treaty these principles have been an essential 
part of the EU treaties and, in regard to subsidiarity and proportionality, they have been further 
developed with the adoption of protocols introducing additional guidelines and mechanisms 
for their application and safeguard.  
Despite all these developments there are still serious doubts expressed whether these principles 
are adequately designed for the circumstances existing in the EU and continuous criticism is 
addressed to the CJEU for not adequately and effectively tackling the issues related to the 
competence conundrum. This sort of perception has been one of the underlying reasons for the 
strengthening of the safeguards and the introduction of the early warning mechanism in the 
                                                          
63 Fabbrini (n 24) 30; Alec Stone Sweet, Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP 2004) 8; Weiler (n 17) 55; Carlo 
Panara, ‘The Enforceability of Subsidiarity in the EU and the Ethos of Cooperative Federalism: A Comparative 
Law Perspective’ (2016) 22 European Public Law 305, 310, 315; Volcansek (n 12) 8ff; and von Danwitz (n 14) 
520. 
64 Elazar (n 2) 154; and Koopmnas (n 57) 1047, 1051. 
65 Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials Fifth Edition (OUP 2011) 94. 
66 George A. Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 331, 335. 
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protocols of the Lisbon Treaty.67 While the early warning mechanism, as well as the impact 
assessment reports of the Commission, has provided valuable information for the CJEU in its 
review of subsidiarity and proportionality this, however, has not remedied the main weaknesses 
of the judicial safeguard of these principles which remains a concern for the member states. 
Therefore, the lack of effective judicial safeguard has caused and provided justification from 
the onset for some constitutional courts in Europe to declare their power to intervene on 
instances in which the vertical division and exercise of competences in the EU is not adequately 
safeguarded by the CJEU.  In this manner constitutional courts have gained another new role 
of what is here referred to as an external federal mandate better known as ultra vires review. 
In order to better understand the crucial reasons and justifications for the establishment and 
development of such a new role for constitutional courts, particularly in light of constitutional 
pluralism, one needs to first take a look at the meaning and role of these constitutional 
principles in the EU after which the specificities of the political and judicial safeguards of both 
subsidiarity and proportionality need to be addressed along with the main weaknesses.     
3.1 The principles of conferral of powers, subsidiarity and proportionality in the EU  
The division and exercise of competences in the EU is regulated with Article 5 TEU which 
incorporates three principles for that purpose.68 The first one is the principle of conferral of 
powers, the broadest and most general but at the same time the weakest, and has to do with the 
overarching distribution of competences.69 The principle of conferral states that all 
competences of the EU stem from the member states and the EU is limited only to those which 
have been conferred upon it. Additionally, this provision defines that residual powers, meaning, 
those which are not conferred upon the EU by the member states, belong to the latter.70 The 
conferred competences are supposed to be used in order for the EU to achieve the objectives 
foreseen in the Treaties. In this sense, the conferral of powers does define and determine the 
general limits of EU competences however their exercise and also their scope, in light of the 
objectives, are a matter that is supposed to be determined with the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality.71 In more practical terms, the conferral of powers looks whether there are 
appropriate legal basis for the EU to act and regulate at all, while the latter two principles are 
concerned with the exercise of EU competences.72  
In this sense, when it comes to whether and how EU competences should be exercised the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are supposed to provide the answer. The 
underlying idea of subsidiarity is that the central authority should act and exercise its 
                                                          
67 Panara (n 63) 321-322. 
68 Bearing in mind the great abundance of literature on this specific topic these principles will not be dealt with in 
great detail and the discussion will be limited to details which are related to the general argument in this chapter 
and reasons that serve as justification for an active role of national constitutional courts. 
69 Gareth Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, In the Wrong Place, At the Wrong Time’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 63, 66; and Albrecht Weber, ‘Article 5: Principles on the Distribution and Limits of 
Competences’ in Hermann-Josef Blanke and Stelio Mangiameli (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU): A 
Commentary (Springer 2013) 259-261.  
70 Article 5(2) TEU 
71 Craig and de Burca (n 65) 95. 
72 Weber (n 69) 258, on the distinction between distribution and exercise as seen through these three principles. 
224 
 
competences only if this cannot be done effectively enough at a level closer to the citizens.73 
In this way the central authority has a subsidiary function.74 As in the EU, this relationship is 
between the EU and its member states. Article 5(3) TEU regulates that subsidiarity concerns 
the exercise of non-exclusive EU competences which is conditioned by the fact that “the 
objectives of a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states, either at 
central level or at regional and local level”, but nevertheless these objectives could be better 
achieved at the Union level “by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action.”75 
Therefore the main consideration of subsidiarity is to determine which level is the most 
appropriate in achieving the legislative objectives which are part of non-exclusive 
competences. Such understanding inevitably embeds a certain assumption in favor of the lower 
level of government because the central authority acts only if specific conditions are met.76 
This assumption is based on several considerations which are related to efficiency, democracy 
and identity which are all legitimate concerns of the member states and they need to be weighed 
when subsidiarity is concerned.77 However, in the EU, as in most federal states, under 
subsidiarity the goals and objectives of the central authority seem to be privileged as observed 
also through the case law of the CJEU.78 This has caused the perception of a hierarchy of 
objectives which favors the federal or central ones under the principle of subsidiarity making 
this principle rather unsuitable to serve the purpose of balancing between EU and member 
states competences.79  
Once it is determined that the Union level is the appropriate one, the manner in which a 
competence or objective is achieved through EU actions needs to be looked into. Namely, the 
principle of proportionality as regulated with Article 5(4) TEU is supposed to determine 
                                                          
73 Robert Schütze, ‘Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?’ (2009) 68 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 525; and Weber (n 69) 261. 
74 Schütze (n 73) 525; and Schütze (n 11) 244-245. 
75 Article 5(3) TEU. 
76 George A. Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 331, 339; and Gabriel A. Moens and John Trone, ‘Subsidiarity as Judicial 
and Legislative Review Principles in the European Union’ in Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (eds) 
Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Springer 2014) 171. 
77 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the 
European Union’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 503, 518ff; however, this is even more elaborately explained 
Bermann (n 76) 339-344. He numbers all of values that need to be taken into consideration when the subsidiarity 
principle is being applied. Those are: 1) Self-determination and accountability; 2) Political Liberty; 3) Flexibility; 
4) Preservation of Identities; 5) Diversity; and 6) Respect for Internal Division of Component States.   
78 Davies (n 69) 67; Millet (n 24) 262; and Elazar (n 14) 42. 
79 Davor Jancic, ‘The Game of Cards: National Parliaments in the EU and the Future of the Early Warning 
Mechanism and the Political Dialogue’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 939, 943, he calls this a hidden 
hierarchy. See also Elazar (n 14) 42-44, according to him, judging by its origin subsidiarity is intended to reduce 
hierarchy, however it inherently includes it as opposed to federalism. This type of hierarchy of objectives finds 
its reflections also on the values which are protected manifesting an ‘uneven pace’ in protecting certain values 
more than other, such as the difference between the Union’s social and economic dimension. On this see more 
Mark Dawson, ‘The Political Face of Judicial Activism: Europe’s Law-Politics Imbalance’ in Mark Dawson, 
Bruno de Witte and Elise Muir (eds) Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Edward Elgar 2013) 25-
26, he claims that “when balancing market and non-market values, makes an implicit hierarchy between them” 
[reference omitted], at 26. On a narrower comparison of unequal protection of values such as between human 
rights and implementation of federal values see Jacob Öberg, ‘The Rise of the Procedural Paradigm: Judicial 
Review of EU Legislation in Vertical Competence Disputes’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 248, 
274.  
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whether the content and form of union action exceeds what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties or not.80 However proportionality is not limited only to non-exclusive 
competences. As a matter of fact, the principle of proportionality is also relevant for issues in 
which we have areas of exclusive competences thus also related to the conferral of powers.81  
The principle of proportionality is applied through a three-prong test as developed by the 
CJEU.82 First, it is assessed whether the disputed measure is appropriate to achieve legitimate 
objectives. Second, whether this measure is necessary to achieve this objective. Third, at the 
end it is assessed whether the measure at issue is the least intrusive on the applicant’s or 
member states’ interests.83 While the proportionality test within the exercise of EU 
competences carries a lot of resemblance with the proportionality test used in cases of 
fundamental rights still there are grounds for differentiation, especially in light of the general 
interests which are being protected. On the one hand we have autonomy of the individual when 
proportionality is applied in cases involving fundamental rights, and on the other, the autonomy 
of the member states to regulate certain issues when it comes to the exercise of EU 
competences. In the latter case the legitimate objectives that are supposed to be achieved by 
the EU are being limited to the ones that comply with the principle of subsidiarity, while in the 
former case this specific type of limitation does not exist. As result of this proportionality is 
closely tied with subsidiarity when the balancing is conducted in light of the member states 
autonomy.84  
The wording of Article 5 TEU as well as the main logic behind these three principles clearly 
demonstrates the strong relationship between them. After all they are part of a single article 
which regulates the issue of division and exercise of competences in the EU thus there is a 
strong link between the principles. In this sense the conferral of powers determines whether 
there are legal bases for certain EU legal action. Once this is determined then subsidiarity and 
proportionality further determine whether the exercise of non-exclusive competences is done 
at the appropriate level, Union or member state, and how these competences are exercised by 
the EU in regard to the achievement of the legitimate objective. As a matter of fact, the phrase 
of ‘insofar as’ in the provision regulating subsidiarity clearly goes in line with the claim of 
close intertwinement of subsidiarity and proportionality.85 The strong tie between subsidiarity 
and proportionality is to be clearly seen through the fact that the legitimate objective or purpose 
and whether this is better achieved at the Union level is something that is determined through 
subsidiarity. The way in which the legitimate objective or purpose for EU action is defined and 
determined is crucial in claiming that the EU institutions have been in compliance with 
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subsidiarity.86 On the other hand, how this purpose is achieved is determined by 
proportionality. As it was stated above proportionality is directly tied to the legitimate objective 
and the way it is intended to be achieved. Therefore, just as the legitimate objective is an 
essential element of the proportionality test so is subsidiarity or vice versa, proportionality is 
one of the crucial components of subsidiarity.87 Perceived in this way, subsidiarity needs to be 
seen through the lenses of federal proportionality.88 Following this line of thought, the principle 
of subsidiarity would actually answer whether an EU act interferes with the autonomy of 
member states disproportionately.89 This also follows the logic and order of Article 5 TEU, 
starting from a general principle and ending with the principle going into details while all of 
them relate to and regulate the same issue of division and exercise of competences.90  
Accordingly, broader interpretation and implementation of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality easily leads to the broadening of the EU competences, thus breaching the 
principle of conferral of powers, or seen differently, creating a situation in which EU law is 
broader than EU competences.91 In this manner the EU law could regulate an area which is not 
really or completely part of EU competences.  
Lastly, bearing in mind that these principles are regulating the division and exercise of 
competences between the EU and member states, it becomes very logical that striking a balance 
between the interests of the two levels lies at the heart of these principles. Understood in this 
way, all these principles inherently involve an obvious need to take into due consideration the 
interests of member states and their respective autonomy as the division and exercise of 
competences are matters related to the autonomy of both levels. However, this is not something 
that is done by the CJEU in deciding issues of competences.92  
Nevertheless, even according to this sort of understanding, which is not completely accepted 
by the CJEU so far, not all problems are to be solved regarding the competence conundrum. 
As matter of fact many question still remain open and subject to differing interpretations such 
as the meaning and scope of “legitimate objective”,93 what is required for one level to 
“sufficiently” achieve an objective,94 the necessity of certain EU measures and actions and 
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whether they should be balanced with member state interest. As a result of the dynamic nature 
of the division and exercise of competences, but also the innate limits of law, these issues 
cannot simply be encapsulated in just a few legal provisions which would answer all possible 
dilemmas. In this sense, while distinguishing between the three categories of EU competences, 
which was done in the Lisbon Treaty, might have brought some clarity it has definitely not 
solved the burning issues revolving around the division and exercise of competences in the 
EU.95 Nevertheless, since the introduction of these principles into EU law there have been 
several attempts to remedy the existing shortcomings in the process of understanding, 
interpreting and applying these principles in practice. Those attempts have mainly oriented 
towards the political safeguards of subsidiarity and proportionality instead of directly tackling 
the shortcomings of the judicial safeguards that caused more reasons for concern.    
3.2 Political safeguards on the distribution and exercise of competences in the EU   
Since the enactment of the provisions of subsidiarity and proportionality in the Maastricht 
Treaty there have been several attempts to strengthen the implementation of these two 
principles due to the manifested weaknesses in their interpretation and application.96 Based on 
the idea that subsidiarity is primarily a political principle,97 different aspects of the pre-
legislative and legislative procedures in the EU were subject to additional regulation. The main 
instruments and safeguards for subsidiarity and proportionality were frequently put in protocols 
attached to the treaties. 
Based on the European Council conclusions from Edinburgh, the Amsterdam Protocol98 
introduced, above all, procedural guidelines for all EU institutions to comply with these 
principles.99 This obligation was particularly emphasized for the pre-legislative and legislative 
procedures in which a Community action needed to be justified through quantitative and 
qualitative indicators which would indicate the compliance with subsidiarity and 
proportionality.100  
Driven by the wish of further strengthening the ex ante political control of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, and based on the conclusions of the European Convention, the Lisbon Treaty 
has introduced certain changes in this direction. Namely, the main pillar of the reform in the 
sphere of subsidiarity and proportionality was conducted by providing national parliaments an 
active reviewing competence through the establishment of the early-warning mechanism 
(EWM).101 The EWM was introduced in the Lisbon Protocols on subsidiarity and 
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proportionality102 and the role of national parliaments in the EU103 and found its reflection also 
within Article 5 (3) TEU.104 
The EWM foresees an active controlling power of national parliaments in the legislative 
procedure. Under this mechanism there is an obligation for forwarding draft legislative acts, 
primarily originating from the Commission but also other EU institutions, to national 
parliaments along with the legislative proposals of the European Parliament and positions of 
the Council, so these acts can be reviewed in the course of eight weeks in regard to their 
compliance with subsidiarity.105 In case a national parliament is not convinced that such 
compliance exists then they can issue a reasoned opinion which is sent to all three EU 
institutions (European Parliament, European Commission and Council of the EU) involved in 
the legislative procedure. If the view expressed in a reasoned opinion is shared and supported 
by national parliaments which represent at least one-third of the total votes allocated to 
parliaments, taking into consideration that each parliament has two votes regardless of its 
structure, the Commission must take this reasoned opinion into consideration and review the 
draft. Nevertheless, the Commission is not obliged to abide by the opinion and if it decides to 
maintain the proposal it will provide its reasons in a decision.106 This is the so-called yellow 
card procedure. 
Under the second procedure, frequently named as orange card procedure, which is foreseen for 
the ordinary legislative procedure, if a reasoned opinion of national parliaments for non-
compliance of the draft legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity is supported from 
national parliaments which count for at least a simple majority of the votes, then this act must 
be reviewed by the Commission. However, the latter is not bound by the reasoned opinion. If 
the Commission wants to maintain the proposal, then it has to issue a reasoned opinion of its 
own. Additionally, and different from the yellow card, the European Parliament and the 
Council have the opportunity to terminate the legislative procedure upon the proposal if they 
decide with a majority vote or 55 per cent of the members, respectively, to side with the 
reasoned opinion of national parliaments.107   
The EWM, along with the continuing obligation for the Commission to conduct wide 
consultations in the pre-legislative procedure as well as to produce the impact assessment 
reports,108 represent the crucial pillars of political safeguards of subsidiarity in the post-Lisbon 
era. Nevertheless, these political safeguards have shown shortcomings which put their 
efficiency into doubt.  
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More specifically, the EWM has five major shortcomings.109 First, the control conducted by 
national parliaments is applicable only to legislative acts thus it does not include delegated acts 
or judgments of CJEU.110 This limitation also runs against the very wording of Article 5(3) 
TEU which calls on all EU institutions to respect this principle. In this sense this shortcoming 
became even more visible with the euro crisis and the increasing influence of the ECB which 
was also at issue in the OMT case.111 Second, the EWM is limited to subsidiarity and thus it 
does not include the closely related principle of proportionality or even the principle of 
conferral. This has created a situation in which the national parliaments have a very limited 
scope of monitoring dealing only with the issue of whether it is better for the Union to act or 
not.112 Third, the period of eight weeks seems to be very short for any serious review to be 
conducted by national parliaments. While this deadline has not proven to be a great obstacle 
for individual national parliaments as there have been a respectable number of reasoned 
opinions,113 however, the same could not be claimed where mobilization of a critical support 
for a yellow or orange card procedure is required.114 Moreover, this is easily concluded if one 
takes into consideration that so far there have been only two instances in which the yellow card 
procedure was initiated, however in both cases without a significant success, and not a single 
instance in which the orange procedure has been applied.115 Fourth, since the reasoned opinions 
of national parliaments are not totally binding for the Commission they seem to lack strength 
and thus efficiency. In none of the three situations in which a reasoned opinion is sent to the 
Commission it is not obliged to withdraw or alter the proposal.116 The fifth shortcoming has to 
do with ignoring the fact that in most cases the parliamentary majorities stand behind the 
governments in the member states which accompanied with the high level of political party 
discipline makes it rather infeasible for national parliaments to object to something that is 
supposed to be supported by the government and its ministers in the Council.117 Therefore, it 
should not come as a surprise that the bulk of the reasoned opinions from national parliaments 
have originated from ten member states in which the parliaments are able to act independently 
in this sense from the executive power.118  
When it comes to the impact assessment reports, the main shortcoming of this mechanism in 
practice has been that while the report is being written by the Commission in a pre-legislative 
phase its legislative proposal could be subject to amendments later on. Consequently, the report 
might happen not to accurately reflect the potential impact of parts of the enacted legislative 
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act which have been changed during the legislative procedure in the Council and the European 
Parliament.119  
Summing up the arguments on the ex ante political safeguard of subsidiarity, one could argue 
that even though the EWM as well as the other instruments have led to the advancement of the 
political dialogue120 between the EU institutions and the national parliaments, they have still 
not adequately tackled the main issue which has led to their establishment and the overarching 
goal of subsidiarity; that is, the competence creep and gradual centralization of competences 
on the EU level.121 Essentially the roots for the latter two developments could be located in the 
CJEU case law, through the expansive interpretation of EU objectives regulated under Article 
114 TFEU122 and the flexibility clause as regulated by Article 352 TFEU,123 which has been 
accompanied by the extensive legislative reach of the Commission.124 Nevertheless, the 
information produced through the ex ante safeguard of subsidiarity could be highly relevant 
for the process of judicial safeguard of subsidiarity by the CJEU and serve as a good 
information bases for a stricter scrutiny and review.125 Such a scrutiny would not represent a 
substitution of the opinion and judgment of the EU legislative institutions but would only serve 
the purpose of taking subsidiarity more seriously.126  
3.3 The CJEU and the judicial safeguard of distribution and exercise of competences 
In circumstances in which the political processes manifest their weaknesses judicial activism 
inevitably steps in.127 The judicial activism of the CJEU of broadening of EU competences 
which followed a straight line under the banner of further integration, approximation and 
harmonization has been among the main reasons for the introduction of the three principles and 
the strengthening of their political safeguards since the Maastricht Treaty.128 Actually it was 
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the fear of the member states of further unwarranted expansion of EU powers which needed to 
be remedied through these principles.129 However the latter have not really substantially 
influenced the CJEU’s approach. Subsidiarity has never taken an important spot in its case 
law.130 As a matter of fact there is only one decision, the Tobacco Advertising judgment,131 in 
which the CJEU quashed an EU act for disproportionately overstepping the EU competence as 
interpreted through Article 95 TEC.132 However, none have been annulled on basis of 
subsidiarity.133 These facts along with several other reasons lie behind the wide spread criticism 
of the Court’s doctrine and approach towards the distribution and exercise of competences in 
the EU. Even some authors have raised their voice and called for the establishment of a new 
specialized court dealing only with these issues, thus somehow implying the structural bias and 
inadequacy present at the CJEU.134 Accordingly the reasons for these perceptions could be 
located, above all, in the actual approach and judicial doctrine of the CJEU towards the issue 
of EU competences and the structural bias, such as federal and jurisdictional bias, present at 
this court.   
3.3.1 CJEU’s approach 
Taking into consideration the CJEU approach towards division and exercise of competences 
one can recognize three closely related lines of criticism. The first line concerns the 
understanding and judicial safeguard of subsidiarity. The second line is related to the way in 
which proportionality is applied to EU acts in competence disputes. The third line of criticism 
is addressing the lack of an integrated framework which brings together the two principles 
under one jurisdictional test which is the only way to adequately balance the EU and member 
states interests and autonomy. The overarching argument against the CJEU approach, in 
general, is that as result of the high level of deference to the legislative discretion of the EU 
exhibited by the Court by applying low intensity review the Court is not adequately protecting 
or even taking into consideration the regulatory autonomy of member states. However, by 
distinguishing these lines of criticism the intention here is not to diminish the importance of 
the principle of conferral of powers and the overall relationship between the three principles. 
As a matter of fact, the conferral of powers is deeply intertwined with both the subsidiarity and 
proportionality that their breach might also mean a breach of this principle as well. This actually 
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means that the expansion of EU competences through their functional definition leads to a 
situation in which the principle of conferral of powers is blurred and weakened.135  
3.3.1.1 Subsidiarity 
The CJEU reviews the compliance with subsidiarity from two aspects, procedural, as 
established by the protocols, and substantive, as regulated by Article 5(3) TEU.136 The 
procedural aspect essentially represents the judicial safeguard of the obligations set for the EU 
institutions as envisaged by the Lisbon Protocol No. 2 for providing detailed statements on 
compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality and why, taking into consideration the 
objectives behind the draft legislative act, such objectives could be better achieved at the EU 
level.137 However, the CJEU has denied that these obligations impose a duty for the EU 
institutions to state detailed reasons in regard of these two principles. A general statement, or 
recital in the preamble of the specific EU legislative act without referring to subsidiarity, 
suffices in order to fulfill this obligation.138 Thus the CJEU does not deem it necessary for EU 
institutions to state reasons in their detailed statements why specific provisions, which 
obviously raise questions of subsidiarity, are not compromising this principle.139 This stance 
of the CJEU calls for a consideration of the approach taken by it on the substance and 
justification of the detailed statements made by EU legislative institutions.  
The substantive conditions for the respect of subsidiarity consist of determining whether the 
foreseen objectives could be better achieved by the EU than the member states. However, the 
CJEU does not really enter or apply the test of comparative efficiency140 nor does it actually 
enter into a thorough analysis at all. Such an analysis would involve reviewing the justification 
provided not only by looking into the benefits for the Union but also what type of problems or 
costs a certain EU act does incur if the matter is left for the member states to regulate.141 Instead 
of entering such an inquiry the CJEU heavily relies on the reasons stated in the pre-legislative 
and legislative procedure and only demonstrates circular argumentation supporting these very 
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same reasons.142 This creates circumstances under which the EU legislative institutions are not 
taking subsidiarity seriously, both substantively and procedurally.143  
Demonstrating this high level of deference to legislative discretion, the CJEU applies a ‘light 
touch’ scrutiny by providing a broad legal basis under Article 114 TFEU (previously Article 
95 TEC) for EU acts which have as their objective the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market through the removal of obstacles to trade and distortion to competition. Under 
such an approach of the CJEU towards the exercise of competences EU acts could also regulate 
in areas which are not initially part of EU competence but in which such obstacles or distortions 
to trade and competition could allegedly be traced.144 The most recent case, Philip Morris, 
dealing with an issue of exercise of competences, thus subsidiarity and proportionality, proves 
this argument right. 
“In that regard, while a mere finding of disparities between national rules is not 
sufficient to justify having recourse to Article 114 TFEU, it is otherwise where there 
are differences between the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the 
Member States which are such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have 
a direct effect on the functioning of the internal market.”145 
Thus, the CJEU does not distinguish between the areas of regulation and whether they are 
related to an economic activity but only focuses on the objectives which justify EU 
intervention.146  
“The Court has also held that, provided that the conditions for recourse to Article 114 
TFEU as a legal basis are fulfilled, the EU legislature cannot be prevented from relying 
on that legal basis on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the 
choices to be made.”147 
This understanding of legal basis and justification for exercise of competences creates a 
situation in which basically it is impossible to claim that an EU legislation or act runs against 
subsidiarity.148 As long as the objectives set in the specific EU act fall within the realm of 
Article 114 TEU it cannot breach the principle of subsidiarity since they are defined as EU 
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objectives and they could almost by default be better achieved at the Union level. Furthermore, 
even when one or more of the stated purposes or objectives of the respective EU acts could be 
better achieved at a member state level it does not necessary lead to the conclusion of an 
invalidity of the EU act due to the interdependence with the other stated objectives. Thus, by 
bundling of legislative purposes or objectives the EU institutions are circumventing the 
principle of subsidiarity and the CJEU has given this approach a clear go-ahead without any 
proper assessment in light of subsidiarity.149  
More specifically, the CJEU has taken the same approach even in a case in which it was shown 
that one member state could actually better achieve one of the objectives and purposes of the 
enacted EU act.150 This has not even led the Court to second guess the reasons provided by the 
EU institutions for the enactment of the Directive even though there was a clear indication that 
Estonia has managed to achieve the objectives sufficiently well.  
“It follows that the principle of subsidiarity cannot have the effect of rendering an EU 
measure invalid because of the particular situation of a member state, even if it is more 
advanced than others in terms of an objective pursued by the EU legislature, where, as 
in the present case, the legislature has concluded on the basis of detailed evidence and 
without committing any error of assessment that the general interests of the European 
Union could be better served by action at that level.”151  
In this way, invoking the argument that subsidiarity principle is to be seen and applied generally 
in deciding the appropriate level for the accomplishment of EU legislative objectives the CJEU 
has dismissed the claim made by this member state without any attempt to thoroughly justify 
this stance or to take it into consideration when the principle of proportionality is concerned.152 
The very fact that a qualified majority of member states have voted for an EU act does not by 
itself confirm that the principle of subsidiarity has not been breached and that the CJEU should 
apply self-restraint by not properly reviewing the legislative act.153 Even the conscious 
agreement among them to decide in breach of the principle which represents a factual Treaty 
amendment cannot be taken as an argument.154   
These reasons have led to assertions that Article 114 TFEU represents the EU Commerce 
Clause which at the moment is even broader than its US counterpart. While the US Supreme 
Court has succeeded to reduce the scope of the Commerce Clause especially for non-economic 
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activities in Lopez155 and Morrison156 the CJEU has so far left a significant leeway to legislative 
discretion.157 In this manner the CJEU has enabled the EU institutions to broaden the scope of 
EU law even outside of its competences.158 Ironically, these were the exact reasons why the 
principle of subsidiarity was introduced in the first place, to prevent justifications for this sort 
of extensive and broad interpretation of legislative objectives which would justify the 
enactment of EU acts in areas in which the EU lacks competence and member states could 
regulate at least equally good.159  
3.3.1.2 Proportionality 
Once it is determined that a certain issue should be regulated at the EU level, the CJEU also 
looks into the question whether such a regulation is conducted in a manner that is proportionate. 
However, here the CJEU is again criticized for the ‘light touch’ review. Namely, the 
proportionality test for EU acts is substantially less intensive than when applied to the member 
state measures which limit the fundamental freedoms for instance.160 This could be easily 
observed if one looks into the standard which is applied in the former case. The review of 
proportionality of EU institutions is limited only to the standard test which requires the 
applicant to prove that an EU act is “vitiated by a manifest error of assessment or a misuse of 
powers or whether it has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion.”161 Under such a 
standard of review the legislative discretion is rather broad.162  
On the other hand, in determining the proportionality of the EU legislative act through the 
‘manifestly inappropriate’ standard the CJEU only considers whether the act is proportionate 
in relation to the fulfillment of the stated legislative objectives but not if it is proportionate 
when the loss of autonomy of the member states is concerned.163  
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“Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if 
the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the 
competent institution is seeking to pursue.”164  
By omitting the autonomy and interest of the member states when this sort of federal 
proportionality test is being applied the CJEU is essentially taking away the strength of this 
principle and instrument. This sort of application of proportionality compromises the very logic 
and purpose of this principle and therefore the standard of review should definitely be revised 
especially if one takes into consideration that such a light touch review could not be seen even 
in some of the federal states in Europe.165 By considering the autonomy of member states 
within the proportionality principle the CJEU would essentially recognize the obvious link with 
subsidiarity and thus perceive it through the prism of federal proportionality and create a 
coherent framework and doctrine which is lacking.166 The concern for the member states 
autonomy and rather stricter scrutiny was expressed by AG Maduro in Vodafone,167 however 
this remained just a lonely attempt as the CJEU did not take it into consideration even in the 
very same case.   
There are generally two counter-arguments which try to discard this sort of reasoning over a 
stricter proportionality review in the realm of division and exercise of competences. The first 
one invokes the policy considerations in which the CJEU would necessarily have to enter if it 
takes proportionality and its third prong more seriously. This would include a large scale of 
judicial activism, the argument goes, and that is not what the CJEU should do.168 However, 
entering policy considerations is something that courts, especially constitutional courts, 
regularly do also when applying the proportionality test by balancing against individual 
interests.169 Actually, this is done regularly by the CJEU when proportionality is used in regard 
to national measures limiting fundamental freedoms.170  
The second argument is the one forwarded by Craig who argues that in cases in which a non-
compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality was claimed by the parties the stricter scrutiny 
of proportionality, even within a single framework with subsidiarity, would not have influenced 
the outcome of the specific cases.171 This sort of argument misses the larger picture which is 
not solely related to the actual outcome but much more to the fact whether subsidiarity and 
proportionality are taken seriously. At stake here is the credibility and legitimacy of the CJEU 
also from the viewpoint of national courts, including the national constitutional courts. 
Furthermore, the change in its approach not only will reduce the amount of criticism that CJEU 
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is faced with and by it gain the much-needed trust of the national courts but it will also influence 
the legislative process clarifying the requirements under these principles.172  
3.3.1.3 The lack of a single framework of subsidiarity and proportionality 
An additional line of criticism builds upon the previous two and involves another aspect of the 
CJEU’s approach or better said the lack of a coherent approach. Namely, the Court throughout 
its case law refuses to design a single coherent framework in which it would recognize that the 
exercise of non-exclusive competences in the EU needs to be reviewed by bringing together 
both subsidiarity and proportionality.173 As argued by Kumm, both principles should be placed 
in a single jurisdictional test where subsidiarity determines the legitimate purpose and its scope, 
while proportionality determines the way this purpose is being achieved through EU legislative 
acts. In this sense the three prongs of legitimate purpose, necessity and balancing with this 
single jurisdictional test are being split between subsidiarity and proportionality. The third 
prong would also involve the balancing of the legitimate purpose with the autonomy of the 
member states. Applied in this manner this single framework would adequately reflect the spirit 
and proper meaning of Article 5 TEU and the understanding of subsidiarity in terms of federal 
proportionality.174 
3.3.2 Structural bias 
The approach taken by the CJEU on the division and exercise of competences has invited strong 
criticism and has led to questioning of its legitimacy and credibility in this regard. However, 
its legitimacy is being also put under doubt as result of the structural bias that is being 
recognized by some authors.175 This sort of doubts and questioning necessarily compromise 
the perception on the CJEU as a neutral arbiter which is able to strike a fair balance between 
the EU and member states interests. The structural bias in this sense has two dimensions: 
federal and jurisdictional.  
The first dimension is related to the fact that the CJEU is an EU institution and as such an 
institution of a central authority. The CJEU has for a long time been at the forefront of the 
integration process through its doctrines and principles developed throughout the years which 
created the perception that it tends to favor EU’s interests and expand competences.176 Even 
though this type of bias is present in every federal structure such an initial perception and 
assumption of a lack of neutrality of federal constitutional courts is often rebutted through the 
constitutional structure and framework which provides clear legal basis for this neutrality.177 
Equally important is the case law of these federal courts which demonstrates that the respective 
courts are seriously engaged with achieving a fair balance.178 Accordingly, this draws the 
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attention back to the actual approach of the CJEU, which has already been discussed, and to 
another question connected to the jurisdictional bias of the CJEU.  
Following this line of thought, the second dimension of the structural bias depicts the 
jurisdictional limitations for the CJEU when deciding on issues of competence. Namely, when 
balancing between the EU and member states interests in competence disputes the CJEU is not 
competent to interpret or invalidate national constitutions or laws but only EU law. In contrast, 
the federal constitutional and supreme courts in federal states under the banner of supremacy 
of the federal constitutions and federal laws have the power to consider and review state 
constitutions and laws and thus invalidate them. Taking this into consideration the CJEU is 
placed between legal and policy requirements which are rather unbalanced.179 This is mainly 
the result of the confined jurisdiction of the CJEU over national law and the high level of 
deference to EU’s policy consideration which are often contested by member states and to 
which different meanings are given. Although the instruments of the political safeguards of 
subsidiarity and proportionality provide the CJEU with substantial information concerning 
these two principles from the dialogue between member state and EU institutions in the pre-
legislative and legislative procedure, the CJEU has not changed its approach. Therefore, this 
represents another weakness of the judicial safeguard of the division and exercise of 
competences in the EU which is coupled with its ‘light touch’ scrutiny of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. This weakness is even greater if one realizes that in the EU the ‘federal stakes’ 
are much higher in comparison to full-fledged federal states.180 The importance of member 
states autonomy in the EU is way more emphasized and deeply entrenched in comparison to 
any other federal structure.181        
All these arguments on the structural bias just build up on the previous ones related to CJEU’s 
approach and reveal that in essence there have been no substantial adjustments or changes of 
this approach and that the judicial safeguards for division and exercise of competences in the 
EU not only do not create proper solutions, but, on the contrary, remain a cause of concern. 
This is also due to the fact that there are no EU internal incentives for the CJEU to change its 
approach. There are no reasons stemming from the treaties or their reforms, including the 
Lisbon Treaty, for a change in the judicial review of competence issues. Bearing in mind that 
the treaty reforms, despite the statements made during the European Convention,182 have not 
really directly addressed the CJEU case law on the matter of division and exercise of 
competences then one cannot recognize any incentives for the Court to change or adjust its case 
law.183 The reforms have mainly focused on the procedural aspects of the safeguard and not 
really at the root cause for certain concerns among the member states. Therefore, the CJEU has 
not really altered the general line of reasoning and argumentation present in its case law. It 
could be observed that the relevant case law and doctrines date back even to the pre-Lisbon 
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period. As a result of this it becomes very logical that national courts, above all constitutional 
courts, would need to step in to prevent unwarranted centralization.  
4 Constitutional courts and the ultra vires review of EU acts 
The resolution of competence disputes and jurisdictional conflict has been one of the key 
reasons for the proliferation of constitutional review and constitutional courts as institutions.184 
While the resolution of horizontal competence conflicts has been a necessary component of 
constitutional courts’ powers, the prominence of the resolution of vertical conflicts has not 
been less important.185 Actually, there are certain authors who argue in support of a strong 
relationship between federalism and the development and spread of constitutional review as 
well as constitutional courts.186 Such claims have actually been rather concretely manifested in 
two federations, Austria and Belgium, where the structural and functional elements of 
federalism such as division of competences represented a driving force in establishing or 
strengthening the constitutional courts.187 In the words of the renowned scholar of 
constitutional review, Cappelletti, “[h]istorically, constitutionalism and federalism have been 
the two major political forces leading to, and providing the intellectual justifications for, 
judicial review of legislation.”188 In this sense, not only has constitutional review been 
propelled by federalism but also the process of establishment of constitutional courts. In the 
words of Hans Kelsen “[c]onstitutional adjudication attains its greatest importance, however, 
in a federal state.”189 Constitutional courts in this sense represent an objective authority and at 
the same time a forum in which disputes of an arguably political nature could be presented and 
dealt as questions of law.190 This is the case because in every federal structure one of the most 
important political disputes which are subject to constitutional review are the disputes over 
jurisdictional boundaries of different levels of authority, that is, the issue of distribution and 
exercise of competences. Therefore, it could be easily claimed that constitutional courts have 
played a very important role in federal, but also quasi-federal, states. Even though 
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constitutional courts are established as federal institutions, the federal bias has been avoided, 
to a certain extent, by placing them outside of the traditional institutional structure and 
separation of powers scheme within the states. Additionally, the emphasis has been put on the 
fact that their mandate and legitimacy are stemming directly from the constitution therefore 
acquiring certain aura of neutrality.191 Accordingly it should not come as a surprise that all 
federal and quasi-federal or regionalized states in the EU do have a constitutional court which 
is assigned with this specific task.192 Thus, on a national level, constitutional courts have been 
perceived to be the most suitable institutions to have this type of federal mandate determining 
jurisdictional boundaries between different levels of government.  
Nevertheless, with the substantial influence of the EU and integration process the questions 
arises what kind of role constitutional courts should have in a neo-federal structure such as the 
EU. Therefore it should be determined what kind of place and influence they have in 
determining the answer to the ‘decisive question’ of whether there is a single institution 
according to law which will make a final decision on matters related to claims of EU acts being 
ultra vires.193 Competence disputes have crucial importance and are embodied within the 
nature and function of national constitutional courts in the EU, therefore it is argued here that 
under certain conditions constitutional courts should be entitled to exercise the reverse or 
external federal mandate through the ultra vires review of EU acts when these jeopardize the 
distribution of competences in the EU and lead to an unchecked expansion of EU competences. 
Taking this into consideration, there are two important issues that need to be resolved in order 
for one to convincingly argue for the ultra vires review of EU acts by the constitutional courts 
of the member states. The first issue is related to the reasons behind this type of review of EU 
acts which are not related to the purely national and ideational arguments revolving around 
sovereignty and democracy, but are rather more functional and neutral, thus do not carry any 
type of bias either related to the EU or member states. The second issue is related to the actual 
design, elements and conditions under which a reverse or external federal mandate is to be 
exercised by the constitutional courts through their ultra vires review. This review is being 
conceived here in a manner which does not jeopardize the overall unity of EU law and the 
institutional balance in the EU and it complies with normative values of constitutional 
pluralism, however, at the same time preserves jurisdictional boundaries as authorized by 
national constitutions. The remainder of this section will address both of these issues.  
4.1 Reasons behind the external federal mandate – placing the ultra vires review in the 
frames of constitutional pluralism 
The most important grounds upon which certain constitutional courts have argued for their EU 
federal mandate to be exercised in the form of the ultra vires review have been related to 
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sovereignty and democracy as ideational reasons and justifications.194 More precisely, the 
argument goes that through the limited transfer of sovereign powers to the EU, the member 
states have not relinquished their right to exclusively determine the jurisdictional boundaries, 
meaning that the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz has not been transferred to the EU.195 
Therefore as ‘Masters of the Treaties’196 and based on the principle of democracy,197 member 
states, also through their highest courts, retain the last say on competence conflicts in the EU.198 
This sort of state centered approach, which has often been subject to criticism, under 
circumstances of a multilevel structure such as the EU and existing plurality of constitutional 
orders is doubtfully conducive to the coherence and unity of EU law as it pushes for the 
supremacy of the national constitutions as opposed to the supremacy of EU law. Under such 
circumstances the chances of irresolvable conflicts are greater as both propositions are 
mutually exclusive. As matter of fact the claim for a judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz by, above 
all, the FCC and some of the other constitutional courts is essentially once again introducing 
the strict hierarchical relationship between different legal orders199 which is neither compatible 
with or fitting the actual reality in the EU and its neo-federal character, nor with the normative 
assumption of how it is supposed to be according to constitutional pluralism. In this way, by 
insisting on having the last word the national judicial supremacy and ‘Diktat’ is essentially 
replacing the European one leaving no room for flexible legal solutions which are being 
required especially on competence disputes.200 Therefore this sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
should be left open and undecided because determining who has the final say on competence 
issues in the EU proves to be rigid and inflexible as opposed to balancing of competences by 
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deciding which approach is more apt for solving possible jurisdictional conflicts in the EU.201 
In this sense putting aside the Kompetenz-Kompetenz justification does not mean an outright 
denial of the justification of ultra vires review based on the principle of democracy and 
sovereignty but rather excludes a hierarchical perception which calls for the existence of a ‘last 
word’ power placed in the member states and their institutions, above all constitutional 
courts.202 Therefore the ideational reasons for ultra vires review revolving around democracy 
and sovereignty should be reconfigured to the new reality. More important place should be 
given to other rather neutral and functional arguments which would justify constitutional courts 
intervention in determining jurisdictional boundaries. This, however, would not exclude the 
invocation of the very same constitutional and legal bases for the employment of the external 
federal mandate of constitutional courts.203  
Contrary to the ideational reasons behind the ultra vires review which are very much imbued 
with traditional notions rooted in the nation-state there are functional reasons for such a review 
of EU acts by national constitutional courts. Actually, these functional reasons are rather 
neutral and different from the ideational reasons and they are not based on traditional notions 
which are often used and instrumentalized for either member state or EU supremacy or 
exclusivity, thus introducing a bias which is damaging the constructive division of 
competences. The functional reasons actually reduce the pressure created by the traditional 
ideational reasons behind the ultra vires review by constitutional courts which strongly 
gravitate toward the national constitutional supremacy and (re)introduce hierarchical ordering 
of the legal orders in the EU. There are three general functional reasons behind the involvement 
of constitutional courts in matters of distribution and exercise of competences in the EU which 
do not imply a hierarchical relation between the national and EU legal order. 
The first reason has to do with the fact that the EU represents a neo-federal structure which as 
a result of coupling federalism with constitutional pluralism necessitates the redefinition of the 
established principles of federalism, above all the principle of supremacy of the federal legal 
order and the federal judiciary.204 However, not only is neo-federalism requiring this 
redefinition but also there are doubts whether federalism is truly compatible with this type of 
hierarchy.205 Namely, Hans Kelsen has clearly argued that the promotion of any type of 
subordination to federal law and the precedence of this law over the legal order of the 
constituent members is in itself paradoxical and not compatible with the idea of a federal 
state.206 According to Kelsen it is the federal mandate of a constitutional court to ensure that:  
“[a] legal act of the union that steps over the boundary drawn for it by the constitution 
of the whole, and that penetrates into the sphere of competences of the constituent state, 
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has, from a legal point of view, no more right to exist than the legal act of a constituent 
state that interferes with the competence of the union.”207 
The best proof that these arguments which Kelsen had made are not only of theoretical value 
is the fact that in Belgium there is no primacy clause in the constitution which would regulate 
precedence of federal law over the law of federal units.208  
Taking all this into consideration, if legal hierarchy of this sort is not in line with the idea of a 
federal state but has in essence resulted, perhaps most importantly, from the aspiration to 
further the centralizing tendencies in federations under the banner of uniformity and coherence, 
then this should resonate even stronger in a neo-federal structure such as the EU. If it is quite 
common for a federation to determine the division of competences as a federal rule under which 
both the competences of the central and constitutive authorities are being determined, in the 
EU as neo-federal structure this is not the case.209 The EU treaties do not determine the member 
states’ exclusive competences, but they are rather confined solely to EU competences. This 
was the direct result of the strong will of member states during the Convention to avoid this 
federal logic and impression.210 Furthermore, this type of regulation of competences finds its 
reflection also on the CJEU powers which do not include the review of national constitutions 
and laws because of which it cannot claim the judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Consequently, 
if the EU does not incorporate all the elements of a federal structure then there is no logic for 
it to include judicial supremacy and safeguards which are foreseen in federal states. Therefore, 
whenever the safeguards of this neo-federal structure are not fulfilling their function of 
respecting and preserving the heterarchy between legal orders and neutralize strong 
centralizing tendencies then this further creates a situation in which there is a strong case and 
justification for intervention by the national constitutional courts. The design, character and 
nature of the safeguarding instruments in the EU actually lead to the other two reasons for ultra 
vires review.  
The second functional reason behind the ultra vires review is related to a specific design of 
some of the safeguards against compromising the division and exercise of powers in favor of 
the EU. Namely, the EWM which was introduced with the Lisbon Treaty is actually an 
instrument which is not present in any of the other federal systems. Therefore, the EU as a neo-
federal structure has an actual safeguard of member state competences which is completely 
new and redefines the position and possibility of direct intervention of national institutions in 
the EU legislative processes without them being part of an EU institution, such as the Council 
of the EU. In this way national parliaments are conducting an ex ante political safeguard and a 
form of legislative control or review limited to proportionality and subsidiarity. Taking this 
into consideration there is a case for making the argument that the intervention of constitutional 
courts in light of the nature of their constitutional review, which nature is much more legislative 
than judicial, in the ex post judicial safeguard of proportionality and subsidiarity in the EU 
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would be justifiable in this sense. In both ex ante and ex post review of EU legislative acts one 
would have national institutions involved, both parliaments and constitutional courts, which 
are acting as positive and negative legislators respectively. Therefore, under specific conditions 
where the CJEU does not provide an adequate safeguard for the division and exercise of 
competences in the EU, then the constitutional courts would have every right to step in with 
their external federal mandate. The latter would thus compensate for the evident weakness of 
the EWM but also weaknesses of the judicial safeguard. In this sense, the actual design of the 
competence safeguards is closely related to their actual functioning in practice which is even 
more important. 
The third functional reason supporting the external federal mandate is related to the fact how 
the safeguards of division and exercise of competences actually work in practice and whether 
they are able to neutralize strong centralizing tendencies in a (neo)federal order of competences 
such as the EU. As a matter of fact, if there is a new reading of federalism in the EU context, 
then also the principles and mechanisms relating to the focal functional dimension of the 
federal principle, the division and exercise of powers, need to be reconceptualized. They need 
to be reassessed from this new perspective and additional mechanisms need to be introduced 
in order for traditional federal principles of conferral of powers, subsidiarity and 
proportionality to be protected and their safeguards to be adjusted to the needs of a neo-federal 
structure.  
In this sense, if the CJEU has been the EU institution which fashioned a constitutional 
framework for a federal-type structure in Europe then it is reasonable to claim that there should 
be an external judicial check to this sort of development which has resulted also from a certain 
disregard towards EU law by the member state institutions at the outset of the creation of the 
fundamental legal principles which represent the basic legal features of the EU as a (neo)federal 
structure.211 Furthermore, by sticking to a functional definition of competences the CJEU has 
essentially weakened the principle of conferral of powers and has expanded the scope of also 
the EU competences.212 Therefore, the need for an external judicial check comes as a direct 
result of not only the inconsistency of the strict hierarchical relationship of the legal orders with 
(neo)federalism existing in the EU, but also as result of the weaknesses of the existing 
safeguards of the EU which have not been able to truly cope with the centralizing tendencies 
and the introduction of hierarchy through the back door.213  
As discussed above, both the political and judicial safeguards of the division of competences 
have manifested serious flaws. The introduction of the EWM was meant to remedy the federal 
bias issue on the side of the CJEU manifesting centralizing tendencies, however it has not been 
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perceived to be successful. On the one hand, the limited scope and insufficiency of the EWM 
have not been able to prevent the negative effects of the narrow understanding and application 
of proportionality but even more so when it comes to subsidiarity. As a matter of fact, the latter 
instead of softening and diluting hierarchy in the EU is actually further entrenching a ‘hidden 
hierarchy’ also in the area of exercise of non-exclusive competences.214 The CJEU, on the other 
hand, is supposed to remedy the weaknesses of the EWM but instead has continued to 
extensively interpret EU competences thus, by not completely respecting the principles of 
conferral, proportionality and subsidiarity, further manifested the contested federal bias. The 
intervention of the national constitutional courts under specific circumstances would play a 
constructive role following the logic of ‘emergency brake’215 or ‘nuclear option’216 which 
serves best when not used. However, this latter point should not be misinterpreted that such a 
break should not be used under any circumstances, as it is often claimed lately217 because this 
runs against the very reason of existence of an emergency brake. If it is not supposed to be ever 
used, then there is no reason for it to be there as it would only represent a useless waste of time 
and resources giving a false impression of its purpose. On the contrary, if the emergency break 
is frequently used then this would be an obvious signal that something is totally out of line and 
the system is not working as it should, thus requiring major reforms. Therefore, the logic behind 
the emergency brake in this context, as in every other, is that it should be used very cautiously 
and in emergency situations only. This logic on its own determines that any abuse should 
necessarily lead to raising a question of responsibility for such a (mis)conduct. In this sense, if 
the extensive reading of competences through a judge made law by the CJEU has been the root 
cause of member states concerns in this regard, then it is up to their judicial instances to place 
a check on the CJEU.218 As Bogdandy and Bast put it “[a] restraint on judge-made law requires 
other instruments than a modification of the order of competences.”219 This other instrument 
should be the external federal mandate of national constitutional courts.  
Determining the reasons and justification for an external federal mandate of national 
constitutional courts is just creating the bases for such an intervention. Nevertheless, it does 
not answer the question of the design, actual application and limits of the ultra vires review. 
Before turning to these aspects of ultra vires review one needs to first take a look at the origin 
and development of this review of EU acts from the viewpoint of the case-law of respective 
constitutional courts. 
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4.2 The origins and evolution of the ultra vires review 
The ultra vires review of EU acts and measures, or as it is referred here, the external federal 
mandate of national constitutional courts, has once again been established and developed by 
the FCC, similarly to other doctrines on the relationship between the legal orders in the EU. 
Even though this sort of review was announced or alluded in earlier decisions,220 the FCC has 
unequivocally established its powers to directly review EU acts in this light in its Maastricht 
decision. In the Maastricht decision the FCC referred quite clearly to the so-called ideational 
reasons for declaring this type of review power, such as the state origin of EU powers and the 
need for democratic legitimization by national institutions, reasoning that through the conferral 
of sovereign powers the member states have not also conferred the Kompetenz-Kompetenz to 
the EU and that the member states remain the ‘Masters of the Treaties’.221 This is the direct 
result of the fact that even though EU law is autonomous, it still does not have an original 
source and origin.222 This means that there is no possibility of expanding limited EU 
competences beyond the ones which are conferred by avoiding and circumventing the treaty 
amendment procedure through judicial interpretations of EU law and its principles.223 
Therefore, such an EU act which is not covered by the competences conferred upon the EU 
will constitute an “ausbrechenden Rechtsakt” and German institutions are under a 
constitutional duty not to apply such an act.224 Accordingly, whether the EU institutions have 
acted within limited competences conferred to them will be reviewed by the FCC. The 
constitutional and legal basis for such a review is directly related to the so-called European 
integration agenda which is set with the Act of Approval (Zustimmungsgesetz) in accordance 
with Article 23(1) GG and which review could also be activated through Article 38(1) GG 
protecting the right to vote.225 Even though the ultra vires review has been further developed 
with subsequent decisions the legal basis for the review has remained the same.   
The Lisbon decision has confirmed the reasoning on ultra vires review laid down in the 
Maastricht decision, however, it framed it within the newly established principle of openness 
towards European law.226 This has led to certain clarifications and qualifications over the 
possible exercise of the ultra vires review. Namely, the ultra vires review is to be considered 
only under exceptional circumstance as an ultima ratio in case a legal protection cannot be 
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obtained at EU level.227 Further, taking into consideration the viability as well as the unity and 
coherence of EU legal order the FCC declared a monopoly on the exercise of ultra vires 
review.228 Lastly, even though the Maastricht decision mentioned the principle of subsidiarity 
in this context the FCC in the Lisbon decision established the link between the ultra vires 
review and the respect for the principle of subsidiarity.229  
There has been one issue argued by some authors which is related to a terminological difference 
between the Lisbon and Maastricht decision of the FCC. More specifically it has been argued 
that the introduction of a new wording through ‘ultra vires’ in the Lisbon decision instead of 
the earlier ‘ausbrechenden Rechtsakt’230 has led not only to a change in wording but also in 
character. In this sense, on the basis of one paragraph of the Lisbon decision, the ultra vires 
review is to be perceived as a doctrine of public international law argued by some authors.231 
While it is a fact that generally ultra vires review originates from public international law, it is 
also a fact that in this particular relationship between the legal orders of the member states and 
the EU this review is based also on the specificities of EU law. Therefore, the ultra vires review 
is justified and practiced with regard to these specificities and treatment of EU law through 
which this law is deliniated from public international law.232 Accordingly, one has to bear in 
mind that the clarifications presented in the Lisbon decision are directly the result of the respect 
for the newly created principle of openness towards European law.233 As a matter of fact, 
perceiving the EU legal order as different from the international legal order carries even 
stronger arguments for justifying the ultra vires review.234 In this sense, the notion of the last 
word under relationships between the legal orders, which the FCC itself declares to represent 
“contexts of political order which are not structured according to strict hierarchy”,235 is even 
more emphasized through the prism of public international law than through the constitutional 
or the prism of constitutional pluralism. Furthermore, the use of the phrase of “ultra vires 
review” adds to the universalisability, which is called upon by Maduro and Kumm in the 
context of constitutional pluralism, in order for this sort of review to be understood and applied 
universally by all constitutional courts in the EU thus engaging in a compatible and comparable 
practice of review.236 
Nevertheless, just as in the Maastricht decision, and also in the Lisbon decision, ultra vires 
review was discussed on a more abstract level, confirming the power to conduct an ultra vires 
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review as a matter of principle without further clarification on how it would be applied or the 
basis оf the elements of this review, especially in light of the principle of openness towards 
European law. Against this background and development, the Honeywell decision seems to be 
the most important in this regard. Namely, in this decision in which the FCC was called to 
review the strongly disputed Mangold decision of the CJEU237 and whether it was ultra vires, 
the FCC actually provided the elements and design of the ultra vires review for the first time.238  
The FCC in Honeywell determined that in order to respect the principle of openness towards 
European law, as well as the primacy and unity of EU law,239 ultra vires review needs to be 
qualified.240 In this sense the ultra vires review will be exercised reservedly and only in cases 
where the breach of competences is sufficiently qualified. The latter would occur only when 
the EU act is, first, manifestly in violation of competences, that is specifically violating the 
principle of conferral, and, second, the challenged EU act is highly significant in the structure 
of competences between the member states and the Union.241 However the FCC would exercise 
the ultra vires review only after it sends the issue through a preliminary reference to the CJEU 
so it could consider the validity and interpretation of the EU act at question unless it has not 
already done so.242 In assessing the preliminary ruling in such a case the FCC is supposed to 
show certain level of deference over the methodology employed by the CJEU as well as the 
result by according it with a right to tolerance of error.243 Nevertheless, such deference is not 
to blur the line which needs to be drawn between the interpretation and development of EU 
law by the CJEU and unwarranted expansion of EU competences which essentially amounts to 
a de facto amendment of the Treaties.244  
The FCC applied all these elements of the ultra vires review on the Mangold decision however 
it decided that it was not an ultra vires act.245 Even though the review was applied the standards 
that it includes remained unclear.246 While the FCC had several opportunities to tackle this 
issue247 it took it six years to once again address the standards within the elements of the ultra 
vires review.  
In the preliminary reference sent to the CJEU on the OMT the FCC clearly confirmed the 
Honeywell test and discussed it in the context of the OMT decision of the ECB.248 The FCC 
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clearly hinted that the OMT might be declared ultra vires unless the CJEU interprets this 
decision in line with what has been argued by the FCC.249 Therefore the reference has not 
introduced any further clarifications of the standards in the ultra vires review.250 However, this 
was different with the OMT decision of the FCC which was delivered after the CJEU 
preliminary ruling.  
The FCC in its OMT decision251 has introduced further clarifications to the standards of the 
ultra vires review, however, with a strong critical undertone for the CJEU and the shortcomings 
of its judicial safeguard for the division and exercise of competences in the EU.252 After 
confirming the basic elements and standards of the ultra vires review as established in the 
Honeywell decision, the FCC went on to provide some additional clarification which gives it 
more leeway in exercising the ultra vires review thus by lowering the thresholds of its standards 
making this review less restrained compared to Honeywell.  
First, a manifest exceeding of competences of an EU act is in the case when “the competence 
cannot be justified under any legal standpoint”.253 Additionally, determining this standard or 
element is not conditioned by an existence of a consensus even among the academia, politics 
or media. This means that “[a]n exceeding of competences can be “manifest” even if it results 
from a careful and meticulously reasoned interpretation”.254  
Second, an EU act would represent a structurally significant shift to the detriment of the 
member states “if the exceeding of competences carries considerable weight for the principle 
of democracy and the sovereignty of the people” which means that “it is capable of altering 
fundamental competences of the European Union” and that in essence it would require a treaty 
amendment or the employment of an evolutionary clause.255  
Third, and perhaps most important, the FCC seriously reduced the leeway provided with the 
CJEU’s right of tolerance of error by providing certain limits. Namely, in applying its methods 
of interpretation,256 which are based on common constitutional traditions of the member states, 
the CJEU should not manifestly ignore “the traditional European methods of interpretation, or 
more broadly, the general legal principles that are common to the legal system of the Member 
States”257 and thus act “in a way that is objectively arbitrary”.258 This third point is actually a 
lot clearer and gains force when the FCC directly criticizes the type and standard of review 
employed by the CJEU in safeguarding the division of competences between the EU and the 
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member states and particularly the respect of the principle of conferral259 as a principle of EU 
law which also incorporates constitutional principles from the member states.260 In this sense, 
the FCC criticizing the weak judicial review argues that “[i]f fundamental interests of the 
Member States are affected, as is generally the case when dealing with competences in a union 
(Verbandskompetenz), judicial review may not simply accept the asserted positions of organs 
of the European Union without verification.”261   
The most recent instance in which ultra vires review has been referred to by the FCC is its 
second preliminary reference to the CJEU which has confirmed the elements and standards of 
this type of review established in the previous case law. Namely, the FCC’s preliminary 
reference on the Quantitative Easing or more precisely the Public Sector Purchase Program of 
the ECB and the issue of the relationship between the monetary and economic or fiscal policy 
in the EU has entrenched the link between Honeywell and OMT decision on the ultra vires 
review without adding any new elements.262 While the FCC has changed the tone of the 
reference compared to the OMT referral, which tone is now friendlier and reserved, the 
reasoning closely resembles the OMT decision thus leaving any potential clarifications to be 
made upon receiving the ruling from the CJEU.263 In this sense, for the time being the state of 
FCC’s ultra vires review remains the same as from the OMT decision. 
4.3 The scope of ultra vires review and its relationship with other forms of review  
While the standards and elements of the ultra vires review have been clarified to a certain 
extent in the case-law of the FCC some aspects of this review remain unanswered. These 
aspects relate directly to the scope of the review and the status of ultra vires review in relation 
to the so-called identity review and fundamental rights review.  
The FCC in its case-law has argued for the limited scope of the ultra vires review especially in 
light of specific constitutional principles but also with consideration for the interests of the EU 
legal order. Namely, this could be argued by looking at the elements of this type of review 
which at the same time represent procedural and substantive limits. The former relate to the 
declared monopoly of the FCC to conduct ultra vires review and only after the CJEU has an 
opportunity through the preliminary reference sent by the FCC itself to decide on the 
interpretation and validity of the EU act at stake, unless the CJEU has already dealt with the 
same issue before. The latter, substantive, limits are related to the manifest breach of 
competences and the significant structural shift threshold. However, there is another dimension 
of the scope of the ultra vires review which needs to be resolved in order to better position and 
evaluate it in the framework of constitutional pluralism. From the case law of the FCC it is not 
clear whether the ultra vires review is aimed at respect of the principle of conferral only, which 
would be a narrow understanding of this review, or if it also includes the review of the respect 
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for the principle of subsidiarity thus having an ultra vires review in a broader sense.264 Hence, 
the question that is raised here is whether the FCC confines the ultra vires review to the 
principle of conferral or if it assumes that this review also includes the principle of subsidiarity 
taking into consideration the relationship between the two principles. This issue is not a purely 
theoretical one as it does reveal the understanding of the FCC on how competences are 
conceived in the EU and accordingly the manner in which an ultra vires review should be 
employed. 
In both the Maastricht and Lisbon decisions the FCC has declared the link between the issue 
of review and safeguard of the division and exercise of competence in the EU with the principle 
of subsidiarity. In Maastricht this was done indirectly by defining subsidiarity and its relation 
to the principle of conferral by stating that “if a power to act is conferred by Treaty, the 
principle of subsidiarity shall be used to determine whether and how the European Community 
may act”265 and that “[t]he principle of subsidiarity, the observance of which is to be monitored 
by the European Court of Justice, is intended to protect the national identity of the member 
states and to preserve their powers.”266 
In the Lisbon decision of the FCC the link between the ultra vires review and subsidiarity was 
directly established267 through reasoning that: 
“the Federal Constitutional Court examines whether legal instruments of the European 
institutions and bodies keep within the boundaries of the sovereign powers accorded to 
them by way of conferral whilst adhering to the principle of subsidiarity under 
Community and Union law.”268 
Against this background, when it came to clarify this abstract reasoning of the FCC on ultra 
vires suddenly there was no mentioning of subsidiarity in this context. More specifically in 
Honeywell and OMT decision in the respective paragraphs which discuss the ultra vires review 
it is only the principle of conferral which is being in the spotlight. This raises questions also 
regarding the constitutional bases for the ultra vires review, Article 23 (1) GG, because this 
constitutional provision might be interpreted in a way that infers that the respect of subsidiarity 
should be included in the ultra vires review of EU acts as well.269  
One explanation for the reason behind this approach of the FCC is that in none of the issues 
raised in these cases the matter of respect of the principle of subsidiarity was at stake. They 
were all related to competences which were exercised by the EU institutions but were claimed 
not to have been transferred upon the EU. However, this explanation omits one feature. If we 
take into consideration that the FCC in these decisions went into generally clarifying the 
elements and standards of ultra vires review before actually applying it, then ignoring the 
principle of subsidiarity becomes a notable point. As a matter of fact, in the OMT decision the 
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FCC openly criticized the CJEU for its light touch scrutiny of the division of competences, i.e. 
the conferral of powers principle, but it did not invoke the actual exercise of non-exclusive 
conferred powers and thus subsidiarity, which is a major concern.270 Therefore, it is not clear 
whether this means a departure from a broader understanding of ultra vires review which was 
obviously adopted in earlier cases, Maastricht and Lisbon, and replacing it with an ultra vires 
review in a narrower sense. Nevertheless, there are serious indications that this is taking place. 
First, it was the introduction of the second substantive standard of ‘significant structural shift’ 
which excludes a review of a more nuanced and subtle way of acquiring powers by the EU 
institutions. Second, has to do with the way the FCC views competences generally and their 
division between member states and the EU. It is argued that the FCC views the EU 
competences more as ones based on fields rather than as competences based on aims, that is 
functional competences.271 As result it might be possible to claim that this sort of understanding 
of competences could have influenced the FCC to put aside the review of the respect of 
subsidiarity through the framework of ultra vires review and instead focus solely on the 
principle of conferral of powers.   
Another issue which has occupied the interest of scholars is the standing of ultra vires review 
in relation to the identity review and the fundamental rights review. Simon argues, for instance, 
that the difference between these three types of review is exaggerated and that they should be 
approached together due to their structural commonalities.272 Against such views there are 
strong arguments for the independent existence of ultra vires which in the end were also 
confirmed by the FCC. When it comes to the differences between the ultra vires review and 
fundamental rights issues273 they are generally related to the reasons why a certain EU act or 
measure is challenged and the consequences which result from these two types of review. First, 
in the case of ultra vires review the reason for one act to be declared ultra vires is a certain 
defect which is related to the breach of competences. In the case of an infringement of 
fundamental rights this could occur because of procedural reasons on the side of the level of 
protection exercised by the CJEU or simply because of a diverging understanding and different 
definitions of certain fundamental rights.274 Thus, in such a case it does not imply a defect of 
an EU act. Second, declaring an EU act ultra vires necessarily includes its reproach and it 
applies to all member states since the defect is related to the division of competences between 
all member states and the EU. With fundamental rights this is not the case as the level of 
protection and definition of fundamental rights could have certain specificities in separate 
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member states because of which the infringement of fundamental rights could be sort of 
localized.275  
The later point is also applicable to the relationship between ultra vires and identity review, as 
the elements of the constitutional identity could be country specific, however there is another 
point which is more important. This point is related to what the subject of the review is. In this 
regard the FCC has directly given the answer itself and put the scholarly discussion to rest for 
the time being. In the OMT decision the FCC clearly distinguished ultra vires from identity 
review, even though they are based on same constitutional grounds, by stating that while the 
former is reviewing the EU acts from a jurisdictional aspect the latter is focused on the 
substantive aspect.276 Under the identity review it is not relevant whether the impugned act is 
in breach of the transferred competences or not. What matters in such a case is whether there 
is a breach of the fundamental constitutional principles which form part of the constitutional 
identity. Even objections to this sort of separation between the two types of review based on 
the claim that every EU act which breaches the constitutional identity is essentially an act ultra 
vires cannot be accepted as this is oversimplifying the situation in which the issue of 
constitutional identity could be raised. The third preliminary reference of the ICC on the 
Taricco issue exemplifies this point quite strongly. In this reference the claim for a potential 
breach of constitutional identity was not related to a claim of an ultra vires EU act. 
4.4 Ultra vires review in a comparative perspective 
The ultra vires review of EU acts has been first established and developed by the FCC. 
However, doubts are being raised whether this is an exclusively German doctrine which is not 
really accepted and applied by other constitutional courts in the EU. The FCC itself has stated 
that its stances and doctrines on EU law including the ultra vires review are shared by many 
national constitutional courts in the EU.277 This has been subject of scholarly debates. For 
instance Claes, in her recent work, has voiced skepticism and serious criticism of this attempt 
of the FCC to present its doctrines as widely accepted by the other constitutional courts thus 
representing a pattern of a common European approach.278 Accordingly the ultra vires review 
of EU acts remains more or less to be a purely German legal phenomenon to which some of 
the other national constitutional courts in the EU have referred but have never developed any 
clear theory of competence review.279 Nevertheless, the arguments presented by Claes are not 
focused solely on ultra vires review but usually are presented together and somehow 
interchangeably with the ones on identity review. This actually reveals the gaps in the 
argumentation, the same thing for which the FCC is being criticized.  
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Perhaps it was as the result of this and other similar negative accounts that the FCC in its OMT 
decision has extended the list of decision of national constitutional courts and supreme courts 
which share its views on the limited precedence of EU law in light of limited conferred 
competences and constitutional identity.280 Still, one should look into some of these decision 
in order to analyze the extent to which ultra vires review is accepted by other constitutional 
courts in Europe because the FCC makes this account on a broader basis relating to the 
relativity of the primacy or precedence of EU law. 
While Claes basically claims that not even the clearest instances of acceptance of the ultra vires 
review developed by the FCC are convincing enough, the case law of several constitutional 
courts proves these claims wrong. The CCC, PCT and HCC have unequivocally stated that 
they would have the power to conduct such a review while Belgium, as one of the most 
Europhile courts, and Spain have clearly alluded such a possibility.281 In the case of the CCC, 
this constitutional court was the first to actually directly apply the ultra vires review and declare 
a decision of the CJEU ultra vires and inapplicable in the Czech Republic. Regardless of the 
actual effects of this decision which were very much confined to this specific member state it 
cannot be denied that it is obvious that the CCC accepts the power to conduct ultra vires review. 
The latter was clearly declared in both of its Lisbon decisions.282 Namely, in the Lisbon Treaty 
II decision by referring to the decision Lisbon Treaty I the CCC declared that:  
“the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic too will (may) although in view of the 
foregoing principles – function as an ultima ratio and may review whether any act by 
Union bodies exceeded the powers that the Czech Republic transferred to the European 
Union pursuant to Article 10a of the Constitution. However, the Constitutional Court 
assumes that such a situation can occur only in quite exceptional cases; these could 
include, in particular, abandoning the identity of values and, as already cited, exceeding 
of the scope of conferred competences.”283 
In adopting the ultra vires review the CCC closely followed FCC’s footsteps by restraining 
this type of review to exceptional cases in which there are no legal remedies at the EU level. 
However, there is no mentioning of an obligation for sending a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU before exercising an ultra vires review. In its Holubec decision,284 in which this review 
was applied, the ultra vires review was neither further developed nor were any elements of 
restraint in its application presented, since the CJEU had already ruled on the same matter and 
this decision was subject to review and declared as ultra vires by the CCC. 
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Also, contrary to Claes’ arguments,285 the PCT has also endorsed ultra vires review. It is true 
that the PCT has not elaborated in detail on this type of review or completely taken over all the 
elements and standards from the FCC, but nevertheless it has assumed its power to conduct 
such a review. This was already inferred in the Accession Treaty286 and Lisbon Treaty decision 
by clearly claiming Poland’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz thus paving the way for ultra vires 
review.287 The EU Regulation decision confirmed the power of the PCT to conduct ultra vires 
review as a subsidiary review which would be exercised only as an ultima ratio.288  
The HCC has declared to have the power to conduct ultra vires review even before the 
enactment of the new constitution – Fundamental Law – in 2011 with its Lisbon Treaty 
decision.289 However, its further dealings with ultra vires review are rather puzzling. Namely 
in the criticized290 recent decision from 2016 the HCC puts forward a very confusing reasoning 
on this matter, but also on other issues related to the relationship of national constitutional law 
with EU law. Even though it accepts the ultra vires review the HCC departs in many aspects 
from the one developed by the FCC. First, the ultra vires review according to the HCC’s 
approach consists of two types of review, sovereignty and identity review.291 Second, the ultra 
vires review does not foresee a review of EU acts including decisions of the CJEU.292 Thirdly, 
there is nothing on sending a preliminary reference to the CJEU prior to the conduct of ultra 
vires review.293 Actually the HCC has demonstrated an odd understanding of constitutional 
dialogue in the EU mainly conceived in an indirect form by referring to the case law of other 
constitutional and supreme courts thus unsuccessfully imitating the FCC.294 Be this as it may, 
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once again it is obvious that another constitutional court in the EU has embraced the power to 
control the division and exercise of the competences in the EU.295  
Lastly, when it comes to the SCT the situation is the least clear when it comes to ultra vires 
review. The SCT has stated in its Constitutional Treaty decision that there are constitutional 
limits on the exercise of EU competences which were conferred by the member states.296 While 
it could be easily inferred from this stance that the SCT reserves a power for itself to review 
this, nevertheless the SCT has never made this explicit or developed it any further.297  
As it could be observed there are several national constitutional courts in the EU which have 
already adopted the ultra vires review therefore this type of review cannot be claimed to be a 
purely German legal phenomenon.298 It is true that the FCC, as in several other aspects of the 
relationship between national constitutional law and EU law, is at the forefront of the 
establishment and development of legal doctrines which have been later adopted by other 
constitutional and supreme courts and ultra vires review is just another example. While certain 
constitutional courts still need to define the elements and standards of the adopted type of 
review it is very much expected that some of the other constitutional courts will join this group 
in the not so distant future. As a matter of fact, there is another group of constitutional courts 
which have already set constitutional limits to European integration following a similar logic 
and reasoning without declaring their power to review the division and exercise of competences 
in the EU.299  
Beyond any type of categorization or classification, the very fact that the ultra vires review is 
not adopted explicitly by some of the other constitutional courts in Europe as part of their 
review powers regarding EU law does not deny the arguments why this review is normatively 
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acceptable and even desirable under certain conditions when placed in the framework of 
constitutional pluralism and in light of the fact that the EU is not a full-fledged federation. In 
this sense whether the FCC is a ‘leader of a pack’ or not300 does not have a great normative 
value.301 Consequently, what needs to be looked at is under which conditions and in which 
form an ultra vires review should be exercised in order to optimally fit the reality of 
constitutional pluralism and EU law.         
5 The compatibility of ultra vires review with EU law and constitutional 
pluralism  
The key issue when discussing any type of decentralized review of EU law by national 
constitutional courts through establishing constitutional limits to EU law is the modality in 
which this sort of review is to be conducted. In this sense, the general task in designing this 
type of review in a (neo)federal structure, such as the EU, is in ensuring efficiency of the 
(neo)federal order while avoiding excessive centralization of regulatory power.302 
Accordingly, the greatest challenge is actually how to conceive an external federal mandate of 
constitutional courts, when it comes to review of the division and exercise of competences in 
the EU, which would not compromise the unity and coherence of EU law and thus the overall 
European integration but would still create incentives for the CJEU to adjust its reasoning and 
case-law to accommodate diversity by taking into consideration the autonomy of the member 
states.303 
In this regard, the ultra vires review, particularly with the latest OMT episode in the 
relationship between the CJEU and the FCC,304 has come to occupy an important part of the 
debate. This debate has revolved also around the issue of compatibility of ultra vires review 
by constitutional courts with both national constitutional law and EU law whereby certain 
authors have expressed their clear dismay over this sort of power of the FCC and national 
constitutional courts in general.305 Nevertheless, as result of the multiple aspects that this debate 
has brought to the surface it is very important to confine the discussion here to the claims which 
argue for the (in)compatibility of ultra vires review with EU law, since going into national 
specificities of each and every member state would not shed light on the bigger picture in the 
relationship between the legal orders. The national constitutional aspects are undoubtedly very 
important in this regard to the extent that they provide the constitutional bases for the exercise 
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of this type of review of EU acts, however, not in light of the national procedural requirements 
of constitutional review or national constitutional standards. Therefore, while it is true that the 
compatibility of the ultra vires review with the national constitutional law is equally 
important,306 the task here is to analyze the potential constructive role which the ultra vires 
review has and can possibly have in European integration.  
Following this line of reasoning, the arguments which make the case for the constructive role 
of ultra vires review are related to different aspects of this review. The first aspect is related to 
the issue of having an accurate perception of the ultra vires review. In this sense it is to be put 
forward that the perception of ultra vires review as an external federal mandate of national 
constitutional courts is the one that best catches the essence of this review. The second tries to 
argue that certain doctrines such as Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the last word are misconceived 
as result of which the ultra vires review is argued to be incompatible with EU law and European 
legal integration. The shortcomings of these doctrines reveal that the whole debate about the 
judicial supremacy on the issue of distribution and exercise of competence in the EU is quite 
misplaced. The third aspect is to address the need for certain adjustments in the design and 
substantive and procedural standards of the ultra vires review which would limit it however 
without making it toothless and as such redundant. This would require adjusting the substantive 
and procedural restraints in order to optimally suit the European integration process and at the 
same time adequately reflect the constitutional pluralism in the EU.  
5.1 Ultra vires review as an external federal mandate of national constitutional courts 
The first step to argue for the constructive role of ultra vires is to create an adequate perception 
of ultra vires review based on the true reasons which support and justify it. Namely, the ultra 
vires review needs to be perceived as an external federal mandate of national constitutional 
courts in the EU which represents a confined form of decentralized review of EU law. Such a 
mandate is the direct result of two factors, structural and institutional. First, it is the neo-federal 
structure through which the EU is being identified and which does not allow the application of 
traditional federal doctrines, such as hierarchy of legal orders or exclusivity of the central 
authority in resolving competence disputes between them, in the context of the EU. These 
federal doctrines are in obvious contradiction with constitutional pluralism which presents the 
dominant descriptive and normative account of the relationship between legal orders.307 Taking 
into consideration that the EU is not a full-fledged federation one cannot simply apply the same 
traditional federal doctrines and instruments in the EU.308 In this sense the arguments put 
forward that this external federal mandate of national constitutional courts is not in compliance 
with the centralized judicial review in the EU, inter alia also of competences, as a typical feature 
of a federal polity,309 accordingly also with EU law, are misplaced. There are exceptions to the 
centralized review by the CJEU and for good reasons even under EU law. As a matter of fact, 
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the whole idea of a decentralized judicial review on competence issues is not so unimaginable 
even in federal states, as it is often presented.310  
The second factor is related to the inherent link between constitutional review and 
constitutional courts and the review of the division and exercise of competences. This is the 
same logic which stands behind the jurisdiction of the CJEU to conduct one form of a judicial 
safeguard of the division and exercise of competence in the EU under its general mandate 
regulated with Article 19 TEU. However, as result of both the structural reasons related to the 
EU and the functional reasons behind the ultra vires review, the need for an external form of 
review by a national counterpart to the CJEU as seen in national constitutional courts is more 
than evident. It is exactly because of these reasons that the checks placed on EU law and CJEU 
which are designed and applied by national constitutional courts result from both the 
institutional position of the CJEU and national constitutional courts.311 The review of the 
division and exercise of competences is an unavoidable part of the constitutional powers of 
national constitutional courts therefore as result of their institutional features these national 
institutions are best equipped and qualified to employ ultra vires review as an ultima ratio 
instrument when other legal remedies are not available in the EU. As a matter of fact, the claims 
that this review should be left to the political institutions somehow omits the fact that the CJEU 
as a motor of integration has been behind the expansion of EU competences, either with 
activism or active passivism.312  
Such an understanding of these two factors closes the argumentative gap between the 
substantive limits of EU competences, as seen through fundamental rights and identity review, 
and the procedural or jurisdictional competence of the national constitutional courts to review 
EU law because the functional reasons behind the ultra vires review also reveal the structural 
specificities of the EU which necessitate this sort of external check.313 This understanding and 
perception of the ultra vires review simply shies away from insisting on Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
and opens a possibility of perceiving the issue of competences as a matter of both national 
constitutional law and EU law.    
5.2 The fallacy of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the last word doctrines 
The national constitutional courts led by the FCC have put great emphasis on the so-called 
“ideational reasons” justifying their external federal mandate in the EU. All of these reasons 
are summarized through the German doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz as applied to the EU 
context.314 This context reveals that through the transfer or conferral of limited powers to the 
EU the member states have not transferred their power to decide on their own competences. 
This notion implies a hierarchical relationship of legal orders in the EU and thus assumes a last 
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review functions with foundational principles such as democracy, human dignity and the rule of law and almost 
mythological notions of sovereignty and identity. “ 
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word reserved for national institutions, particularly constitutional courts. However, this is a 
very simplified way of understanding the relationship and it contradicts the existing pluralism 
in the EU as it fails to cope with the actual reality. Nevertheless, this reality is equally not 
grasped by the claims that the CJEU has the exclusive competences, according to the treaties, 
to decide on the competence disputes in the EU.315  
The division of competences in the EU, different from the situation in other federal structures, 
is not conducted by a federal rule which decides on the exclusive competences of both the EU 
and the member states.316 In this way, the issue of competences is not related to the 
interpretation of a single federal rule, but on the contrary, it needs to incorporate both national 
and EU perspectives. On the other hand, the member states have transferred to the EU, but not 
relinquished, their powers and they have done this according to their own national 
constitutional requirements and authorization. Therefore, the issue of division and exercise of 
competences in the EU is to be perceived from both EU law and national constitutional 
perspective317 and not only as a matter of doubling standards318 by reviewing EU law against 
the German, or more broadly, member states’ interpretation of EU law. After all, the exercise 
of competences not conferred on the EU, strictly speaking, cannot really be part of EU law. No 
wonder the FCC in its case law has continuously referred to EU law and its principles and 
doctrines besides the national constitutional principles in designing and applying the ultra vires 
review. Accordingly, the logic goes, if one is to perceive the matter of competences from both 
an EU law as well as a national constitutional perspective, then the matter of the last word 
should remain open and every insistence on it by any of the highest judicial instances would 
go against this reality. 
The scholarly debate reveals great deal of complexity which needs to be further discussed, also 
some myths have to be dispelled in order to argue for the legitimacy of ultra vires review. One 
of the arguments which are being frequently emphasized is that while the member states still 
have the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, in the EU, it is the CJEU that has the judicial Kompetenz-
Kompetenz and therefore has the exclusive competence to decide on competence disputes 
between the EU and member states.319 This stance is proven by invoking specific EU Treaty 
                                                          
315 Weiler and Haltern (n 28) 333ff. 
316 See for instance Grimm (n 271), “die Kompetenzverteilung in den europäischen Verträgen erheblich unklarer 
ist als in den Verfassungen von Bundesstaaten.” 
317 See for instance FCC Lisbon (n 31) para. 234; FCC OMT decision (n 251) para. 185: “The principle of conferral 
is not only a principle of Union law but also incorporates constitutional principles from the Member States.” 
318 Mayer (n 217) 117; Mayer (n 274) 412; and Bast (n 250) 171. Cf. Sauer (n 41) 193. 
319 On the issue of ‘Jurisdiktionsvorrang’ see Bethge (n 30) 145-146; Weiler and Haltern (n 28) 333ff; Sauer (n 
41) 88, 180-181; and Sauer (n 305) 983. 
261 
 
provisions (specifically Article 19 TEU,320 Article 263(4) TFEU321 and Article 344 TFEU322) 
which arguably confirm this power of the CJEU to which member state have consented. These 
arguments, however, are not very convincing.  
First, there is no strong case in making a distinction between the two types of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, especially in the EU. Such a distinction is faced with an obvious contradiction. 
Namely, the EU institutions with the support of the CJEU have continuously expanded their 
powers through the interpretation of the EU Treaties.323 This has been enabled by the CJEU 
through exercising a light touch scrutiny on issues of division and exercises of conferred 
competences and by turning a blind eye on the matter.324As result, this approach has signaled 
the EU institutions that they actually have a sort of limited Kompetenz-Kompetenz unless they 
overstep the competence boundaries in a manifest manner which is particularly unlikely in a 
federal order in which you have so-called functional competences. Therefore, having a court 
which has a judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz unavoidably leads to the expansion of powers and 
thus legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz.325 This tendency of expansion is particularly 
strengthened by the structural and federal bias present in the EU. 326 This makes the distinction 
between the two forms of Kompetenz-Kompetenz unsustainable. Under circumstances in which 
a clear and explicit federal rule on division of competences is lacking in EU Treaties, the 
problem that might occur by adopting this logic is even greater. Namely, the remedy for a 
situation in which the CJEU provides interpretations to treaty provisions that lead to the 
expansion of EU competences is only through a treaty amendment enacting a provision which 
would override this sort of interpretation. Bearing in mind that this is a hugely cumbersome 
process which everyone tries to avoid the CJEU could easily take advantage of this fact 
knowing this is the only way to overrule its decisions and further proceed with its approach 
towards the issue of competences.327 This would be even more worrisome if one takes into 
                                                          
320 Particularly Article 19 (1) TEU: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, 
the General Court and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties 
the law is observed.” See more on this in Simon (n 197) 266; Sauer (n 41) 180-181; and Sauer (n 303) 983. 
321 Article 263 (4) TFEU: “It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the 
European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, 
or misuse of powers.” See more on this in Simon (n 197) 266; Sauer (n 41) 180-181; and Sauer (n 305) 983. 
322 Article 344 TFEU: “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein”. On this see Mayer 
(n 217) 116-117. 
323 On a very vocal criticism of this approach of the CJEU see Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken, ‘Stop the 
European Court of Justice’ EU Observer, 10 September 2008, available at: https://euobserver.com/opinion/26714 
last visited 15.10.2018. 
324 See for instance Panara (n 63) 309-314; and Moens and Trone (n 76) 168. 
325 Grimm (n 218) 57, quoting Georg Jelinek, Algemeine Staatslehre, 7.Aufl., Berlin (1960), 495: “Souverän ist 
diejenige Einheit, die über die Aufteilung der Hocheitsrechte zwischen Zentralstaat und Gliedstaaten entscheidet 
Ausschlaggebend ist folglich die Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In einem föderalen System zieht sich die Souveränität 
in die Kompetenz-Kompetenz zurück. Souverän ist, wer die Kompetenz-Kompetenz hat.” 
326 See Kokott (n 194) 96, basically arguing that if there is no effective national check on the usurpation of 
competences then the Kompetenz-Kompetenz would lie with the EU. 
327 Grimm (n 218) 214: “Der EuGH ist also wegen des Verfassungsrangs in Verbindung mit Umfang und Inhalt 
der Verträge viel starker gegenüber demokratischen Einflüssen immunisiert als nationale Gerichte.“ On the 
particular difficulties related to the possible override of judicial decisions by Member States see Höreth (n 134) 
39-44; and Dawson (n 79) 17. 
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consideration that the EU treaties contain so many provision which regulate so many areas and 
issues which in member states are never part of constitutional but just of statutory regulation.328 
On the other hand, while the FCC is claiming to have the last word as result of the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz it has severely restricted the ultra vires review with the substantive and procedural 
requirements.329 In this sense the FCC is somehow acknowledging that the EU and CJEU have 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz as long as they do not enact and confirm EU acts and measures which 
are manifestly breaching competences and which lead to a significant structural shift to the 
detriment of member states.330 As a result, the whole debate over Kompetenz-Kompetenz seems 
to be displaced and its invocation has implications which are not compatible with the character 
and legal order of the EU. Therefore, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz as an ideational reason has 
been the main source of criticism of the ultra vires review. In this sense, regardless of the 
disagreement on the origins of EU competences the claim for exclusive jurisdiction either by 
the national constitutional courts or by the CJEU to decide on them is not based on strong 
arguments. 
But is there really no rule which allows the CJEU to exclusively decide on competence disputes 
in the EU? This question brings us to the second argument which essentially gives a definite 
answer. To put it simply, if the CJEU has the exclusive power to rule on these types of disputes 
then it will have the power to decide on which are the exclusive competences of the member 
states as this could be put by the CJEU within the scope of Article 5 TEU.331 This is very much 
against the whole idea of the division of competences in the EU. The CJEU cannot decide on 
legal disputes which are not purely a matter of EU law. The three provisions which are 
frequently invoked, Article 19 TEU, Article 263(2) TFEU and 344 TFEU, need to be 
interpreted taking into consideration the previous. In this sense, if the legal issue is not purely 
and solely a matter of EU law then the exclusivity of CJEU’s jurisdiction under the treaties is 
not applicable as the latter refer to EU law only in the context of the CJEU’s competences and 
jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the treaty provisions do not conceive that the CJEU itself could be out of EU 
competence bounds through its interpretations and decisions. Therefore, it could be 
convincingly argued that they can indeed be ultra vires.332 While there is a strong presumption 
of abiding by EU law and CJEU’s decisions, still, there is a need for the existence of certain 
constitutional limits. This argument is in accordance with, what Paulson and Schilling refer to 
as, the distinction between material and formal authorization to interpret law.333 While the latter 
                                                          
328 See on this in Grimm (n 271); and Grimm (n 218) 212-214. 
329 FCC Honeywell (n 238) para. 61ff; see also Möllers (n 232) 165-166; and Payandeh (n 220) 16, 21ff. 
330 Sauer (n 305) 985. 
331 Cf Bast (n 250) 172ff, invoking the Consorzio doctrine on rendering an act non-existent due to certain legal 
defects without the need for declaration of invalidity. See more in CJEU, Case 15/85, Consorzio Cooperative 
d’Abruzzo v Comm’n, Judgment of 26 February 1987, ECLI:EU:C:1987:111. Somehow Bast is forgetting that it 
is the CJEU that allows this decentralized review and that in such a case constitutional courts would conduct a 
review under CJEU’s mandate, thus imposing standards which are already subject to serious criticism. In this 
sense the central authority of the CJEU would be confirmed. 
332 Kumm (n 236) 370. 
333 Stenley L. Paulson, ‘Material and Formal Authorisation in Kelsen’s Pure Theory’ (1980) 39 The Cambridge 
Law Journal 172; and Schilling (n 193) 406-407. 
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provides the authorization to interpret EU law generally and without paying attention to the 
material constraints of the constitutional legal order(s) and limits placed on to the actors 
conducting it, the former is conditioning this authorization with this interpretation being 
‘right’.334 By ‘right’ interpretation it is meant that there is a material authorization only if the 
conferral of powers is respected through respecting the constraints that it imposes. However, 
even if such a ‘right’ interpretation is missing, the act at stake will not be invalid as there are 
no other legal means to decide on its invalidity.335  
Applying this reasoning to the EU context where there is a heterarchical relationship between 
the legal orders, even if the CJEU declares a certain EU act to be in respect of the principle of 
conferral of powers or subsidiarity, this does not mean that the national constitutional courts 
should obey such a decision which is based on an interpretation contrary to the restraints that 
these principles imply. However, such an EU act cannot be declared invalid since there are no 
other legal means strictly under EU law since this is the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU and 
it has already pronounced the validity of the act. But there are good reasons that this act could 
be declared inapplicable by a national constitutional court based on two grounds. First, the 
matter of competences is not a matter of only EU law thus the constraints stemming from the 
national constitutional orders should be taken into serious consideration. Second, as a result of 
the previous, an EU act could be declared inapplicable if the interpretation of EU competences 
and of an EU act by the CJEU is done in a manner which is erroneous (legal errata) in light of 
the true meaning of these principles under both EU law and/or national constitutional law. In 
this sense, there is a strong presumption of the CJEU having formal authorization and that its 
decisions on EU law are final due to interests of the EU legal order. But when it comes to 
competences, as in our case, this presumption could be rebutted. Once certain exceptional 
circumstances are present the binding nature of the decision is lost, and it has only persuasive 
authority.336  
The logic behind these arguments thus shows that strict jurisdictional exclusivity, as 
represented by the ‘last word’ notion, is definitely not suitable for the reality of constitutional 
pluralism in the EU. No wonder certain scholars have reiterated that the issue of the last word 
should be best left unresolved.337 Following this line of reasoning, one could strongly argue 
that ultra vires review conducted by national constitutional courts is also compatible with EU 
law and it essentially stems from the neo-federal structure and reasons related to its functional 
dimension. This type of external federal mandate of national constitutional courts reflects the 
uniqueness of the EU legal order and strengthens the values of constitutionalism in the EU.338 
In achieving this, the external federal mandate of national constitutional courts should 
                                                          
334 Paulson (n 333) 188; and Schilling (n 193) 406-407. Ironically, this argument has been, willingly or not, 
completely omitted by Weiler and Haltern in their critical analysis of Schilling’s article in Weiler and Haltern (n 
28). 
335 For more on this see Paulson (n 333) 189, 192-193. 
336 Schilling (n 193) 407; and Mattias Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional 
Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262, 300-301. 
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338 Maduro (n 201) 522-523. 
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definitely be exercised with restraint in order to preserve the legal order of the EU and at the 
same time abide by the respective constitutional obligations of the member states.  
5.3 Restraining ultra vires review while maintaining its credibility and legitimacy 
The restraint in applying the ultra vires review is of crucial importance as any extensive and 
arbitrary application would jeopardize the EU legal order and its unity and coherence placing 
the judicial instances on a track of, often legally complex, conflicts. Additionally, this would 
represent a breach of domestic constitutional provisions and principles favoring the European 
integration processes. However, determining the limits of the external federal mandate needs 
to be done and balanced in such a manner as not to diminish the credibility of this sort of review 
while serving its purpose of constructively checking the division and exercise of competences 
in the EU. In contrast, the restraint should not follow the ill placed interpretation behind the 
‘emergency brake’ logic of not using the ultra vires review at all.339 Therefore the overarching 
qualification of the ultra vires review should be based on serious considerations of the interests 
of the European integration and the EU legal order and practiced in the spirit of cooperation 
and the common interest in the respect of the rule of law and values of constitutionalism in the 
EU.  
In this sense, the FCC has introduced substantive and procedural requirements on the ultra 
vires review in its case law. The Honeywell decision was even interpreted to go too far in its 
restraints making it hardly possible for any EU act to be in manifest breach of competences 
and create a structurally significant competence shift thus declared ultra vires.340 However, the 
OMT episode of the FCC has partly denied this impression. On the one hand, there were 
realistic possibilities of declaring the ECB’s decision ultra vires by the FCC. On the other hand, 
the FCC slightly lowered the threshold of the ultra vires review substantive standards.341 
Through this the FCC put the ultra vires review back into the spotlight revealing its 
shortcomings and weaknesses which need to be addressed, especially when it comes to the 
substantive restraints. In doing this the FCC was subject to mounting criticism, which is not 
always supported by well-founded arguments against it. This criticism has somehow either 
created or followed a trend of putting the FCC in a negative context while protecting the status 
of the CJEU.342 These weaknesses could be analyzed from three different aspects. The first 
aspect is related to the clarity and determinacy of the substantive standards. The second 
analyzes the importance, or lack of it, of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity within the 
framework of the external federal mandate on the division and exercise of competences in the 
EU. The third one has to do with the procedural requirement to bring the matter before the 
CJEU through the preliminary reference procedure before declaring an EU act ultra vires. 
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5.3.1 The issue of determinacy of substantive standards of ultra vires review  
In establishing the substantive standards of the ultra vires review the FCC has not provided a 
detailed test or criteria. The standards of manifest breach and structurally significant shift, as 
established in Honeywell, are quite broad and in this sense they have remained rather unclear 
even after the OMT decision which has produced some clarifications.343 It is interesting to note 
that the FCC in Honeywell, in determining whether a breach of the principle of conferral is 
sufficiently qualified, referred to the standards established by the CJEU in its Fresh Marine 
judgment.344 However, in this judgment the CJEU invokes only the manifest breach standard 
but it is equally or even more unclear than the FCC’s. On the other hand, invoking CJEU 
standards by the FCC in exercising the ultra vires review is not the wisest step. While it is of 
the utmost importance to have due regard for the EU legal order, the FCC should bear in mind 
that it is employing a review which is above all based on the GG. That is supposed to remedy 
the lack of proper judicial safeguards for the division of competences by the CJEU which also 
results from its weak standards and scrutiny, as exemplified by the approach taken in Fresh 
Marine. Furthermore, by invoking the CJEU’s standards, the FCC enters the description which 
is criticized here of doubling standards by introducing an interpretation of German origin of 
EU law based on EU standards.345 It was perhaps because of these and similar concerns that 
the FCC changed its approach and did not refer to the CJEU case law in clarifying the standards 
of review in the OMT decision.  
The lack of clarity over the standards in the FCC case-law has been criticized lately.346 
However, there are strong reasons why such a lack of clarity under certain circumstances is 
actually beneficial for the relationship between the highest judicial instances. First, it is very 
difficult to introduce strict definitions on standards as this would make the ultra vires review 
very inflexible particularly in a setting in which competences are developed and interpreted 
very dynamically and there is a need of continuous adaptations and adjustments. Since there 
are no objective criteria in determining the two standards,347 the openness and lack of clarity 
of the standards gives the ultra vires review leverage and credibility that should have a positive 
influence on the stability of the relationship with the CJEU.348 FCC’s discretion in determining 
the standards of its external federal mandate needs to mirror and respect at the same time the 
very same discretion of the CJEU in order to achieve the constructive effects of balancing and 
stabilizing. Therefore the FCC correctly recognizes this discretion of the CJEU even though it 
openly declares that this discretion has its limits.349 Goldmann refers to this relationship as a 
mutually assured discretion which follows the same logic as Voßkuhle’s ‘emergency brake’350 
or Weiler and Haltern’s ‘mutually assured destruction’.351 Perfectly aware of the destructive 
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potential, this approach would properly function only in an environment in which the mutual 
trust and shared values are not compromised.352 In case the contrary occurs, the mutual assured 
discretion is abused353 and the legitimacy of the ‘emergency brake’ is put into serious doubt. 
The contrasting experiences in the Slovak Pensions and the OMT sagas illustrate this idea very 
well. It also illustrates how a case of unilateral but not thoroughly substantiated revolt against 
the CJEU might even endanger the position and legitimacy of a national constitutional court 
thus risking of being isolated, both domestically and internationally, such as the CCC in 
Holubec.354 Nevertheless, the lack of clarity and uncertainty that stem from the external federal 
mandate of national constitutional courts is something that has been a constant companion of 
the EU legal order which managed to channel them into a constructive force.355 The 
unrestrained attempts of ultra vires review would be surely condemned by political institutions 
of the very same member states or even of the others but also their highest judicial instances 
including the national constitutional courts probably through indirect form of horizontal 
judicial dialogue. Accordingly, this would legitimize a reaction by the EU institutions that 
would possibly end up before the CJEU.  
5.3.2 Including the review of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity within the framework 
of ultra vires review 
The qualification of the ultra vires review through the establishment of substantive and 
procedural standards which manifest a certain level of deference to both political institutions 
and the CJEU has its positive effects particularly on the unity and coherence of the EU legal 
order. Extensive use of the ultra vires review would definitely put at risk the effectiveness and 
coherence of the EU legal order. It would go against the deference that national constitutional 
courts should have for decisions of political institutions both national and of the EU, as well as 
for those of the CJEU, which is even required with the national constitutional principles. 
Nevertheless, there is one negative consequence of this qualification and far reaching restraint 
of the FCC, as seen through the case law related to the exercise of conferred power on the EU, 
which has the potential of rendering the ultra vires review toothless.  
In introducing and developing the ultra vires review in the Maastricht and Lisbon decision the 
FCC established a very strong link between the principle of conferral and the principle of 
subsidiarity.356 However, this link totally disappeared and the FCC in Honeywell and the OMT 
referral and decision only referred to the principle of conferral. Namely, in these decisions the 
ultra vires review has been totally detached from the review of the respect of the principle of 
subsidiarity by the EU institutions, above all the CJEU. By introducing the second standard of 
the ultra vires test which is that the challenged EU act should be highly significant in the 
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structure of competences between the member states and the Union357 the FCC focuses only 
on the immediate effect of the specific violation without looking at the possible structural shift 
which could result from the accumulation of such violations in the future.358 Such an 
accumulation could be recognized in cases in which the CJEU puts forward an interpretation 
which serves to expand the competences of the EU in a manner which is characterized by 
incrementalism rather than by single step structural shifts and most importantly without paying 
due attention to the member states’ interests and autonomy. Therefore, the FCC and other 
national constitutional courts should focus even more on the CJEU decisions when it comes to 
shift in competences through weak scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity.  
It could be argued that the FCC somehow lost sight of the actual nature of competences in the 
EU which are based on their functional understanding and instead sticks to the competences 
based on fields by focusing on the conferral.359 The FCC turns a blind eye to the serious 
problem of competence creep in the EU and the obvious incrementalism which is 
characterizing the expansion of EU competences.360 The latter has been the direct result of the 
structural problems in the EU of not taking the division and exercise of competences seriously 
and the lack of proper political and judicial safeguards for subsidiarity and proportionality.361 
All this is necessitating a broader scope of ultra vires review which would include the review 
of the respect of these two principles. Therefore, the second standard of the review should be 
adapted to this need. Namely, it should be interpreted to include the review also of possible 
transgression of competences which would be the result of a breach of the principle of 
subsidiarity bearing in mind its relationship with the principle of conferral of powers.362 This 
would mean that the ultra vires review would look whether the interpretation and justification 
of the challenged type of EU act could prospectively entail a significant structural shift of 
competences instead of focusing on the actual violation in the specific case at hand. The OMT 
referral and OMT decision seem to go in this direction withdrawing from the extensive 
restraints put on the ultra vires review with Honeywell which could be a ground for including 
subsidiarity in the ultra vires review.363 The FCC in the OMT decision has stated that there is 
a significant structural shift in cases where an EU act or measure is capable of altering the 
fundamental competences of the EU that would essentially require a treaty amendment or 
making use of an evolutionary clause.364 If this shift is to be prospectively realized from an 
interpretation and justification provided or confirmed by the CJEU through a problematic weak 
scrutiny of EU legal acts, obviously breaching the principles of subsidiarity, then this should 
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definitely be reviewed by national constitutional courts. This stance could also have its effect 
on loosening or adjusting of the manifest breach standard but according to the latest reasoning 
of the FCC in the OMT decision it would not be necessary as it is already broad enough 
especially when it comes to the erroneous interpretation of the CJEU.365 As a matter of fact 
these same arguments are equally applicable to the safeguard of the principle of subsidiarity. 
Therefore, the justification for broadening the ultra vires review of this principle of exercise of 
competences in the EU is already present. 
Such a broadening of the ultra vires review due to the structural problems in the EU was 
embraced by Kumm as even being required by constitutional pluralism. He clearly put a 
particular emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity in justifying the jurisdictional dimension of 
the power of national constitutional courts to review EU law.366 In his recent article though, 
dealing with this issue in the framework of the OMT referral, he seems to withdraw from his 
previous positions justifying this through the increased sensibility of the CJEU on competences 
and the absence of structural deficits in the EU.367 However, as it was discussed previously, 
there is definitely no strong evidence proving this stance. In supporting his argument Kumm 
refers to two annulment decisions of the CJEU, brought before it by the Commission mainly 
on charges of the impugned acts being based on wrong legal basis, which do not even involve 
Article 5 TEU or mention the principle of conferral or subsidiarity.368 Thus they could not be 
convincingly invoked in this regard as they do not show any change in the approach of the 
CJEU towards the issue of competences or the principles regulating their division and exercise 
in the EU. The structural problems obviously are still persisting be it either related to the role 
of political institutions in safeguarding the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality or the 
judicial safeguards by the CJEU. Therefore, Kumm’s earlier arguments are still more than valid 
in the present context which view is not to be blurred by the contentious developments over 
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establishment of the facts of the case (aa), the principle of conferral (bb), and the judicial review of acts of the 
European Central Bank that relate to the definition of its mandate (cc) (para. 181), “Generously accepting as fact 
asserted aims while at the same time granting wide margins of assessment to bodies of the European Union and 
considerably decreasing the intensity of judicial review is well-suited to enable institutions, bodies, offices, and 
agencies of the European Union to autonomously decide upon the scope of the competences that the Member 
States have attributed to them (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <349 et seq.>). Such an understanding of competences does 
not sufficiently take into account the constitutional dimension of the principle of conferral.” (para. 184), “The 
principle of conferral is not only a principle of Union law but also incorporates constitutional principles from the 
Member States (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <350>).” (para. 185) “The principle of conferral’s interface function must 
have an effect on the methodical review of whether it is being respected. If fundamental interests of the Member 
States are affected, as is generally the case when dealing with competences in a union (Verbandskompetenz), 
judicial review may not simply accept the asserted positions of organs of the European Union without 
verification.” (para. 186). 
366 Kumm (n 336) 295, 300; and Mattias Kumm and Victor Ferreres Comella, ‘The Primacy Clause of the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union’ (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 473, 475. 
367 Kumm (n 342) 213. 
368 Kumm (n 342) 213 referring to CJEU, Case C-137/12 Commission v Council, Judgment of 22 October 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:675; and CJEU, Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council, Judgment of 5 October 
2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:544. 
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the OMT saga.369 Accordingly, the ultra vires review is still perfectly compatible with 
constitutional pluralism and it even needs to be broadened to include the principle of 
subsidiarity as there are legitimate concerns for the lack of adequate respect for this principle.    
The exercise of this sort of review would take place after the CJEU has the possibility to have 
its say on the matter at hand and possibly as result of an unsuccessful attempt of the national 
parliaments to conduct a political safeguard of subsidiarity. In the case of Germany there is a 
constitutional provision which foresees such a constitutional possibility for the Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat.370 Nevertheless, this constitutional possibility for national parliaments is not a 
mandatory prerequisite for constitutional courts to enter an ultra vires review in light of 
subsidiarity as they could send a preliminary reference to the CJEU in cases in which this court 
has not had the opportunity to rule on the particular issue.   
Once this procedural requirement is fulfilled the national constitutional court would in the 
context of the impugned EU act assess the interpretation of the CJEU and the adequacy or the 
lack of any safeguard for the principle of subsidiarity, accordingly of the member states’ 
interest and autonomy, and thus declare a manifest breach of competences.371 If the 
constitutional court establishes that the approach and practice of the CJEU would amount to a 
significant structural shift in the competences to the detriment of the member states as applied 
to the case at hand then it should declare the EU act ultra vires and thus inapplicable.  
5.3.3 The ultra vires review and the preliminary reference procedure 
Besides the substantive requirements the FCC has also established a procedural one in 
Honeywell. Namely, emphasizing the restrictive and cautious use of ultra vires review the FCC 
has declared that the CJEU needs to be provided with an opportunity to have its say on the 
matter at hand, unless it has already ruled on it, in the context of a preliminary ruling procedure. 
This requirement is justified in light of the interests of the EU legal order as well as the 
constitutional principles and doctrines such as the openness towards EU law and the spirit of 
the cooperative relationship with the CJEU.372 In this manner the CJEU as the only authorized 
institution under EU law to decide on the interpretation and validity of EU law would be 
afforded a chance to remedy the legal errata done by the legislative institutions in the EU, or 
by its previous judicial interpretations, which have led to the questioning of the so-called 
material authorization of the CJEU to interpret EU law.  
The FCC has confirmed this stance in the OMT decision in which it paid a particular attention 
to the limits of the tolerance of error for the CJEU in light of its interpretation and more 
specifically on its understanding of the principle of conferral and the high level of deference to 
                                                          
369 Large part of the criticism was addressed to the FCC mainly relating to the national constitutional aspect of the 
jurisdiction of the FCC as well as its justification for the exercise of ultra vires review. 
370 Art. 23 1a GG. See FCC OMT decision (n 251) para. 171, the FCC sees this as a constitutional obligation, 
applying to all constitutional organs, to take steps actively to ensure that the European integration agenda is 
respected. 
371 FCC OMT decision (n 251) para. 149. 
372 Mayer (n 217) 130-131, he denies the possibility of having a cooperative relationship between in the ultra vires 
review 
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EU institutions, in the specific case the ECB.373 In this way the ultra vires review would not be 
solely applied on the EU act but could also be broadened to the CJEU decision and 
interpretation which has confirmed the legal basis for such an enactment. Through the 
involvement of the CJEU the argument that this issue of competences should be left to political 
institutions374 additionally loses its force as this involvement would prove that the issue needs 
a legal resolution. On the other hand, this would provide the national constitutional courts with 
a sound justification to put checks on the CJEU contentious interpretation of competences. 
Thus, once the preliminary ruling is made by the CJEU there are good reasons for stricter 
scrutiny by the FCC.375 Understandably such a review would be restrained and cautious and 
following the requirement of universalisability as well as the substantive requirements.  
This procedural restraint is perfectly in line with constitutional pluralism and respects the need 
for having an ultra vires review which would take into serious consideration the arguments 
stemming from both legal orders and thus balance them. In this sense it creates the dialogical 
bridge through which arguments relating to both EU law and national constitutional law would 
be weighed and reconsidered in order to reach an optimal solution. The OMT case has shown 
exactly why this is so important for building and developing a common European legal order 
in which occasional conflicts should be perceived as grounds for improvement.  
Nevertheless, while the FCC has been praised for making this commitment of using the 
preliminary reference procedure and actually sending its first reference in the OMT case, still 
several scholars raised serious concerns over the downside of such a reference within the 
framework of ultra vires review. These concerns amount to claims of actual abuse of the 
preliminary reference procedure by the FCC as it has made clear that it might not respect the 
CJEU’s ruling in exceptional cases. The argument goes that in such a case the preliminary 
reference from a national constitutional court would be reduced to a mere phase of the ultra 
vires review376 or even make the procedure potentially irrelevant and unnecessary.377 All this 
could lead to a situation in which:  
“a request to the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling could even end by having 
the undesirable effect of embroiling the Court in the chain of events ultimately leading 
to the breakdown in the ‘constitutional compact’ underlying European integration.”378  
Accordingly, as Mayer argues, through the exercise of ultra vires review there would be no 
place for a relationship of cooperation between the judicial instances due to the effects of 
declaring an EU act ultra vires. First, this would imply that there is a defect in the act which 
                                                          
373 FCC OMT decision (n 251) paras. 160-161. 
374 On this argument see Sauer (n 305) 991. 
375 Möllers (n 232) 165. 
376 CJEU Gauweiler AG Cruz Villalon (n 299) paras. 45-46. 
377 Wendel (n 217) 290. 
378 CJEU Gauweiler AG Cruz Villalon (n 299) para. 51 [references omitted]. This is sort of exaggerations are 
mirrored in the Dissenting opinion of Lübbe-Wolff FCC, OMT referral, 2 BvR 2728/13 of 14 January 2014 paras. 
3-9; and see also Mayer (n 217) 134. 
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concern is not confined to a specific member state. And second, this would represent an 
encroachment on the CJEU and the European legal order.379  
All these arguments against the preliminary reference within the framework of the ultra vires 
review represent a slight exaggeration of the effects of this sort of review. It seems that this is 
the reason why the CJEU in Gauweiler did not raise this issue at all, as opposed to the opinion 
AG Cruz Villalon. The CJEU has referred only to its case law which confirms the binding 
nature of its preliminary rulings in the main proceedings because of which a preliminary 
reference was sent.380 Following Wendel’s reasoning this would mean that the CJEU has 
expressed its tacit acceptance of the ultra vires review by the national constitutional court.381 
In the specific context of preliminary reference the general abidance of the national 
constitutional courts would be excluded only under very exceptional cases. Such exceptions 
would not put into question the general respect for CJEU’s preliminary rulings which would 
remain protected even by the national constitutional courts.382 On the contrary, constitutional 
courts would send a clear warning signal to the CJEU and would thus provide it with another 
chance to reconsider its stance in light of the arguments and reasoning presented by the national 
constitutional courts in their references.383 As a matter of fact, the actual practice so far, as seen 
through the Slovak Pensions and OMT cases, proves this claim right. In the former the CCC, 
by declaring a CJEU judgment ultra vires, had not caused such disastrous effects, bearing in 
mind that the CCC had no opportunity to defend its position before the CJEU. As for the latter, 
the OMT decision of the FCC, regardless of the harsh criticism of scholars, especially on the 
tone and approach taken by this court in its preliminary reference, the outcome has produced 
the desired effects of direct judicial dialogue. Messages and signals have been sent and a certain 
common ground has been reached while reservations and differences of views still exist. Even 
if an EU act is declared ultra vires, while observing the restraints placed on the ultra vires 
review that does not deprive the national constitutional court of the material authorization to 
intervene in the interpretation of EU law, this would not bring down the EU. It would be a 
cause for renewed deliberations seeking legal and political solutions for the newly occurred 
                                                          
379 Mayer (n 217) 130 -131. 
380 CJEU Gauweiler (n 111) para. 16, referring to CJEU, C-173/09 Elchinov, Judgment of 5 October 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:581; and CJEU, Case C-446/98 Fazenda Publica, Judgment of 14 December 2000, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:691. See also the case note on this judgment, Vestert Borger, ‘Outright Monetary Transactions 
and the Stability Mandate of the ECB: Gauweiler’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 139, 167.   
381 Wendel (n 217) 291, “Should Luxembourg declare the reference admissible in terms of Article 267 TFEU 
(which seems likely in political terms), it would therefore have to strictly avoid that this could be (mis)understood 
as a tacit approval of Karlsruhe's claimed right to carry out ultra vires reviews… The ECJ would in any case have 
to make it crystal clear that it responds to the preliminary questions only on the premise that the referring court 
subsequently accepts the interpretation given by the Court of Justice... To avoid any semblance of an implicit 
approval of Karlsruhe's claim to ultra vires review, a clarification would also and particularly be necessary in case 
the interpretation by the ECJ partially resembled that of the FCC.” 
382 These and similar situations are not totally unfamiliar even in federal state based on a model of a so-called 
cooperative federalism. Namely, a legal revolt of a state court against a federal court decision or a federal rule 
could not bring the federation to a collapse. But it would rather create a new momentum and incentives for a 
renewed legal and political process tackling the issue at hand. In theory this phenomenon is labeled as 
‘uncooperative federalism’. For more on this in the US context see Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather K. Gerken, 
‘Uncooperative Federalism’ (2009) 118 The Yale Law Journal 1256.  
383 Grimm (n 271). 
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situation.384 In this sense the exception to the general binding nature of preliminary rulings 
should be accepted by the CJEU as it would be the direct result of the existing constitutional 
pluralism and neo-federal structure of the EU under which there is a heterarchical relationship 
also between the respective judicial instances.  
6 Conclusion 
This chapter has tackled a very contentious and complex issue related to the division and 
exercise of competences in the EU and what kind of role should constitutional courts have in 
this regard. The overarching argument here is that constitutional courts should have an external 
federal mandate through the conduct of ultra vires review of EU acts when it comes to 
competence issues. Such a review would represent an external check on the unsatisfactory 
practice of the CJEU on the distribution and exercise of competences which has directly 
contributed to an unwarranted expansion of EU competences and the resulting centralizing 
tendencies in the EU. In arguing for the constructive role of this sort of review of constitutional 
courts three lines of argumentation were put forward. The first line or group of arguments are 
related to the critical analysis of the federalism discourse in the EU which tries to project 
political goals on the future of the EU and has its implications on the status of EU law. This 
discourse has demonstrated serious weaknesses by replicating the same doctrines developed in 
the context of a nation-state onto the EU, thus somehow turning a blind eye to the fact that the 
EU is not a state. As a matter of fact, two assumptions made as result of this discourse on the 
supremacy of EU law and the judicial supremacy of the CJEU remain to be subject to heavy 
contestation by the national constitutional courts, especially in this specific area. Accordingly, 
the relationship between the different levels within the multilevel structure in the EU should 
be perceived through the prism of neo-federalism which couples the federal features of the EU 
with constitutional pluralism. 
The second group of arguments are related to the doubts over the effectiveness of both the 
political and judicial safeguards on the exercise of competences in the EU. The Lisbon Treaty 
introduced new political safeguards as seen mainly through the establishment of the EWM, 
however, this has not successfully tackled the previously existing problem of a light-touch 
review of subsidiarity and proportionality by the CJEU. Structural and jurisdictional bias on 
the side of the EU have led to this light-touch review which enabled the continuous expansion 
of EU competences which in the end compromises the principle of conferral of powers.   
The third group of arguments go into the reasons behind the establishment of the ultra vires 
review by the constitutional courts. The traditional reasons behind this type of review do not 
seem to be well adjusted to the circumstances in the EU and thus functional reasons are the 
ones that need to have the primacy in justifying the ultra vires review. These functional reasons 
should be embraced by all constitutional courts which have so far accepted their power to 
                                                          
384 It is in the essence of the circular nature of the legal and political processes to react and seek new and better 
solutions to issues which have occurred with the application and interpretation of the law. One should not forget 
that the Holubec episode of the Slovak Pensions saga was essentially muted after the regular changes in the 
composition of the CCC, and this fact should not be omitted. On this see Kühn (n 305) 193. 
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conduct ultra vires review on EU law. They, above all the FCC, should broaden the scope of 
review since the substantive limits of ultra vires review unreasonably narrow it. 
While the three groups of arguments make the case for justifying the exercise of ultra vires 
review of EU acts, they do not deal with the issue of appropriately designing and adjusting the 
ultra vires review for it not to unreasonably jeopardize the effectiveness and uniformity of EU 
law. Therefore, constitutional pluralism is being employed in adjusting this review making it 
an instrument for the constructive role of constitutional court in European integration. In this 
sense, ultra vires review needs to be perceived as an external federal mandate of constitutional 
courts due to structural reasons behind the EU and institutional reasons related to constitutional 
courts. Exactly these two reasons necessitate that the issue of division and exercise of 
competences in the EU needs to be looked at from both national and EU law perspectives. This 
argument is confirmed through the fallacies of the traditional doctrine of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz and the notion of the last word which needs to be left open. On the other hand, the 
substantive elements of the ultra vires review need to be readjusted as to create a situation in 
which this review will not be toothless and that the ‘emergency brake’ is not only theoretically 
possible. In this manner, the ‘mutually assured discretion’ will be genuinely assured and it will 
serve to guarantee the balance among legal orders and it will strengthen the values of 
constitutionalism in the EU.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
The relationship of constitutional courts with EU law and the CJEU has definitely been one of 
those topics which have drawn significant academic attention ever since the first decisions of 
the ICC and FCC. Many academic contributions have been written in covering different aspects 
and angles of this topic. Therefore, dealing further with this relationship could be perceived as 
an exercise of stating the obvious and the already well known. However, just as other 
relationships, also this one is subject to evolution and characterized by a dynamism which could 
easily alter the entrenched perceptions and dominant narratives. It is exactly such perceptions 
and narratives over the role and place of constitutional courts in European integration that are 
the subject of this dissertation. In this sense, the dissertation tackles and analyses an arguably 
old topic through new lenses. Accordingly, the main emphasis of this work has been placed on 
deconstructing two contradictory narratives on the role of constitutional courts in European 
integration. On the one hand, there is the narrative of the global spread and rise of constitutional 
courts, based on the success of the centralized model of constitutional review, not only in 
Europe but also in other parts of the world, often seen as one of the crucial institutions which 
safeguard rule of law and further democratization. On the other hand, there is a relatively recent 
narrative which claims the demise and creeping loss of relevance of constitutional courts faced 
with an increasing supranationalisation of national law resulting from the expanding scope of 
EU law and growing influence of the CJEU.  
Belying the expectation of choosing between the two narratives, this dissertation actually 
places the main thesis on a path of an apparently even more paradoxical and contradictory 
argumentation that, when it comes to European integration, constitutional courts are indeed on 
the rise while falling. Only at first glance this stance and argumentation is confusing. While it 
cannot be denied that constitutional courts have been deeply impacted by European integration 
in a sense of decreasing their influence and position, at the same time, resulting from the 
process of adaptation to the new circumstances caused by supranationalisation, they have been 
developing new roles vis-à-vis EU law and the CJEU not previously foreseen in any of the 
domestic constitutional and legal provisions. These new roles are directly related to three 
crucial dimensions of the relationship between constitutional courts and the CJEU: procedural, 
substantive and jurisdictional. More specifically, constitutional courts are pivotal national 
institutions in providing constitutional legitimacy to EU law through different forms of judicial 
dialogue in Europe, they have taken over the role of protecting the constitutional identity of the 
member states, and lastly, these courts are overseeing the jurisdictional boundaries through 
safeguarding the vertical division and exercise of competences in the EU. Bearing in mind the 
institutional specificities of constitutional courts, these three roles represent the added value 
that these institutions bring to the legal integration in Europe and through which they should 
fulfil their potentially constructive corrective force. However, before discussing the three new 
roles and in which direction they should further be developed several issues are clarified related 
to the institutional features of constitutional courts and the history and evolution of their 
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relationship with the CJEU and EU law in order to recognize their potential added value in 
European integration.  
As specialized constitutional bodies with exclusive power to conduct constitutional review, 
constitutional courts are a relatively recent institutional phenomenon compared to the other 
central national institutions. They were introduced and established mainly as a consequence of 
the shortcomings of the traditional understanding of separation of powers, which culminated 
in the first half of the 20th century, resulting with a high tendency of abuse of power seriously 
compromising the rule of law. Based on their institutional purpose for remedying such 
shortcomings and their success in dealing with the frequent challenges related to this purpose 
they soon became a very popular institutional solution for safeguarding constitutionality and 
the rule of law in numerous countries. Some of the crucial reasons and factors for this diffusion 
of constitutional courts were related to their institutional adaptability and also their specific 
institutional features which enabled them to cope with frequent internal and external challenges 
to their status and authority. The internal challenges came mainly from the other national 
institutions who felt that their established positions were put under question with the 
functioning of the constitutional courts. However, it soon became clear that external challenges 
caused far more concerns for these institutions as they had to do with the core functions and 
powers of constitutional courts.  
Among the external challenges the supranationalisation of national legal orders through the 
process of legal integration in Europe rather quickly became the most serious one. In dealing 
with this challenge constitutional courts, regardless of the diversity of these institutions in 
different countries in several respects, have developed certain common threads in their attitude 
and stance towards EU law and the CJEU. Their approach to the development of EU law has 
been generally reactive and their acceptance of the special nature of EU law and its fundamental 
doctrines and principles has been conditional and always based upon a national legal basis. 
Additionally, constitutional courts have almost in all cases manifested reluctance of entering 
into a direct judicial dialogue and using the preliminary reference procedure mainly out of fear 
to jeopardize their position in relation to the CJEU. Such fears, often not so well-founded, have 
been strengthened with the overestimated impact of the Simmenthal II decision and its progeny 
on the alleged external decentralizing effects on constitutional review and the arguable 
development of the doctrine of displacement of constitutional courts by the CJEU through its 
case law. 
Employing the substantive approach in analyzing the relationship between constitutional courts 
and the CJEU there are three main areas which represent both meeting points and points of 
constitutional resistance and contention. Those are directly related to fundamental rights, 
division and exercise of competences in the EU and specific national constitutional provisions. 
It is precisely around these areas that constitutional courts have developed their new roles 
which could enable them to be a constructive player. Nevertheless, the explanation and 
justification of this place for constitutional courts does not seem to comply with the traditional 
theories and doctrines to which also constitutional courts frequently refer. 
276 
 
The weaknesses of the traditional theories and doctrines, such as monism and dualism, have 
proven them to be unsuitable to provide an accurate normative and descriptive account of the 
complex reality of legal integration in Europe. This has left large space for new theoretical 
frameworks to emerge. In this sense, constitutional pluralism as a theoretical framework which 
accommodates the competing claims for ultimate constitutional authority of both the EU and 
national legal orders represents the best alternative to the traditional theories. Accepting and 
embracing the existence of plurality of intersecting and overlapping constitutional orders in 
Europe, constitutional pluralism provides strong reasons for placing these orders in a 
heterarchical relationship requiring continuous accommodation and mutual respect among 
them. Taking into serious consideration this heterarchy, constitutional pluralism denies the 
existence of an ultimate legal rule or an exclusive right of a last say because there are no 
objective criteria to determine a single all-purpose authoritative legal answer. Applied to a 
specific institutional context of exercise of judicial power, in a broader sense, between the 
different legal orders in Europe, constitutional pluralism paves the path for new narratives and 
perceptions of constitutional courts’ place and role in European integration, above all, through 
providing normative justifications for new roles of constitutional courts which should serve the 
purpose of preventing irresolvable legal conflicts among the legal orders through instruments 
of mutual accommodation and respect. In any case, in order to have a constructive interplay 
between the legal orders and their respective institutions the main tenets of constitutional 
pluralism need to be abided by all of them, particularly constitutional courts and the CJEU. 
This is the main reason why the three new roles are analyzed through the prism of this theory 
under which specific guidelines are provided. 
The first new role of constitutional courts is stemming from their specific deliberative nature 
and has to do with the procedural dimension of providing constitutional legitimacy to EU law. 
This legitimacy is provided by constitutional courts through both indirect and direct judicial 
dialogue. The former, even though often underestimated, has proven to be rather instrumental 
in this regard and has been the main avenue through which constitutional courts have been 
anchoring EU law and providing instruments for its direct implementation in national legal 
orders. When it comes to direct judicial dialogue, whilst the circle of constitutional courts that 
have entered at least once into a direct judicial dialogue with the CJEU has broadened lately, 
still constitutional courts are rather reluctant towards entering into such a dialogue and remain 
to have a cautious attitude. The direct judicial dialogue provides them with a possibility to feed 
constitutional principles directly to the CJEU which would induce it to deliver better reasoned 
decisions that would take the views of constitutional courts into serious consideration. 
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons why constitutional courts should continue to have a 
cautious stance towards the direct judicial dialogue particularly in situations in which 
irresolvable legal conflicts are imminent. In both forms of judicial dialogue constitutional 
courts have a specific input compared to other national institutions since they are able to 
provide clarity by channeling the dialogue, send credible warning signals over serious 
constitutional inconsistencies involving EU law and, as a result of their particular institutional 
design, have a higher level of political sensibility and prudence compared to ordinary courts. 
The latter could be easily recognized even in cases in which constitutional courts are not part 
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of the judicial dialogue but have nevertheless taken over the task of safeguarding that ordinary 
courts abide by their constitutional and EU duty to send preliminary references to the CJEU.  
The second new role is of a substantive character. It was basically initiated by the introduction 
of the national identity clause in the Lisbon Treaty or more specifically its rediscovering. While 
there were many expectations over the scale of the impact of this clause, perhaps, its most 
important impact is related to the empowerment of constitutional courts to which it led. 
Namely, constitutional courts have taken the opportunity by linking this clause to the 
constitutional identity of the respective member states and developed their new role of 
protecting this identity in the EU. In this manner, the balance has slightly shifted in favor of 
constitutional courts which could be observed from two developments. Firstly, constitutional 
courts have utilized the constitutional identity to limit the absolute primacy of EU law, as 
proclaimed by the CJEU, by demarcating certain areas which are particularly sensitive to 
transfer and supranationalisation. Interestingly, through their case law on constitutional identity 
constitutional courts have tacitly embraced heterarchy and started departing from the traditional 
and anachronous doctrines which definitely needs to be furthered. Secondly, strengthening the 
limits of absolute primacy has encouraged constitutional courts to engage much more with EU 
law as well as to enter into direct judicial dialogue with the CJEU. The latter has intensified 
since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and with constitutional courts’ case law on 
constitutional identity which has given them much needed leverage. However, in order for 
constitutional courts to represent a genuine constructive force in the EU they need to abide by 
the general tenets of constitutional pluralism that, at the same time, needs to be mirrored with 
the much required accommodation and respect by the CJEU which is still lacking. 
The third new role of constitutional courts revolves around a multi-faceted jurisdictional issue 
over the review of the vertical division and exercise of competences in the EU. Reconfiguring 
the structure of the EU into a neo-federal paradigm, which couples the existing federal features 
of the EU with constitutional pluralism, provides a fertile ground for a strong case in favor of 
an external federal mandate of constitutional courts. Understood in this way, neo-federalism 
essentially disputes the existence of an outright supremacy of EU law and judicial supremacy 
of the CJEU which are common features within the context of federal states. Following this 
line of reasoning, this mandate of constitutional courts is exercised through the ultra vires 
review not only of EU acts, but also CJEU decisions. The main reasons behind the justification 
of the ultra vires review are rooted in the serious doubts over the effectiveness of both the 
political and judicial safeguards on the division and exercise of competences in the EU. The 
EWM has been basically toothless and the CJEU has continued to exercise a light-touch review 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. However, the way ultra vires review has been designed so 
far, above all by the FCC, demonstrates an obvious need for it to be recalibrated so it could 
prevent unwarranted centralization of powers while not unnecessarily jeopardizing the unity 
and coherence of EU law. Namely, both the procedural and substantive requirements behind 
the ultra vires review need to be adjusted but in a way that will preserve the credibility of this 
type of review. This is especially true when it comes to including the link between the conferral 
of powers and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that would cover the 
competence creep that occurs through a longer period of time.  
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Taking into consideration the arguments presented, this dissertation does not have the ambition 
to answer all the open questions regarding the relationship between constitutional courts and 
the CJEU and EU law. By employing an interdisciplinary approach linking different theories 
and notions it offers a new perspective and provides guidelines and suggestions for approaching 
the current and future challenges in this relationship, thus trying to pave a novel academic 
avenue to be further explored. In this sense, the dissertation attempts to mark the beginning of 
a new cycle of research and debate on this topic following the further development of the case 
law of both constitutional courts and the CJEU.
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